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The sequence of belief


The Sequence of Belief

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
A Collection of Religious Thoughts
FROM HINDU TO BUDDHISM

By LALAH KUMAR

Published by the Author



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THE SEQUENCE OF BELIEF

A Consideration of Religious Thought
FROM HOMER TO OCKHAM

by Edward Motley [✓]Pickman

St Martin's Press, New York

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THIS BOOK has not been undertaken in order to demonstrate any thesis, nor, I think, does it in fact demonstrate any. Its purpose is primarily to relieve some of my own curiosity and, incidentally of course, to help relieve that of others.

Probably the most enduring historical problem is the extent to which man's beliefs originate from within or above, rather than from without or below—that is, from inspiration rather than from environment. Although this problem is here often incidentally raised, no attempt is made to resolve it. The main effort has been to expound not the cause so much as the special character of successive beliefs.

This requires both depth and length; in order to give them both free play, width has had to be sacrificed. And as the depth increases as we proceed, the width inevitably decreases. Thus our story begins with little depth but much width and, as the depth increases, the width narrows: from the whole Mediterranean, to its western half, to the Frankish empire, to France, and finally to the University of Paris. Logically it should proceed thence to the individual, where alone the greatest depth lies. But here the historian, never unmindful of either width or length, hesitates to become too deeply involved. For he can never get either space or time quite out of his mind.

It happens that during most of the period here under consideration Christian and even Catholic belief was the dominant one. But this does not mean that the approach is essentially theological. Today, for instance, racial, political, economic, and strictly moral and scientific beliefs are as historically significant as the theological; and some of them may overshadow it. The responsi-

bility assumed by the historian is to weigh and pass judgment on the relative significance of these various beliefs without fear or favor.

This survey covers a period of twenty-five hundred years and, perhaps because the plot seems to thicken as the centuries pass, the later periods invite ever closer attention. Thus, although for Book I and the earlier parts of Book II original sources have been most heavily relied on, the treatment, alas, is relatively superficial and even unreliable, for the bulk of modern erudition has in almost every case had to be eschewed. These chapters, indeed, have been inserted in order to refresh the reader's—and also the author's—recollection rather than to furnish any original, or even presentably sound, instruction.

*The chapter in Book II on Augustine and the chapter in Book III on the Reaction against Augustine cover ground already included in an earlier volume of mine called *The Mind of Latin Christendom*, 373–496 (Oxford University Press, 1937). For this reason the coverage here is, I fear, too condensed. Only with the chapter in Book III on Caesarius of Arles does the work attain its full dimension. The original sources for a time continue to serve as the basis but, as the Middle Ages loom, modern works have had to be more and more exclusively relied on.*

EDWARD MOTLEY PICKMAN

October 1957

EDITOR'S NOTE

THIS BOOK was accepted for publication by St Martin's Press before the author's death, but it was not then quite ready to print. It has been my care to correct the inevitable small obscurities, inaccuracies and repetitions that take so much rereading and so much conscientious anxiety when the author is not there to co-operate.

I could not have undertaken this work without the scholarly and judicious help of Jeremy Adams. It was his intelligent understanding of the text which enabled us to make the necessary corrections without changing the author's meaning.

John Bridges White must be thanked for completing the chronological lists (the names before A.D. 1250 are all of his compiling) and Margaret Linforth Harrison and Isabel Garvey for their excellent proofreading.

My deep gratitude is also due to those who read the manuscript and advised publication although they are in no way responsible for the author's views or the many problems of scholarship represented by a volume of this scope. The names of these good friends are William Alfred, Myron Gilmore, Mason Hammond, Robert Lowell, Perry Miller, Paul Weiss, and Hugh Whitney.

HESTER PICKMAN

B O O K I

The Mediterranean Before Christ

GREEK BELIEFS

1. HOMERIC

THE GREEK COSMOLOGY as depicted in the Homeric poems was based on impersonal law rather than personal will. This law may best be called Fate or Necessity although it did not exclude Chance or Fortune.

What might be called the fundamental laws were the regularly recurrent phenomena. To be sure, their causes or effects were given names, such as Sun, Earth, Night, Dawn, Sleep, and even Discord, and were referred to as living beings; but only exceptionally do their personalities emerge, as where Hyperion, the Sun, warns that, if Zeus will not heed his complaint, he will sink to Hades and shine among the dead. Fore-known, but nonetheless always respected by the gods, was Death, who decreed not only the inevitability of each man's end, but also the moment of it.

This routine of Fate or Nature, however, was from time to time interrupted by variations, usually unpleasant, such as earthquakes, plagues, thunderbolts, storms, droughts, and floods. These, because spasmodic and unpredictable, seemed the result of personalized, if still divine, will.

Among these gods Zeus claimed sovereignty, but Poseidon thus challenged his claim:

Shame on him! Strong as he may be what he says is surely overbold. He would control me by force and against my will! Yet I am his equal! Three brothers we are whom Rhea bore to Kronos. Zeus and I, and the third one Hades Lord of those below. All was divided in three with a share of power to each. When we cast lots I

got the grey sea to live in forever and Hades the hazy dark and to Zeus fell the sky spread wide in air and clouds, but the earth belonged to us all and lofty Olympus. Nor need Zeus mind where I walk; let him stay quietly in his own third, strong though he be—let him not threaten me with his fist as though I were wholly a coward. (*Iliad*, XV, 185–199.)

In partial confirmation of Poseidon's claim was the status of the underworld, ruled by Hades. Here, clearly, the authority of Zeus did not prevail, because when, impelled by Discord, the gods fell out,

Hades, Lord of the Underworld, was frightened and leapt from his throne and shouted to stop Poseidon the Shaker of Land from splitting the ground above him, laying his dwellings bare to mortals and deathless alike—the mouldy and terrible dwellings the gods loathe. (*Iliad*, XX, 59–65.)

Moreover, in order to make his oath as binding as he knew how, Achilles thus prayed:

Zeus be my witness first! Highest and best of gods! And the earth and the Furies beneath the earth who take vengeance on all men, on whoever swears falsely. (*Iliad*, XIX, 259–260.)

Evidently Zeus could neither prolong men's lives nor, after their deaths, reward or punish them. He was the god of life, goodness and light, and therefore not of death, evil, or darkness.

The sea, which Poseidon ruled, was, to a seafaring people, almost as terrifying as the underworld because over it always hung the threat of an unavoidable and ignominious death. In battle a man had a chance to fight for his life, and the likelihood of honorable funeral rites if he lost it. If he died at sea, it would too often not be known how courageously, or even whether, he had died. This was a leading theme of the *Odyssey*. Poseidon was therefore the great rebel among the gods, to whom even Zeus must at times defer.

Thus it was to Poseidon that the Cyclops, Polyphemus, prayed in his agony, crying, "If I am truly your child, Poseidon, and you acknowledge me, keep Odysseus the destroyer away from his home"; that same Polyphemus who, shortly before, had boasted to Odysseus that:

The Cyclops think nothing of Zeus and his aegis, or of any blessed ones, for we are much stronger; nor would I ever against my own

will and just to avoid the anger of Zeus, think of sparing either you or your men. (*Odyssey*, IX, 276-278.)

On a later occasion, when Poseidon complained that he had been unjustly dealt with, Zeus was at pains to mollify him:

What are you saying now? You, Poseidon, who rule the world and make it tremble. The gods are innocent of all irreverence towards you. Indeed it would be an abominable thing for them to scoff at the eldest and best of their company. As for mankind, if anyone thinks himself powerful enough to slight you, you have all the future in which to take your revenge. You are free to please yourself; act as you see fit. (*Odyssey*, XIII, 139-145.)

Zeus, however, for all that Poseidon alleged, was ruler not only of the sky but also of the earth, and so of men so long as they lived on earth. Nonetheless, his position was not too secure, for should he not faithfully obey Fate he might go the way of his father Kronos, who was now imprisoned "beneath earth and unvintaged sea."

As representative of Fate he held the scales of destiny and, as they tipped, he read, and thereupon executed, its decrees. In this way he acquired foreknowledge of general events, as of the Trojan War. And it was his task to prevent the lesser gods from effecting any serious deviations.

In return he was granted, as Achilles said to Priam, a mysterious power over the earthly destinies of individual men:

So have the gods spun out men's wretched fate that though they have no cares he lives in pain. Two jars stand on the floor by Zeus filled with the gifts he gives us. One jar for the evil and one for the good. To whom Zeus, who delights in thunder, deals a mingled lot, that man may chance now upon evil ways and now upon good. But Zeus brings only shame and misery to him whose lot is from the evil jar alone. (*Iliad*, XXIV, 525-530.)

In drawing from these jars was Zeus blindfolded or did he voluntarily choose? Doubtless no mortal, not even Achilles, knew; in either case the process gave Zeus foreknowledge of the 'luck of lucklessness' which Fate had decreed for each, but also, in return, the duty to see to it that, however men or lesser gods might try to thwart this Fate, all should happen as predestined.

Of the lesser gods who served the greater, the Olympians under Zeus were of chief concern to man. They were the per-

sonifications not of Nature's but of man's idiosyncrasies and were correspondingly exasperating, for, in contrast also to Zeus, they had little sense of justice and less of impartiality, and their favorite occupation was to disobey Zeus when he was looking the other way. The root of the trouble was that by copulating with mortals they produced mortal children whom they naturally tried to favor. Since many of these gods were in their turn Zeus' children, they could count on his readiness to forgive their escapades. Zeus, therefore, had hardly a moment's peace: he had to try, first to forestall their mischief and second, if he could not, to repair it, in order that Fate, as well as he, might not be successfully defied.

If these meddlesome gods were too often a trouble to mortals, they were, equally often, a convenience: for men could plausibly blame them in cases where they must otherwise blame themselves. If cowardly, angry, amorous, covetous, or cruel, they could believe, or at any rate allege, that some god had made them so. Whereas if they did something to be proud of, they, if less plausibly, took the credit for themselves. Rarely if ever did a victor suggest that a god had helped him, by imbuing either him with courage or his victim with fear.

Every man was constantly praying and offering sacrifices to these gods, currying favor by every ingenious argument and promise. If for justice, his prayer would be to Zeus, as to repair or revenge a wrong; but if for mercy—which too often took the form of a request for an unjust favor at another's expense—then his prayer would be to that one of the lesser gods whose wishes most nearly coincided with his own. The hope of its effectiveness lay in the fact that these gods could not, or at any rate would not, act unless beseeched.

That for this life, at least, Zeus would deal as justly with men as Fate would allow, seemed clear. His rewards, as to Odysseus, and his punishments were long delayed but never-failing. And he demanded of men no more than decency and moderation. The issue of free will was not clarified, for some thought Zeus dispensed his rewards regardless of merits, whereas others claimed that for misfortunes men had only themselves to blame. Yet, up to a certain point virtue brought its own reward.

This justice of Zeus was not without all mercy or compassion, nor without a readiness to forgive. Perhaps Zeus did not love men, but he did understand and sympathize with them in so far as his Fateful office allowed. So, at least, thought old Phoenix:

Master your great temper now, Achilles! Your heart must not be cruel! Even the gods can yield, they who yet surpass you in courage, fame and strength. When man has done wrong he can, as suppliant, with incense and pious vows, libations and savory sacrifice beguile the gods into forgiveness. Prayers of repentance are the daughters of great Zeus, wrinkled and halting and with eyes askance they must follow carefully in the steps of sin. But Evil is swift and strong and far outstrips them. All over the earth she runs before them to strike men down, and prayers come afterwards to heal the harm.

He who stands in awe of these daughters of Zeus whenever they draw near is greatly blessed by them and his petitions are granted. But if anyone spurn and stubbornly disown them they will turn to Zeus the son of Kronos and pray that Evil may follow that man, and strike him down and force him to full payment. (*Iliad*, IX, 496-512.)

In the afterlife, too, the Furies, as we have seen, "take vengeance upon men," but the rewards for the good were feeble and few. Ino was allowed to become a sea goddess, Menelaus was promised an abode on the Elysian plain, Orion was given leave to live content in Hades. But the misery awaiting most of the rest was only to be alleviated by the ghostliness of their being—as mere shadows of their once vigorous selves.

2. ARCHAIC

In Homeric times Zeus was envisaged as the agent authorized to see that the decrees of Fate were properly executed. In the so-called Archaic Age, which followed the Homeric and ended with Socrates, Zeus came to be more nearly identified with Fate itself, at least as far as the destinies of men were concerned. The lesser gods were assigned correspondingly more dignified and responsible roles.

For a time this new role seems rather to have aggravated the sensitiveness of the gods to any slight by man. A government rather of wills than of natural law, the gods, intoxicated

by their new powers, became egotistical, revengeful, and even bullying. Not only were they quick to punish perjury and the profanation or neglect of their altars, they also resented any human manifestation of pride or even self-esteem. The offense of tempting God was not yet to leave to God a task which man was quite capable of performing himself but rather to try to usurp a power clearly reserved to divinity!

The offense might or might not be identifiable; the punishment was only too apparent—disease, sterility, drought—which may indeed have led to the saying, “whom the Gods would destroy they first make mad.” The rewards were no less apparent—health, fertility, prosperity, the happy life. Demeter bestowed fertility, and it was she who was chiefly worshipped in the Eleusinian mysteries. If she furnished the abundant crops, it was Dionysos who furnished the wine—the happiness of the orgy of self-forgetfulness, to which Orpheus was later to bring the music for the dance. Even old Hades, the crotchety underworld brother of Zeus, must be thanked for furnishing the riches embedded in the earth—soil for the crops and vines, riches for men, minerals for use, and precious stones for display.

Apollo, too, played his part. He was generally regarded as the special benefactor of mankind, for although he caused he also cured sickness and, by means of his Delphic oracles, was willing to reveal to man what had offended, what could best appease, the gods, and what to avoid in the future. Apollo was virtually the vicar on earth of Zeus, his averter of temporal evil.

As man, experiencing the penalties suffered by the headstrong, became more thoughtful, the gods, too, became more considerate. For, in becoming aware of the folly of striving only to win glory during life and a posthumous fame, and in perceiving instead the value of justice, man recognized that the gods had long before perceived this, too.

The first step would then naturally be the fuller realization of a contractual relation whereby if men were just to other men as well as to the gods, the gods were bound in equity to reciprocate. The ritual therefore developed accordingly. First man must assure himself that he comes before the god with clean hands, that is, by abstinences, by expressions

of regret for any sin he may have committed, and finally by participation in the ritual of prayer and worship as a public manifestation of his submission. The god thus invoked was then bound in honor to forgive him and so to carry out his part of the bargain: to deal with him justly.

How much this procedure was regarded as a mere psychological appeal, how much as a magical or physiological pressure obliging the god to reciprocate, is hard to say. This latter belief is now called sympathetic magic or theurgy. It amounted to tempting God because it substituted a human for a divine interpretation of justice in the specific case.

Was this belief in the divine justice corroborated by experience? So long as men regarded their community as a single moral entity—Greek or Trojan—there was small reason to doubt: if the Greeks won, their merits and the sins of the Trojans could easily be identified; if the Greeks lost, their own sins could seem enough to explain the disaster.

Nevertheless it was only natural that the justice dealt out to them seemed, on the whole, a good deal less than their behavior warranted. It was a temptation for them to believe, therefore, that they were still paying a penalty for certain unexpiated sins of their ancestors. This belief in original sin seems to have been at the basis of the cult of Dionysos, for its myth is the murder of that god by the Titans, from whom mankind is descended, heirs to the curse laid on the Titans which men could expiate only by soliciting the pardon of the now resurrected victim. For Dionysos played many roles, as god of wine and forgetfulness, as god of freedom, as virtual savior because he was in a position, and inclined, to wipe out the curse of as many as besought him to do so.

The family had always been the most fundamental unit, and as community responsibility became less convincing, inherited sin was naturally attributed rather to a man's more immediate ancestors. But this only made the operations of temporal justice the less likely, partly because some parents had a good reputation but evil progeny, or vice versa, and partly because some of the children were good and others bad.

Finally a time came when the father's authority weakened, and individual responsibility could no longer be convincingly denied. Vicarious justice, whether applied to the living

community, to the common or to the specific ancestors, no longer seemed to *be* justice. Yet according to this new sense of individual responsibility, temporal justice appeared to be even less consistently operative than before. If Zeus or any other god or gods were the masters of men's fate, they must be unjust unless, perhaps, in the Hades of afterlife these temporal injustices were somehow rectified.

This afterlife in Hades had already been described in the *Odyssey*, a revolting picture of lament and misery to which all men, irrespective of merit, were doomed. A more consoling belief was also familiar, namely, that the afterlife was a shadowy replica of the mortal life, in which Patroclus would have his horses as a consolation. But no one looked forward to this afterlife as more desirable than the present one.

With the rise of the later cults, however, the idea of future rewards and punishments became familiar, and this was doubtless due to the realization that the new social ideal of justice was only very inadequately attainable in this life. The Eleusinian cult of Demeter involved a double initiation. It is possible that the first aimed merely to promote temporal justice, and that the second—a still unsolved mystery even today—evolved later, in order to further eternal justice. And it may be, too, that the cults of Dionysos and later of Orpheus followed a similar course: as Dionysos saved men from the temporal curse, so Orpheus, his prophet, revealed that Dionysos also saved men from the curse of an eternal damnation.

Meanwhile a new conception of man's soul becomes apparent, perhaps a Northern importation. As the psyche of Homer came to be more and more conceived of as an integral part of man and therefore dying with, rather than departing from, the moribund body, the way was opened for the new belief that man's soul also contained a divine element which for this reason did depart from and survive the body. It was a latent survival of innate divinity, almost, but not quite, smothered by the grossness of the material body, which was now referred to as the tomb of this soul.

Why was it that these particles of divinity ever left the serene life of the immortals above? Since justice, and not the blind Fate or Nature of Homer, was now believed to prevail,

it could only be that the lot of men, some chancing "now upon ill and now again on good," others chancing only on the "bad kind," had been just and therefore a punishment for sin. The fullest description we have is that of Empedocles:

There is an oracle of Necessity, an ancient ordinance of the gods, eternal and sealed by fast and broad oaths, that whenever one of the daemons, whose portion is length of days, has sinfully polluted his hands with blood, he must wander thrice ten thousand seasons from the abode of the blessed, being born throughout the time in all manners of mortal forms, changing one toilsome path of life for another. . . . One of these I now am, an exile and a wanderer from the gods, for that I put my trust in insensate strife. (Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 222.)

And he adds:

From what honor, from what a height of bliss have I fallen to go about among mortals here on earth. (*Ibid.*, 223.)

Nevertheless, for such as he there is an escape, for:

At the last they appear among mortal men as prophets, song-writers, physicians, and princes; and thence they rise up as gods exalted in honor, sharing the hearth of the other gods and the same table, free from human woes, safe from destiny, and incapable of hurt. (*Ibid.*, 226.)

Empedocles apparently attributed this divine origin to only a chosen few besides himself, but it was soon after attributed to all men.

This became a central doctrine of both the Orphic and the Pythagorean cults, with both of which Empedocles was closely associated, though there were certainly more divergences than can be detected from the fragmentary sources. One of these divergences was as to whether all or only a few chosen men possessed this soul. The Pythagoreans extended this doubtful privilege to most living things, including not only animals but certain vegetables. These, therefore, they would not eat. In either case, however, their souls had been incarnated as a punishment; therefore the way to escape from this so-called "wheel of birth" or successive reincarnations was by trying to live independently of matter, as they would if in heaven. This matter thus came to be regarded not only as the consequence of past sins but also as the cause of their present ones—the prison was blamed for the crime.

Extreme asceticism, then, replaced the faith in a ritual magic, and the sense of one's own essential divinity even led to that cultivation or nurture of the soul which was soon after to be stressed by Socrates. Incidentally, too, the idea of a Fall in knowledge as well as in behavior naturally appealed to the scientifically inclined: the body not only corrupted the heart but blinded the mind. Escape from the wheel of birth was to be achieved not only by behaving but also by thinking as the gods did. The techniques required in order to escape the miseries of the temporal life reveal a resemblance to the later Christian purgatory, not only because the "penance" is for personal guilt, but also because the duration of the sentence chiefly depended on the personal efforts of the penitent himself.

The religion of the Archaic Age, and particularly the specific cults of Demeter, Dionysos, and Apollo, can be traced back to the seventh century B.C.; and although there are indications of foreign influences and even origins, they were, as we know them, already firmly rooted in the Greek peninsula. The scientific development, on the other hand, cannot be traced before the sixth century and for a time it was active only in Asia Minor and, soon after, in southern Italy at Croton and Elea and at Akragas in Sicily. Not until the middle of the fifth century—only a generation before Socrates—did it penetrate Greece proper. For Anaxagoras of Lydia was the first scientist to reside in Athens, and his only reward there was to have his views condemned.

As the study of religion was of the invisible or supersensuous, so that of science was of the visible or sensuous. What was this stuff which man can see, hear, taste, smell, and touch? First it was identified with water, or air, or fire, then earth was added. To these in turn were added Nous or Mind, Strife, and Love, as the active agencies. From these simpler notions they advanced to the suppositions, first, that it was composed of the seeds of everything, and later that it was all composed of one thing: ever-active atoms.

The next problem was the phenomenon of this motion and change. There was nothing supersensuous about it but a great deal that was unintelligible. Some thought that this visible

universe was not only alive but self-sufficient, others supposed that its life depended on inhaling the boundless air outside of it. This was already the famous world soul or macrocosm, inferred from the breathing of the human microcosm. Thus, as in the concepts of the gods, man was, from the first, though in a different sense, the measure of all things. By this or other natural means the opposites latent in the world were roused to activity: the One and the Many, and especially those already identifiable in man: hot and cold, dry and moist, love and hate—the latter being also called good and evil, or the cheerful and sad.

Yet obviously some sort of equilibrium between these opposing forces must exist or there could be no element of permanence. The universe was therefore supposed to be either a natural harmony of opposites, as in music and mathematics, or else, like a pendulum, self-regulating. More specifically this might be alternating contraction and rarefaction or, more usually, in the proportions of the ingredients or elements of fire, air, water, and earth and so of hot and cold, dry and moist. The opposite, in a word, produced both tensions and harmonies, a constant state of war in which neither side ever triumphed.

The most highly articulated explanation was that of Empedocles. He imagined a cycle divided into four stages: first a chemical compound of unlikes by the power of love, second their gradual separation by the power of strife, third the complete separation of unlikes and so concentration of likes, and fourth the gradual recompounding of unlikes as love challenges strife again. As a pessimist he believed that his world was going through the second age, a philosophy of history reminiscent of much more recent vintage. That this cycle was presumably based on the astronomical Great Year as we know of it from Heraclitus and the Stoics, is no reason for our regarding the theory with condescension. If our idea is nearer to that of the earlier Anaximander—that ours is merely one of many worlds each in a different stage of coming into and passing out of being—Empedocles was rather a mild than a radical pessimist.

Only Parmenides of Elea denied motion and change, declaring it a mere illusion of the senses because our world—the

only world—was “plenum,” thus offering no room for motion.

Parmenides raised some hard questions. It was agreed by all that substance was eternal because uncreated and indestructible, but whereas others had said that it also moved, he alleged that it can be eternal only if it does not move. He also asserted that our world was a finite sphere and, in contrast to Anaximander and others, that there were no other worlds. What, then, was outside of it? Nothing, he asserted, not even a void, because a nothing is not thinkable.

Now it was at first agreed that the void did not exist, that everywhere there was at least the limitless breath or air beyond. The theory of Anaximenes that motion consisted of condensation and rarefaction suggested degrees of emptiness, and Pythagoras implied that the inhaled air served to keep the units within separate from each other. To be sure, it was argued that motion was nonetheless possible within a plenum—as of earth within water—but it was not until the atomists (Leucippus was barely older than Socrates) that the existence of a void was plausibly asserted. If there were a void, motion was easily explained and infinity of space more “thinkable.”

One has to be a philosopher to appreciate the importance of the problem of whether reality is a One or a Many. Parmenides had said that the world was not only the only world but was also a motionless plenum and therefore itself a One, thereby contradicting Heraclitus who had said that motion was the result of a tension between the One and the Many, and Empedocles' later variation of a tension between likes and unlikes.

Anaxagoras had prepared the way for atomism by supposing that substance, while containing every variety or seed, was nonetheless infinitely divisible. Zeno, however, had argued that if an infinitely divisible body has magnitude it cannot move within a finite time, and, as a result, the atomists prudently declared their atoms to be indivisible—which also overcame the difficulty raised by Melissos that there cannot be a Many unless there is also a One.

Thus we get a glimpse of the origins of mathematics and logic and thereby of Plato and Aristotle, and further, through these, of the remoter origins of medieval and even modern scholasticism.

It was generally agreed that the present cosmos had had an original becoming, that is, an evolution from a once shapeless and disordered mass. Whether by means of an outer breath or the innate activity of substance which was attributed to atoms, energy was generated; and this energy roused the opposites to draw the shapeless mass into one or more vortices, as of water or air, whereby the heavier elements were sucked towards the centre, and the lighter ones forced towards the periphery. Only Anaximander, however, supposed that this evolution would continue into the indefinite future. The variously conceived tensions, harmonies, and attunements having taken hold, the process had, by now, become stabilized. Instead of the substantially straight line of indefinite change, whether for better or worse, cycles had formed, either short or long, within which no innovations but only repetitions were henceforth possible. Anaximander did envisage real future evolution; but the others seem, at least by indirection, to have disagreed.

The most obvious vortices were the smaller ones like the sun, moon, earth or other planets, and the larger one of our visible world, with the heavy earth at the centre and the sphere of fixed stars on the periphery. The earth was variously imagined to be a disc, a tambourine, or, more usually, a sphere. Some thought it motionless, others attributed to it a rotary motion, but only in the sense that it rotated with the rest of the cosmos, as the sluggish centre of the cosmic vortex. That the earth not only rotated but, like the planets, revolved in an orbit was a theory which Aristotle later attributed to the Pythagoreans, but there is evidence that this was not the view of any of the Pythagoreans during this period or of anyone else.

It was generally supposed that the fixed stars marked the outer rim of the cosmos, which completed a full circle every twenty-four hours. Only the perspicacious Anaximander had declared that space was unlimited, that the stars, like the planets, were at varying distances from the earth, and that they made no diurnal revolution around it. Their apparent diurnal motion was, he thought, caused by the earth's diurnal rotation. Evidently, then, he identified the earth's rotation with a local vortex, but did not recognize the stars as on the periph-

ery of any cosmic vortex. The stars were not fire because light substances, but perhaps were other worlds with vortices of their own. A generation later Pythagoras, ignoring the vortex theory, also believed that the planets' motions were independent. In other words, neither of them imagined the planets' motions as retarded because nearer than the stars to the sluggish centre of the vortex, but instead attributed to each of them an independent motion of its own.

How was it that all these bodies kept their relative positions or orbits? Some said by the encompassing air, but the more usual view presupposed an equilibrium of some sort. The later Pythagoreans alone were more specific: they imagined that each body emitted a certain musical note according to its particular velocity and relative position, and that the harmonies thereby produced created a mutual stability which none could violate. This belief was not far from the later one of Kepler.

Except in southern Italy among the Pythagoreans and their heretic Empedocles, there seems to have been little contact between religious and scientific beliefs. To the scientists the traditional gods played no important role; Xenophanes actually denied their existence, the others merely ignored them. Nature, even Fate, ruled unchallenged.

And as by these scientists the gods were ignored, so to some extent was man, for he too, except as a scientific specimen, was relatively slighted. The bold Anaximander supposed that the human species had originated among the fish, and that its survival depended on how effectively it could adapt itself to its environment. Others explained the cause of a man's death more concretely as the failure of the circles in the human head to complete their orbits as did the planet of the macrocosm, or because his attunement of opposites got out of order, or because the elements forming his mixture lost the power of regaining their balance. Anaxagoras explained evil merely by attributing the pain caused by sensation to the inevitable clash of opposites. The idea of guilt or sin was quite absent.

To be sure, Anaximander had declared that the clash of opposites was unjust, and Heraclitus had countered that, on the contrary, it was just, because it resulted in an attunement;

but neither view was, or was intended to be, of any consolation to the human victim. What, indeed, "is man, that thou art mindful of him?"

Many of these scientists, particularly Anaxagoras, had regarded the body as the tomb of the soul, but it was the Pythagoreans who first suggested how the imprisoned soul might ultimately extricate itself. To be sure, this soul was still undifferentiated from nature: to Anaxagoras it was merely a particle of the corporeal element *Nous*, which was the source of energy or life in general, and the Pythagoreans merely elaborated this notion by splitting the *Nous* into mortal and immortal halves. The one died with the body; the other survived, to enter a succession of other bodies until finally it escaped, as Empedocles said, to the peace of heaven.

Only here did the religious or at least moral element enter, and it was rather nature than any gods who engineered this salvation: for it was by nature that the imperfect souls became incarnated, by nature too that a purified or perfected soul disentangled itself to rise again. It was man, to be sure, who effected this purification, whether by ritual, magic, ascetic taboo, or a cultivation or nurture of the soul by moral and intellectual effort. But the effort was, in however feeble a degree, shared by all living things. It was a natural rather than a human effort, with no line between divine Fate and human will yet envisaged.

3. PLATO

a. Mechanics of Knowledge

Plato, like any other philosopher or seeker after knowledge, had to start with certain premises. In order to qualify as such they must first of all be rational; second, they must be such that everybody present, or of consequence, is willing to accept them. Third, they must offer the greatest practicable certainty, must surpass mere opinion or belief, must at least be approximations or, better still, "true judgments." In order to illustrate their shortcomings he contrasts the autobiographer and the historian; the former trusts his own memory, the latter is obliged to weigh not only the autobiographer's memory but also his veracity, just as the judge must weigh the testi-

mony of an alleged eyewitness. The scientist is in the same kind of situation: he too must judge of the credibility of the eyewitness of events whether in India, the sickroom, or the foundry. Only the mathematician is more favorably situated because he can observe all the phenomena for himself. This was one reason why Plato had such a liking for figures. Nevertheless, even here, proofs were not always forthcoming: for every problem which the Pythagoreans could solve they laid bare a new problem which they could not. For instance, how a line could be made up of points, or how to relate $\sqrt{3}$ to $\sqrt{4}$.

Plato, therefore, in the spirit of Socrates, declared that it was quite as important to be suspicious of premises as it was unavoidable to use them if in pursuit of even tentative conclusions.

The method which he recommended for the testing of any premise he called "dialectic"—he especially recommended it to these Pythagoreans who were finding themselves bogged down by their own ingenuity. We shall speak of this again later. Among the various suggestions he offered was one of semantics or the analysis of ambiguous words and phrases. For instance, he refuted Parmenides' logic that since A is Being and B is not A, B is non-Being, by showing that although the word "is" signifies sameness, the words "is not" may signify *some* just as well as *utter* difference.

Another method of checking premises was based rather on close observation than on reason: for it seeks to make distinctions more precise by relating the wider, to its particular, category by means of subdivisions. A good example is Plato's process of definition by following a chain of categories: thus, a sophist is one who distorts the truth by practicing in rhetoric the:

"Contradictious
dissembling
without knowledge
human and not divine
juggling with words
phantastic or unreal
art of likeness-making."

Jowett's introduction to *Sophist*
(vol. III, p. 473)

Thus, in seeking to define sophistry with precision, our observation obliges us to choose, at each step, the more undesirable alternative. This is comedy, to be sure, but only that the stroke may cut the deeper.

A further kind of analysis may be applied to the compatibility or incompatibility of the characteristics of things. Just as a certain succession of notes of a musical scale produces a melody whereas others do not, so a certain succession of alphabetical letters produces intelligible words, whereas others do not. In the same way in philosophy only certain characteristics are compatible. Motion is compatible with Being, but not with Rest.

Beyond the specific method of establishing premises and of constantly trying to improve them by dialectic, Plato had further to inquire into what knowledge itself was. The sensuous world was obviously a source of knowledge yet was of itself purely ephemeral. In order to acquire a knowledge of reality we must proceed from this ephemeral to the permanent element behind. And to the why and how as well as to the what. This meant that in order to know, man must think as well as observe.

Now it was true that some kinds of knowledge as of mathematics, were primarily cognitive (or, as Aristotle was to call them, theoretical), whereas others, like statesmanship were, because to be acquired chiefly by experience, practical. The cognitive concerned the abstract or physical, the practical rather the psychological. But in either case experience plus effort was vital, and man must become so thoroughly possessed by the subject matter—whether it be a mathematical formula or human behavior—that he can deal with it and infer from it virtually by instinct. Thus a physician must know, not only what and how much medicine to prescribe, but to whom and when. Like the mathematician with his formula or the statesman with his projected legislation, he can best achieve his end by relying on his hunch, as the product of his experience and thought.

A great deal was later made of passages in Plato which seemed to say that some of the knowledge acquired by the soul in a pre-existence subsisted in the reincarnation, and that, although at first latent, it could be recalled under the

stimulus of sensuous experience and reason. In the *Meno* Socrates demonstrates how, by asking an ignorant youth the right leading questions, this youth can discover that the area of a square described on the diagonal of one previously described is double the area of the original figure. The experiment, however, seems simply to show that certain kinds of knowledge can be acquired by reason alone, without the help of sensuous experience. It does not indicate that Socrates or Plato thought that this knowledge remained innate in the soul after rebirth; it shows rather that, although this knowledge may originally have been innate, it had been obscured before the rebirth and could only be recovered to the extent that reason, and usually experience too, could do so as the result of slow and unremitting effort. An analogous instance is given in the *Phaedo*, where the sight of a portrait starts a train of thought leading to one's recollection of a friend one had long forgotten. The experience was a goad to thought, and thought in turn a goad to memory.

b. The Good

Whether living things are aware of it or not, their desire is always and exclusively to attain the good. That they should so desire is an indication of their origin. Beasts also desire to attain the good, but they not only seek inferior goods, such as food, but are satisfied with them. Men, on the other hand, are not. For until they become aware of the supreme Good they remain dissatisfied. Since it is not knowledge that is innate but only the desire to recapture it, the teacher's duty is to show his pupil how to direct that desire, lest, like the beasts, he misdirect it. The later "sufficient grace" of the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales (p. 482) resembles this innate desire, though that teaching was of how to believe rather than of how to think.

In any case the gift was not of attainment, or even specifically of the will or power needed to attain it, but rather of the realization that one had not attained it and had not even been trying to do so. Fortunately for man, however, it was at least partially attainable, only he must do his utmost to find out how. No doubt some did not sufficiently feel this desire,

but such were the times, apparently, that Socrates' and Plato's worry was rather that so many, in their eagerness, fell prey to some misguided or even unscrupulous Sophist, who set about it to persuade these eager ones that, for a fee, he could teach them how to satisfy their desire. Instead, of course, he sought rather to persuade them—because in this way he could collect more fees—that there was no higher good than popularity, power, or fame. The task which Socrates and Plato undertook, therefore, was to show that the greater one's knowledge of the truth, the more obvious the real good becomes and the easier it will therefore be to approach it. As the true objective becomes clearer even false signposts cannot long mislead. For recognition, conviction, activate the will power almost automatically.

Both Socrates and Plato had much to say about the nature of this virtue of recognition if and when found. In the perfect structure and motions of the heavenly bodies Plato best saw how the Many was resolvable into the One. Possession was therefore either of every virtue or of none, which is precisely what the Christians were to say of efficient or saving grace. He who really possesses it manifests it invariably, under any and all circumstances.

Plato alleged further that virtue was not only a One but an Absolute, outside of time or place. It was not even, as the more honest Sophists alleged, what we are taught by parents, or have learned in society, or even what we may have worked out for ourselves. For it is far beyond our present understanding. The best we can hope for is that by dint of unremitting effort we can become gradually less ignorant of it. Good teachers and good company lend us aid, but the task is our own, and it is only our own conscience, fortified by our own thinking, which will not betray us.

Civil laws can hardly do more than codify prevailing, conventional, traditional, and respectable understanding. We can and must uphold them so long as we choose to live under them, but this should not deter us from holding to, and expressing, our personal convictions regarding their defects. Virtue requires that we as individuals should 'turn the other cheek,' but as citizens we must punish even virtuous persons if they are manifestly dangerous to the state.

A still debatable distinction is here made between the personal virtue of a hedonist or atheist, and his disastrous influence on others. His behavior may serve to promote Nature's purposes, but his doctrine inevitably corrupts. Put in more familiar Christian language, it is he who paves Hell with his good intentions in contrast to the Devil, who, by vainly tempting the virtuous, paves Heaven with his bad ones.

This legal distinction, however, is only an empirical one, based on practical needs; it does not help to make an absolute distinction between the pleasure of sophistical hedonism or atheistical mechanism and the happiness of the true philosopher. Moreover, even the distinction between ephemeral and enduring pleasure is superficial. For surely the man who farsightedly calculates that ephemeral pain, whether of mind or of body, is the surest means by which enduring pleasure is to be obtained is, in spite of his greater knowledge, no better morally than the thoughtless rake. And this in spite of the fact that he may willingly face death because he calculates that it will be less painful than to suffer the later anguish of remorse and shame which must ensue if he chooses rather to survive.

By what means, then, can a man make himself truly virtuous? The later answer, of Augustine and his Protestant and Jansenist followers, was that there were no means within his power; that he can merely pray and hope for God's arbitrarily conferred grace, which miraculously, and often undetected even by himself, will enable him to think and act not only virtuously but also unselfishly.

The Platonic, like the free-will Christian, solution, was that the gift to all of "divine possession" made it possible for anybody and everybody to shake off much of their selfishness by cultivating love. In the *Symposium* Plato records the speech of Socrates describing Love's ladder of perfection; from passion for another's body, to friendship for another's soul, to love of country, love of science, love of beauty or good. And finally from love of possessing, to love of being possessed by, this good—that is, from a passive appreciation of and desire for it, to an active behavior instinctively and even irresistibly resulting from it.

Was Plato, however, quite convinced? Surely he realized that love is above all a pleasure, because, however psychologi-

cal rather than physiological, it is immediate, that is, it is neither the reminiscence of a bygone, nor the anticipation of a future, love. As even the mystical experience describes itself, its acute sensation of love is so ephemeral that an immediate reaction is likely to ensue. Indeed it was later to be attributed to grace for the very reason that it seemed wholly involuntary.

If, then, love is in fact a gift, how can it best be acquired? By knowledge, as Socrates and Plato alleged, or by will, as most Christians were to suppose? Will not either of these estimable assumptions, unless combined, open the door, if not to hypocrisy, at least to cant? That this was, if unfortunately, true both Jesuits and Jansenists were later to admit. They differed only regarding the possibility of salvation for those who tried their best to love but failed.

This loftiest love, of the Good as an end, appealed equally to both Socrates and Plato, but with different emphasis. Socrates confined it to the inner man whereas Plato also related it to man's environment. The one was a warm, the other a cool lover. Socrates sought this abstract love primarily in the heart; Plato sought it in the heart too, but also, as we shall now see, in the mind.

c. *The Creation*

That God existed and was good seemed to Plato the most if not the only plausible premise, if only because it was man's almost universal conviction. He therefore desired to create more goodness, and formulated His Ideas of how best to achieve it. These Ideas constituted His model; the realization of them outside of His mind would exemplify them.

Plato could not conceive of a creation of a material world out of nothing, but he could and did presuppose a coeternal world reduced to the four elements of fire, air, water, and earth, unmixed, formless, chaotic, existing, yet without being in time or space—visible, indeed, “but in a state of discordant and disorderly motion” (*Timaeus*, 30A). Its only law was that of Necessity or Chance.

In describing the process of the creation Plato was at pains

first to present an erroneous theory then prevalent, probably that of Archelaus, who was about fifty years older:

It is by chance that all these elements move by the interplay of their respective forces, and according as they meet together and combine fittingly—hot with cold, dry with moist, soft with hard, and all such necessary mixtures as result from the chance combinations of these opposites—in this way and by these means they have brought into being the whole heaven and all that is in the heaven, and all animals, too, and plants—after that all the seasons had arisen from these elements; and all this as they assert, not owing to reason, nor to any god or art, but owing, as we have said, to nature and chance. (*Laws*, Loeb Classical Library, 88gB.)

Plato, however, believed in God because he could not conceive that even the imperfect order in the world could be produced by disorder. Only complete order could produce any order at all. He was desirous of perfection and to him this meant permanence, and permanence in turn meant ordered rest in contrast to the disorder of a necessarily aimless motion. It was precisely because God wished to bring order out of the disorder of the four elements—"deeming that the former state is in all ways better than the latter"—that He made up His mind to create. But in order to reduce the pre-existing motion God had to produce countermotions, as of resistance, which would first bring ordered motion as a preliminary to ordered rest.

Apparently, therefore, God first enabled the four elements to combine to form matter and, second, infused them with the desire of each of the combinations to seek its own physical level. This was what Aristotle was to call natural motion.

God further created, apparently by an emanation from himself, lesser, spiritual souls which all possessed the power of initiating motion and, at least in varying degree, the power of reason; and these he infused into matter or bodies to give them form.

In refuting Archelaus, Plato seems to have dismissed the idea of a coeternal chaos of motion, for in his later *Laws* he says:

How will a thing that is moved by another ever be itself the first of things that cause change? It is impossible. But when a thing that has moved itself changes another thing, and that other a third, and the motion thus spreads progressively through thousands and

thousands of things, [how] will the primary source of all their motions be anything else than the movement of that which has moved itself? (*Laws*, X, 894E.)

Plato goes on to say that since God is the first and sole cause of motion and so of change He cannot Himself change and is therefore eternal, whereas everything else is in greater or less degree ephemeral. This conception was already virtually that of Aristotle's First Mover.

d. Forms

God's creation consisted of forms which were the realizations of the Ideas best suited to reduce the separate elements of chaos to a beginning of structure and order. The Creator was Perfection, the created was to inaugurate a Becoming.

The first form was the world soul or visible universe which in turn contained and transmitted every lower form. Next in the hierarchy were the fixed stars with bodies of fire which were in motion but only less perfect because they moved at a uniform velocity in a permanent circle. Next came the still less perfect, because errant, planets. Then far below these, at the centre of the world soul, was the earth. This was immobile except that, in order to account for the rarity of eclipses, it must have either a slight pendulum motion across, or circular motion around, the geometrical centre.

The mineral world, composed largely of earth, had received no soul or form enabling it to initiate any other motion than to seek its own level. It apparently received its various forms, of shape, density, and color, not from any lower living souls, but rather directly from heaven.

All those creations which were able to initiate other motions than simply that of seeking their own physical level had been infused with live forms or souls, whether vegetable, bestial, or human. These qualities had been received from the celestial souls, but only that of man had been endowed with reason, and so with a will or desire for beauty, knowledge, and virtue. To these abstract qualities of Socrates, Plato had added this soul's capacity to grasp the existence of such forms as straightness, length, and size, and even of weight, temperature, and motion. But here Socrates balked by saying that, al-

though logically dirt and mud should be recognized as forms, he was afraid that this might lead him into "abysmal nonsense."

These forms were all permanent, but the living souls which had informed bodies came from the stars, and at the death of their bodies passed into other bodies according to the degree of perfection they had been able to attain. The most perfect returned to the stars for good, the least perfect entered the bodies of animals and must there earn the merit which gave them the chance for a higher reincarnation. Only when they regained their human status, and earned the top merit possible there, could they return again to their birthplace among the stars. These souls were produced to serve as God's agents to help realize His Ideas of bringing order out of chaos, of permanent concord out of ephemeral discord, of structure and rest, of wisdom and virtue. Unless and until these agents had fulfilled their missions, they would receive no permanent reward.

Plato adds another argument for the human soul as not only a product of, but also as of the same nature as, the primary Soul or Good. This he inferred from the human soul's awareness of its ignorance and sinfulness and of its longing to be rid of them. Lifeless bodies contained the physical and mathematical forms only; but souls contained not only those of motion but also those of virtue, beauty, and goodness. This yearning for knowledge for the purpose of acquiring virtue indicated a yearning not so much for mere permanent form as for the ethical forms in their pristine purity. This was perhaps a reminiscence of their original state, before they had become entangled in bodies.

Plato distinguished formal and efficient causes. The formal were the restrictions imposed on form and body, before as well as after their union; the efficient were rather the energies imparted by God or His derivative souls to this unity. Put in another way, the substance is the effect of the formal, the event of the efficient, cause. That he made this distinction is important if only because it was adopted and elaborated not only by Aristotle but also by the medieval schoolmen and by their successors down to the present day.

e. Evil

The problem of evil, which was to prove so baffling to later generations, was not a particular puzzle to Plato because he assumed that Nature, morally neutral and imperfect, imposed limits on the power not only of man but of God. Therefore in His ordering of the world the good Artificer had to take account of this Nature, of both its now incarnated souls and its bodies, had to work with the tools which He had at His disposal. Ethics had to be promoted within the framework of science. Keenly aware as Plato was that Nature was not having its own way, he was no less aware that its necessity was hampering intelligence and so also goodness and perfection.

This explains why God, although a perfect soul, could not produce other souls which were as perfect as He was, why He could produce an Eros or Love as intermediary between Himself and men, but not a Jesus Christ. For His production even of souls had to partake in some degree of Nature and thus assume some of its imperfect characteristics. True, these souls would some day rise to the heaven of virtual perfection, but, until they did, they betrayed all too often traits more akin to Nature than to their God.

What, then, was to blame? It was neither the lifeless nor the living forms, nor was it their bodies; it was rather what we might call the chemical reaction set up in the process of compounding the two.

Neoplatonism was later to put all the blame on body; Augustine was later to put all the blame on the souls of angels and men gone wrong. Plato, perhaps partly because he was a remarkably intelligent man himself, attributed evil to a lack of intelligence, which caused souls, encumbered with and blinded by body, to do harm under the illusion that they were doing good. Men, no less than God, were well-meaning, but, because God did not have the power to make them intelligent enough, they could not properly distinguish good from bad.

Nor were men alone involved: the stars could not prevent the planets from describing irregular motions; even Eros was too often injudicious. It was not men only but the intermediate souls themselves who, perhaps because Homer had not been forgotten, were too often no better than they should be.

f. Justice

How did man's soul, deriving from God, come to its present existence? How far was it due to God, to Nature, or to the soul itself? Myths incorporated in the current religious cults described the soul's fall as a combination of the nature of souls in general and of the quality of each individual soul; all were bound to fall, but the superior ones fell less far and regained their original status sooner.

The difficulty, at bottom, was to explain why one soul differed from another, for, even with freedom of choice, if all the souls had originally possessed an identical freedom they would all have willed alike.

The further current myth, of pre-existence or reincarnation, accepted by Orphics and Pythagoreans alike, merely aggravated the imbalance. For if all souls had been alike in the beginning they would have remained so regardless of time and circumstance unless chance intervened, which is what all religions have refused to allow.

Socrates had been exposed especially to the Orphic beliefs, Plato rather to the Pythagorean. It is generally understood that they aired and discussed these beliefs only as reasonable but inconclusive hypotheses—morally sound enough, but scientifically unproved.

Socrates was apparently content to stress moral education. Plato concurred but he added not only scientific education but also, as complications, the influence of heredity—partly derived from previous incarnations—and even of climate, soil, and other environmental effects.

If one believed that each man was getting what he deserved there was no cause for concern, but to the extent that his prospects had been left to chance it was the duty of men to try to mitigate these injustices. Because of the political exigencies, however, Plato was more particularly concerned to raise the general level of intelligence and virtue for the sake of the general welfare. To him justice was to be sought for the sake of the good of the temporal State rather than for that of the afterlife of the individual.

Was God, then, having created the world according to His Ideas, allowing it to shift for itself? This question was already

being debated. Plato, in contrast to the later Epicureans, did not believe so. Although God did, he thought, keep His pressure on Nature lest it get out of hand, men were expected to do their part and, regardless of their innate differences, benefit or suffer accordingly. "To him that hath shall be given."

In Orphism a ritual was prescribed, by the proper performance of which it was believed that the divine will could be influenced in favor of the participants. This Plato condemned because it was a substitution of ceremonial for intrinsic virtue. So, too, he condemned prayers for future favors. Not that he thought prayer evil in itself, but only that it was too easily abused. It should be a communion with God, an expression of gratitude for past favors, but without any appeal for mercy. For, to ask God to do more than He was doing, was to insinuate that He was not already doing all He could.

Plato did not deny that prayers addressed to the intermediate and therefore imperfect Souls might be heard and heeded. These, if intended to dissuade them from an evil purpose, might prove salutary, but, human nature being what it is, the temptation would be to try to put bad rather than good notions into their heads. Consequently Plato advocated severe punishment for those who professed, whether sincerely or not, to be able by sorcery and incantations to invoke even the lesser gods of air, water, and earth.

Salvation was therefore the result of personal achievement: in man's knowledge of how to direct his innate desire for the good so that he recognized it as such and was able to pursue it. At a certain point in that pursuit man's soul, being immortal, would be rewarded by an ultimate eternal abode with the Good. Socrates and Plato both seem as sure of this principle as they were unsure of the details. Thus they did not quarrel about why men differed; of how, if at all, their souls had been, or might again be, reborn in other bodies; or of how they were chosen for final salvation. They were only sure that virtue would ultimately triumph.

The Orphic belief was in a Last Judgment whereby, as in Christianity, the sheep were separated from the goats. The sheep went straight to heaven: the goats, if curable, were reborn; if incurable, were damned to hell. All this might be, thought Plato, but again it might not. He was sure only that

virtue would be rewarded and that most souls would some day come to earn that reward. But he had no idea of the temporal life as a premeditated or punitive purgatory, where man must suffer and be unhappy either in order to put his virtue to the test or in order to deserve heaven as the only just compensation. Temporal life was rather an imperfect imitation of the eternal, with immediate, if small, rewards for virtue as a preview of the future and greater rewards to come.

g. Mathematics and Virtue

Since Plato was primarily a mathematical scientist he made no important contribution to that vast area of knowledge which seems to us to lie between soul and number. He touched on chemistry, for instance, only by analogy to spiritual forms, some of which could not unite in the soul at all because incompatible opposites, like hot and cold, motion and rest, good and bad, whereas others, like being, rest, and good, could unite. On the nature and behavior of the different physical elements he added little to the beliefs of Heraclitus and Empedocles.

In astronomy Plato rather followed the Pythagorean or other existing beliefs than conceived new ones. His stars and planets alike were composed of fire, but only the former seemed to be the prime initiators of motions, the planets being rather dragged along. That the motions of the planets were, by contrast, irregular seemed to be presumptive evidence that the influence of the divine perfection weakened as it descended towards the universe's centre, and this because that influence, being purely spiritual, was obstructed as it encountered solid bodies—from fire, air, water, to earth. That the lifeless motions were caused by the world soul and the stars was likely enough; but the encouragement which Aristotle was to give to astrology was lacking in Plato because to him every soul also freely initiated its own bodily activity.

Naturally there were many theories then, as there have been ever since, of why, except for the sun, there are any celestial bodies at all. Plato's was perhaps as good as any others. Following close on the heels of the discoveries of the Pythagoreans, he felt assured that their perpetual orderly motions were made visible to man because God wanted to enlighten men's

ignorance by showing them that the opposite of Nature's chaos was the orderly structure which He was imposing on that chaos by creating souls and thereby reason. Plato was here only too happy to recognize that the design was basically unified by mathematics.

By mathematics Plato meant exact knowledge in contrast to mere belief or true judgment. It was the technique for getting to the bottom of things, for finding permanent truth. It has been assumed that he made his two arduous trips to Sicily to persuade the young tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysius II, to master mathematics in order that he might in this way be the better able to save Sicily for Greece from the double menace of conquest by Carthaginians and Italians.

Although Plato was probably the earliest forerunner of Descartes in his perception of mathematics as the key to an understanding of the physical world, he was not able to turn the key in physics any more than in chemistry. He perceived it only imaginatively, as Voltaire was later to perceive evolution. Moreover it is still a mystery how he could have supposed that such knowledge was the key to the virtue not only of Socrates but of the young Dionysius. The best explanation is perhaps that, because he loved science as much as he did virtue, he had faith that they were merely different aspects of a single truth.

In contrast, his mathematics proper was superb. He believed that the current results obtained by the Pythagoreans must be subjected to dialectical analysis, and his brilliant efforts to prove this were hardly surpassed until the nineteenth century, when the Pythagorean irrationals, incommensurates, and infinitesimals were at last brought under satisfactory control.

4. ARISTOTLE

a. Logic

Aristotle, the disciple and successor of Plato, has been especially regarded as the great logician, the master of words as the Pythagoreans and Plato had been masters of mathematics. If Aristotle dealt less with the latter it was partly because it had already been so soundly dealt with, whereas the logic of words

was still, by the Sophists, being unsoundly—even dishonestly—dealt with. He did not, however, regard either of these logics as independent methods of discovering the truth, but only as negative and therefore preliminary methods of avoiding errors which resulted from their misuse. His logic, indeed, was on the whole only a fulfilment of what Socrates and Plato had begun.

For, very judiciously, he recognized that the surest road to truth was observation by the senses. If this observation be likened to a traveler in a strange land, logic would be likened to his map, which was no substitute for his legs and eyes but would perhaps prove indispensable in keeping him on the right road. A philosopher, perhaps more than another, must start with premises, but those of logic, although the surest ones, were, if too much relied on, also the most fruitless.

Aristotle moreover, although Plato's pupil, was also the son of Nicomachus, a physician; and a physician, if he was to be successful, had often to pick up his premises as he went along. They had to be chosen, as the surgeon chose the readiest available instruments, to be discarded, however, as often as he could lay his hands on better ones. Therefore while Aristotle acknowledged, as the skeptical Academics of his day were already doing, that premises can be pursued backwards indefinitely, he realized that, in order to reach any conclusions, he must assume tentative premises, so that the real problem was to choose the least arbitrary or most natural starting point.

b. Substance

One such was obviously the reality of substance, which might be spiritual or physical. Furthermore, as a corollary of physical substance, he must assume space, and since substance could not exist without space, he inferred further that space could not exist without substance.

Moreover these physical substances quite obviously had varying characteristics, as of quality such as shape, weight, temperature, and solidity, or of quantity such as number, length, breadth, height, and distance. All these could be distinguished according to genera and species. Although he realized that truth or science was practically obtainable only by

comprehending the more inclusive classifications, like weight rather than an individual stone or man rather than Socrates, he was also convinced that it was only through the individual thing that the wider or universal reality could become known. For without individual men, the species Man would not exist.

A further premise no less obvious than the existence of substance and space was that of the motion of these substances and therefore also of time. This in turn necessitated a consideration of cause and effect. This was a baffling problem because, just as an effect will itself be a cause of some further effect, so a cause must itself have been an effect, which indicates an even more indefinite backward chain than that involved in premises. Must these chains be infinite? Perhaps light could be best thrown on this cause-and-effect problem, as on that of premises, by first following the chain forwards by observing the behavior of lifeless bodies as the physician studies that of living bodies.

As with universality so with immobility: because it was the more permanent it was a quality of truth. For truth must embrace the past and future too. Furthermore, as universality reveals itself only through the individual and immobility only through motion, so does the eternal reveal itself only through the ephemeral: degrees of change point the way to the least degree, and so to none. That which does not change is necessarily eternal and therefore Being, in contrast to what exists only temporarily.

Now the ephemeral character of all things on earth—especially of living things—seemed a contrast to the permanence of the heavenly bodies. To be sure, these too moved; but their motion was of a kind intermediate between permanence and change because it was a circular motion which could persist eternally without break and so without abrupt change. Even at the end of 26,000 years the heavenly bodies would return precisely to the same positions in which they had been before. Here, then, was a minimum of change, a virtual permanence: of all observable substances, the most nearly eternal and therefore possessing the most Being.

c. Spirit and Matter

To these qualities of universality, immobility, and permanence which Being possessed, spirit must be added. Since God was pure spirit and man largely but not wholly matter, the heavenly bodies, being intermediaries between God and man, must be largely but not wholly spirit. They were neither spiritual nor corporeal, but rather incorporeal substances.

Below this hierarchy of living substances were the physical or corporeal. To be sure, their underlying elements—fire, air, water, and earth with their qualities of heat and cold, dryness and fluidity—were uncreated and therefore eternal. But, as compounded, which they must always be, they were conspicuously liable to change. For, as such, they constituted sensible matter and this compound, although at any given moment actual was also at any given moment susceptible of becoming something else—as a living body of becoming a corpse. The physical, corporeal, or material world, therefore, although its elements and qualities were eternal, was itself in a constant flux between generation or growth and destruction or decay.

But how, merely in terms of logic, can one corporeal substance change into another? How can A, which is not B or C, become B and yet not become C? Aristotle's plausible, although overformal, answer was that A, although already a potential B, was not a potential C. Thus a planet has very little potentiality—it cannot even stop moving—whereas the wood of a sapling can become a full-grown tree, or fuel for fire, or food for a worm, or, if petrified, a mineral. The more matter a thing has, the more numerous its potentialities.

Aristotle concluded therefore that although Being as such was eternal, concrete entities of Being varied in duration, from God and the four elements to sensible matter, which was the most potential of all substances in the sense that, because of the variety of combinations which the four elements can assume, it can become actualized into almost any physical substance. The elements are themselves eternal and therefore fully actualized, but their compounds are, as actualized substances, the least permanent and stable because the most redolent with potentiality. Consequently a further hierarchy here reveals itself, from God, who has no potentiality and is there-

fore complete Being, to the four elements as compounded with four underlying qualities (heat, cold, dryness, and fluidity) which are nothing but potentiality. God cannot change or even move; these compounds cannot help doing both.

d. Desires

Closely related to the problem of growth and destruction, of potentiality and actuality, of permanence and change, is that of motion or change of location. As we have said, the circular motion of the stars and planets seemed to Aristotle to indicate permanence rather than change, but this did not solve the mystery of what caused this motion. Perhaps the problem of how the human soul caused its body's motion suggested an analogy: this soul was a spiritual substance and it moved its body without itself moving. Without resorting to the Pythagorean belief that the universe had a special soul of its own, Aristotle supposed that God, who was, if not outside, at least separate from and independent of, the universe, moved it without Himself moving.

But how could a spiritual substance, whether divine or human, affect a corporeal substance? If not by a physical influence, it must be by a spiritual. This was not so strange since the heavenly bodies also clearly described a circular motion which could be explained only by assuming their control by souls of very superior intelligence. If one spirit can affect another one, it surely can also affect its own corporeal substance. But how is it that one spirit can affect another? Presumably as one human spirit affects another: by reason or emotion.

e. Physics

In this way the God of perfection, the end to which all imperfections aspire, has only to be known in order to inspire the desire of emulation, and in the case of the heavenly bodies this produces an admiring circular motion within the desired object; that is, around the inner rim of encircling divinity. And so with the rest of nature: both the desire and the energy are transmitted down through the successive spheres to the sun and below. But, with each descent the relative strength of

desire declines and, as imperfection increases, the now errant energy plays an ever more decisive role. The critical point for man is where the irregularity of the sun's orbit around the earth—sometimes nearer one pole, sometimes further, circling the ecliptic rather than the equator—leads to the varying seasonal changes on earth and produces an irregular cycle of growth and decay.

Nonetheless, although in comparison with the spiritual energy or desire the physical energy has become relatively greater, it too (since both originate from above) has, by expansion and consequent dissipation, become so weak that the earth, in contrast to the heavenly bodies, lies inert and stationary. Many before Aristotle had supposed otherwise: that the earth at least rotated, and perhaps even revolved around a central fire, or else that it moved back and forth in a straight line which passed through the universe's centre.

One might suppose therefore that Aristotle, since he likened the earth to the hub of a wheel, would have thought that it too rotated if only, like the revolving planets, at a retarded velocity. However, according to his premise that energy, and therefore motion, originated at the periphery of the universe, he must infer the diurnal revolution of the sphere of stars to be not only apparent but real, and to suppose any rotation by the earth would cast doubt on this premise. Furthermore the traditional theory of opposites required that as the stars of the periphery moved, the earth at the centre did not.

Now lifeless bodies compounded of the four elements moved only because their four qualities of heat and cold, dryness and fluidity, moved them. These latter moved only because they were agitated by the peculiarity of the sun's orbit alternately above and below the equator. Left to itself, fire, being preponderantly hot and dry, would remain at the top; earth, being preponderantly cold and moist, would remain at the bottom, with air below fire and water above earth, in horizontal layers. It was the seasonal cycle caused by the sun which, by varying temperatures and humidities, kept upsetting their spatial dispositions. But what causes fire to tend to rise and earth to fall? What causes them, when impelled from without, to move, if only temporarily, in other directions? What, in a

word, were the causes of these two motions which Aristotle called the natural and the violent?

In a laudable effort to explain these phenomena Aristotle offered explanations which were to be long accepted. Although under suspicion in the fourteenth they were not supplanted till the seventeenth century. The first was that all the elements and their compounds felt some degree of desire: not the desire of man for the Good nor of the beast for his physical welfare but rather for occupying their natural or most congenial locations. Thus fire, since it was hot and dry, was least solidly material. Its desire was therefore to detach itself from earth. Earth, on the other hand, being cold and moist, was most solidly material, and its desire therefore the opposite. In default of our conception of gravity, the belief that weight was synonymous with stupidity was perhaps as good as any other. To suppose that a stone wants to fall because it feels more at home on the ground than in the air may seem foolish to us, but even Newton's laws tell us how to measure that inclination rather than that there is none.

The second of Aristotle's now discredited theories of motion concerned the way in which its energizing cause was transmitted. When a spear is hurled through the air its horizontal motion is soon changed to a vertical fall, caused, said Aristotle, by its lack of desire, as a heavy stupid object, to rise. But why, then, after losing contact with the arm which had hurled it, did it proceed horizontally at all? Here Aristotle, being quite unaware of Newton's First Law (of inertia or momentum) supposed that an object could move unnaturally or violently only so long as it remained in physical contact with its mover. He was therefore driven to the unfortunate conclusion that the arm had also set the air in motion and that it was this air, still in contact with the spear, which pushed or pulled it along. Yet this explanation was inadequate even according to his own contact theory because the instant the arm stopped hurling, not only the spear but also the air must also cease to move.

Perhaps Aristotle's physics did not seem so important to him as it has seemed to the men of later centuries, but it invites special notice because the Christian world, although from the first suspicious of his metaphysics, long accepted his

science at virtually face value, and his physics, because conspicuously defective, apparently delayed the birth of modern physics by several centuries.

f. Man

God is eternity, immobility, cause, perfection; and since these are the very things which constitute truth He knows them by merely knowing Himself. The Intelligences know them less well because they know them not as parts of themselves but only as things perceived in God.

At the other extreme is the lifeless earthly body which has not only no knowledge but also only the minimum of desire: to retain or regain its natural level.

In between are the degrees of life, that is, of bodies which possess souls. The lowest degrees have only a vegetative soul which enables them to desire to live and to perpetuate their species. The next above possesses in addition a sensitive soul rendering them capable of desiring, and therefore of seeking, pleasure as well. But they know only what, at any given moment, they like or dislike.

Finally there are men, whose bodies, while also possessing both a vegetative and a sensitive soul, are further endowed with a rational soul which enables them to think as well as to will and therefore to know not only what is physically but also what is intellectually pleasant.

The lower function of this rational soul is to distinguish future from present pleasure and thereby give its possessor the opportunity of choosing between them, but its higher function is to enable its possessor to seek and thereby obtain a knowledge of invisible and therefore intelligible truth. This involves deduction and induction, synthesis and analysis, comparison and distinction, hypothesis and proof—capacities which we take for granted as natural but which, to even the most enlightened of the Greeks, seemed to have an element of the supernatural. For to them man was generally assumed to occupy a middle position in the hierarchy and therefore to be half divine, half natural. Since the split between the rational and appetitive desires appeared to be the most radical, Aristotle naturally inferred that the rational was that part of

him which was supernatural. However, he would not go so far as to suppose that human reason was supernaturally prompted. Even mathematics, although apparently requiring no aid from the senses, was not granted such an origin. But it did seem as if the remarkable inferences which man was able to draw from his sensuous impressions betrayed a supernatural origin.

In any case, Aristotle chose to solve the mystery by supposing that the rational soul was itself divided into an active and a passive element; that the passive was potentially capable of receiving and manipulating the sense impressions but could in fact do so only because the active element actualized that potentiality. The closest analogy was to the light which actualizes the eye's potentiality to see.

It was intelligence rather than knowledge, but it was the indispensable prerequisite to knowledge. The higher intelligences enjoyed actualized knowledge, man's intelligence enjoyed a mere potentiality for acquiring it. But, by the co-operation of the active rational soul and the senses, the passive rational soul was able, however slowly, painfully, and imperfectly, to acquire a good deal of truth.

This active intellect had several peculiarities. It was an integral part of man, yet not in the same degree as were his other parts, for although it did not exist before the rest of man's soul or body, it alone survived man's death. Even while in man's body it remained essentially a One. This active rational soul was partially blinded by contact with its body, which explained why man's search for truth was so imperfectly successful. Once freed by the death of its body, however, it joined the universal One—unaffected by its ephemeral contact with the body and therefore fit at once to be assimilated into it.

It is not clear, however, how the attainment of this final status was possible. For originally the soul was the potential active intellect of a man; and yet, since Aristotle did not accept the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, this potentiality no longer existed. At the same time, so long as it was separated from the body it could not, except potentially, exist. No wonder the nature of its acknowledged immortality was destined to become a subject of endless, because fruitless, dispute.

g. Form

In general all substances are compounds of what Aristotle called matter and form. There are, to be sure, certain exceptions, for God, the Intelligences, and the active element of man's rational soul are pure form; and, at the opposite end of the scale of being, is pure or prime matter. This matter, although uncreated and eternal, is of itself non-Being, but because of its capacity or potentiality to be clothed with form, it both is and is not a nothing. In all other cases these terms connote relatives, not absolutes.

In a lifeless human body, for instance, its shape is its form, but when occupied by a human soul, this shape becomes part of the living man's matter, and the soul assumes the role of being his form. Then, when at death the soul leaves the body, this shape again becomes the body's form. Similarly the reproductive semen has a form as semen which becomes an indistinguishable part of the matter of the infant only when he acquires a soul. This semen is merely a potential man because, although capable of becoming one, it is still only actual as semen.

Aristotle indeed carries this relativity so far that not only is shape at once the matter of a man and the form of his body, his organs too are the matter of his body and the form of his tissues, and his tissues are the matter of his organs and the form of the four elements of which all these are ultimately composed.

Viewed from another angle, Aristotle regarded quality, such as shape, weight, or temperature, as the matter of a substance whose form was quantity, such as length, breadth, or height. He regarded this quantity, in turn, as the matter of a substance whose form was mathematics. The successive steps were here from the corporeal to the incorporeal.

The over-all frame of Aristotle's philosophical system is therefore a hierarchy formed of various related but distinguishable parts. Listed from the top down they are from Being to non-Being, from Eternal to Ephemeral, from Immobility to Mobility, from Energy to Inertia, from Knowledge to Ignorance, from Form to Matter, from Incorporeal to Corporeal.

And there is a further one, to be mentioned last because it is the better comprehended if the others are fresh in our minds. This is the descent from cause to effect.

h. The Four Causes

Just as Aristotle uses the words *matter* and *form* in a now unfamiliar sense, so he uses the word *cause*. To him cause includes all the necessary conditions precedent to any given effect. Thus the causes of a substance include its form and its matter as formal and material causes, which together constitute its static existence. Over and above these were final and efficient causes, which caused the behavior of that substance (that is, its energy, motion, and liability) to change. The nature of these four causes can best be understood by considering again his concept of a hierarchy of substances.

According to it, those which possessed the most form and the least matter were the most influenced by desire; those with the least form and the most matter, by physical energy. The final cause was the realization of that desire whereby substances strive to preserve and perfect themselves and their species. (This desire moreover is innate, that is, self-impelling, in contrast to the physical energy which arises from without.) Since desire, as it descends the hierarchy, declines from a dominant to an insignificant cause, the efficient or physical cause acquires relatively greater control. Thus, just as the formal cause is the indispensable foundation of the final, so the material cause is the indispensable foundation of the efficient. Or one might say that since desire is dependent on form, which in man is his soul, the formal cause is the potentiality of desire, of which the final cause is its realization. And similarly that, since physical energy is dependent on matter, the material cause is the potentiality of this energy, and the efficient cause its realization.

It is important to observe that although both the final cause or desire and the efficient cause or physical energy originate in God above, the formal and material causes lie deeper—in Nature herself. God can do no more than activate or realize potentialities which are coeternal with Him. Therefore God is independent of Nature only as man's soul is of his

body, and Aristotle himself is in this respect not wholly independent of the macrocosm-microcosm belief of the Pythagoreans.

i. Evolution

A moment's reflection on these causes brings to mind the issue of evolution. Since on the lowly earth Aristotle assigned the dominant role to the material-efficient causes, one might suppose that he would have been inclined to adopt the evolutionary belief of Empedocles that function is the cause of structure: that is, that the eye, for instance, is caused by the advantage (for purposes of survival) of being able to see. But he instead believed that structure is the cause of function, that is, that we, fortunately, can see because we happen to have eyes.

It is true, no doubt, that, if Aristotle could have observed what Darwin did, his belief would have been shaken. Yet, since Empedocles, though presumably observing no more, did grasp the likelihood of evolution, we may properly inquire what induced Aristotle to deny it.

His difficulty, presumably, was that he regarded the genera and species of things as static. Nature was, from eternity, virtually that which it still is. Therefore man has always had eyes, light has always been light, and the sensuous world has always been virtually the same. Yet Nature, for whatever unaccountable reason, did not at all plan it that way, it just was so. Because Nature happened to provide us with eyes we just happen to be able to see.

But why was this structure unchangeable? Observation strongly indicated to him that although the individual man was born and died, his reason-for-being was chiefly justified by his procreation—of a new individual, to be sure, but of the same species. This species was therefore the permanent thing and, as such, the eternal and significant. It was an integral, not a mere incidental, part of Nature. It was part of the total essence or form of Nature; and Nature, being eternal, cannot by its very definition change.

How then did he explain individual variations, as for instance between brothers? It was at this point, he said, that the

formal-final cause lost most of its power; where, at the bottom of the hierarchy, the material-efficient cause assumed the dominant role. These variations, the very phenomena which to Empedocles had suggested natural selection, Aristotle dismissed as incidentals, having no significant cause and producing no significant effect.

Concluding this brief exposition of Aristotle's underlying beliefs, we must recognize that to him the ultimate reality is Nature. To be sure, God is the indispensable cause of desire and energy, and so of change, but He did not will it so and He cannot prevent its being so. He has been active, from all eternity, and He must forever continue to be so. No less than man He is part and parcel of Nature's mechanism, the mere spark igniting and vivifying Nature as a whole. As for the individual man, his only significance is as perpetuator of his species. His active intellect serves no purpose except to satisfy his intellectual curiosity, and when released by death it loses whatever small individuality it may have acquired as it melts into the All. Only as one of the infinite links in the chain of the species Man does any one man have even a minimum of importance. Although he is rational, the reward he gets for the knowledge he can thereby acquire is merely to become convinced that although he is rational he is not otherwise distinguishable from the rest of the animals.

5. HELLENISTIC

Two other Greek beliefs were already challenging the Platonic and Aristotelian in their own day, and were to continue to do so for centuries to come. These were the Epicurean and the Stoic. Roughly, the divergences were threefold. The two earlier had both regarded the substance of the universe as divided into the spiritual and material; the two later recognized only the material. The two earlier had supposed that material substances tended to be immobile and moved only when subjected to pressure by spiritual substances; the two later thought that material bodies—and there were no others—moved by their own innate natures. Finally, the two earlier believed that there was no empty space or void; whereas the

two later claimed that it was precisely in empty space that their atoms moved.

This change marks a reaction from metaphysics back to the earlier Archaic physics. The Epicureans and Stoics were more practical, empirical, and comprehensible than their more imaginative predecessors, but perhaps this was because they chose to overlook some of the most baffling difficulties.

In the popular mind Epicurus was the champion of pleasure, and that is correct. But he was also a champion of the atomic theory, and this perhaps had the greater influence on subsequent ages.

Actually the atomic theory had been propounded by two contemporaries of Socrates, Leucippus and Democritus, but its adoption by Epicurus, who lived after Aristotle, led later ages to saddle him with the responsibility for both beliefs.

Hedonism, or the association of happiness, even virtue, with pleasure, was indeed not of Epicurus' invention either. Men must have thought of this as soon as they could think at all. But he may well have been the first to argue that, however tempting it might be to treat pleasure with condescension, to do so might also be imprudent. The issue, though narrow, was not superficial. He agreed that the highest pleasure was best won by virtue—that is, by living wisely, nobly, and righteously—but he denied that virtue, rather than pleasure, was therefore the end. Suppose that virtue should, on the contrary, be unpleasant. Would anybody then still seek it? No, said Epicurus, pleasure is the end, and it only just so happens that virtue has proved to be the best means of attaining it.

The atomic theory which Epicurus adopted from his predecessors supposed that, except for time and space, both of which were infinite, all Being, whether apprehensible or not by our human senses, consisted of an infinite number of imperceptible, indivisible, and indestructible units of compact matter, which differed one from another only in size and shape. In place of the alleged soul or spirit was substituted energy and therefore motion, as a quality inherent in each and every material unit. Thus, in contrast to Plato especially, there was no duality between an inert, lifeless matter and a very active soul. For matter was itself active; therefore in or-

der to explain the cause of activity and motion, there was no need to presuppose the existence of any other substance, whether natural or supernatural.

According to the somewhat later testimony of Theophrastus, Leucippus, whose own texts have not survived, imagined the dynamics of the universe in these terms:

He says that the All is infinite, and that it is part full, and part empty. These (the full and the empty), he says, are the elements. From them arise innumerable worlds and are resolved into them. The worlds come into being thus. There were borne along by "abscission from the infinite" many bodies of all sorts of figures "into a mighty void," and they being gathered together produce a single vortex. In it, as they came into collision with one another and were whirled round in all manner of ways, those which were alike were separated apart and came to their likes. But, as they were no longer able to revolve in equilibrium owing to their multitude, those of them that were fine went out to the external void, as if passed through a sieve; the rest stayed together and becoming entangled with one another, ran down together, and made a first spherical structure. This was in substance like a membrane or skin containing in itself all kinds of bodies. And, as these bodies were borne round in a vortex, in virtue of the resistance of the middle, the surrounding membrane became thin, as the contiguous bodies kept flowing together from contact with the vortex. And in this way the earth came into being, those things which had been borne towards the middle abiding there. Moreover, the containing membrane was increased by the further separating out of bodies from outside; and, being itself carried round in a vortex, it further got possession of all with which it had come in contact. Some of these becoming entangled, produced a structure, which was at first moist and muddy; but, when they had been dried and were revolving along with the vortex of the whole, they were then ignited and produced the substance of the heavenly bodies. (Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 338.)

Aristotle said they taught that these atoms "move in the void (for there is a void), and by their coming together they effect coming into being; by their separation, passing away." Though in reality it was not so much Being as the assumption of a bulk large enough for our senses to be aware of their presence. To these accounts is to be added the belief of Epicurus that the individual atoms all moved at an identical and very high velocity. Furthermore it is their swiftness which produces heat and their conglomeration which produces weight.

Modern as this atomic theory is in so many ways, it still adhered to the traditional premise that one physical body could affect another only by physical contact. Therefore just as our eye sees an object only because atoms are continuously shooting out in all directions from that object, some of which hit our eye, so the whirl of the vortex, in which the larger agglomerations by hitting the smaller either carry them along or cast them aside, is the cause of observable physical effects. This tallied with Newton's corpuscular theory of light but was oblivious to his laws of gravity and of inertia.

Why the ethics proved so generally distasteful to later generations needs no explaining. The physics, however, proved hardly less so and for an analogous reason: it offered no sop to man's idealistic intuitions. For not only were the gods, whose existence Epicurus at least would not deny, of the same physical composition. They were not Creators or Providences; they must be indeed wholly indifferent to man's dilemma and fate. Furthermore not only was individual immortality denied, the traditional conceptions of will, reason, and even life itself were turned into a grotesque, if not a hideous, caricature. Indeed the doctrine flatly contradicted every belief, pagan or Christian, in the reality and primacy of spirit or soul. In addition, it was an encouragement to the practitioners of those notoriously vain and even disreputable arts of astrology and alchemy.

Plato had distinguished three kinds of reality: form, soul, and matter. Aristotle had reduced them to two by extending form to include soul, with God as pure form. The Atomists, in their turn, had then extended matter to include Aristotle's form and, in order to explain activity (that is, motion, change, becoming), they were obliged to suppose, instead of the limited desires of matter to move in either a circular or a perpendicular direction, a necessity to move continuously and in any direction. For these atoms moved naturally; they could not help, could not stop, moving. Man, to be sure, could not see their individual motions, but when they collided, and in doing so produced conglomerated vortices, they produced the motions which men did see.

The Stoics accepted this atomic hypothesis as far as it went,

but they chose to inquire further as to why the atoms possessed this natural activity, and the secret seemed to them to be found in the relative activity or inactivity of the different manifestations of bodies. Here the traditional distinction of the four elements of matter suggested a solution, for fire was most active, then air, then water, and finally, least active, earth. Fire was merely atoms roused to great activity by heat. This seemed to be corroborated by the observation that heat was a cause of expansion, as when water produces a new pressure when heated to become steam, or as when inert bodies being touched by fire are suddenly activated into becoming fire.

This theory was just the reverse of that of the Epicurean. Instead of activity being merely the result of velocity plus weight, or of momentum, it was the result of pressure or tension, and the greatest activity was present not in the heaviest but rather in the lightest bodies. In the coldest and heaviest their natural activity was only enough to hold themselves together, causing resistance to efforts to break them up; in the hottest and lightest, on the other hand, the natural activity was quite enough, thought the Stoics, to explain life, consciousness, and even reason.

Aristotle had said that matter had a merely potential existence unless endowed with form, and this form included desire as well as shape. The Atomists' matter included shape and even desire, but whereas Aristotle's stone desired only to fall, the Atomists thought that the stone was likely to move wherever its own or the other tensions impelled it.

Plato had supposed that only spirit or soul had life and so the innate capacity to initiate motion. Since not only men but also the heavenly bodies moved, he inferred that the sensible world was also endowed by the Artificer with a soul of its own. It was the live realization of the model form or idea of the cosmos no less than man himself that was a realization of the form or idea of man.

To Plato this macrocosm or world soul was, as the first created thing, an intermediary thing between the eternal God and temporal man. But the Stoics, being empirically disposed and so working from the bottom up, conceived of the cosmos, rather as did the Archaic physicists, as modeled after man.

Now the Stoic man was wholly composed of matter yet could move, feel, and even think. Why then should God not be wholly composed of matter too? And if so, why was the sensible cosmos not itself God?

Since man is obviously a part of this cosmic whole he must be inferior to it. But this need only be a difference of degree. The microcosm was chiefly composed of the coarser stuff—of earth or water; the macrocosm of the finer—of fire or air or ether. To be sure, man's reason was also composed of this finer stuff, but, as he had proportionately so much less of it, his capacity to move, feel, and think was far more feeble.

Just as it is the part of necessity and therefore of discretion that man's organs and members obey the injunctions and desires of the higher part of man—of his desires and especially of his reason—so is this equally true of the microcosm in relation to the macrocosm. For the stomach to refuse to digest the food which man chooses to swallow will be of no benefit to the stomach. Therefore whether pleasant or not, it had better comply and cheerfully, because there is really no alternative.

This is the classic doctrine of Pantheism, among the most natural and yet the queerest of religious beliefs. God's Providence was so complete that it resembled Fate. Free will was confined to whether you obeyed willingly or reluctantly, to whether you enjoyed or hated such a disciplined life. There were no rewards or punishments after death. The fire and air were simply released to be absorbed into that of the macrocosm, until such time as they were again commissioned to enter a human body.

The over-all dynamics raised two further questions: since change was the underlying nature of such a universe, what was its origin and what was its destiny? The origin was easily explained: it was by the expansion of the fiery world soul; as it expanded the pressure lessened; parts of the fire turned into air, and parts of air in turn to water and finally to earth.

But why didn't this process of expansion, and so of activity, ultimately cease, leaving nothing but motionless, lifeless earth, no longer with even the tension required to keep its conglomerate parts from breaking up? Their prophecy of the future, like those of many since, was feeble. The Stoic was here only too glad to be able to fall back on the support of the tradi-

tional Greek belief in the cycle based on the precession of the equinoxes, when all things in heaven as well as on earth would simply repeat the process of becoming all over again. In Stoic terms this was the setting in of the reverse process, of contraction instead of expansion, whereby the atoms would return to highly pressurized fire and so be ready, as the wheel completed its full circle, to begin again its work of creative expansion. For to a living organism it was as easy to take the world back into Himself by contraction as it had been to create the world out of Himself by expansion.

We must not make the mistake of assuming that the meaning of a Greek word can be precisely conveyed by its nearest English equivalent. For instance, just as the Greek *soul* connoted life rather than consciousness, so the Greek *virtue* connoted appropriateness or adaptation rather than holiness. Because God was a personification of Nature rather than her antithesis, the Greek injunction to obey Nature was akin to, rather than a contradiction of, the Christian injunction to obey God. This was in no case more striking than in the Stoic belief.

This makes it easier to see why most of the Greeks believed that virtue was to be acquired by the cultivation of knowledge—knowledge of man and of Nature and thereby of the appropriate relation between the two. Since Nature could not be expected to adapt herself to suit man, man must adapt himself to suit her. Nature was good, not because she was perfect but because she was the only, and therefore the best, available good.

The cardinal virtues of prudence, fortitude, justice, and temperance were integral phenomena of Nature, implanted by her in man. Man must therefore respect and cultivate them at his peril. As man's finger or stomach must learn what behavior is appropriate to it and thereupon act accordingly, so must man first learn what are God's commands, and then exercise the strength of mind required in order faithfully to execute them.

To most of antiquity, moreover, Nature was as fixed, static, and preordained as God was. She was not a process having a contingent future destiny which man might in some degree

affect—and thereby either harm or help. The future was inexorably determined.

This cosmic fatalism the Epicureans were inclined to interpret indulgently: if man is only circumspect he may safely enjoy a certain freedom. The Stoic interpretation, on the other hand, was strict: duty does not recognize alternatives or compromises, justice does not recognize mercy. Man, therefore, must eschew all comforts and conveniences, and devote himself besides to persuading others of the wisdom of doing likewise. He was but one of many equally important or unimportant particles. He must therefore recognize the brotherhood of all men. He may not allow himself the consolation of expecting any other reward than a sense of a duty well done. No prayers, such as others resorted to, for divine favors either for himself or others, or for either temporal or eternal rewards. Nature offered man no alternative to a dogged and disciplined pursuit of the knowledge of how to conform, and to the cultivation of the strength of character needed in order to be able to.

To the Stoic, man's intellect was a particle of divinity and must behave accordingly. Now the perfection of the Greek divinity lay in His reason and this reason was the antithesis of any kind of unreason and therefore of passion or emotion. As He neither loved nor hated, neither must man. As He was neither cruel nor merciful, but exclusively just, so must man be, but no more than just to either himself or his fellow men. It was the cultivation of one half of man's nature at the expense of the other, and this other was bound, sooner or later, to have its revenge.

To simple people, gods and the sensible universe were both equally and wholly real. To the philosophically minded, however, the reality of either one cast doubt on that of the other. Thus Plato, having assumed that reality was perfection and that perfection presumed eternity and permanence, further inferred that whatever lacked these qualities was relatively if not wholly unreal.

To the scientifically minded, on the other hand, the sensible world was an undeniable reality and since it was constantly in motion and so in process of change, any other state was unreal

and presumably a figment of the imagination. The effort of Parmenides to show that since the sensible world was real it must, in spite of appearances, be permanent and so unchanging was now discarded. Indeed the split between the supersensible and the sensible world was becoming ever wider, until atomism came to offer the most accredited explanation.

To be sure, Epicurus allowed that there might be gods, but, if so, they were composed of atoms and were oblivious to the world of man below. The Stoics sought to save the existence of God by identifying Him with the macrocosmic universe, of which the sensible world including men constituted the various parts.

Both of these schools, skeptical as they seem to be, originated rather as compromises, for, if Platonism was still supported, there were now, as the fourth century ended, two currents of outright skepticism. The one, due to Euhemerus, alleged that the myths about the gods betrayed the fact that they were merely human heroes to whom were attributed superhuman qualities and therefore, if not a divine origin, certainly a present divine status. Curiously enough, the wide publicity which this Euhemerism later enjoyed was due in the first instance to the Christian apologists—to show that the pagan gods were not really divine.

The other skeptical current was that attached to a certain Pyrrho, later to be immortalized by Montaigne. He said that neither he nor any other man could be sure of anything. What he believed to be true might of course be true, but neither he nor any one else would ever be able to find out. Under Arcesilaus, a little later, the skeptics acquired control of Plato's famous Academy. As has so often happened since, this skepticism was accompanied by belief in reverse, that is by open atheism which asserted positively that no gods existed. During the third century, in Athens at any rate, this general disbelief, especially in the gods, spread from the intellectuals to the general population.

The great period of the Library at Alexandria was from 270 to 200 B.C. The great age of the Lyceum in Athens began in about 335 and continued till 200 B.C. This was the great age of intellectual discovery and it certainly coincides with the age of skepticism. To quote Professor Dodds:

This period witnessed the transformation of Greek science from an untidy jumble of isolated observations mixed with *a priori* guesses into a system of methodical disciplines. In the more abstract sciences, mathematics and astronomy, it reached a level which was not to be attained again before the 16th century; and it made the first organized attempt at research in many other fields, botany, zoology, geography, and the history of language, of literature, and of human institutions. Nor was it only in science that the time was adventurous and creative. It is as if the sudden widening of the spatial horizon that resulted from Alexander's conquests had widened at the same time all the horizons of the mind. (Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 236-237.)

Plato adopted as his premise propositions accepted by everybody, and Aristotle did no less. After Aristotle they were more and more denied, and philosophy lost her pre-eminence. But the mathematical premises were for the most part not denied, so mathematics continued, notably with Euclid and Apollonius, to prosper.

Observation and experience had their pitfalls too, but, as the sensible world was again observed without philosophical implications, it began to yield characteristics not previously noted. Here we need only mention Archimedes and Aristarchus.

Aristarchus, as everybody knows, was the first openly to champion the heliocentric theory so sensationally revived 1800 years later by Copernicus. The theory won considerable support for a time. But 100 years later philosophy, having come to life again partly with the aid of astrology and magic, found itself helpless unless it could assume the traditional geocentric explanation. It therefore nipped the heliocentric in the bud. Perhaps it had been conceived prematurely in any case, and perhaps only Plato, had he been reborn, could have saved it. But the fact is that Plato the philosopher did not in this case suspect a truth which a skeptical age could both discover and accept.

ROMAN BELIEFS

THE INDIGENOUS Roman belief was the typically primitive one in unknown natural powers to which they gave names corresponding to our 'fertility,' 'disease,' 'drought,' 'rain,' etc. These forces were alive, as everything in nature seemed to be, and could therefore do men good or harm at pleasure. How similar these forces of nature were to human beings or persons it is hard to say. At least they were thought to be so far human that, if properly propitiated, they would hesitate to do men positive harm.

Their gods of fertility or procreation were called Genius and Juno for men, Faunus for cattle, Saturn for crops, Neptune for water and rivers, and, as a chief god, Janus, the initiator or cause of beginnings. But these gods were not directly concerned with men; they were nearer to Fate or Chance than to Providence, and although there was an afterlife for all, it was merely that of gloomy shades, doomed, probably, to no more than a gradual and merciful extinction.

North of Rome were the Etruscans, apparently half-descended from Oriental invaders by sea from Lydia. As conquerors of tiny Rome they introduced the Oriental arts of prophecy, by plotting the flight of birds and examining the condition of the entrails or liver of sacrificial animals. From them also came the Roman trinity of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva—Minerva the goddess wise in handicrafts—perhaps those first introduced into Italy from the East.

Close on the heels of this Etruscan influence came the Greek, from Cumae particularly, through merchants. Thence came Hercules, Castor and Pollux for horsemen, Apollo for

health; and above all, the Sibylline Oracles which, filling the Romans with awe, brought with them most of the other Greek gods. Already in the fifth century had come the trinity of Demeter, Dionysos, and Kore (whom they identified with their own, perhaps indigenous, Ceres, Liber, and Libera), Hermes for the grain merchants themselves, Poseidon for the sailors who brought these merchants and their grain from Sicily. In the third century, came Aesculapius for healing, and Pluto and Persephone, to man the underworld.

It was after the death of Alexander in 323 that Greek ideas began to spread throughout the Orient to inaugurate the Hellenistic age; but, until the end of the Second Punic War in 200 B.C., Rome was not vitally affected. Then, however, she became a Mediterranean power, and, as her power grew, she attracted the attention of her eastern neighbors. Direct Greek influences came first: Cato the Censor first testified to this by lashing out against so baleful an intrusion. But this was in vain, for the next Roman generation was visited by a number of Greek philosophers, most of them belonging to the prevailing school of Stoics; only one was hostile to Stoicism, although another, belonging to the school of Aristotle, defended the eternity of the world and the indestructibility of the human race.

By 100 B.C., therefore, cultivated Romans were studying not only the Greek language but also Greek philosophy. Thus was the East embarked on its conquest of the West.

This influence of Greek philosophy and culture was at first confined to the educated classes, most of them natives and aristocrats. During this second century, however, Rome was rapidly becoming a metropolis, attracting foreigners of many different kinds, not only traders as before, but slaves, soldiers, and immigrants seeking their fortune. Most of these came from the East and brought with them their beliefs. A few, to be sure, had come earlier—besides the Greek Mysteries, the wild cult of the Phrygian Magna Mater in 200 B.C. But it was only after 100 B.C. that the invasion of the oriental cults was in full tide. Within a generation appear traces in Rome of the Syrian, Mithraic, Egyptian, and Jewish cults as well and, brought in by the uneducated, they tended to spread among

the native uneducated. Initiation into the Greek philosophies required an intellectual effort; this was also somewhat true of Judaism which presented racial obstacles as well. But initiation into the other cults required only emotion, imagination, a sense of loneliness, and a generous pinch of credulity.

Only the Phrygian cult, earliest of the Oriental invaders, was already on the decline before A.D. 100. We shall speak of these again in their place.

Antiochus of Ascalon (near Gaza) came to Rome and there taught philosophy to Varro and Cicero. Cicero, fortunately, gives us an account of his teaching. Following Oriental, particularly Jewish, belief, he transformed Plato's divine Artificer, who took advantage of coeternal Ideas in order to give shape to bodies, into a Creator of those Ideas. Plato's distinction between soul and form was thereby eliminated, but, following the Persian rather than the Jewish teaching, Antiochus did not suppose that God was also the Creator of prime matter.

To Antiochus, furthermore, man was naturally endowed with reason in order that by the proper use of it he could discover the Ideas for himself by his own wits.

Although Cicero had mastered Greek thought as had no other Roman before him, he was bewildered by it. He could expound the ideas with clarity but was either unwilling or unable to evaluate them and apply them to his life. Yet Cicero, probably for this very reason, became the chief transmitter of Greek thought to the medieval Latin world.

In contrast to Cicero, his contemporary, Lucretius, embraced the specific Greek belief of the Atomists, immortalizing it in a great poem. It was based on the observation more of Nature than of man, that is on the observation of man as part of rather than as distinct from Nature. Without categorically denying the existence of spirit, he tried to show how Nature can operate as a purely material and mechanically self-sufficient entity and force.

Technically Lucretius added nothing to the Greek theory. But what, as a poet, he did do was to indicate how man, by facing the belief in a purely material reality without blanching, could develop a courage and self-confidence more heroic and evolved than belief in any spirit or God was able to engender. Instead of supposing himself the slave of the supernatural,

man could believe himself the final and most perfect product of a marvelous, infinite, and eternal Nature.

The Roman Jupiter was not, like the Greek Zeus, ruler only of the sky and earth, and even then removable at the command of a higher Fate. He was more of a despot, but His natural justice so far committed Him by an implied contract or covenant that He was bound, so long as men treated Him with the deference He deserved, to treat them as they deserved. A ritual had accordingly been evolved that men might know how to so treat Him, and the procedures were as meticulous and technical as those of their law court.

With the empire and the encouragement of Augustus, the emperor came to be regarded as Jupiter's duly appointed ruler of man's temporal life, whose duty it was to see that the Romans, at any rate, prospered. Already Horace could observe how grateful Jupiter must be that Augustus had relieved Him of such chores as trying to steer the Romans through their civil wars. It was then already clear that Augustus, if only because he was on the spot, had done the better job. The new arrangement was indeed a better one for all concerned, since evidently Jupiter, for all His divine qualities, had been a reluctant, as well as an inefficient, Providence.

This imperial rule by divine right at the same time seemed to solve the religious issue which, with the advent of the Greek and Oriental cults, had become acute. For by settling this political problem and declaring belief in that settlement obligatory, the empire acquired the psychological control over her subjects which only religious sanction could achieve. The solution of other problems could then be safely left to each individual.

In a secular age temporal interests will dominate, but, to the extent that the age is religious, the future life challenges it. This was apparently now becoming the case throughout the Roman world. Was the future to consist only of a gradual extinction in the grave or were men to become shades, hovering homeless in the air or wandering gloomily in the depths of Hades? Men had been divinized in the past as the reward of great deeds. The emperor was already divine. Recently persons had come to Rome who taught that not only heroes but

the wise and even the virtuous might become divinized. And, as the hoped-for reward for merit came to seem more likely, the fear of punishment in case of failure became more terrifying. So long as Hades harbored the good it was not a punishment; but, if there were an Elysium for them, there must logically be a Tartarus for the others.

Inscriptions on many of the tombstones beg the passers-by to pray for the soul of the departed. Since such prayers would be useless if the only afterlife were in the tomb or a common Hades, there must have been an expectation not only of a better or worse alternative, but also of a possibility that a man's destiny might be ameliorated after death.

That such persons as Caesar and Lucretius chose to publicize their disbelief in any kind of immortality suggests that too many of the beliefs in it were causing fear rather than hope. Disbelief, however, was equally unwelcome and the obvious alternative was to render the prospect of an afterlife more palatable. In order to succeed, however, a moral differentiation had to be recognized and alleged; for faith in temporal justice, plausible enough if Romans be regarded as a moral unit, was incredible if applied to individuals. Therefore only the conception of an afterlife where individual wrongs would be righted could offer the good a new hope and at the same time create an incentive for everybody to try to be good. That this solution was thought out by anyone may be doubtful, but, reflecting on the dilemma, we cannot see what other available solution could have been preferred.

Since every Roman was at liberty to believe what he liked about the afterlife there was no general or orthodox doctrine. However, the Sixth Book of Virgil's *Aeneid*, sanctioned by Augustus and probably representative of enlightened opinion, seems to have had a considerable and lasting influence. Perhaps in order to avoid being dogmatic, Virgil expounded alternative beliefs. In the first a Last Judgment, presided over by Radamanthus as agent of Jupiter, condemned the guilty to a fearful Tartarus, and opened a blissful Elysium to the innocent. There was even a limbo for those who, like the infant, deserved neither punishment nor reward. The second belief, which recalls the tomb inscriptions, describes a common purgatory where the impurities which the souls had ac-

quired by their contact with matter were gradually removed over a period of a thousand years. The soul would then rest until reincarnated.

This reincarnation, however, was not that of the Pythagoreans, which was a continuous series of transmigrations until the soul had so far purified itself as to win an eternal salvation on its merits. It was rather that of the Greek Stoics, which was a reincarnation of the soul in what was virtually its identical body, and this only at the termination of the Great Year when, following the lead of the heavenly bodies, everything on earth was also doomed to repeat itself precisely as it had done before.

The Roman Stoics, however, seem to have imagined a more static afterlife, graduated, as later in Dante, according to merit. The good were to gain an eternal reward in heaven, the less good an abode, perhaps not eternal, in the less perfect planetary spheres, and the evil, and perhaps more ignorant, no survival at all. Since this disposal of souls was not consistent with a renewal at the end of the Great Year, they had perhaps, because of other influences, discarded this essentially cosmological rather than religious concept.

What was the nature of this Roman virtue? Horace recognized inner intention rather than outward performance and, in consequence, virtue as purity of heart rather than any aggregate of isolated acts. Virtue was not a many but a One. Nothing was hidden from the gods. All mankind are brothers and should be so treated, but rather because this was salutary discipline for oneself than because it helped the beneficiary. For there was still the taint of egotistical self-respect, and, since one's own reward was the acknowledged end, compassion, however deeply felt, remained but a means to that end.

Furthermore strength was more prized than weakness. The effort should be rather to emulate God than to surrender to Him, rather to rise to than be raised by Him. The end was to earn His just reward rather than to resign oneself to His mercy. It was self-mastery rather than self-abasement, in order that one need depend neither on the world nor even on God but only on oneself.

Such at least was the Roman ethics which culminated in the Stoic Seneca, the contemporary of Jesus Christ.

JEWISH BELIEFS

THE BELIEFS of the Jews may be conveniently divided into three historical epochs: that of the patriarchs, that of the prophets, and finally that which immediately preceded the coming of Christ.

In the time of the patriarchs their God Jehovah was pictured in their own image, superhuman rather than supernatural, who ruled the air, weather, and people in their vicinity—Himself virtually a Jew too, whose life and interests were bound up with their own.

As such, His powers were limited in space as theirs were. Like their own kings and captains He ruled over them and helped fight their battles. For other peoples had other, corresponding, gods; and while men were fighting other men, their God fought other gods. While men performed their feats of bravery, their God performed His feats too, by overcoming not only natural but other superhuman resistances. Although admittedly the artificer of the world, He was nonetheless always true to Israel.

Most striking was His morality. Just, at bottom, He was for that very reason sensitive to injustice, and when upset by it was subject to fits of wrath. He was particularly upset by acts of supposed injustice to Himself, for as God He had the right to demand the complete obedience, loyalty, and devotion of His subjects. He was not too squeamish about their behavior towards other men, and even connived in their attempts to deceive one another; but at the first sign that He Himself was being deceived or even slighted He flew into a jealous rage. In other words He demanded loyalty above all, and in

order to obtain it He had no compunctions about inspiring his subjects not only with respect but with fear. Some modern commentators have even asserted that this Jehovah was a natural bully.

Men had to curry favor with Him, to keep in His good graces, and this was most easily done in time of battle when the interests of both were identical and ethical niceties might be ignored. But in peacetime, when Jehovah was more conscious of His dignity and more suspicious of His worshippers, the techniques to be employed were ticklish. It was then that Jehovah was hardest to please, because loyalty must now too often be demonstrated by mere words rather than deeds, and, unlike deeds, words could be deceitful.

Words, that is prayers, were nonetheless indispensable in order to placate Jehovah, prayers of thanksgiving for past favors, of repentance for past sins, of request for future favors. But more tangible evidence of devoted loyalty must be added in the form of sacrifices—of first fruits usually, whether vegetable, animal, or even human. These various manifestations took a ritual form; but ritual as magic—that is, as having an element of physical or other compulsion—was not at this time envisaged.

The succeeding age, after 750, was launched by the prophets, who now first envisaged their God not as mere Jew, but as the sole and undisputed ruler over all mankind. His justice was no longer military; He had no need to resort to opportunism or expediency. He could afford to be just—strictly just—though He was not wholly forgetting that special devotion to the Jews which had led Him to make them His Chosen People.

In this new role Jehovah became a full-fledged God. As ruler of the world He had to reside above it, as He had before resided above Israel. He was no longer immanent now, but transcendent. For the same reason He was not merely wise but omniscient, His knowledge penetrating not only time and space but even the most secret thoughts of men. And the better He understood men, the less they understood Him.

His power, too, being now unlimited, He controlled past and future as well as present. By Isaiah and Ezekiel, who were

prophesying His future Coming, He was no longer being depicted as a mere artificer of the cosmos, but as the Creator, by the mere exercise of His will, of everything out of nothing.

Jehovah's power had increased at the expense not only of the other deities but also of man. However, although now physically helpless, conspicuously so in battle, man retained, and perhaps by way of compensation even sharpened, his free will. He got a more certain and sympathetic help if he deserved it, but also a more severe chastisement if he did not.

A nice sense of right and wrong was not, however, to be acquired overnight. As an expedient, therefore, and in order to retain their status as the Chosen People, the Jews stressed the tradition of an ancient covenant between Jehovah and His People whereby if they would faithfully obey His law, and particularly that which He had revealed to Moses, He would, in return, protect and even favor them. Regarding morals, this law consisted chiefly of 'Thou shalt not's'; regarding observances, it consisted chiefly of ritual. Because ritual was the easier to accomplish, the tendency was to emphasize its importance at the expense not only of good thoughts and intentions but even of good deeds.

As Jehovah's attention seemed to become more concentrated on man, so man's attention became more concentrated on himself, and the result was another new belief, that God had created everything purely for man's sake. First God had emancipated Himself from Nature by becoming not merely its artificer but its creator; now man was emancipating himself from Nature too. The two protagonists had now stepped forward to the front of the stage, with Nature serving merely as a backdrop.

So long as Jehovah was believed to be a mere superman whose power was limited and therefore imperfect, He could not be wholly blamed if, in order to gain His ends, He resorted to otherwise questionable means. Like any statesman, He had often been forced to choose merely the lesser of two or more evil courses. It was not then really He who was the cause of evil but rather other agencies, perhaps Fate or Chance, perhaps matter or Nature, or perhaps other rival and therefore evil deities. In His new role, however, He could no longer be

so easily excused. By becoming sole Creator and Cause, He became the cause of evil too.

How was He then to be exculpated? On the assumption that the people as a whole, in contrast to each person individually, bore the sole responsibility for good or bad behavior, several suggestions were offered, more ingenious than satisfactory.

One of these was offered in order to explain why the reigns of several of the evil kings who succeeded David were so prosperous. It was because David had earned such merit during his life that he deserved a greater reward than he received, and this excess was accordingly inherited by his successors. David had, as it were, atoned for their sins in advance.

As this was based on a theory of accumulated merits, so the second was based on the companion theory of accumulated demerits. Thus in order to explain the misfortunes suffered by Israel under good kings it was argued that, because the earlier Jews had died without fully atoning for their misdeeds, "the sins of the fathers shall be visited on the sons, yea, even unto the third and fourth generations."

The third suggestion was, like this second one, offered in order to explain why the Jews appeared to be suffering misfortunes out of all proportion to their deserts. This, it was explained, was because Jehovah had chosen their people, on account of their unique excellence, for the signal honor of being made to suffer, undeservedly, in atonement for the sins of the Gentiles, in order that these, edified by the display of Jewish virtue in adversity, might the better recognize and acclaim their Jehovah as the one true God.

This last suggestion, that Israel had been chosen as the sacrificial lamb for the sake not only of Jehovah but of all mankind, constituted an early attempt to penetrate the secret of divine, in contrast to purely human, justice. But the idea was probably too edifying to win wide acceptance. The first two suggestions were doubtless more to the taste of the average Jew, but they too ran counter to the now growing belief that true justice, even if obscure because divine, must consider not mankind, not all Jews whether dead, alive, or yet unborn, nor even only those now alive, but rather each individual irrespective of whether he happened to be dead, alive, or yet un-

born. Therefore all three suggestions, being based on the theory of communal or joint moral responsibility which characterizes a clan stage of civilization, became inapplicable as awareness grew that the moral unit is individual and that rewards and punishments, if they are to be truly just, must be individually and not vicariously bestowed. The alternation between belief in vicarious atonement and belief in personal responsibility is best revealed in the *Psalms*.

In the early period human history had been regarded as a series of advances in wisdom accompanied by a corresponding deterioration in piety. To these Jews, as to their Greek contemporary Hesiod, man had passed successively through four metallurgical ages, from the golden, to the silver, to the bronze, to the iron. What hope, then, had the future to offer?

At first the prophecy was of doom: that Jehovah would eventually lose all patience and in His anger wipe man out in punishment. But hope later succeeded despair, giving rise to the belief in a Messianic promise that Jehovah would ultimately give them a human savior—a son of David—to bring back the legendary glory of Israel's past and thereby, if a bit incidentally, a Kingdom of God on earth for all mankind.

The first was an eighth-century expectation, the second a sixth-century emendation. In the fifth century the priests undertook to reverse these concepts of the prophets by supposing the four ages to be an advance, not in general knowledge but only in Jehovah's specifically revealed injunctions: whereby piety instead of declining had steadily increased—from Adam, to Noah, to Abraham, to Moses. The complete and final revelation had been to Moses; henceforth man had been told precisely what he must do, and it was therefore up to him and to him alone to do it.

By the Covenant the Jews had promised to try to do just what Jehovah asked of them; in return Jehovah had promised that the better they obeyed the more He would see to it that they prospered, in power, riches, happiness. For they were the Chosen Race. Pragmatically, at any rate, there were two defects to this theory. The first was that the meticulous ritual supposedly constituting obedience was a mechanical procedure with no substantial relation to right living, virtuous intentions, or even virtuous acts. The layman at any rate,

whether virtuously or viciously inclined, realized this. The second defect was that, on the face of it, the theory had not proved true: in contrast to the Jews, many of the Gentile peoples had fared far better, certainly in power and riches, probably too therefore in happiness. A return to the belief in a future intervention by Jehovah which should miraculously reward the faithful, whether because ritually or morally deserving, was therefore in order.

The variety of Apocalypses that was prophesied need not be elaborated here. Some, as we have seen, prophesied punishments, others rewards; some imagined rewards only for the pious Jews, others rewards for all Jews, others rewards for all mankind; some looked for Jehovah Himself, others for a Messiah who was a descendant of David; some imagined a mere annihilation of the wicked, others a positive punishment. Finally all imagined an eternal survival, but although it was most generally supposed that the new life would still be a carnal one in an earthly paradise resembling Eden, a few were beginning to envisage it more spiritually, in a closer communion with their now transcendent God.

The optimism of 490 B.C., which had envisaged a steady improvement in piety and thereby in just treatment and prosperity, was in turn to be superseded by pessimism. The growing concern that Jehovah, although perhaps just to Israel as a people, was not just to individual Jews, is indicated by a new prominence given to Satan as at least a troublesome if not a malicious power who thwarted Jehovah's best intentions. In the beginning Jehovah had been thought neither wholly powerful nor wholly benevolent; later His power had seemed to overshadow His benevolence. Now, however, benevolence had become His paramount quality, and, in order to emphasize it, some of His power had to be attributed to some less desirable agency.

In the early second century Israel fell into the power of the Hellenistic-Seleucid kings of Syria, and she then suffered her first strictly religious persecution accompanied by martyrdoms. The complete absence of any temporal justice for individuals thereby became more obvious than ever before, and one result was that the doctrine of a progressive advance by a

mere observance of the law of Moses was discarded in favor of the contrasting earlier view, that of a progressive deterioration until Jehovah should intervene to reverse the trend. The chief difference was that instead of the four metallurgical stages from gold to silver to bronze to iron, there were now four political stages, from the mild hegemony of the Babylonians, to that of the Medes, the Persians, and the present intolerable Hellenistic-Seleucids. Their priests could not save them, nor any mere son of David, but only Jehovah Himself.

Such was the conclusion of the author of the *Book of Daniel*, who wrote soon after 164. But the *Book of Ecclesiastes* which followed ridiculed such wishful thinking. Besides, even this explanation was not a satisfactory one, for, although it would save future generations the miseries of temporal injustice, it would do nothing to repair the injustices already inflicted on the innocent dead. Surely the good Jehovah would not let them rot interminably and unrewarded in their graves.

Belief in the immortality of the soul had by this time become general among the peoples of the Orient. But the Jews had so far clung instead only to the expectation of a Kingdom of God on earth for future generations, and it was questionable whether the immortality then expected was to be individual or merely racial and religious. In any case it would not include any of those who, at the time, were already dead.

Certain sixth-century passages in *Job* were taken as intimations of an afterlife, but the idea did not catch, and it was not until an annotation in *Isaiah*, written in about 250 B.C., that it was revived, in the form of a future resurrection which included bodies as well as souls. This was repeated in 164 B.C. with the addition that many "of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." Apparently not even all the Jews were to be so destined, and the everlasting life or contempt was still to be on earth. Nonetheless the decisive novelty in both texts was that the personalities of the dead might, at least in some cases, everlastingly survive.

In *Ecclesiastes*, to be sure, the latest of the canonical books, this belief was questioned, and the succeeding texts which defended it confined the resurrections to the soul. In these, Hellenistic influence is recognizable, and in the last pre-Christian

texts the issue had become a burning one, with the Pharisees adopting the Hellenistic view of immortality of the soul emancipated from the burden of matter, in opposition to the traditional Jewish view of a physical as well as spiritual survival in an earthly paradise for those of their descendants who should remain true to the traditions of their race.

B O O K I I

The Mediterranean Under the Roman Empire

THE NEW TESTAMENT

JESUS, founder of Christianity, was a Jew, evidently steeped from early youth in the lore of the Old Testament and sharing the opinion of the Pharisees which, in contrast to that of the Sadducees, held man's soul to be immortal.

Thus inspired by the texts of the prophets and shocked by the contrast between their ideals and the worldly attitude and behavior of even the more reputable priests and laymen, who identified correct ritual observance with moral virtue, his sensitive spirit revolted against what he called the world.

From the Old Testament he had also learned of the many apocalyptic prophecies of a coming Messiah, a son of David, who was to herald the end of the world as it then was and inaugurate a new and happier era. Like the Pharisees, he understood this not as a temporal utopia on earth but as a supernatural survival: blissful for the deserving, miserable for the undeserving.

Because he felt that life in the present corrupt world was unbearable, he assumed that it could not last, that the end might come at any moment, and that when it did, only a very few could possibly deserve other than an eternal punishment. Men's only hope for salvation was a quick repentance for past sins.

But how was a man to know whether he had repented? In order to encourage him to make the effort it was essential to hold before him the prospect of knowing whether or not he had succeeded. So when Jesus saw that John the Baptist was receiving the repentant and was professing to obtain their pardon by the rite of baptism, he followed suit, promising pardon

even to all who should do no more than believe in his own supernatural power of forgiveness.

1. DIVINITY OF JESUS

The problem of the divinity of Jesus has two aspects. The more familiar one relates to the fact, but another relates to his own belief regarding that fact. The former problem is doubtless the more fundamental, but the latter is not purely academic. For if it is unlikely that Jesus, although in fact substantially divine, remained ignorant of this, it is almost as unlikely that he was aware of it from birth. The problem therefore imposes itself of when and how he came to believe in his divine nature.

It would seem fair to suppose that this realization came gradually and even by distinctive stages. At first he believed himself to be a specially inspired, but still wholly human, agent of God, another prophet—teacher of course as well as seer. Then, as his successful conversions and his cures—whether in fact miraculous or not—multiplied, he began to see himself as something unique, chosen not only to speak in God's name but to act as only a divine power can act. Was he not, therefore, probably the very Messiah whose coming had been so long prophesied, destined not merely to prepare men for the Messiah's coming but to be him as well?

For a long time, however, he apparently remained uncertain: even if he were the Messiah, was he not perhaps still only a man? May this not explain his frequent care to keep secret not only his miracles but his teaching? At one time he glorified himself as a god; at other times he abased himself, his self-confidence replaced by premonitions inducing dread and even fear. His mood shifted from the one extreme to the other. Was he, as the Messiah, doomed to die, and, if so, what was to be the nature of his resurrection? At times he felt and behaved like a god, at other times like a mere man.

2. REDEMPTION

It was clear to him that as Messiah, he must die as a sacrifice, for this had been prophesied. But why was this foreordained?

Later it was supposed that it was in order to break the Devil's power over men, and this explanation was already suggested in *John*.

But to Jesus the Devil was rather a personification of human temptation than an independent superhuman force. He held to the more ancient view that Jehovah's will was not impeded by any other Being or power. This concept, however, had become complicated because, unless there were immortality, justice had to be realized during mortal life; and in order to make this plausible the idea of vicarious rewards and punishments had been evolved and accepted. Thus David's merit had saved some of his sinful successors from punishment, and conversely the unpunished sins of the fathers had had to be expiated by their sons.

Belief in immortality theoretically eliminated the need for such ingenious, yet not wholly satisfactory, explanations: for temporal injustices could now be righted in the next world. But Jesus did not wholly rid himself of the old hypothesis of vicarious merits and demerits. Although he might well have shrunk from seeking such help for himself, he nevertheless urged others to seek it from him. Men, he reasoned, were by and large too far steeped in sin to deserve a happy afterlife: a just judgment must condemn all but a very few, such as the prophets of old, to hell. But if he, although innocent of sin, could die a cruel and humiliating death, he might not only earn a personal reward in heaven but might also, like David, earn the further reward of winning salvation for many who were presumably not going to earn it by their own efforts. This merit, which he was to earn over and above what was required for his own salvation, was what later came to be called divine grace.

Observe that God remained the familiar Jehovah: still just, but obliged now, as a just judge, to reward the merit of Jesus, and there was no other way of doing this than by allowing men to be, because Jesus had wished them to be, the beneficiaries. This is what was meant by Jesus' ransom of men by his blood.

Strictly speaking, therefore, Jesus did not soften God's heart to mercy, nor did he outwit the Devil. Rather he put God into such a position that, as a just judge, He was obliged

to be merciful. Jehovah had not changed; but Jesus, by taking advantage of Jehovah's own recognition of vicarious justice, forced Him to behave as if He had.

This Jehovah, too, was still the god of the Jews, most of whom did not recognize the divine authority or nature of Jesus. Thus Christians would come to teach that, although belief in Jesus presumed belief in Jehovah, this new Jehovah, as the Christian Father, was a mere pale reflection of His old self. First it was rather Jesus who presided over the Last Judgment, saving or damning as he chose; later it was also Jesus who was the creator of heaven and earth and so of all men. This Jesus, indeed, who, at least in the beginning, had represented himself as the subservient emissary of Jehovah, was already said by Paul to have "thought it not robbery to be equal with God."

3. SALVATION

The sacrifice of Jesus rendered men's salvation far easier than before, but it did not mean that all, including the undeserving, would be saved. How then must men go about it in order to become deserving? Faith in Jehovah and a virtuous life had, before the coming of Jesus, occasionally earned this reward as a matter of strict justice, but something more was now requisite; namely, a faith that the teaching, behavior, and miraculous power of Jesus was of divine origin.

Paul was later to define faith as "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." This was faith that Jesus was divine and therefore spoke the truth. But faith in the unseen is based nonetheless on what has been seen. We may properly consider, therefore, which of these appeared the more cogent. It does not seem to have been the virgin birth as described in *Luke*; nor, unless incidentally, Jesus' apparent fulfilment of the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament. It was not primarily even the purity of the morality he taught, for to those at all familiar with the words of the old Jewish prophets there was less novelty than truth in them. It was partly, no doubt, his courage in facing the Cross, but it was primarily his miracles, and chief of these, his resurrection after death.

How was salvation to come by this faith? This problem,

soon to be so debated, was not faced at once because all who wanted faith obtained it, and the others did not care. But it had to be faced as soon as it was realized that faith could not of itself save, but that good works must supplement it. For whereas anyone who wanted to believe could and did, almost none of those who wanted to achieve perfect virtue could and did. The harder men strove the more conscious they became of their failure and the more likely they were to suspect that the power was not in them but only in Jesus, the omnipotent and arbitrary dispenser of his free grace. On the other hand, these same men were the very ones most aware of the potentialities of will power and therefore of its moral implications. Within a generation Paul was already in the throes of this dilemma.

To Jesus, faith in his divinity sufficed for salvation, he himself judging in each case whether it was sincere or sham. He prescribed, however, that this faith must be proved by submission to the rite of baptism as a public avowal of faith and repentance, thereby assuring men a state of mind fit to receive, through the Holy Ghost, a share of the merit which Jesus had earned on their behalf.

The recurring supper together, of bread and wine, in memory of Jesus after his death was a natural way of keeping an eye on the baptized lest they stray from the fold. In order to encourage attendance it was also natural to hold out concrete benefits to the participants. To this end the enigmatic words of Jesus as he served the bread and wine—"this is my body" and "this is my blood" and "whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life"—were interpreted so literally that, so long as the persecution lasted, it was believed that all such communicants, since they risked their lives by so doing, would, if only they did not thereafter falter, be automatically saved.

Apart from the formalities of baptism and communion, however, the distinction between faith and works was at first blurred because it was taken for granted that without faith good deeds were impossible and that with good deeds lack of faith was impossible. The *First Epistle of John* drew the corollary that "every one that doeth righteousness is born of him."

The works which came to be required in addition to faith came in time to constitute the heart of Christian teaching and the chief cause of its later popularity. Yet the Revelation itself was clearly designed as a moral code, not for any enduring temporal life but solely for an extreme emergency. It was a code with which to face not life but death. Implicit obedience to the precepts of Jesus was indispensable to salvation, and this involved a complete renunciation of temporal attachments: a disregard of food, clothing, family and friends, of any thought for the morrow, of nonresistance to evil even if it threatened others than oneself. So great was the hurry that one might not even bury the dead. Works of charity, even, were commendable only in so far as they benefited the giver. And the only intrinsically constructive work was that of converting the sinner, a deed which "shall hide a multitude of sins."

On the borderline between purely passive faith and purely active deeds were other requisites. First and most important was the love of neighbor; next was prayer: for the forgiveness of one's own sins and those of others, especially of the sick. Prayers were deemed especially efficacious if said jointly and in common, and the more virtuous were those who offered the prayers the more likely they were to be heeded—for the good reason that they were more likely to conform to God's will. Recommendable also were mutual exchanges of confessions of sins, regardless apparently of the availability of one having special authority. Salvation was more easily to be won by a poor and ignorant man—of evil, or at least of no, repute. Contrariwise those who were rich were at a disadvantage, for "they have their reward"; "woe unto you that laugh now! for ye shall mourn and weep."

The promises made to induce conversions were not only that present sufferings would be short and future rewards eternal; to his apostles Jesus promised further that they would "sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel."

Those who had qualms because the rewards offered seemed out of proportion to the merit required were assured that, however selfish their desire to be saved might be, it was not to be accounted sinful. For, as Paul said, to cultivate virtue was folly unless in order thereby to win a happy immortality.

Love, therefore, was frankly based on the promise of future favors, whether love of God or love of neighbor for God's sake. It was also frankly based on gratitude for favors already received. For in the parable of the two debtors Jesus asks Peter which of them will love their creditor most. And Peter answering "he to whom he forgave most," Jesus replied "thou hast rightly judged." It would seem, therefore, as if the possibility of a wholly disinterested love was not envisaged.

4. ORIGINAL SIN

The Old Testament had been vague about demons. The serpent who tempted Eve was a mere serpent, punished only by having thereafter to go on his belly and eat dust for "all the days of thy life." In general the demons were spirits of the air, some of whom were sorcerers. In *Job* Satan was rather a prosecuting angel than a fiend, and even to Jesus he was, as we have said, rather a personification of sin than an independent entity and potential power.

But to the disciples the Devil appeared not only as the authorized tempter of man but also as a substantial obstacle to the omnipotence of God. In his role as prince of the air or of the world, he had long shared much of the power, and as the Antichrist who was to be finally destroyed only at the end of the world, he became one of the cornerstones of the Christian faith.

Since God had created all things, however, He had also created the Devil, and the best explanation was that he and his minions had once been angels but, having declared their independence of God, were punished accordingly. Since the damnation of men to hell was now recognized, it was natural enough to suppose that these demons had been sent there also, to make themselves useful to God by torturing the damned men.

Because Jewish belief in immortality was a late development, the problem of inherited guilt was not acute. Adam had had free will and had sinned, and his descendants likewise. That the sins of the fathers were often visited on the sons was a matter of common observation. That every child was born guilty, however, or that every man, because he had free will

to sin, must inevitably fall prey to the Devil unless he received supernatural help, was not believed by the old Jews or by Jesus.

Even Paul, although he laid the groundwork for these beliefs, did not specifically introduce them. Of the first stage he said: "death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned . . . for sin is not imputed when there is no Law."

But God, through Moses, having revealed the Law, the evil which almost all men continued to do became sin and, after Christ's further revelation, so much the more sinful. Mere belief in Jehovah had not stemmed the flood of sin, but the promise of Jesus that men, by believing also in him, would be able to resist it, now offered a way out: "for as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous."

Paul does not say that the descendants of Adam were born guilty but only that they were born with an irresistible propensity to sin, a propensity which, we may say parenthetically, was not absent in Adam himself. So unnatural was the punishment, for this was no longer ephemeral vicissitude but eternal torture, that neither Paul nor any one of his time dared to believe that Jehovah, the father now of Jesus, had willingly imposed it. Was it not possible, then, that the blame could somehow be put on the Devil?

As a Jew brought up in the Jewish faith, Jesus at times supposed that his redemptive mission was confined to that race and faith. "I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel." For he sensibly assumed that to undertake more would result only in accomplishing less. It was to be the task of his disciples to carry his revelation abroad. This they achieved with such remarkable success that Paul could boast, if hyperbolically, of the Gospel "which was preached to every creature under heaven."

5. PREDESTINATION

By means of this self-limitation Jesus was able to avoid the problem of the fate of those who, although surviving the day

of his Passion and Resurrection, had never heard of him or of his teaching. To Jesus those chiefly deserving of hell were the obdurate Jews who had heard him and yet plotted to kill him, whereas to his disciples the damned included all the unbaptized the world over. The question was then first raised, therefore, of why God, so just and never a respecter of persons, should seem to be still so unfair. If the Jewish converts did not worry, the Gentile converts did.

This difference in perspective, moreover, may explain the contrast between the bitterness of Jesus towards those who repudiated his teaching and the mild and detached castigations of Paul. For whereas Jesus was damning only those who could, but would not, heed him, Paul was constrained also to condemn all those who, scattered over the whole earth, could not heed him or any other Christian if they would.

These different perspectives may also explain why Jesus took free will for granted. For virtually every Jew had been given a fair chance to heed him or not. Paul, on the other hand, flirted with predestination: "for who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?" For time must elapse, perhaps a long time, during which some were being saved, while others, through no fault of their own, must go on being damned. That God had thus predestined these because He had foreknown that they would have rejected Jesus even if they had heard him, Paul, rather desperately perhaps, suggested: "for whom He did foreknow He did also predestinate." But he did not insist, perhaps because he foreknew the later decision of the Church that God, even if He could foreknow, would neither reward nor punish men on account of deeds which although they were necessarily disposed to, they did not ever in fact, commit.

6. FORGIVENESS

The first task must be to sanctify as many as possible before the end of the world; but as time passed and it did not come, some of those who had so hastily become sanctified relapsed into their former worldly ways—to be inelegantly compared to "the dog turned to his own vomit."

Such persons had once already, by baptism, been forgiven the sins they had committed before heeding the teaching of Jesus. Should they, having again sinned and repented, again be forgiven? And, if this second time, why not a third and fourth? In his *First Epistle* John is for forgiveness if the sin be "not unto death"; for him, therefore, who did sin unto death, further forgiveness was to be withheld.

There was already the apostate as well as sinner: he who, having been sanctified, had "trodden under-foot the Son of God" and had "counted the blood of the covenant . . . an unholy thing." "Of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy?"

Man's fate was to be sealed only at the Last Judgment, and in deference to God as well as from distrust in human discernment, Jesus said, "Judge not, that ye be not judged." Yet he also told Peter and later all the disciples that whatsoever they shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and that "whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained."

In the first case the authority was perhaps limited to defining what sins are mortal, but in the latter case the authority extended to pinning the sin on a particular man. They were therefore given authority to judge, but presumably only of whether a man's sins were "not unto death" and therefore remissible, or "unto death" and therefore unremissible unless by Jesus himself.

7. LOVE AND HATE

One of the most often reiterated evidences of faith was that, although a man must love his neighbor as himself, he must hate the world and the world must hate him. This involved repudiation not merely of carnal things, but also of friends and even of family, unless these were either Christians like himself or, presumably, likely prospects for conversion. In general he must despise the temporal life and therefore be unhappy so long as he was alive.

Now since unhappiness was indispensable to Christian piety, it came to be identified with it, and Jesus drew the natural

conclusion that all men who had lived miserably (as had Lazarus, for example) would, whether Christians or not, be somehow saved on that account. For his sense of justice demanded that the miserable on earth be happy thereafter and, contrariwise, that the happy on earth, those who had loved life, be miserable: for already "they have their reward."

God therefore sees to it that the sinner shall live and die happy—"He is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil"—and He sees to it also that no happy man be good. In accord with this assumption, it was taught that in order to be happy on earth one had only to eat, drink, and be merry.

So extreme a view, however, was hard to maintain consistently. Compensations, for instance, were given to the disciples and, by inference, to other true Christians. They may not only, as Jesus says metaphorically, move mountains, "they shall (safely) take up serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing it shall not hurt them." They may also enjoy the pleasure of exorcizing those possessed of devils and of curing the sick by a laying on of hands. Yet surely such powers were not well calculated to intensify their hatred of the world, or the world's hatred of them.

There were other suggestions that some degree of temporal justice might be operative:

And as Jesus passed by, he saw a man which was blind from his birth. And his disciples asked him, saying, Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind? Jesus answered, neither hath this man sinned nor his parents, but that the works of God should be made manifest in him. (*John*, IX, 1-3.)

Here the plain intimation is that if the man himself or his parents had sinned, temporal justice might well have operated to blind him; and that far from having been blinded in order that he might the better come to hate the world, it was only so arranged in order that Jesus might the more conspicuously manifest his power by curing him.

A final indication of how, as the coming of the end of the world seemed ever to be postponed, the belief in temporal injustice weakened, is the admonition in 1 *Peter* iii 10. "For he that will love life, and see good days, let him refrain from evil." Since this is a paraphrase of *Psalms* 34, 12-13, it presumably refers not to the future but to the present life.

ORIENTAL BELIEFS, 100-250

1. DECLINE OF THE WEST

IN ABOUT the year A.D. 100 the distinguished ruling Romans hailed largely from Italy and Spain. Seventy years later it was otherwise. The Emperor Marcus Aurelius, last of the Stoics, was a Roman; of his successors one was Greek, two were North African, two were Egyptian, two were Lydian, and three were Syrian. By the early third century the Orientals were in complete control, of government, law, science, philosophy, and religion. Rome still ruled, but the Africans and Asians ruled Rome. The popes may have represented orthodoxy partly because they were reluctant to resist the popular tide.

2. GREEK AND ROMAN

The Greek, and especially the Eleusinian, mysteries had maintained a certain popularity. Cicero had chosen to be initiated, and every emperor until after Marcus Aurelius did likewise. There are even evidences of their survival in the fourth century.

The worship of the emperor also persisted, but it assumed more and more a political than a religious importance. The Christian emperors, indeed, were willing to hold the office of Pontifex Maximus and to receive divine honors after their deaths, until 367. But in the course of the second century these European cults became obsolete.

3. CAPPADOCIAN AND PHRYGIAN

Of the Oriental cults which were brought to Rome by immigration, those from Cappadocia and Phrygia, both in central Asia Minor, were apparently the first. At any rate they were the first to reach, and pass, their peak of influence: the Cappadocian about A.D. 1, the Phrygian forty years later.

The Cappadocian Mâ was a war goddess and in her ceremonial dances men struck each other with swords and axes, and drank the blood thus drawn. That her cult could enjoy even a brief popularity in Rome was a sign that the time was coming when analogous beliefs might have a more lasting success.

The Phrygian Magna Mater cult, of Cybele and Attis, had a longer vogue. Although no emperor but Claudius openly encouraged it, the idea of a man dying and then being resurrected as a god, and of men, by the blood bath of the Taurobolum, being able to share in this resurrection, was not one which was to lose its appeal. Doubtless the annual resurrection of Attis had at first signified only the return of the fertility of spring, but the belief in Rome seems to have included a faith in a propitious immortality as well. Mithraism was, as we shall see, to adopt the blood bath for its own purposes.

4. EGYPTIAN

In the early Egyptian cult was the belief in a cosmic warfare between the beneficent gods of light, rain, and health, and those of darkness, drought, and disease; the ritual, by simulating the cosmic battle as suggested by the recurring seasons and even eclipses, was designed to further the victory of the propitious powers. But the benefits expected were merely temporal and even seasonal.

It was only later that these supernatural forces became specialized and thereby personalized. The Egyptian Isis evolved as the favored deity because to her were attributed the domestication of wheat and even the invention of the plow which could be drawn by oxen. She also became the Goddess of mar-

riage, possibly because the more sedentary agricultural life facilitated a more permanent family life.

It was then that Isis acquired a husband, Osiris, who, having been killed by evil powers, was resuscitated by Isis, who thereby became the goddess even of life itself. To be sure, Osiris was obliged thereafter to live underground but, since he was still a beneficent god, he was able to make a beneficent and even attractive abode for himself. The only trouble was that he needed help in the way of food and clothing in order to survive there; the meticulous and sumptuous ritual, therefore, included offerings of the food and clothing which would ensure his well-being. Later it came to be believed that, as a result of the ritual, he must reciprocate by receiving his votaries there, body and soul, to share his serene and eternal existence. But should he not prosper there, neither would they.

Until about A.D. 100, moral behavior was not a requisite for this immortality, but the ritual did include periodical ascetic practices, evidently offered as proof of the sincerity and intensity of one's devotion. At least the later Roman votaries were reported as bathing in the icy Tiber and crawling on bleeding knees. Thus the only virtues demanded by these gods were those of self-humiliation as proofs of loyalty. There was no thought of love for god or of pity for mankind.

Although this cult seems to have reached its peak of influence in the empire by the year 200, many traces of it are of a much later date.

5. SYRIAN

There were several Syrian gods, and it is not clear if they were included in a single belief, or, if they represented distinctive beliefs, how far these were contemporaneous or successive. The goddess Atargatis was worshipped in 190 B.C.; by A.D. 1, the god Adonis is recorded as having died and been resurrected. Soon after there is record of Astarte, goddess of love, and, before A.D. 150, there was a god Baal, and apparently more than one. Baal had originally been a god of earth and fertility and his abode an underground Hades. Later he was god of thunder and, perhaps still later, of the sun. Finally, probably under Chaldean influence, he was regarded as resident in

heaven and mover of the circling stars. As such he had neither died nor been resurrected, being instead omnipotent and eternal.

When Baal lived in Hades it was there too that men went after death, and when later he lived in heaven, it was there that at least the good men went, whereas the bad ones were still doomed to Hades. Chaldean influence led to the belief that the physical world was at the mercy of the stars, but that man's will was left free. As man had originally fallen from heaven to earth, so the good at least would at death arise above the influence of the fateful stars, to complete freedom and bliss.

This Syrian cult flourished in Rome particularly under the Syrian emperors Caracalla and Alexander Severus, from 218 to 235. With Mithraism it shared the doubtful honor of introducing into the empire the worship of the sun and stars and thereby, if incidentally, it encouraged the art of magic. These were more and more to infect paganism, and almost 300 years later, as the sixth century began, they were still dominating the thought of the last schools of Greek philosophy.

6. PERSIAN MITHRAISM

The Persian cult known as Mithraism likewise spread from East to West. Under a Persian dynasty it was brought into Asia Minor and, after the defeat of its king Mithridates in 64 B.C., Mithraism was diffused throughout the empire, by the defeated slaves and pirates now, as well as by soldiers. Some 250 years later it had become the dominant Oriental religion. About 185 the Emperor Commodus was initiated, and although its prestige declined after the year 250, it was still the favored cult of the soldier-emperors Diocletian, Galerius, and Licinius. Even Julian tried to incorporate it into his pagan pantheon.

The belief is usually described as dualistic, but it must not be overlooked that the sovereign power was a One. This One was Infinite Time or Fate or Destiny, creator and destroyer of all things. On the one hand Time had created Oromasdès, now identified with Jupiter, god of heaven; Spènta-Armaîti,

now Juno, goddess of earth; and Apâm-Napât, now Neptune, god of the ocean, who was their son. By these all the lesser gods had been produced. On the other hand, Time had also created Ahriman, now Pluto, god of the underworld, who, by Hecate, daughter of the Titan Tartarus or Night, had produced all the lesser demons. But if Fate is Time, Time is not Fate. For, given time, not only gods and demons but even men can affect events occurring in time without changing the ultimate destiny.

Originally there had been no contact between the upper spiritual and the lower material worlds. But, as the creations succeeded one another, conflicts occurred. The celestial bodies acquired certain evil passions and so, as other souls fell further, they in turn got caught in matter and became incarnated men. It was then that Ahriman, angered at such intrusions, with the aid of his fellow demons assaulted heaven, and the outcome remained doubtful until Oromasdès called on Mithra for help.

This Mithra was a popular hero of legend, born miraculously of a stone. His first exploit had been to master the sun, and, since the sun was regarded as the governor of the celestial bodies, from this central position as the fourth in order of the planets he was able to regulate their orbits. Did this conception contain an intimation of gravity and so of the heliocentric theory? In any case Mithra had conquered an ideal strategic base for further operations.

Next he captured a wild bull, which he was intending to master and domesticate as he had the sun when he received orders from above to kill the bull. This, reluctantly, he did, and from the corpse issued all vegetable and animal life. This was no doubt so designed in order that the souls which were now falling so far that they became caught in earthly bodies should find the earthly domain of Ahriman fertile instead of barren.

Ahriman then of course counterattacked, but Mithra, now specifically designated to be the savior of mankind and becoming himself incarnated, successfully resisted Ahriman's assaults and, having won out, gave a victory banquet and then reascended to heaven, from where he nonetheless continued the fight in men's behalf. Thus the battle was henceforth

fought on three levels: Mithra against Ahriman, the propitious against the unpropitious celestial bodies, and the good Mithraists, chiefly soldiers now, against those (specifically the barbarians) who would not honor, as Rome did, the Mithraic pantheon. It was a case of each for all and all for each.

In due course would come the end of the world, presaged by Ahriman's final desperate counterattack. Again there would be convulsions, but this time he would lose for good and Oromasdès would annihilate the visible world, Ahriman and his evil cohorts, and all those human souls which had not been willing to repudiate him.

The good human souls, however, would join Mithra in heaven. It was therefore of vital importance to know how to become good, and the cult, like every other, had its own indispensable and infallible precepts. Loyalty was naturally the prime requisite and in order to manifest it, ritual was provided. It was relatively simple: a baptism, a confirmation, and a banquet to commemorate the one given by Mithra before his resurrection, including the familiar libations of wine to give the participant strength, both physical and spiritual, with which the better to overcome the enemy and so earn an eternal reward. Propitiations were also in order, to win or hold the favor of the lesser deities, the stars, planets, and others who controlled the terrestrial environment.

Mithraism furthermore incorporated the notorious Phrygian ceremony of the blood bath from a slain bull. By slaying his bull Mithra had brought into being the vegetable and animal kingdoms which enabled men to live on earth. Possibly, then, as the banquet was calculated to enlist the help of Mithra in winning salvation, so the blood bath was intended to engage his help in assuring them against agricultural disasters.

As in Christianity, the question of what happened to a soul after death but before the end of the world was a poser. At each man's death the soul, according to the merit it had acquired, either rose to heaven, being divested of its passions as it passed the planets (concupiscence at Venus, belligerence at Mars, intelligence at the sun, and so on), or if still unworthy passed into another perhaps animal body, or else went straight to hell.

Yet only at the end of the world would there be a Last Judgment, presided over by Mithra, who would decide for good and all whether a soul should reside forever after in heaven or be, like Ahriman and his cohorts, annihilated. This doctrine, as it applied to the souls, human or animal, then still alive was not inconsistent with the other. But those who were then dead had already been saved or damned. Were these to be rejudged when the world ended?

One thing in any case this Last Judgment did do for the dead souls: Mithra gave them back their bodies. Those of the good souls then rose, those of the bad shared their souls' immediate and permanent annihilation.

This Mithraic cosmology was therefore based on faith in a hierarchical trinity of gods: Fate, Ruler, and Savior. As ruler Oromasdès was not the serene and self-sufficient judge, but rather a harassed monarch whose subjects were not mere suspects under indictment, but comrades-in-arms, all of them engaged in a common enterprise. The general commanding in the field was Mithra, the enemy Ahriman. Oromasdès and Mithra needed men's help no less than men needed theirs.

This encouraged a special kind of ethics, that of the soldier, containing a minimum of self-analysis, contemplation, mercy, or love. Instead the martial virtues were cultivated: loyalty, justice, courage, the famous Persian truth-telling, generosity, forgetfulness of self. There were prayers, fasts, even periods of continence, but nothing was asked that would tend to impair a virile manhood.

Like Christianity in so many ways, Mithraism was in others a contrast. Protected by the toughness of the largely Mithraic frontier garrisons, the tenderness of the Mediterranean seaboard was being left free to grow and spread. Soon the seaboard would conquer, only to face a far greater frontier toughness which was to take a thousand years and more to tame.

7. JEWISH

During the first century B.C. the Jews had spread westward too, and by A.D. 19 already comprised 50,000 or one twentieth of the population of the city of Rome. After the destruction

of Jerusalem this number doubtless increased. Here, as no doubt elsewhere, they formed a distinct, though not physically segregated, group, and although they proselytized, not wholly unsuccessfully, until the end of the first century A.D., they rarely married Gentiles or lost their racial identity.

The Roman authority, often exasperated by their unwillingness 'in Rome to do as the Romans do,' at times passed discriminatory laws against them, especially regarding conversions, citizenship, and intermarriage. But most of the time it allowed them special privileges, namely civil and criminal jurisdiction over their own people, and the right to worship the emperor as Divinity rather than God. Certainly their exclusiveness and obstinacy made them unpopular, but they were doubtless also law-abiding and industrious. They liked the City but continued to dislike Roman civilization, politically, religiously, and socially. And the Romans heartily reciprocated these feelings.

The Jews were among the last of these Oriental peoples to believe in a positive afterlife, and even after Jesus the Sadducee sect resisted the novelty. But most of the Jews, like Jesus, followed the Pharisee lead in believing that men, at death, were subjected to a sort of First Judgment, whereby the souls of the virtuous Jews were awarded a happy abode in some sort of paradise. The other souls were herded into one or more circles or pits, all unpleasant but some less so than others. The arrangement was a temporary expedient concocted in the belief that the coming of the Messiah was imminent.

This prospective Golden Age was already long overdue but hope was not abandoned. So many of the prophecies, however, which had boldly announced the year had one after another proved false that an early third-century rabbi exclaimed, "Blast the bones of those who reckon out 'ends', for when their computed 'end' comes, and he [the Messiah] does not come, they say, 'Well, then, he is never going to.' "

The delay of the Messiah's coming was as puzzling to the Jews as the delay of the end of the world was to the Christians. Many came to suppose that this was due to the Jews' procrastination in repenting. Others, struck by the accumulating disasters befalling the Jewish nation, as under Titus and Hadrian, suggested that the Messiah was waiting only until

the Romans should be about to destroy the whole Jewish race. Still others thought that Jewish sinfulness, rather than repentance, must first reach its apogee.

What, when it did come, would it be like? It was agreed that the Messiah would be a Son of David, a man, and would remain a man. For his kingdom was to be an earthly, temporal one, lasting only for a limited time. Its capital was to be Jerusalem, and from there he would govern the people of the world, replacing most specifically the hated Roman empire. The bad Jews would die, the good Jews from all over the empire would miraculously be brought back to Palestine, there to be joined by all the good Jews who had died and were now to be revived with their own or other bodies. The dead in the various pits or circles would remain there; the living Gentiles would go on living, becoming subjects and slaves as the Jews now were of the Romans. In retaliation, however, for the destruction of Jerusalem, the city of Rome would be razed.

The Old Testament had prophesied the return to earth of the prophet Elijah. This would surely be the appropriate occasion. But what, precisely, was his mission to be? Some, being concerned lest the separation between the rulers and the ruled be defective, alleged that Elijah's task would be to insure that none who were tainted with alien blood should share the privileges to be accorded the Chosen Race.

This age would therefore constitute the final triumph on earth of the Jewish people and nation. It would also be the triumph of Jehovah because, although He had always been the one God of all mankind, He would now first be universally acknowledged as such. Henceforth, at last, there would be but a single faith throughout the world.

This Golden Age, although supernaturally engineered by Jehovah, was to be, once inaugurated, as unsupernatural as was the present Roman empire. The migrations, destructions, subjections, and conversions would therefore take time, but it would thereafter last only long enough to satisfy the Jewish thirst for revenge. At this point the original purpose of the Creation would have been realized and its further prolongation could serve no useful purpose.

Then would come the end of the created world. Heralded perhaps by the catastrophic appearance of Gog and Magog,

all men, not excepting the Messiah, will die and all will then, being dead, resume their former bodies and be called up for the Last Judgment. Who will then be finally saved or damned?

The good Jews who had already died would simply have their innocence reaffirmed; the good Jews who, like the Messiah, had just died would be acquitted once and for all—and probably too the good Gentiles who had had no fair occasion to accept conversion. For the more innocuous sinners there would be a purgatorial term after which, having become clean, they would join the society of the elect. About the bad Jews there was less agreement. Some thought that they too would ultimately be saved; others supposed that, after receiving the full punishment which justice required, they would be extinguished for good. For the rest there was reserved an eternity in hell. Among these would be the hopelessly evil, on account of their misconduct; the others would be the heretics and apostates, the Epicureans and Skeptics, on account not so much of their misconduct as of their misbelief.

8. CHRISTIAN

During several centuries following the writing of the New Testament the Christian theologians were chiefly concerned to determine the true nature of Jesus. Some presumed that, as the Messiah, he had been a mere man, his precocity being explained perhaps by his recollection of experiences acquired during a previous incarnation. Others alleged that on the contrary he had been purely a God, who had chosen, in order the better to effect his purpose, to appear in the guise of a man. Most of them, however, were convinced that he was compounded of both human and divine natures and, in order to explain how this might be, resorted to his chronology: either that he was the son of Joseph, only to be later possessed by the Holy Ghost and finally adopted and divinized by God, or else that he was the son of God who became for a time incarnated as a man. These alternative shifts from mortality to divinity or vice versa were not last desperate solutions. On the contrary, they were both commonly accepted as rare but not unfamiliar occurrences. That of divinization was especially fa-

miliar to Greek tradition, that of incarnation to Oriental. Ignatius of Antioch sensed the illogic of a mystery, saying that Jesus was both born and not born, alive in death, God in the flesh, at once a real man and a real God.

Matthew records Jesus as instructing his disciples to go forth and baptize all nations "in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." And accordingly the profession of faith (which existed before A.D. 150) to be repeated by him who was to be baptized followed this same sequence.

Meanwhile, however, as the use of *Logos* in the Fourth Gospel indicated, the Greco-Roman world had come to regard the supreme God as a being so completely superhuman and even superrational that there could be no direct relation between Him and men. Since there must be some relation, however, it was natural to recruit the many lesser deities as intermediaries. Out of this need a variety of heavenly hierarchies were conceived, each in turn proceeding out of, and created by, its superior—as from wisdom or the Word, to soul, to a Demiurge who created man. The New Testament fitted into this scheme, but only rather awkwardly, because according to it the Holy Ghost as well as Jehovah had been Jesus' father.

The difficulty could be reduced if all three Gods were one, but it was too much to suppose that it was Jehovah who had been crucified.

Confusing as this already was, the more radical of the so-called Gnostics only added to it. For they, under Greek influence, refused to recognize the Old Testament Jehovah as the supreme God Whom Jesus had served, identifying Him instead with one of the fallen angels who, without authority, had proceeded to create the world and man and all the evil to be found in them. Jesus, a deity of far higher rank, had therefore come, not in order to serve but rather in order to destroy Jehovah and thereafter so far patch up the evil world that men could at least escape from it into a tolerable afterlife.

This was one of those original ideas which failed because it was too original. More judiciously, most of the Gnostics held on to the *Logos* theory, fought off the temptation to assign Jesus the position seemingly left vacant by the overthrow of Jehovah, and, with Origen and Novatian, approached,

though still falling short of, the concept which less than a hundred years later was to become the Nicene Creed.

The Old Testament had treated matter with condescension. Jehovah had created it out of nothing by merely willing it, and could in the same way annihilate it at His pleasure. Nor did the New Testament hold it in any more respect. Men, and not Jesus only but also the apostles and other holy Christians, could deal with it miraculously, and the demons too could command it by tricks of magic.

Greek tradition, however, was otherwise. As the idea of God's transcendent inaccessibility evolved, His relation to the sensible world also faded, and it became the more likely that matter, as the antithesis of soul, had not been created by soul but had, like God, always existed. Creation there had been, but only by a subordinate, imperfect, and even rebellious soul, who had, like Plato's God, molded this chaotic matter into a world which, if not positively evil, was full of imperfections. Jesus had shrunk from it, and he had prophesied that in its present form at least it would soon cease to be. It is true that by his bodily resurrection he had led many Christians to believe that man's body would be resurrected too. But on this point there were now also skeptics, and many too who longed for an afterlife unencumbered by body, with all its needs and mortifications, its impediments, ills, and concupiscences.

Only after the year 200, when real hope of an imminent End had faded, did good Christians face the problems of reconciling themselves to a life in the flesh, and even then they did so only with misgivings.

To Jesus those who believed in him were saved and the rest were damned. It was as simple as that. But he also hoped that before long everybody would come to believe in him; which led Paul to declare that Jesus "will have all men to be saved."

Paul and the disciples, however, also said that Jesus was no respecter of persons. Why, then, did he reveal himself only to the Jews? And not only were there millions then alive and to be born who would never hear of Jesus, there were also the many more millions already dead who were irretrievably damned. The only exceptions made were for the benefit of those patriarchs and prophets who had believed in his Coming.

Nor did the problem quite end with the unlucky. Of the lucky ones to whom Jesus had been revealed many who heard him or were to hear of him did not believe. Since free will was then taken for granted, it was fair enough that these too be damned. But there were also many who, although they heeded the word of Jesus, either misunderstood or made light of it.

Among these persons were the heretics, the hermits, and the sinners. Of the heretics we have spoken. Of the hermits—soon to become the monks—it is to be observed that, if they accepted baptism and perhaps the laying on of hands, or confirmation, whereby they received the Holy Ghost, they flouted most of the routine ritual and, in doing so, the authority claimed by the priests.

Therefore, in order to have a fair chance of salvation a Christian must believe what he was told to, and must be a participant in the now fast evolving ritual of sacraments, church attendance, prescribed fasts, vigils, etc. These were the indispensable requirements for all. More was asked only in so far as a man had sinned. But since of course all men had sinned, there was still the difficulty of determining the degrees of guilt in order to assess the fair price for forgiveness.

If the priest judged the sin to be venial, he gave the absolution of forgiveness following confession of it and a declaration of repentance, but there were three mortal sins which at first no priest was authorized to forgive; namely, adultery, apostasy, and murder. Persons guilty of these might, however, by publicly confessing and undergoing a strict penance for the rest of their lives, hope to be forgiven by Jesus at the Last Judgment.

As conversions increased in the third century such strictness became impractical. Pope Calixtus first authorized an exception for adulterers, whose penance he set instead for a term of years with absolution then to follow.

The heavy persecutions under Decius in 250 had produced not only martyrs and apostates, but also many so-called 'lapsi,' those who, while refusing to sacrifice to the emperor, had to a greater or less degree sought to avoid martyrdom. When the persecution stopped thousands of such 'lapsi' were revealed, including many priests and even bishops. Some, like Bishop Cyprian of Carthage, had followed the example of Paul, who

escaped from Damascus, and sought to justify their behavior by saying that it was for the advantage of their Church and flock. This was certainly giving thought for the morrow, but it was also understandable. Pope Fabius had been martyred, but his successor Cornelius had had no wish to follow his example, and Bishop Denis of Alexandria, too, defended Cyprian's view. It was in protest that the sect of Novatian arose to trouble the Church for many years thereafter. True, the priests were taking matters formerly left to Jesus into their own hands. But since the success of their faith seemed at stake, the times seemed now to call for statesmanship rather than principle.

The problem of "thou shalt not tempt the Lord" was now to the fore: it was generally understood to mean that you may not ask God to do even for Himself that which you can do for Him. If Cyprian thought that by surviving he could save the African Church he was right not to leave it to God to do so while he, Cyprian, abandoned his responsibility in order to grasp the crown of martyrdom. This official recognition that Cyprian, by becoming a lapsus, had done a Christian deed, marks the emergence of Christianity as a temporal as well as a spiritual power. For it recognized that, because God desires men to promote His ends as well as their own, a divine end justifies human means.

Clear as it was that the royal road to salvation was love of God and one's neighbor, this love was not to be acquired even by man's free will. It was rather a free gift or grace, supposedly bestowed by the sacraments; but many, not feeling this love, concluded that if they were to be saved they must acquire their wished-for merit by some other means.

Jesus, in expectation of an imminent End, had suggested such means: a physical as well as mental repudiation of the world. This was now very much in the spirit of the age. Out of it had grown various beliefs to justify this repudiation, among others that of matter as the coeternal antithesis of spirit and therefore of God and the good. It had been chiefly the Greeks like Aristotle and the Atomists who had defended matter, and few were now defending either one.

Here was a golden opportunity for the eager but unimaginative Christian: he could cultivate merit by means of fasting,

vigils, bodily discomfort, menial tasks, and especially by chastity. He could sacrifice himself and, since his neighbor often seemed addicted to worldly and physical pleasures, he could even, with clear conscience, withhold the small natural affection for him which he might otherwise have felt.

This asceticism moreover proved to be a dangerous kind of virtue in an opposite way. For some of the sects cultivated so intense a contempt for their own bodies that they disowned them, declaring that, as souls already saved, they were not responsible for the immoral or criminal acts committed by their bodies. Jesus had exposed and condemned conventional smugness; many unconventional varieties now sprang up which, by assuming one disguise or another, were to delude all but the most perspicacious.

According to the Old Testament, all but the decent Jews were to be damned; according to Jesus, all but those who believed in him. Later it was found expedient also to damn those who, although believers in Jesus, had sinned and not won forgiveness. At this time there were few definitions of heresy; suspected cases had, for the most part, to be judged individually and tentatively. Justin Martyr said he thought that the Jews who had become Christians without ceasing to be Jews would be saved, but he recognized that many good Christians felt otherwise. Valentinus the Gnostic put it differently: those men who believed in his doctrine were assured of salvation because their adherence proved that God had so predestined them. Other Christians, however, retained the free will to sin or not to sin; they too might be saved, but again they might not be.

Origen's view, half Christian and half Greek, was, if not the soundest, at least the most original and perhaps the most appealing. He imagined that all souls had fallen: angels least, men next, and demons the farthest. Men, at least, had retained their free will, with which they might either expiate their sins or add to them. After death all souls would be obliged to undergo purification by an immaterial fire, the duration being based on the degree of purification required. All, including the Devil, would therefore ultimately reach heaven. Thus no one would go to heaven directly and no one would be damned to eternal hell. Rather it was purgatory for all,

unbelievers and sinners as well as believers and saints; only the duration, and presumably the rigor of their purifications, would vary. More humane, it was less efficacious than the doctrine of Jesus, for, as things turned out, even fear of an immediate and eternal hell was not to prove enough to make mortal men behave. This gentler view of Origen, however, was to be officially condemned only in the year 400, when Christianity felt secure enough to force conversions by physical threats.

In order to support their various inclinations the sects picked those texts which best suited them and then interpreted them in like manner. Some rejected the Fourth Gospel and the *Apocalypse*; others accepted these and very few others. Some said that the apostles had been given secret revelations which explained the published ones. Others, again, said that the apostles were so stupid that they misunderstood what Jesus had really said. More and more, they were all subjecting the whole of Scripture to allegorical or spiritual as well as to literal or common sense interpretations. Never had statesman-like control been more needed than now. Fortunately it was about to appear.

9. PHILOSOPHICAL

From the time of Philo Judaeus, a contemporary of Jesus, philosophy flourished again in the eastern half of the empire. This philosophy is described as eclectic, a mixture of earlier schools, but although it often used Aristotelian, Stoic, and Jewish ideas it derived chiefly from Plato. Its cumulative effect, therefore, was to lay the groundwork for the coming Neoplatonism.

We have seen how God, whether Jehovah or Zeus, was already in the process of being dehumanized, so much so that certain Christian Gnostics had seen in the old Jehovah a positively evil deity. To the pagan philosophers, too, God was becoming more a mere principle of perfection. As such He was described as incomprehensible to man, which was an exaggeration because He was also quite confidently described as Being, reality, transcendent, omnipotent, a One, simple,

infinite, eternal, immovable, unmoving, pure good, pure spirit, pure thought, free, self-sufficient—indeed, altogether the opposite of all (if we do not take the meaning of Being and reality too literally) that man's senses were most familiar with.

What then was this sensible world of so-called non-Being and unreality? What was matter? It was at least enough of a something to enable men to predicate a good deal about what God was. Among other things, if God was pure good, matter, as His opposite, must be pure evil. Both Plato and Aristotle had taken it for granted that, at least in its chaotic or potential state, matter was uncreated and eternal. But Plato did not regard it as evil, and Aristotle had even thought it, if rightly used, a good. To them, however, there was still Nature within whose framework even God must work; whereas the new God, being omnipotent, must supposedly have assumed Nature's responsibilities and, in doing so, must, as pure good, have assumed the good qualities of Nature. Clearly, however, this left her evil qualities unaccounted for; and everything that God was not—that is, all non-Being and unreality—had henceforth to be predicated of matter.

The significance of matter must of course be played down. Since even as atoms it was still too real, the tendency was to associate it, as the Pythagoreans had, with number. Some said not only that number was the structure of and key to matter, but that matter, being unreal, was nothing more than number.

Although Jehovah had created not only the sensible world and men but also the ideas or plan according to which He created them, He had encountered a variety of not wholly identifiable obstacles which continued to hamper and even thwart their fulfilment. Plato's God, on the other hand—perhaps fortunately for His comprehensibility—had had no alternative but to use the ideas which Nature put at His disposal and do the best job He could with them. The philosophic effort of this period was to reconcile these two conceptions: to fit these two Gods into one.

This God could not demean Himself by having any direct dealings with matter, but He was able to produce by emanation other, subordinate deities who could and did. The first and least imperfect product was variously called the Logos,

Nous, Demiurge, or World Soul. It was He who, following God's ideas, had created the angels, demons, and souls of men, and who had molded matter into the world and the bodies of men. But, in thus coming into contact with matter, this World Soul had become somewhat soiled; many of the angels had become soiled to the point of becoming demons; all men had been soiled—but probably no soul irremediably.

For all this God's Providence was generally affirmed; but it was left to the World Soul and by him, probably, to the good angels to administer it in the face of the resistance of the bad ones. This Providence, however, unlike the Jewish, was solicitous of the whole emanated and created world, of which mankind and especially the individual man was but an insignificant part. The new God had scotched Nature but not killed her.

On these philosophical assumptions how could men win a happy immortality? It has been said that a philosopher is concerned about his afterlife chiefly because he will then learn how nearly he had guessed right. Beyond this, he will be satisfied, as Plutarch apparently was, if he can rejoin his family and friends.

But how was a man to behave in order to deserve this boon? The fall of his soul from God to earth had entailed a double loss, of knowledge and of virtue. It was natural to infer, therefore, that heaven was to be regained by trying to recover these losses. This, at least, was Origen's view, which neither Christians nor pagans at this time seriously disputed.

It has frequently been said, and on the whole correctly, that the Christians sought salvation by faith, the pagans rather by knowledge, and that this was one of the reasons why the former captured the unlettered multitude. Yet this is an oversimplification. For at bottom both faith and knowledge were assumptions based on inadequate understanding, compounds of desire and reason. As the Christians had their saints and theologians, so the pagans had their mystics and philosophers. If it is likely that the philosophers were already borrowing ideas from Christians, the opposite is equally likely. Even before Plotinus, first Philo, later Ammonius Saccas, had expounded a so-called ladder of perfection, the latter's five steps being from asceticism, to purification, to rational virtue, to inspired

virtue, to vision of God. If knowledge was on a par with virtue, intuition was superior to both. The far sharper distinction was that the pagans (shades of Homer!) thought that they, rather than God, were the cause of their achievements.

Did they then not pray, not sacrifice? Certainly much less. They believed in a Providence, but as governor of the universe rather than as mentor of individual men. Prayers were addressed rather to the inferior deities, and rather for temporal than eternal favors. In their sacrifices there was already a taint of theurgy, whereby for favors received the deity invoked was obliged, not only morally but in fact, to comply, and this use of prayer and sacrifice was now being developed in basically the same way by their Christian contemporaries.

NEOPLATONISM, 250-320

1. PLOTINUS

BEST KNOWN of the Platonist school of Alexandria was Plotinus, he who, partly because he settled in Rome and had a great success there under the patronage of the emperors Gallienus (260-268) and Aurelian (270-275), and partly because an abundance of his writings has been preserved, has always been regarded as the founder of the so-called Neoplatonic school. Possessing as we do a merely fragmentary record of the beliefs of his predecessors, we cannot pass precise judgments on his originality. We can, however, acknowledge the magnificence of his architecture, and see why it was that his influence on later generations and even centuries surpassed that of any other pagan philosopher except Aristotle. If it was Aristotle who ruled in the thirteenth century, it was Plotinus who, if more indirectly, ruled in the twelfth, fifteenth, and, in the north, far into the seventeenth century. The so-called Platonists of Chartres in the twelfth, of Florence in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth, of Oxford in the seventeenth, were as familiar with the doctrine of Plotinus as they were still ignorant of that of Plato.

At the root of Being or existence were two forces, God and matter. Both were uncreated and therefore eternal, both were prior to Being and neither, therefore, themselves Being or even essence. Both, too, were incorporeal. Together they constituted the original All.

Otherwise, since they were opposites, they differed. God

was the principle of good, and therefore of activity, motion, and life, of unity, plenitude, and self-sufficiency, of light, order, and beauty, of will, reason, and knowledge. As the antithesis of God, matter was the principle of all the opposites of these: inertia, multiplicity, darkness, disorder, blind necessity—the characteristics associated with evil.

God was not good so much as the Good, was not perfect so much as Perfection. But, in order to be these things, He must be radically distinguishable from man and even from life. Therefore He could not desire or will anything, He could not act or even know or think, He was hardly even conscious of Himself. He was in no sense a person but rather a principle or cause.

How then did Being come to be? As goodness God necessarily overflowed, in the form of an emanation, thereby producing the first Being. This was *Nous* or Intelligence. He was not a creation and was not in time. His relation to God was like that of light to the heat emanating from the sun, instantaneous and therefore eternal, yet not part of God because God was thereby in no way diminished.

This *Nous* was especially endowed with God's beauty and, since to the Greek philosophers Beauty was akin to Knowledge, he was so designated. And he was the recipient of Reason or Knowledge, that is, of the Platonic Ideas or Forms.

Furthermore *Nous*, although still, like God, a One, was the principle of the Many. Just as *Nous* emanated from God, so the world soul emanated from *Nous*. As *Nous* was the particular depository of Beauty and Knowledge, so Soul was the depository of Power. This was best explained by supposing that he had a double nature: the higher one was the passive recipient of the Ideas; the lower was the active realizer of them, like the artificer-god of Plato. It was he who created the sensible world.

To Plotinus the Creation occurred neither in time nor in space; but since the analogy of time and space was so evidently in his mind we need not apologize to him for explaining his dynamics in those terms. Such terms as emanation and motion can be more easily understood in their literal connotations.

Recurring, then, to Plotinus' suggestive analogy to the light and heat of the sun, we find him speaking of the progressive

degradation in perfection as the successive emanations proceed from their common origin and cause. The lower part of the world soul in due course proceeded so far that it came into collision with matter. By this time its 'light' and 'heat' had become so dissipated by diffusion and distance that matter was able in some degree to resist, and therefore affect it with a positive imperfection. And at the same time the soul so far affected the matter as to actualize it, that is, transform it from a passive non-Being to the active Being which is the sensible world—imperfect, certainly, but now only relatively and not absolutely imperfect. In other words the Ideas became Things, Matter received Form, processes which Plotinus described as the "blend" or "beneficent interweaving." This was no longer emanation, but creation—in time and space now and so transitory—for that which can create can equally well annihilate, perhaps in order to create other worlds instead.

In this way were created—if not in order of time or space, at least in a descending order of perfection—the angels and demons (presumably also incorporeal), the star gods which foretell but do not cause earthly events, the benignant sun and other planets, then men, animals, plants, and lifeless things. Man, apparently, was in the centre, with equal ingredients of soul and body, of God and matter.

For like the world soul the human, too, had a higher and a lower nature: a divine fragment even of the *Nous* coupled with an element sufficiently degraded to unite with body—identifiable respectively as reason and passion. So wide still did Plotinus feel the gap to be that he even imagined a third nature in the soul as necessary in order to mediate between the other two.

From the point of view of science this human soul was, like Intelligence and the world soul, a mere link in the chain of cosmic evolution, or, as Plotinus more euphemistically put it, God's "gift to the universe."

But from the point of view of religion these same higher soul particles had been incarnated as a result of their own misused free will.

In a weary desire of standing apart they find their way, each to a place of its very own. This state long maintained, the soul is a deserter from the All; its differentiation has severed it, its vision

is no longer set in the Intellectual; it is a partial thing, isolated, weakened, full of care, intent upon the fragment, severed from the whole, it nestles in one form of being; for this it abandons all else . . . for a thing (body) buffeted about by a worldful of things. (*Enneads*, IV, 8, §4.)

As the soul falls it acquires one by one the various passions to which the successive planetary spheres are liable, and ends by becoming so imperfect that its entry into a body is appropriate and therefore inevitable.

This fall is presumably only from the lower part of the world soul and is due to neither good nor evil, but to that "unwisdom" which is at the mercy of Fate.

Whatever may have been the immediate or proximate cause of this fall of the soul, the result was that it had become soiled by its contact with the body and other matter; and, even if now remorseful, the task of so purifying itself that, on the death of its body it was fit to rise to its original state, was not to be completed in a single life span. Some souls had apparently been separated from their bodies before having made any appreciable progress, others before that progress had been adequate. Neither of these souls was then fit to return, yet they were immortal. What, therefore, was their fate to be unless they could enter other bodies, there to resume the tedious task of further self-purification? Transmigration offered so handy a solution that Plotinus was virtually bound to accept it.

Some men, indeed, seem to have been born good and to have done their best so to live that they grew even better. The souls of these had presumably already benefited from efforts made in previous incarnations. These, at the death of their present bodies, might, like Empedocles, hope at last to be worthy of the final resurrection; Plotinus, having lived a blameless life, believed that he was one of these. For on his deathbed he had said to an attendant friend, "I was waiting for you, before that which is divine in me departs to unite itself with the Divine in the universe."

Man has a double desire and hope: to be happy both in his mortal and in his immortal lives. He feels that he has a right to be treated in both at least as well as he deserves, and he won't complain if he is treated even better.

Now in regard to just treatment during his mortal or temporal life, Plotinus was a good deal of a cynic. To be sure, God was wholly just and also, through the actualizing by the world soul of God's Ideas, the cause of earthly events. Plotinus said the *sole* cause, but he obviously did not mean this. For in the first place the incarnated soul's free will was also a cause. And there was another:

But what of chastisements, poverty, illness, falling upon the good outside of all justice? . . . Such misfortunes do not answer to reasons established in the nature of things; they are not laid up in the master-facts of the universe, but are merely accidental sequents. (*Enneads*, IV, 3, §16.)

Evidently God's power on earth, weakened by its progressive dissipation throughout space, has, by endowing Matter with Form, endowed it also with a certain active power which is capable of counteracting, if only insignificantly, God's energy. Necessity has been born in the guise of chance or, as Plotinus says, "accident." Though the helmsman can keep his ship on her course, he can only reduce, not eliminate, her tendency to yaw. Insignificant, however, as these 'accidents' seem to God and perhaps to true philosophers, they are decisive in the lives of ordinary men.

Will prayers help? Certainly not, says Plotinus: God will not only not heed them, He will not even hear them. He will do nothing to save brave individuals or even whole armies from death and defeat. He will do nothing either to cause or to cure disease. He will do nothing to bring on or avert famines, droughts, or plagues, to make men—good or bad, industrious or lazy—acquire riches or fall into poverty. No praise induces God to mercy; no insult incites Him to wrath.

Many of man's sufferings are the direct consequence of his own folly, are indeed self-inflicted because he neglects to pursue, as he should, virtue, knowledge, and ultimate union with God. This is not a punishment, it is just a fact. Furthermore suffering is often salutary, turning men's minds from things to God. Finally, "we may reason that the undeserved stroke can cause no evil to the sufferer in view of the beneficent interweaving of the All."

As a Providence, God played a pretty shabby role.

But Plotinus after all was interested in eternal rather than

temporal life; he was therefore quite ready to show how defective the temporal life was. The sooner, he thought, man turned his back on mortality and faced eternity the better for him and for everybody else.

How, then, was such a believer to go about it? What were the most appropriate techniques? The purity of God was so many things. He was incorporeal, that is, independent of, and even hostile to, the corporeal; ascetic practices were therefore clearly in order. But God was also, through His Intelligence, infinitely wise. It was therefore also necessary to cultivate philosophy. To emulate His power, to be sure, was—unless by influential teaching—impracticable; but it was practicable to try to emulate His wisdom and, even more, His goodness, which by good fortune was God's most essential quality.

Goodness, however, unless it was specifically God's goodness had no pertinence, and God's goodness did not seem to have much relation to mortal life. Therefore civic virtue or even concern for the welfare of individuals during their mortal lives was not, certainly, the essence of it. Obviously it was rather an identification of oneself with God, rather to be living, in one's consciousness, as He lived and so as man's soul would live in Him when resurrected. Occasionally Plotinus felt and believed that he had, if only momentarily, achieved this spiritual union, and it was doubtless this which gave him confidence that his resurrection rather than a further incarnation would follow his bodily death.

This was the real justice, the others did not count. And it was essentially just because man was free to seek or spurn reward. Perhaps the original Fall and consequent soiling of his soul was not really his own fault, but he was given every chance, every man indeed was given an equal chance, of redeeming himself. God had given man the tools; it was then up to him to use them, while God kept His hands off. Prayers were useless, so were those elaborate magical rituals by means of which it was hoped to entice or oblige God to help. For God would react neither to blandishments, to appeals for return favors, nor to magical pressures. Neither penances, contritions, nor confessions could attract divine pardons or even infusions of spiritual strength. They were, however, because intrinsically good, so many evidences that purification was in

fact proceeding and, if persisted in, heralded a not too distant salvation.

Then, like a good Greek, Plotinus added that even this salvation would be only for a time. When the Great Year ended and a new one began, the souls were likely again to fall, again to resume the tedious task of suffering and purification, and so on eternally—the penalty as well as the reward of every soul endowed with immortality.

Such, to Plotinus and to many thoughtful men in the ages to follow, was this “best of all possible worlds.”

2. PORPHYRY

Porphyry of Tyre, a disciple of Plotinus in Rome, wrote on many subjects, but only fragments have come down to us. We have, however, his *Life of Plotinus*, and it was he also who arranged his master's philosophical papers into what he called *Enneads*. We may therefore assume that he admired his master's beliefs and, to use Augustine's word, ‘emended’ them rather in details than in substance.

Yet Porphyry is historically important because his attack on Christianity bore the brunt of the counterattacks of the fourth-century Christian apologists, and also because his *Isagoge* or Introduction to Aristotle's *Categories*, as translated into Latin by Boethius, was not only the authoritative text in the Realist-Nominalist controversy of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, but again became the subject of scholastic *Commentaries* from the later thirteenth to the end of the fourteenth century.

Porphyry evidently accepted Plotinus' divine hierarchy of God, Nous, and world soul. The only novelty, so far as we know, was his inclination to identify this trinity with other traditional and current beliefs. As an indication of how alive the Homeric tradition still was in his day, he declared that the episode of the cave of the Nymphs in the *Odyssey* was a symbol of the world soul. Zeus was, naturally enough, a symbol of Intelligence. To show how influential now was the Old Testament, he calls Jehovah so great a God “that the deities themselves are afraid before him.” Neoplatonism seemed to him to be the final truth towards which previous beliefs, Jewish as well as Greek, had been groping.

In another respect he evidently emended Plotinus: by assigning a more positive role to the demons. Whether because they became such as a punishment or had always been that way, he does not say, but in any case they were a multitude and, because irrational, were actively engaged in deceit. This emendation had a reason: Plotinus had said that God was Goodness and matter Nothingness. What, then, was the explanation of evil? It must somehow have arisen out of the contact of soul and matter which the Archaic Age had described as the strife of opposites. But why the incorporeal demon rather than the incarnated human soul? Was there an alien influence here, Mithraic or Christian, or was there rather a reluctance to follow the Old Testament belief that man gets only what he richly deserves? The Greek tradition that evil is the result of ignorance is in any case giving way to the oriental one that evil is rather the result of positive malice.

To Plotinus salvation had certainly been of paramount importance, but the Greek heritage was still so alive in him that he believed the way to salvation was by knowledge—by knowledge not only of what God wished but also of what God knew. In order to try to resemble God men must emulate not only His goodness but also His wisdom. It would appear, however, that philosophical wisdom was rather less emphasized by Porphyry.

Did man have the free will necessary for salvation? Porphyry was here no more explicit than Plotinus. In a letter he said that "whatsoever good thing we do we must esteem God to be its author, but of evil things (quoting Plato) the guilt lies with ourselves who made the choice, and God is guiltless." Here Porphyry is heralding Augustine's grace and predestination. But elsewhere he says that, "It is Nature that looses body from soul, but soul is loosed from body by soul herself" (Dodds, *Select Passages*, 88). It is here not God who, instead of Nature, looses the soul from the body, but the soul herself. This is an assertion of the existence of free will.

In any case his, like almost every other, prescription for obtaining salvation presupposes this free will, for it presupposes man's capacity to make a choice between alternatives. What might these be? A first choice was between words and deeds. Prayer to God Himself is an impertinence. It is proper only

if directed to a lesser deity and, even then, it should ask only for the bestowal of those gifts which we can retain after the death of the body. The choice, then, must be for deeds. But certain deeds too are improper, particularly animal or other sacrifices and resort to ritual in the hope of producing a magical effect. The only justification, if any, for such deeds was that they might serve to confound the evil demons.

Another deed to be eschewed was that performed in order to help the gods. For they do not need our help, and therefore "he who pays honor to God as to one having need of such service, has fallen unawares into the illusion that he is higher than God." Christianity was teaching that man should not try to leave to God what man can do for himself; Porphyry added that neither should man try to do for God what God can do for Himself. For if God must not be overrated, neither must He be underrated. God and man must each mind his own business and not each other's.

Of the deeds demanded by virtue the first were physical, to serve one's fellow creatures, beasts as well as men. For God had no more created beasts that men might kill and eat them than He had created man to be food for beasts. Beyond this the deeds became the effort of the soul rather than of the body. Thus the second deed was the cultivation of a state of apathy, probably close to Stoic indifference to the sensible world. The third deed was the cultivation of knowledge under the auspices of Nous, the steps here being from knowledge of one's better or divine self to silent meditation. This led to the fourth step, or vision of the divine wisdom. Thus one must progress from words to deeds, to self-discipline, to self-knowledge, to knowledge of God.

This is a virtual repetition of the mystic way of Plotinus, probably without basic originality. But Porphyry was more explicit regarding the lower rungs of the ladder. Furthermore it is not certain that he shared Plotinus' belief in the transmigration of souls, or in the infinite renewal of all things at the end of each Great Year. Here, as in his identification of evil, he was diverging from Greek tradition.

Porphyry said that the alleged Fall and consequent punishment of all Adam's descendants was false because no good God would have done such a thing; and he regarded the at-

tempt to make the saintly but wholly human Jesus into a God as a deliberate fraud. Yet Augustine, speaking of Jehovah, was soon to say, "He is the God whom Porphyry, the most learned of the philosophers, although the bitterest enemy of the Christians, confesses to be a great God . . . the God whom the pagan deities tremble before, as even Porphyry, the noblest of the pagan philosophers, testifies."

Porphyry, the 'most learned' and 'noblest' of the pagan philosophers. What Augustine presumably meant was that Porphyry marks the summit of wisdom to which man, aided only by his own faculties, can attain, but that he was denied, through no fault of his own, the free grace of faith.

3. IAMBlichus

As Porphyry was thirty years younger than Plotinus so the third famous Neoplatonist, Iamblichus of Syria, was just over thirty years younger than Porphyry. This Iamblichus has been described as the founder of decadent Neoplatonism, but the Emperor Julian was not to think so, nor many Renaissance thinkers, who were to call him 'divine.' He is not, therefore, to be too lightly dismissed.

In his hands the divine hierarchy, like late Gothic, became rather too florid. From the now traditionally ineffable One emanated the Nous, a second Unity but the first reality: he was the Demiurge, creator of the world we know. Actually his unity was defective because he possessed a lower as well as a higher nature and thereby the seed of multiplicity. Next in turn came the Psyche, logically enough a triad. Then came the intelligible gods who were the archetypes or Ideas, and below these—each category being more numerous than the preceding—the intellectual gods who were the repositories of the Ideas. Below these in turn were the supramundane gods and finally, at the bottom, the mundane gods who alone were concerned with men.

Quite naturally these last were identified with the gods of Greek and Oriental polytheistic mythology, now ranked and classified rather as angels or demons. Below them, were human heroes of old. In addition each man had a guardian angel of his own.

These mundane gods were immanent, produced apparently in order to serve the particular needs of the created world. They were, therefore, also the embodiments of the Numbers of Pythagoras, the Ideas of Plato, and the Substantial Forms of Aristotle. Together they formed what is called Providence, rulers over Nature and Man.

They were also associated with the heavenly bodies and so with astrology, for they could, to greater or lesser degree, influence the course of earthly events and, what was even more important, could be induced, under specified circumstances, to communicate their knowledge and even their future intentions to men. And they might do even more than prophesy. For if men should pray and sacrifice to them appropriately, they could be induced to return these favors by modifying their intentions accordingly. They might avert an impending doom or even fulfil a deeply cherished hope. Their failures could easily be explained away as due to interference by other gods who had been otherwise solicited.

How did Iamblichus justify his faith in so great a number of heterogeneous divine wills? All too easily, by the almost universally accepted premise that certain beliefs of men had been divinely implanted in men's souls and must therefore all be true. But these beliefs contradicted each other. The answer was that only positive, not negative, belief was so implanted. Thus belief in Jehovah was implanted, but belief that there were no other gods than He was not. On this hypothesis the conclusion that there must be an almost infinite number of gods was the only logical one.

Man's soul originated in the traditional Neoplatonic way, by a separation from the All. Similarly, the cause of this was explained as due both to necessity and to the soul's free will to sin. There is a resemblance here to the contemporaneous Christian solution that, although the soul sins of its own free will, God nonetheless foreknew it. For its will is so constituted that it must, sooner or later, choose to sin.

Again as in Christianity, the consequence of sin was the soul's incarceration in a dying body. But unlike the Christian view, this was a physical, not a judicial, consequence, caused rather by Nature than by will.

This amalgamation of soul and body constituted man, a

being half intellect and half instinct, having at one and the same time a rational desire to be virtuous and an emotional desire not to be. How, then, was a man to extricate himself from this dilemma?

As the sound technique for winning salvation Iamblichus accepted the ladder of perfection as already developed by Plotinus and Porphyry: from kindness to one's fellow creatures (animals included) to self-purification, to philosophic knowledge, to a so-called paradigmatic stage which seems to mean setting an example of perfect virtue, and finally to a superintellectual or mystical stage which was attainable only by priests. Described in his own words:

It is not thought which links the theurgist to the Gods; else what should hinder the theoretical philosopher from enjoying theurgic union with them? The case is not so. Theurgic union is attained only by the perfective operation of the unutterable acts correctly performed, acts which are beyond all understanding; and by the power of the unutterable symbols which are intelligible only to the Gods. (Dodds, *Proclus and the Elements of Theology*, xx.)

Evidently this theurgist was one who, having passed through the first four stages, became qualified to exercise this further power. So completely had he mastered moral behavior and intellectual understanding that he was equipped so to perform these 'unutterable acts' that he could prophesy and even affect coming events. The philosopher is deposed in favor of the priest.

Plotinus, and perhaps Porphyry too, had experienced a mystic union with the All, but these were mere ephemeral visions or experiences. Iamblichus magnified this human potentiality into a permanent power to be exercised by the performance of a magic ritual.

Unlike the Christian priests who acquired their magic powers by ordination and thereafter retained them irrespective of their own sanctity, these Neoplatonic priests resembled rather the Christian miracle-workers, soon to be so prominent, who were deemed to have acquired their powers because of their sanctity. Furthermore, the Christian priests exercised their powers to effect salvation, whereas the other two dealt primarily with temporal matters.

Theoretically, then, this power over the temporal world

was the reward of those who had reached the top rung of the ladder. It served, therefore, as a guarantee of virtue and so of salvation. Virtue was the cause and power the effect. But there was danger that in practice a man's success as a theurgist would too often be taken as proof of his success as a saint, the man's virtue being inferred from belief, however mistaken, in his power.

It was doubly dangerous for the man himself to believe that his virtue conferred power, because he was tempted not only to infer his virtue from his apparent power, but also to overestimate the power itself. Any belief in one's power to prophesy is heady and is the headier if others share this belief. This is even more dangerous if, coupled with it, comes the further belief that one can so shape the course of future events that the prophecy must come true. Once assured of salvation a man's thoughts tend to stray back to the temporal world, hoping to improve it no doubt, but also hoping to get back at his enemies.

Therefore what may seem beneficent magic to the actor can easily seem malevolent magic to him who is acted upon. Such was probably the case in certain recorded cases, as when in 335 Sopater, a disciple of Iamblichus, was executed on the charge of having practiced magic, or when Maximus, also a Neoplatonist, met the same fate about 370 because he had allowed himself to be professionally consulted regarding the identity of the Emperor Valens' successor. For even saints are not always politically judicious, and those who mistakenly believe themselves such are no more likely to be so. For it is often just as hard to come down to earth again as it was to rise above it.

How far up the ladder the layman, even if he were a 'theoretical philosopher,' must climb in order to be saved was doubtless a matter of degree. Transmigration was again to Iamblichus the lot of those who fell short, and the souls of such rose only when their degree of purification automatically permitted it.

It has been said that Iamblichus sought not so much to raise man to God as to bring God down to man. The observation is pertinent. Aristotle had supposed that man's desire for God was not reciprocated; the Epicureans did not think that the

gods had any concern for man, and Plotinus had virtually agreed. Porphyry, however, had approved of prayer, though to the lesser gods alone and even then only for eternal and not for temporal benefits. Iamblichus had agreed that appeal could effectively be made only to the lesser gods, but the appeal was now to be rather for temporal benefits and, among these, not only for a revelation of, but also for a certain direction over, the future.

Meanwhile Christianity was also recognizing the alleged power of prayer and sacrifice, not only to a lesser deity but to the supreme God. Thus by this early fourth century the tendency was to narrow the gap separating gods from men. From independence of and indifference to men, divinity was becoming more and more susceptible to their influence, and Jesus was the culminating example of it. Henceforth man sought not only to raise himself to God but also to draw God down to him. It was the love and compassion of the incarnated Jesus which brought God down to a level low enough to give man confidence that he, from below, could grasp the hand of God as it was extended to him from above.

THE CHRISTIAN TRIUMPH, 250-325

1. PHILOSOPHY VS. RELIGION

a. Rational vs. Irrational

THERE WERE difficulties about monotheism because it concentrated all the desirable qualities of divinity into a One. For, if God were both wholly good and wholly powerful, why was He the cause of an imperfect world?

The Neoplatonists had concluded that God was not omnipotent because matter had power too; a contemptible one, to be sure, but offering such passive resistance that God could not produce any sensible world which was free of matter and therefore of imperfection. Mithraism, in turn, introduced a similar dualistic conception, and at the same time rejected the Neoplatonic subterfuge that this matter, being as putty in God's hands, did not subtract from His omnipotence. To them this matter was under the control of an independent Devil; only the soul was under that of God.

The Jews, in contrast, had preferred the only rational alternative: that although Jehovah's power was unlimited His goodness left something to be desired. It was for this very reason, many Christians were tempted to argue, that Jesus had chosen to intervene.

With the best will in the world other Christians were convinced that God was both wholly good and wholly powerful. They had, therefore, to explain themselves. Valiant efforts were made to disguise the difficulty by so manipulating the respective natures of matter, man, and the Devil that, al-

though never out of God's control, they created the illusion of evil. But being unable, in spite of their ingenious efforts, to arrive at a rational solution, the Christians had finally to fall back on the only alternative solution: that God, by the very fact that the only consistent conception of Him was irrational, proved Himself to be the true God.

Armed with this emancipating premise, the Christian task was made easier. The Neoplatonists had for several centuries struggled to show how the Many could evolve out of the One, how the temporal and imperfect could evolve out of the eternal and perfect. But the Christians had no such problem because to them it was a distinctive quality of God that He could be at the same time a One and a Many, or, as once the incarnated Jesus had been, at the same time as a man ephemeral and as a God eternal.

Fortified by this premise that irrationality was the earmark of divinity, the predicated omnipotence of God could now be corroborated by a literal interpretation of the biblical testimony that God created the world out of nothing. Matter was now no longer a cause of embarrassment; the Neoplatonic effort to reduce it to non-Being or mere potentiality was now superfluous, and the further embarrassment that the world might be eternal in time was also eliminated. For just as God had created something out of nothing, so He could, and in due course would, annihilate that something into nothingness again. Accordingly the Greeks—notably Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Plato—had simply been wasting their time in trying to reconcile change and eternity.

Thus by the Christian innovation Greek philosophy, based on the superiority of the rational, was being discredited. Irrationality, instead of being the distinctive quality of those phenomena which were furthest removed from God, became the distinguishing quality of God. It was not the area of irrationality which reason must try to penetrate and reduce. Rather it was the other way about.

b. Law vs. Will

The Neoplatonist had sought to reconcile ethics and Nature by showing not only how good might produce Nature

but also how Nature might in its turn produce good. For the good and evil principles acted so consistently and even predictably that they differed rather in degree than in kind, as did heat and cold and the other familiar opposites of Greek tradition. Together they were among the underlying powers which produced and operated Nature.

Mithraism, to be sure, conceived of its two opposites as live wills rather than automatic principles; but these wills were so imperturbable that their effects could be foreseen and identified with considerable accuracy. For each was at the mercy of its own simple and uncompromising nature.

But to the extent that God and the Devil were assumed to be alive they must be likened to man. The more they seemed to share the emotions and desires of man, the more they must be supposed to behave like him. Between them these two divine wills ruled the sensible world with an iron hand, reducing Nature and her Greek laws to serving as the common instrument of both.

Under the tyranny of the Christian God, Nature was, at least theoretically, even more helpless and insignificant; it could not even continue to exist unless God were constantly willing that it should. Even the Devil's will was helpless because, as it was invariably evil, God by foreseeing what it must be could easily turn its efforts to His own advantage.

This conception of God as an arbitrary if not petty tyrant occurs too in paganism, but nowhere so sharply as in the Old Testament. In Greece the notion had been seriously undermined by the rise of a natural philosophy. Among the Jews it had survived largely owing to the tradition of a Jehovah who was concerned only with the fate of their race, and not even too much with the fates of its individual components.

The Christian God, on the other hand, was concerned not only with the whole human race but also specifically with each individual. How was monotheism to stand such a strain? What mind, even God's, could conceivably apply itself fully to such an infinite number of details?

It was therefore to be expected that a virtual polytheism should return. To the angels and demons of the Old Testament Jesus could now be added and especially charged to oversee the behavior of men. His representative on earth after the

Resurrection was the Holy Ghost, who entered the bodies of each of the faithful. The Virgin Mary followed, and finally the souls of those who had been martyred in the persecutions. Each and all were under God's orders, the demons included, and empowered to execute them. Theoretically they were given no discretionary powers, but practically they employed them because the tasks assigned were such that they could not be otherwise accomplished. The Neoplatonists had said that it was beneath the dignity of God to concern Himself with petty human problems, and to believe that God not only could but did so concern Himself required if not more vanity at least more imagination than most individuals, good or bad, possessed. Therefore men more prudently chose in most cases to refer their problems to one or another of God's trusted subordinates.

When, as under these circumstances, the activity of subordinate deities was omnipresent, it was an irresistible temptation to men to share, if only in a small way, in that activity: to curry favor with the beneficent spirits and appease the demons. The good men tried to foil the latter by exorcisms, the less good by buying them off. They all of course tried to win over the beneficent ones by prayers, sacrifices, and magic rituals.

It is quite clear that this tendency was not invented by or confined to Christians. Not only was it traditional practice in the Oriental cults and in the Dionysian and Orphic mysteries. The later Neoplatonism of Iamblichus and of others to follow, including the Emperor Julian, also adopted such theurgic practices.

This triumph of will over Nature's law and therefore of spirit over matter opened the door to faith in miracles. For just as God could turn Nature upside down of His own initiative, so could His subordinates, the demons with the rest. Other miracles could be, if not performed, at least initiated by men, by pious men, calling some deity's attention to the need of appropriate intervention. Armed with the joint premises of divine irrationality and the domination of will over Nature, the Christian was ready to face the problem of man's dilemma as revealed by Scripture.

In regard to the question of why human souls, though par-

ticipating in some degree in divinity, came to be incarnated, the Mithraists supposed that precisely because divine they had, out of an innate sense of loyalty, volunteered to accept incarnation in order the better to serve the interests of both God and man.

The Neoplatonists, on the other hand, conceived of the souls' fall rather as the inevitable consequence of their relative imperfection. They had wavered in their obedience, and automatic or self-inflicted punishment had resulted. Their fatal though free-will decision was a virtual necessity because of their inferior nature.

Christianity here shared the Neoplatonic view, for Adam, having been endowed with the free will to sin, seemed virtually doomed sooner or later to do so, and the punishment must therefore follow. The difference was that the Neoplatonic soul, because of transmigration, was always personally guilty, whereas the Christian suffered less justly because his guilt had been vicariously imposed.

Therefore in the one case law operated automatically to penalize sin; in the other, will operated, arbitrarily, to punish one soul for sins which had in fact been committed by another.

Regarding Providence, too, Neoplatonism trusted to law: law of the good which saw to it that the general welfare kept the upper hand and determined long-range over-all policy; law of the evil which was constantly interfering in the details without, however, obstructing or diverting the general trend. Much the same was probably true of Mithraism.

Christianity, however, complicated Providence because it assumed its wilful responsibility for every detail, even the most repugnant. Many, for instance Job, must, although innocent, be tortured because God wishes to satisfy Himself that they not only are innocent but will take every pains to remain so.

Neoplatonic salvation was also automatic: as the soul increased in virtue it behaved more like a spiritual and less like a carnal being, and just as matter, as it acquires fire and sheds earth, tends to rise, so, following a final purgatorial incarnation, the liberated soul becomes so cleansed that instead of

passing into another body it rises above matter and so to heaven.

Mithraists and Christians, on the contrary, believed that the soul, on being liberated from its first and only body, was still at the mercy of will. Regardless of its degree of purity it was, forcibly if necessary, brought to court to be judged, and its subsequent fate determined by the Divine Judge, Mithra or Jesus. In the one case it was judged chiefly according to its deeds of physical courage and accomplishment; in the other, rather according to its state of mind at death. But in both cases the judgment was based rather on loyalty to the judge than on personal virtue. For the conception of a will can only be of something analogous to the human will, and it was therefore hard not to believe that loyalty covered, if not a multitude, at least a minimum of sins.

According to the Christian will, moreover, almost all men who had lived before Jesus and all who although living after him had died unbaptized were doomed, irrespective of their behavior, to eternal damnation. Such were some of the consequences of the triumph of will over law.

c. Understanding vs. Faith

When men ask themselves, What is truth? they usually mean, What is important? For no one cares much whether an unimportant truth is true or not. In so far as this is so, the determination of what is important depends on subjective values, or taste, rather than on any objective tests.

If, therefore, the truth which seems to be most important is Nature, with man as merely one of many products of Nature, this truth will have laws but will not necessarily have any cause or purpose outside of itself. But if, on the other hand, the important truth is man, with Nature subordinated to him, the universe must have a cause and a purpose. And since purpose, at least, presupposes will, and will presupposes life, there must be a Creator and Providence.

Harking back to the Archaic Age of the Greeks, we recall the contrast between the scientifically and the religiously minded. Among the former one of the basic disputes was as to which was the more natural, motion or rest. The school of

Heraclitus said motion, because everything *seemed* to move; the Eleatic school of Parmenides said rest, because motion involved change and therefore no abiding reality.

Towards the end of this Archaic Age appeared the Pythagoreans, followed by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. They had observed that man's motion seemed artificial in the sense that his body could move only if, and so long as, it was alive. From this observation they concluded that whereas rest was natural to matter, there was also spirit, a something to which motion was natural.

It was not man alone, or animals and plants, which moved, however. The winds blew, the rain fell, and, above all, the celestial bodies seemed to be moving, and at a great velocity. Spirit, therefore, was active, violently active, in the upper air and heavens, and this Spirit was life, was will and purpose. Thus was God wrenched from the entrails of the physicist and handed to the religious. Thus was the God of faith revealed as also the God of understanding. For He had become a scientific necessity.

Passing thence over the skeptical ages which then followed to the year 300, we come again to a religious age, and one now in which God and His celestial subordinates were understood; and it was only natural that different races had given God different names, such as Oromasdès or Jehovah instead of Jupiter or Zeus. It was on this basis that polytheism and considerable toleration flourished.

Third-century belief had therefore remained to some extent one of understanding; but the fourth century now to follow was to become more and more an age of faith. The mystery of this change is not to be easily unraveled but one thing may be observed: the challenge to the God of understanding by a variety of saviors, who each, although speaking only in God's name, tended—like the Merovingian mayors of the palace speaking for the king—gradually to eclipse Him.

No longer were men satisfied to believe that "God's in His heaven—all's right with the world." Nor to believe that, since God is good, He will reward men according to their deserts. Rather they must know Him more intimately, must know His desires, even perhaps His foibles, that they may the better strive not only to please Him but also to draw His par-

ticular attention to themselves. But these techniques could not be understood; the only way to find them out was to have Him reveal them.

In earlier days there had also been saviors of a sort, notably Orpheus among the Greeks and, among the Jews, Moses. To these were now added Mithra and Jesus. Each depicted God in his own way and each claimed that, since his revelation was infallible, men could please God only by following his specific injunctions. Simple virtue, whose nature had, however vaguely, been understood, now became more and more a matter of a meticulous and even artificial faith, because if God were to be in any degree worshipped otherwise, He would not only not be edified, He would be outraged.

Such was the tendency which Porphyry, Iamblichus, and later the Emperor Julian, tried to resist. For Julian was intolerant of the Christians chiefly because they were at that time the most formidable of the various champions of intolerance.

Superficially it would seem that faith, being acquired, as it now was, by hearsay, would be less sure of itself than would an understanding based on personal, firsthand experience. Yet paradoxically it was, certainly at this time, just the other way about. The reason seems to be that individual judgment soon becomes aware of its own limitations, realizes that probability today may seem like improbability tomorrow; whereas judgment derived from another is far more inflexible because unless that other's judgment alters, one's own cannot.

In later times it was alleged that Christ's Revelation did not cease with his Ascension, and that his Church had been empowered to proclaim each subsequent doctrine as it was secretly revealed to her. In this manner the content of Revelation became more flexible, but it did not offer the conscientious believer any greater opportunity to supplement or solidify his faith with his own understanding. The Roman of 300 had perhaps a unique opportunity to choose which, if any, faith he preferred. All faiths offered a god of justice, but some also offered a god of war, others of peace, some a god of race, others of Rome, others of all mankind; some a god of love, others of hate.

There was of course the evidence of rational probability,

but how much did this count when weighed against desire? The longing for miracles is proof of the need for sensuous evidence, but was it not rather desire which enabled this need to be so frequently satisfied?

Understanding has its own techniques for the encouragement of individual judgments and the discouragement of overconfidence in them. This had been the Greek practice, and Rome in earlier times adopted it. But faith was now promoting the opposite technique, apparently because it dared not trust itself in either isolation or uncertainty.

Christians must therefore strive to convert others to their faith, and to silence those who balked; and they must furthermore bolster their certainty by setting up an authority from which there was no appeal. At first Jesus himself had served as this authority, then the apostles, then the Gospels, then the Bible, and finally, in order to eliminate any vestiges of dissent and therefore of doubt, a pope in place of a council.

In the course of the fourth century the General Councils were to develop. Now it was rather the text of the Bible that was being formulated, for not only were there many purely Jewish texts which seemed undesirable, there were also many Christian. All these were sorted: the desirable ones accepted and declared to be inspired and therefore infallible; the rest rejected, some as false, others as perhaps but not certainly true.

Hearsay bolstered by miracles and certainty bolstered by authority were now on the point of turning the Roman world upside down. Were men thus huddling together because they foresaw the cataclysm, or did the cataclysm come because they huddled? That is for the reader, if for anybody, to decide.

d. Fact vs. Symbol

The Christian faith was in the truth of everything alleged in the Bible. Being divinely inspired, it could contain nothing irrelevant or insignificant. This must be so in spite of the fact that to the uninitiated reader at least the larger part seemed to be both. Already, however, Paul had warned against trusting the letter rather than the spirit, and it was not long

before the spiritual or symbolic interpretation gained the upper hand.

Granted, however, that a text should be so interpreted, how was one to know what this text, without saying so, really meant? This might be a poser for a modern mind, but antiquity had long been versed in such puzzles as their reliance on oracles and dreams testify, and the Christians merely followed suit. If not Plato at least Plotinus and Porphyry had belittled such practices—vain efforts, however, doomed to defeat even at the hands of their own disciples.

There was, moreover, the further consideration that there were evidently symbols in the text itself, as where Adam and Eve heard the voice of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool of the day. If itself a symbol, it could only be understood literally as such. But if a passage was apparently literal, it was permissible to interpret it either way. Then, in the New Testament, where Jesus described himself as the Son of God rather than of man, where he said "thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my church," or where, taking bread, he said "this is my body," none but a literal interpretation was admitted. But where Jesus prophesied the imminent end of the world, and even where the *Apocalypse* interpreted this as a mere prophecy of a millennium, the literal interpretation was repudiated. Some, in the third century, stoutly believed in this millennium, complaining that symbolism could be carried too far; but the more symbolically minded had little difficulty in pulling the rug out from under their feet.

Already by an arbitrary choice of which texts must be literally, and which symbolically, understood a wide discretion was authorized. Yet, this latitude not sufficing, it soon became recognized that a passage might be interpreted both ways, and soon after this it was further agreed that the symbolic interpretations could themselves be of two kinds, and, later still, this was to be increased from two to three. That a text might be interpreted in any one of four ways was still reasonable, but that it could be so in all four surely bordered on the unreasonable.

Might not Nature, then, also be symbolically interpreted? Here paganism had already set ample precedents, a striking instance being the various significances attributed to the sun

by the cults of Attis and Baal in the East, of Apollo and Orpheus in Greece, and by the Neoplatonists and Mithraists. The Christians, however, were presented by the Old Testament with a special incentive, for this revealed that the whole universe had been created exclusively on account of man. On this assumption not only the sun and the other awe-inspiring phenomena, but also each humblest detail on earth must have a symbolic significance because it had been specifically designed to serve if not man's carnal desires then his spiritual need. There were no degrees, as from order and reason to disorder and chance, for everything was not merely relatively, but quite absolutely and therefore equally, significant.

Doubtless because of the importance which the heavenly bodies played in pagan beliefs, Christians did not now stress their significance. The sun, at any rate, was soon after relegated by Pope Leo—rather mischievously we should like to believe—to the menial office of serving as man's clock. He would not even give it the pagan credit of furnishing light or heat.

But for the most part sensible phenomena were honored to the extent of supposedly furnishing symbols, either dogmatic or moral. Not only were such vital matters as suffering, disease, war, and death attributed directly to the divine will. Everything else was too.

To be sure, if the wind blew gently its significance was not examined, but if it blew hard enough to cause damage, a symbolic interpretation was in order: it was a salutary warning, chastisement, or punishment, and the more ingeniously and plausibly any slightest event could be thus interpreted the more estimable was judged to be the faith and therefore the virtue of the interpreter; whereas he who made a deliberate inquiry into the natural behavior of anything was deemed guilty of the sin of idle curiosity, or worse.

2. UNLIKELY CAUSES

In trying to determine what beliefs contributed most to the now imminent Christian triumph we must first eliminate the least likely ones. These were presumably those which were shared by philosophy and religion alike.

One of these was the doctrine of the divinity, and therefore immortality, of the soul. On this matter, indeed, the philosophers were the most adamant because they believed that all human souls would ultimately regain a divine perfection and status. Origen and later Gregory of Nyssa agreed, but, like the Mithraists, most of the Christians maintained that by sin a man could and too often did, forfeit his divinity forever—immortal to be sure but only in the realm of hell.

Otherworldliness, too, was as much a philosophical as a religious inclination. To the Neoplatonists matter was the prime cause of evil, and souls were so good that some of them refrained from causing suffering even to animals. Only the more fanatical Mithraists or Christians were, like Plotinus, ashamed of being in the body. Nor were the Neoplatonists any more interested in promoting the temporal or civic welfare. Except on the lowest rungs of the ladder of perfection they were not, like the Mithraists and Christians, concerned even to raise the moral level of the public by rousing it to emulate their own standards of conduct.

Finally, it is not at all sure that the surviving polytheism of the Greek tradition was a cause of Greek philosophy's defeat. It is true that the fourth-century Neoplatonists like Iamblichus and Julian returned to polytheism, but monotheism had been the Platonic tradition until then and this later reaction from it was, as we have said, a general tendency of the day. Many Christians in one way or another tried to preserve the Old Testament monotheism, but no Jew, certainly, could be persuaded that they had succeeded. To a Jew the notion of the Oneness of the Trinity was worse than sophistry, and the budding cult of the martyrs seemed only a further proof of Christian cant. From the fourth century to Mohammed the Jews were the only monotheists, and they were every day incurring a more intense opprobrium.

Just as the Christianity of A.D. 300 resembled the contemporaneous philosophy in certain respects, so in others it resembled other contemporaneous religions. And not only, as we have shown, because it favored irrationality, will, faith, and symbolism, but also because, in order to enhance individual chances of salvation, it devised tempting substitutes for

the uncompromising standards of virtue which the Platonic tradition of ethics had imposed. This tradition had involved eschewing any efforts whether by prayer, sacrifices, magic, or ritual, to influence the will of the gods. Men, having been endowed with free will, must earn their respective salvations wholly on their merits. It was a scratch race, one which allowed no cutting of corners or special assistance in reaching the goal.

The religions, on the other hand, all offered one or more substitutes for this just but merciless pursuit of virtue, most of them calculated to curry favor with the powers above. The first and fundamental requirement was an articulated as well as a sincere loyalty which must, in common justice, invite the divine gratitude in return. There must be, in addition, outward manifestations of this loyalty if only to dispel divine doubts of their sincerity.

These manifestations of devotion varied from the cruder sacrifices first of men, then of first fruits whether animal, vegetable or mineral, or, as in pilgrimages, of effort, time, and risk to life. It was not that moral behavior ceased to be a means to the end, but rather that it ceased to be the only valid means. Even if Plotinus did not think that virtue was an end and so worth pursuing for its own sake, at least he thought that any other means to the end was both degrading to men and offensive to God.

As there were prayers and sacrifices there was also magic: from the simple initiations analogous to baptism to the complex rituals designed in one way or another to force God's hand. The Christians denounced this 'theurgy,' as Iamblichus himself proudly described it, but their own rituals, such as the exorcism of demons, and their sacraments, whereby they called down the Holy Ghost or wrested from Jesus a portion of his superfluous merit, were fast becoming indistinguishable in kind from the practices of their pagan rivals. Mithraism apparently provided only a simple ritual, which, perhaps because of its age, could no longer evolve. This may be one reason why it failed to survive.

These worshippers did not have primarily in mind to gain an unfair advantage over their fellow men. In seeking mercy and forgiveness whether they thought they deserved it or not,

they were also urging all other men to do likewise. At the same time, however, their techniques were not wholly ingenuous. For we must not forget that all the competing cults were now worshipping a supreme God so mighty that to try to bend His will seemed futile. It had seemed possible to move the old Jehovah perhaps, or the old Zeus, but certainly not the now inaccessible God of the Neoplatonists. If, however, He was not to be influenced by men directly, might He not be indirectly, through intermediaries whose fame had been transmitted by men's forefathers? If these could affect the will of the Almighty, men, by influencing them, might thereby, although indirectly, do no less. At least Virgil, if not also Homer, was still a familiar and respected master. Can we be sure we know all the reasons why this was so?

Viewed in this light, the religious rivalries were, by the year 300, based on preferences each for its own mediator or savior as he who, on the one hand, was most inclined to help men and who, on the other, was most able, because of his influence on the Almighty, to satisfy these humane propensities. To be sure some of the Oriental beliefs are in this respect obscure. But it is very doubtful that any of the Greek gods, Apollo, Demeter, Dionysos, or others, were believed to have displaced Zeus; and Orpheus, at least, was definitely a mediator, quite as were Mithra and Jesus.

To recapitulate, then, the Christians of about the year 300 shared with current philosophies the belief in the divinity of the human soul, in the existence and activity of divine wills other than, though subordinate to, the supreme will of God, and a distrust of the physical world and so also of their own bodies. Furthermore they shared with the other, rival religions of this time a belief in the indispensability of ritual devotions for salvation, in the capacity of men by the use of magical devices to foreknow—in fact even to affect in some degree—future events, and finally in the existence of a savior whose special concern and function it was to direct men's temporal lives and to render judgment in regard to their eternal destiny. Although we cannot be sure what were the chief causes of the Christian triumph which was at this moment being consummated, we may fairly suppose that they

were based not so much on those beliefs which Christians shared with others as on those which were uniquely their own.

3. LIKELY CAUSES

It needs no great perspicacity to suspect that the key to the Christian triumph was to be found in the Old Testament as much as in the New, and Jesus himself was the first person to say so. At the same time the Old Testament embodied a belief deeply rooted, tightly racial, and therefore jealously guarded. It was not malleable, but so rigid as to be impervious to influences either alien in space or novel in time. The very solidity of the Old Text served to isolate it.

But alien and novel ideas there were, already knocking against it during the life of Jesus, and as time went on knocking ever more insistently and even menacingly—from Jesus himself, to Paul, to the Gospel of John. As these pressures on the Jews increased, so did the reciprocal pressure of the Old Testament on these increase too.

The resulting ramifications were presumably more complex and certainly more obscure to us than we might be tempted to suppose. As hypothetical illustrations only, what we have already said suggests that the pressures on the Jews were to cultivate the spiritual and eternal rather than the material and temporal, and, combined with this, the conception of a savior more closely linking God to man and man to God. This produced the first purely Jewish converts. The reciprocal pressure of the Jews on the pagans, on the other hand, was the conception of a pure dualism of God and man, with Nature at the mercy of God. For Nature had been created out of, and would return to, nothing. She was no more than a scaffolding or stage set up in order to test and strengthen man's moral capacities. This done, God, having no more need of Nature, would annihilate her. This, dramatized by the corollary of an impending Apocalyptic end, produced the first converts from pure paganism.

But if the Old Testament was the key, it was Jesus who turned it. For was it not he who, carrying further the visions of the prophets, cut away the material and temporal as a de-

ceptive curtain hiding God from men, thereby revealing not one truth or many truths but only those of God and man? He was the intermediary or savior; why should he not recognize this and therefore preach it? And why should his disciples not do likewise? By recording the story of Jesus in their Gospels, the four Evangelists could present to the world a portrait of this intermediary so vivid, tender, and tragic that all the rival saviors—Orpheus, Mithra and the rest—paled by comparison. For here was a divine being who had not only manifested, but incarnated, himself. And who as a man, although still a God, had chosen to suffer, as no other man could have suffered, in order that man might see God as He really was, and thereby be redeemed.

That men might be further assured of his divine status Jesus not only revealed himself after death in all his divine glory but taught, by example as well as by precept, a standard of virtue then little known and less understood. To the Greek virtues, certainly, and also probably to the Oriental, Jesus added humility, contrition, compassion, and love, all the deep but latent promptings of the heart and conscience. No more than had the Greeks did he teach men to aspire to the love of perfection, but this perfection was now first revealed, not as something purely abstract and haughty, but as a thing concrete, as deeply lowly and human as God's perfection was lofty and divine. Man was thus God's counterweight, graced with a potential ethic which God, although He had created it, could not realize in Himself. Perhaps that was why God created man: that through Jesus not only could man rejoice in the presence of God, but also God in the presence of His humble saints.

THE CATHOLIC TRIUMPH

1. DYING PAGANISM

IN THE FOURTH CENTURY paganism lingered on, not yet actively persecuted but snubbed, stripped of its privileges, and financially starved. The Eleusinian mysteries lasted at least until 364, the Christian emperors assumed the office of Pontifex Maximus until 375, the cults of Egypt, Phrygia, and Mithra are last heard of only in 393. A now debased Neoplatonism, composed higgledy-piggledy of all the gods, continued its losing struggle, as during the short reign of Julian, to keep paganism alive.

Christianity was now, since Constantine, safely triumphant, and Jesus had become the God of the empire. His worshippers, however, were still so divided about almost everything else that throughout the rest of the century they had to devote themselves chiefly to bringing consistency and unity out of relative chaos. To them, as victors, belonged the spoils; the problem now was to make a wise and just division of them. The change resulting was from Christianity to Catholicism.

2. CHRIST

The controversy between Christians which overshadowed all others in this fourth century was about the extent to which Christ, as we may now more appropriately call Jesus, was also God. It was first fiercely argued at Alexandria, where in the third century he was conceived of, after the manner of the

Fourth Gospel, as analogous to the Neoplatonic Logos or Nous. In the early fourth century this belief was given wider currency by a certain Arius, who maintained that Christ was the first created being, and chosen by the Father, because He foreknew Christ's future merits, to be the Creator of the Holy Ghost and then of the world.

But because the other, less Platonically minded, Christians thought otherwise, Constantine convoked the famous Council of Nicaea in 325, in order to procure an official determination, and it was there decreed that,

We believe in a single God, Father, omnipotent and author of all things visible and invisible, and in a single Lord, Jesus Christ, Son of God, the only engendered by Him, that is, of the essence of the Father, God of God, light of light, true God of true God; engendered and not created, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all was created . . . and in the Holy Ghost. (Duchesne, *Histoire Ancienne de l'Eglise*, II, 149.)

The Nicene Creed was a compromise, for as it rejected the Arian belief so it also rejected the stricter monotheistic belief of the Sabellians. According to them, there was only one God who manifested Himself successively and so only temporarily, as Jehovah, then Christ, then the Holy Ghost. Therefore, once the purpose of the Creation had been accomplished and the world ended, these three manifestations would contract again into a complete Unity. The incarnated Christ could not be the Son of God because he was God Himself. Even Athanasius, that bulwark of Nicene orthodoxy, denied that the procession from, or engendering of, Christ by God was in any way exterior, and he balked at the idea of the three hypostases, or persons.

As Nicaea rejected the Sabellian position, so the Arians were tempted into moderating their own. From their original position that the Son did not wholly resemble the Father, they now conceded that he was like the Father and some even added the words 'in every respect.' They only refused to say 'of the same essence.' The issue was thereby narrowed to that of the three hypostases. Once this were settled, the precise word to be used to describe the similarity—whether it be homoousios or homoiousios—would no longer matter.

Athanasius, as we have said, would not recognize the dis-

inction of three hypostases; later Gregory of Nazianzen was accused of tritheism because he did recognize it. The confusion of meanings between the Greeks and Latins was a further difficulty. But the disputants were now narrowing the gap; once the meaning of the disputed words *homo (i) ousios* or identical and *hypostases* or persons had been agreed upon, a settlement was in sight.

With the death in 378 of Valens, last of the so-called Arian emperors, the settlement came. The Arians lost on the issue of identity but won on that of persons. This, according to the great Catholic scholar Duchesne, was the final creed:

The divine being manifested in Jesus is absolutely identical with the sole and unique God whom the Christians acknowledge; he is nevertheless distinct from Him by a peculiarity clearly mysterious and incomprehensible, which, in the language of the New Testament, which the Church follows, describes the relation of the Son to the Father. From this arises the distinction of Persons. (*Ibid.*, II, 594.)

The Nicene Creed had simply said "and [we believe] in the Holy Ghost." That left the question of his nature quite open, and naturally many who said that Christ was engendered by God also said that the Holy Ghost was in turn engendered by Christ. Athanasius, to be sure, had no less naturally taken the opposite view, so that arguments flew back and forth on this issue, too, and Basil would not follow Athanasius until after 375. From then on, since it was now recognized that the Son was of the essence of the Father and yet a different person, the same was assumed of the Holy Ghost. The passage of Duchesne thus continues:

To the two hypostases or persons of the Father and of the Son, is added, by an analogous distinction, the third hypostasis or person of the Holy Ghost. In this way the theological Trinity was constituted; thus the Christian tradition became formulated—as clearly as such a mystery can be—in the philosophic language of the time. (*Ibid.*, II, 594.)

The further mystery of the nature of the incarnated Christ was no less energetically argued. In order to be sure of establishing his divinity it was at first claimed by many that his human form, life, Passion and Resurrection were really only

deceptive 'appearances.' Others, the Arians among them, modified this to the extent of asserting that although his soul, and therefore his intelligence and will, were wholly divine, his body was human. The Nicene Creed, on the other hand, had declared that Christ had for us men and for our salvation descended, incarnated himself, made himself man, suffered and was resurrected; and its defenders were able to hold their ground. When later, about 350, a certain Apollinaris declared that to believe that the incarnated Christ was at once both wholly divine and wholly human was as crazy as to believe in centaurs, hircocerfs, or other unreal beings, again the Nicæans resisted and again, for the time being, prevailed.

This issue was to arise again in the fifth century producing the notorious Nestorian and Eutychian explanations; but although it was then further elaborated and refined, the underlying difficulty remained the same. The rationally minded strove still to evade the admission that this too was a mystery, but it was not until the Middle Ages that orthodoxy became reconciled to such rationalism, and even then only for service as a flying buttress.

Why did this mystery seem so important? Because it was believed that by means of it God was able to infuse not only the souls but also the bodies of men with divinity, and was therefore willing to immortalize both. Armed with this assurance, men could conscientiously respect their bodies too, as many of the Platonists and Mithraists had not. Out of this arose the Christian prohibition of suicide, of cremation, of castration, and the approval of copulation, if only by married couples in order to bear children. This indeed was specifically a Jewish heritage, that the body, as well as the soul, must be kept unsullied and intact.

Whereas it was the Incarnation which divinized man, it was the Passion which humanized God. For by dying Christ earned as his just reward not only his own salvation but also the privilege of realizing, at least in part, his wish that all men be saved. This was effectuated, as we have said, by the gift to man, through the good offices of the Holy Ghost, of divine grace—that is, of a merit on account of Christ's merit, added to any smallest merit which a man may himself have earned.

Did Jehovah accede to this change with reluctance or re-

joining? That we shall see in a moment. First we must recur to the part which was being attributed to matter and to the Devil.

3. DUALISM

a. Manichean

The dualism of the Gnostics and Marcionites of earlier centuries, which had since become less influential, was now replaced by a derivative view. This one, called Manicheism after its founder, was inspired by Mithraism instead of Platonism, and was now attracting converts among those who sought a reconciliation of Mithraic and Christian beliefs. This founder, Mani, was a Persian, but as the sect grew and spread, notably to Egyptian and then to Carthaginian Africa, it evidently acquired certain Christian characteristics. Hoping to combine and thereby supplant both of the leading cults, it succeeded only in being persecuted by both: by the Mithraic emperor Diocletian and after him by the Christian emperors. Nevertheless it continued to spread, and in the later fourth century was making serious inroads in Europe as well. We have personal records of only an Aphthonius and a Duke Sebastian in Alexandria in 350 and 357. Later a Faustus appeared in Carthage whose doctrine was attacked by Augustine; and there was of course Augustine's own youthful adherence to the sect from 373 to 383.

In most respects the belief was Mithraic: the same warfare between the Gods of good and evil, between spirit and matter; the same fall of souls from heaven to earth, although now rather from necessity than from choice; the same passions acquired from the planets which still continued to plague them on earth. The same conception of salvation, without magic ritual but with the commemorative banquet, climaxed by a Last Judgment at the end of the world, the innocent purified as they rise through the planetary spheres, the guilty eternally damned.

It may be presumed that this splinter sect, having failed to supplant Mithraism before 300, thereafter aimed instead to ingratiate itself with the now triumphant Christians. As Re-

deemer, therefore, Christ was now allowed to share the supremacy with Mani, and their victory, like that of Mithra, had been over the powers of evil. These powers, however, the Manichees now identified with those of the Old Testament Jehovah who, as to certain Gnostics and Marcionites, was none other than the great Deceiver himself.

Christ's Incarnation, as the Docetists had said, was a deception, though a wholly justifiable one. He assumed the appearance of a man, not because he intended either to divinize man or to humanize God, or even to earn merit, but only in order to make his Revelation the more dramatic and effective. He never *really* suffered or died. Mani's contribution was superfluously parallel: like Christ, he was of divine origin, either he was the *Nous* or, where he was made subordinate to Christ, he was identified with the Holy Ghost.

As in Neoplatonism and Mithraism, so in Manicheism: matter was evil. But on this point the Manichees agreed rather with the Neoplatonists in trying not so much to tame and master as to elude it. The most extreme forms of asceticism were therefore cultivated, abstinences occasionally including refusal to sever even a twig. Naturally such extreme taboos could not be expected of everyone. The faithful were therefore divided into the *Electi* or *Perfecti*, and the mere Hearers. The former, by holding strictly to the ascetic rules, were guaranteed salvation; and such was their supposed holiness that by their prayers they were able to save the Hearers from damnation. This was tantamount to the Christian belief in vicarious or assignable merits. The beneficiaries, however, had to stay in the sphere of the moon until they had been more thoroughly purged.

Nevertheless, in at least one important respect Manicheism introduced a novelty. We mentioned their significant supposition that the fall of the souls from heaven to earth was the result rather of necessity than choice, and it was therefore not illogical for them to suppose further that these souls in due course rose from earth to heaven only because of a like necessity. Thus the 'Perfect' were the 'Elect' in a literal sense, elected or chosen by God for salvation rather than saved because they had qualified for it on account of their own earned merit. Here is surely an echo of Persian astrology, of the old

belief that the destiny of men was in the hands of the stars, so that, as in the case of courage and cowardice in Homer, so in the case of virtue and sin, man's apparent will is not a free creative cause but only an effect of a creative cause originating outside of, and therefore presumably above, himself.

Was this cause Will or God, or was it Nature and therefore Fate? We shall see what, at least, was to be the Christian reaction.

b. Christian

The Neoplatonists identified evil with mere negative imperfection; the Mithraists and Manichees identified it with a positive living malice as well. Must Christians choose between them or could they find a third solution? Their fight against Neoplatonism was being won, but, in the process, they were becoming more susceptible to radical dualism.

The rise of monasticism was one indication. First the solitary hermit, then the cenobitic monk, sought to emulate Christ. Disdainful of ritual sacraments and priests, they sought salvation by silence, solitude, prayer, and abstinences—by escaping from, rather than coming to the help of, their fellow men. This regime was also Neoplatonic, but the difference was that, like the Manichees, these hermits and cenobites were fighting not so much the imperfections within them as the evil powers of the demons outside them. Man, supposedly, could not do much for others or even for himself; he was at the mercy of two exterior powers within him fighting to possess his feeble soul. From the centre of Manicheism in Egypt first sprang this monasticism. From Egypt too a new Gnosticism spread westward.

The Carthaginian Lactantius thought that matter had been created by the Devil; the Spaniard Pacian saw the world as the scene of perpetual warfare between the Devil and Christ. As this Gnostic tendency spread, from Africa to Spain, and thence into Aquitaine, Christian authority recognized the danger. In 385 the leader of these western dissidents, Priscillian, was executed at Trier on the Moselle.

There were other straws in the wind to indicate the ascetic trend. In spite of repeated references in the Gospels to the

brothers of Christ, the belief was now gaining ground that Mary had remained a virgin not only in conceiving and giving birth to Christ but also thereafter for the rest of her life.

Still another indication was the successful effort, led especially by Jerome, to have all other than official Church magic made a criminal offence. Until then magic had not been punishable unless injury could be proved; henceforth not only was mere evil intent punishable but also acts even if proved to have been beneficial—as where a physical remedy was applied in order to cure illness. Thus not only chemistry but medicine as well was virtually declared to be a diabolical vocation. It is therefore not too much to say that matter—even in the form of the human body which had been specifically dedicated to and sanctified by Christ's Incarnation—was being too often regarded as the symbol, and even the instrument, of the Devil.

4. THE REDEMPTION

It was during the fourth century that Christian doctrine, guided by a now powerful and privileged Church, evolved the Revelation of Jesus, by commentary and interpretation, into a full-fledged and authoritative theology capable of holding its own in both consistency and plausibility with any other whether Greek or Roman, Persian or Egyptian. It was coming of age.

Like all other systems, however, it still betrayed weak spots which called, if possible, for further strengthening. Some of these were on the way to solution by simply characterizing their phenomena as mysteries. Such was the case with the Trinity and the Incarnation, which could plausibly be called such because they were mysteries of divine strength.

There remained, however, other puzzling phenomena which could not be so satisfactorily explained because they were mysteries rather of divine weakness. One was the time lag between the Fall and the Redemption, about which Porphyry had been so caustic. Another was also concerned with the time lag between the soul's separation from its dead body and its final summons to the Last Judgment. But far

more important than either of these was the preliminary determination of why Christ had felt impelled to undergo his ordeal at all.

To suppose that the Father had been too impulsive in condemning Adam's posterity on account of his personal sin and that He had come to regret this blanket condemnation was not consonant with His vaunted wisdom. To suppose that it was rather Christ who wished to mitigate the effects of his Father's harshness was not consonant with the Father's unvarying goodness. To suppose on the other hand that some obstacle existed which had thwarted the wills of both was not consonant with their reputed omnipotence. The New Testament, to be sure, here supplied an indispensable clue, for it had there been repeatedly declared that Christ, by his Passion, had paid a ransom whereby he had bought the release of the captive souls of men.

So far so good. But this did not resolve the further and really decisive question of to whom this ransom had been paid. Irenaeus had said that the ransom had been paid in order to satisfy the requirements of justice. This, however, still avoided the question of the identity of the recipient.

A first identification, later to be revived, was that the recipient had been Jehovah Himself. For there was no question but that Christ had come to perfect the Old Law, and that he had supplanted the old regime of justice with the new one of mercy. Since Jehovah had shown no mercy to Adam and less to his descendants until Christ came down to be crucified for man's sake, it was natural to suppose that the Son's sacrifice had so softened his Father's heart that His age-long wrath was at last assuaged.

This theory, however, had serious drawbacks: for one thing it implied that the Son was both independent of, and subordinate to, the Father; for another that Jehovah, as the Manichees were now insisting, was anything but a model of beneficence, for Jehovah had softened His heart not because He loved mankind but only because He could not help but respect and so reward the courage of His only Son.

If not then to the Father, to whom was the ransom paid? Was it to Fate, Nature, matter, or demons? The Mithraists would have said to Fate or Nature, Plotinus to Nature or mat-

ter, the Manichees to matter or demons. The majority of the Church Fathers supposed that it was paid to the Devil.

An earlier supposition had been that in the course of total war the Devil had by violence captured the souls of men and that Christ had somehow magically redeemed them. Now, however, the theory was preferred that God had originally bound Himself by a formal compact or armistice according to the terms of which the Devil might, without being interfered with, tempt any guilty man to sin and, as often as he succeeded, carry him down to hell. In return the Devil had promised not to tempt any man who was innocent. Now if only it be assumed that the Devil had tempted the innocent Adam before the pact had been consummated, the subsequent penalty which God had imposed on Adam's descendants made it quite within the Devil's prerogative to tempt them all, and since God had given His word not to interfere, they all helplessly succumbed.

Because such a state of affairs was intolerable, however, it was supposed that God then devised a way to trap the Devil into breaking the compact. As a Trinity He arranged to incarnate Himself as Christ, and in order that, although a man, he should be an innocent one, God, as Holy Ghost, impregnated a virgin without resorting to copulation in order that their child might not be sullied with the inherited guilt. Whereupon the Devil, having no inkling of the trick being played on him, tempted this innocent man, thereby breaking his promise and so voiding the contract.

That this was good Roman law is doubtful. Certainly according to modern law the Devil's anticipatory breach, since it had been induced by deceit, would not have released God from His obligations under the contract. Possibly the explanation may be that the situation according to the earlier jungle law was still present in the minds of these theologians; for on the assumption that God had signed the contract not freely but under pressure of military necessity, He was bound by it in law rather than in equity and therefore might justly resort to a technicality in order to get free.

The effects of the Redemption in turn must depend on its cause.

If the cause was to assuage the wrath of God, His justice must, at least theoretically, have become tempered with mercy; but the facts did not warrant so optimistic a conclusion. For many, through no fault of their own, were still damned because Christ at the Last Judgment could no longer dispense his customary mercy, God having yielded to Christ only what Christ had justly earned and no more. The conflict therefore was still attributable to a distinction not only of Persons but of Wills. For God, in being just to Christ, grudged only so much mercy to men as this justice required.

But if, on the other hand, the cause of the Redemption was an effort to outwit the Devil, the identity of the two divine wills could be assumed. The so-called mousetrap would in that case have been jointly concocted; and as a result of its success, a human being, Christ, had earned so great a merit that he had not only been justly saved but had retained a surplus which he could vicariously bestow on others in the form of grace.

The Devil, however, had not forfeited all his powers: a man who at death had not accumulated enough merit—by his own efforts plus the grace bestowed on account of them—was still damned, because Christ at the Last Judgment, with the Devil looking over his shoulder, could then no longer dispense his mercy.

On this clear-cut dualist assumption the power which would enforce the terms of the contract was that Justice, Fate, or Mithraic Time which regulated the strife between Virtue or Mercy and Vice or Cruelty. From the beginning the Father as well as the Son had wanted to act mercifully; but, because of the power of the demons, they usually could not. Fate, however, although cold-blooded, was also so far just that if either party broke his word he would be penalized. Hitherto the Devil could tempt men into sin and God could not justly resist him. But now, through the Redemption, He could exercise the comparable power of bestowing so much merit on men that it not only often canceled their sins but enabled many of them to accumulate enough surplus merit to render this mechanism self-perpetuating.

By thus employing His wisdom in the service of His good-

ness, God had been able to overcome in large degree the limitations to His omnipotence.

Nature—that is, the sensible world which the Greeks and later the Neoplatonists had so respected as a force, however passive, to be reckoned with—was now degraded. The only remaining question was which of the contending supernatural beings was, at any given time, manipulating her. Christ had wished all men to be saved. Was the fact that so many nevertheless were not, caused by the Father's severity or by the Devil's malice? If the former, there was nothing that man could do; for if Christ could not influence his Father, surely no man might do so.

But if the Devil was the culprit, man could, as the Mithraists had taught, play a part. For in this case man's soul was precisely the prize or booty for the control of which the rival powers fought. Therefore a supposedly unnatural manifestation or event was interpreted as an incident of that warfare, and man might plausibly hold the balance of power to promote the aims of the one side or the other.

Now when the unnatural event was a propitious one for the faith it was identified as an act of God or of His adherents and therefore called a miracle. When it was contrarily identified it was called sorcery or magic.

Strictly speaking, magic dealt with the secret forces in Nature rather than with forces superior to her; it was that which could be performed by men without the aid of specific supernatural co-operation. But at this time the distinction was made according rather to the supposed origin and intent than to the physical nature of it. Thus the effectiveness of the sacraments depended wholly on the priest and participant—God's co-operation was purely automatic. Yet their effects were classified as miracles and not as magic. On the other hand, medical cures effected by physicians, because the intent was to purify the body rather than the soul, were coming to be regarded as deeds inspired by the Devil—magical, therefore—and the human agents liable to capital punishment. And, as the physicians were to fare, so were all other priors into the secrets of Nature. To flirt with Nature unless the cult authorized it was to flirt with the enemy of God and to flirt therefore also with the enemy of man.

5. THE TRINITY AS A COMPROMISE

In the light of the contemporary issues raised by dualism and the cause of the Redemption, it appears that the Trinitarian doctrine was something more than an acknowledgment that the Revelation was of a Godhead which defied human reason. For it was not only a divine revelation but also a human compromise. This was because it was, and not wholly by chance either, a straddle, an attempt, however unconscious, rather to confuse than to clarify.

To be sure, the more unconscious motives are, the more risky it is to try to identify them, but in this case it seems to be a fair hypothesis that those Platonic and Arian Christians who championed the three Persons were doing so in order to avoid dualism by confining the conflicting forces to the upper, relatively beneficent, world of heaven, that is, to the well-meaning but irascible Father and His more perceptive and sensitive Son. And fair to suppose, too, that those Nicaeans who held to the identity of the essences of these Persons did so because they preferred to put all the blame for the evil in the world on the Devil.

In so far as this association of ideas was deliberate, therefore, it appears that this Trinity was a human as well as a divine mystification: because by means of it, the real question, of the unity not of essence or personality but of will, was surreptitiously eschewed.

6. PRELUDE TO AUGUSTINE

In the later fourth century Platonic Christianity was still based on the great texts of Origen, who had shared Plotinus' belief in a divinity whose nature and aims were unimpeachable but whose power to realize them was impeded by imperfections in matter and thereby in those souls, both divine and human, which had come in contact with it. Realizing, however, that the Christian teaching had revealed depths of perfection of which man had not hitherto been aware and that it was, therefore, of divine origin, he aimed, by recon-

ciling their apparent divergences, to find the truth which underlay them both.

But since he had found much, especially in the Old Testament, which he thought contradictory to, rather than consistent with, Platonism, he had inaugurated, on a vast scale, the resort to a symbolic interpretation of those passages which he could not reconcile with Platonism. In his zeal, he unquestionably played fast and loose with many of the most categorical affirmations of the text.

So long as the persecution lasted opposition to Origen had been spasmodic and ineffectual. Rather his works had furnished many of the most effective arguments in favor of Christian as against pagan beliefs, in spite of the fact that later he also furnished many arguments for the supporters of the Arian heresy. Towards the end of the fourth century, however, the Arians had become discredited, and in order to clinch the victory Origen had to be discredited too. Many of the Fathers had been, and still were, under the spell of Origen's faith in the perfection of divinity and the imperfection of matter; among them Basil and particularly Gregory of Nyssa. But the rise of the repulsive Manichean dualism was opening the eyes of many others to the danger of believing that matter had not been created by God.

Consequently opposition to Origen and his apologists now increased. It was objected in general that his symbolic interpretations had led him to champion heretical views, as of Jehovah as a mere ineffable One, of Christ as a mere Logos or Nous, of the Fall as the natural consequence of the prenatal sin of the soul, of the ultimate salvation of all human souls but of none of their bodies, and of the incompatibility of ignorance and virtue.

The defense of Origen was that if Scripture were understood literally, the Jehovah depicted in the Old Testament was not even a caricature of the God revealed by Christ; that thus to take the old Jehovah at face value was, at best, gross anthropomorphism, and at worst a blasphemy to divinity. To say, therefore, that Jehovah, as there depicted, was the God of perfection and that Christ was identical with this picture of Him in will as well as in essence and differing—as if he were

an identical twin—only as a person, was an insult to human intelligence.

Furthermore there seemed to be much even in the New Testament which ought not to be literally understood. If it was inconceivable that divine Perfection should condemn Adam's descendants almost without exception to an eternal damnation, it was equally inconceivable that Christ should have taught that only those who believed in his divinity would be saved from so cruel a fate. Everyone agreed that God had created men's souls in His image, and that Christ's Incarnation had further divinized them. But to many it remained inconceivable that men's souls had been thus immortalized only in order that most of them should spend the rest of their immortality in hell. How indeed could God have risked that souls thus privileged should most of them become demoniacal? Jehovah had already been cruel enough in His temporal punishments. Must it be believed that Christ was complacently tolerating punishments infinitely more severe?

Yet Origen's doctrines were nonetheless condemned: the omnipotence of the Godhead as revealed in the Old Testament was to be defended regardless of the apparent inconsistencies and cruelties. Who, then, were God's enemies? Not matter, not demons, for these were His chosen instruments and puppets. Could His enemy possibly be rather man? Not, to be sure, the potentially ideal man but the real one, of flesh and blood, of passions as well as of aspirations, of pride and independence as well as of humility and submissiveness. God's mercy, to be sure, was now being made available to some, but even to these at so stiff a price that many a well-intentioned but freedom-loving man still balked before submitting to the yoke.

With this condemnation of Origen in the year 399 Christianity reached the threshold of its Catholic maturity.

AUGUSTINE

JUST AS MICHELANGELO so dominated the art of the Renaissance that it is not easy to identify either his masters or his pupils, so Augustine dominated the theology of the Christian Fathers. Neither, therefore, can be treated as just another link in a chain.

To begin with, Augustine's major premise was the unqualified omnipotence of God's will. The pagans thought of divinity as being constantly balked and hampered by obstacles, not by logic only but also by Fate, Nature, matter, or demons; Revelation taught Augustine, however, that God was faced by only one obstacle, and even that one was of His own creation and for His own specific purpose. This was the wayward behavior of the living souls He had created, first of angels, later of men. First Lucifer had misbehaved, then Adam. Adam's descendants, tainted by his guilt, had behaved no better. But this time, restraining the impatience He had shown in dealing with the angels, He created a sensuous world for men to live in, as a proving-ground; and at the same time He sought, by admonitions and threats, there to chasten and civilize them. The history of this process He had had recorded for man's benefit by the patriarchs, and by pagan writers too, which also revealed, if less plainly, the nature of His solicitude. But these devices were not to suffice of themselves; they were merely preparatory.

For although by these means men had come to know something of God, and so of love, virtue, and the world to come, they were inadequate to produce even a serious desire to control their evil propensities. Therefore, when the time was

ripe, God incarnated Himself in order, by displaying the model of the human nature which He wanted to see realized, to create that desire. In order adequately to inspire it, He was willing to suffer a miserable and ignominious death.

Since God was omnipotent, why did He not save Himself this sacrifice by simply infusing men—as He had the angels who had not disobeyed—with an irresistible and enduring grace? Because Adam had disobeyed and this taint or guilt was inherited. But why did God not so grace all the angels and Adam before they had had time to disobey? Here was a crucial question. The most probable explanation seemed to be that God was not interested in creating puppets, that is, in sharing heaven with a multitude of men who were virtuous only because they had never had a real chance to be anything else. He wanted only men who, like the good angels, had been tempted and had, so far as it was within their power, resisted.

The bad angels had been given, but had failed to exercise, this power. These deserved damnation. But the descendants of Adam had not been given it; therefore their struggle to resist sin, though unsuccessful, deserved consideration. Now history proved God's Providence because He had been successful in raising mankind from barbarism to relative civilization. And by the Redemption many had come not only to understand but to desire virtue. By this tempering, this refining, process man had finally been transformed into a vessel, or raw material, worthy to be endowed with true virtue. His potentiality had now reached the point where it was fit to be actualized.

From these premises Augustine drew certain conclusions: as a potentiality man still had no free will except to choose between sinful alternatives, he still had no pretext for pride. But he was now fit, if and when grace did come, to comprehend, welcome, and therefore clutch it. Few, to be sure, were offered grace; the behavior of too many men made this regrettable conclusion unavoidable. Therefore Augustine was driven to suppose that God, for some mysterious reason, wanted to save only enough to refill the ranks left depleted by the fallen angels. The rest were damned, as all of them, being sons of Adam, actually deserved to be.

In contrast to the current views, therefore, God had never been impeded, by compacts or other obstacles, from conferring grace. Nor was He ever bound to confer only so much as Christ and His saints had accumulated. He did not even feel bound by His sense of justice to confer His efficient or saving grace on as many as earned it, for no man had earned it or ever would.

The so-called saints, therefore, were merely lucky men who, having been saved purely by chance, deserved no further rewards and got none. For living men to pray to God, therefore, whether for others' sake or their own—unless to say, "Thy will be done"—seemed to Augustine as it had to both the Manichees and Plotinus, a presumptuous if hygienic gesture. For living men to pray to a saint was not only futile but blasphemous, because it betrayed a belief that these saints could wheedle God into doing something for men which He might not have done had He been invoked directly.

If Augustine did not belittle the sacraments he did confine them to a symbolic and therefore didactic and psychological role. For God's saving grace was not to be enticed by magical rituals any more than by apparent merits. It came only as He arbitrarily willed to bestow it. Devotion to the sacraments might be evidence of faith and faith in turn of pious intentions but, being the result of mere human initiative, it could not be even a contributory cause of virtue.

There was therefore no reason to worry about the efficacy of sacraments administered by bad priests: because their efficacy was confined to facilitating the outward manifestation of an already existing state of mind. Probably the unbaptized would now almost never receive this saving grace, but if the baptized received it more often this was because they, like Paul, had received the preliminary grace to seek baptism and might therefore have more hope of receiving the rest. Of the Eucharist likewise Augustine said that "these things are called symbols because they show us one object and thereby make us understand another."

The sacraments, therefore, did give the participant the assurance that he was eligible to receive saving grace, but that was all; for the only assurance of having received it lay so

cunningly hidden in each man's heart that none but God could detect it.

There was no Fate but God's own will or pleasure. The only doubt might be whether or not God, being as free as He was immutable, should ever change His mind. To be sure, He might well seem to change His tactics, but if so it was rather that He had already willed from eternity that at a certain time He would. This at least was the inference drawn from Augustine by the much later champion of God's omnipotence, Duns Scotus.

As there was no Fate so there was no Nature other than God's will. Just as He had created Nature merely by willing, so He maintained her in existence and so He could, by merely desisting, annihilate her. If the world functioned according to justice, this was only by God's justice and not because of any limitations imposed from without.

Conventional Catholicism was imagining the so-called miracle as an unnatural because unusual manifestation. Augustine, on the contrary, believed that, since every sensuous manifestation was wholly and therefore equally unnatural, the so-called miracle was merely a rare occurrence which was specifically so designed by God in order, by startling men, to remind them of what He expected of them. For to His routine lessons of every day He knew they would pay no heed.

To Augustine, furthermore, the sensuous world and its phenomena constituted not only an environment but a continuing Revelation which the Bible, far from contradicting, merely clarified. As this sensuous Revelation had preceded the events recorded in the Bible, so it would persist thereafter. As God had taught men from the beginning, so He would continue, in one way or another, to teach them till the end. The tendency of most of the Catholics was to believe that, seduced by the Devil, the pagans had been so misled that the Redemption became imperative in order so to disillusion men that never again would they heed the diabolical enticements of Nature or Reason. Augustine, on the other hand, believed that not only the Old Testament but pagan philosophy too, having prepared him to acknowledge the Revelation of Christ, had been likewise designed so to prepare all mankind. And

since Nature, before Christ, had facilitated man's understanding of Christ's teaching, why should she not forever continue to do so? It was true that present Revelation now lay in the past, but, since it had once lain in the future, why should future Revelation not still lie in the future? If the future must be interpreted in the light of the past, so too must the past be interpreted in the light of the future.

Christianity had been born in a world of pagans who believed that the soul, as such, was divine and without imperfection, and that since man's sins must therefore be due to his material body, the aim of his soul should be so to emancipate himself from his body that his soul would be set free. This led to the familiar turn to otherworldliness, to asceticism, mysticism, and pride. Aristotle and the Atomists had conspicuously resisted this tendency, but with the wave of Orientalism they had been largely forgotten.

Even Augustine had known of Aristotle only indirectly and vaguely. On the other hand, he knew both the Old and New Testaments by heart, and he thought he perceived in them a revelation that the dualism in the world, which was undeniable, lay not between God and Nature, God and matter, or God and demons, with man—being a composite of soul and body—as the unwilling and helpless prey for whose possession the divine rivals were contending, but rather between God and man's soul, with Nature, matter, and demons merely passive and neutral instruments devised and manipulated by God in order the better to tame man, in order to so mold him that, having received grace, he would become presentable enough to be admitted to heaven.

If God were resisted by Nature or demons, He could be presumed to love men. Therefore a man who loved God could also safely love his neighbor. But if God were resisted by nothing except men, He must be presumed to love only those men who loved and therefore obeyed Him; and a man who loved such a God could not safely love those of his neighbors who were not loving and obeying this God. Theologically, therefore, a Providence which is the net effect of contending powers permits a love of one's fellow men, whereas a Providence by the will of an unchallenged despot impedes it. Augustine, with his stinging irony, thus defends his position:

I must now, I see, enter the lists of amicable controversy with those tender-hearted Christians who decline to believe that any, or that all of those whom the infallibly just Judge may pronounce worthy of the punishment of hell, shall suffer eternally, and who suppose that they shall be delivered after a fixed term of punishment, longer or shorter according to the amount of each man's sin. In respect of this matter, Origen was even more indulgent; for he believed that even the devil himself and his angels, after suffering those more severe and prolonged pains which their sins deserved, should be delivered from their torments, and associated with the holy angels. But the Church, not without reason, condemned him for this and other errors, especially for his theory of the ceaseless alternation of happiness and misery, and the interminable transitions from the one state to the other at fixed periods of ages; for in this theory he lost even the credit of being merciful, by allotting to the saints real miseries for the expiation of their sins, and false happiness, which brought them no true and secure joy, that is, no fearless assurance of eternal blessedness. Very different, however, is the error we speak of, which is dictated by the tenderness of these Christians who suppose that the sufferings of those who are condemned in the judgment will be temporary, while the blessedness of all who are sooner or later set free will be eternal. Which opinion, if it is good and true because it is merciful, will be so much the better and truer in proportion as it becomes more merciful. Let, then, this fountain of mercy be extended, and flow forth even to the lost angels, and let them also be set free, at least after as many and long ages as seem fit! Why does this stream of mercy flow to all the human race, and dry up as soon as it reaches the angelic? And yet they dare not extend their pity further, and propose the deliverance of the devil himself. Or if any one is bold enough to do so, he does indeed put to shame their charity, but is himself convicted of error that is more unsightly, and a wresting of God's truth that is more perverse, in proportion as his clemency of sentiment seems to be greater. (*De Civitate Dei*, XXI, 17.)

Augustine was here attacking those Christians who, like Origen, had been persuaded by the Neoplatonists that punishment in hell was not eternal. Such persons, believing that God was impeded by other obstacles than men, could also believe that His mercy, however much impeded, was bound eventually to prevail. But if, as Augustine believed, God was free to dispense all the mercy He had a mind to, yet was clearly not so dispensing it, the only conclusion was that He did not choose to. From this we in our turn must conclude that to Augustine the commandment to love God consisted in loving

righteousness rather than mercy, in hating sin rather than in loving men.

Thus was brought into sharp relief an issue age-old and still unsolved, either in religion, philosophy, law, or ethics. Where does righteousness end and love begin, where does justice end and mercy begin, where does the head end and the heart begin? Even the Christian God and His great saints have not yet told us.

In the sequence of belief where does Augustine stand? No Christian certainly has ever known or revered the biblical text more completely, yet like everybody else he interpreted it according to preconceived convictions derived from his own temperament and experience. The severity of Jehovah's justice seemed no less than wilful men deserved, and Christ's mercy seemed a good deal more than men deserved. It was therefore easy for him to deny dualism and to dismiss Nature and demons as bogies rather than powers. At the same time, from his Manichean youth he seems to have retained the beliefs that the Redemption had a merely didactic effect, and that man, so long as he was in the flesh, could do nothing good. From Christ he first learned what true love was: a product not of ratiocination and aloofness but of simple flesh and blood. But if he repudiated the Platonic self-inflation of the ego, so euphemistically called the soul, he clung to the equally Platonic scorn of cringing and flattering which most of the current rituals were engendering. Rather than tolerate magical, theurgic practices or pandering to influential saints, he preferred to go to the other extreme of asking no favors even of God Himself, because he felt in his heart that he deserved none.

This appalling yet gigantic doctrine has been the most enduringly controversial in Christian, and therefore in European, belief. For not only were the Protestants to prefer it, many professed Catholics, like the Jansenists, were also to risk condemnation by defending its underlying principles. Even certain orthodox Orders such as the Franciscans and Oratorians were to come under its spell. The history of its influence on the course of orthodoxy itself would probably be a rather startling one, for although one specific segment after another

has been condemned when championed by others, Augustine himself never has been.

The truth is that this doctrine has, for Catholicism, been equally burdensome and indispensable. If, as we speak of the Ship of State we may speak also, as Boniface later did of the Ship of the Church, Augustine furnished her leaden keel. This keel, by itself, could not sail or even float, but a ship, unless it has such a keel, though it can both float and sail, can also, encountering heavy weather, both capsize and sink.



B O O K I I I

The Western Mediterranean During
the Invasions

REACTION FROM AUGUSTINE

1. MONASTICISM

a. Chaos of the Invasions

THE FIFTH AND SIXTH CENTURIES were those of the barbarian invasions. The more memorable dates for Gaul were 406, 451, 466, and 486, for Spain 415, for Africa 429 and 484, for Italy 410, 450, 455, 476, 493, 537, and 568. In considering the changes in belief during these 200 years, these successive disasters should not be forgotten.

b. Oriental Origins

The first Christian monks appeared in Egypt. They were the legendary hermits or anchorites who, wishing in so far as they could to escape the temporal carnal world, retired to the desert. There they practiced not only chastity and poverty, but also an extreme asceticism—vigils, fasting, continual prayer, general contempt of the flesh. To them the temporal world meant not only women but both men and women, and this often included the priesthood and even the Church herself.

To say that they hated men would be as wrong as to say that they loved them. Like Christ, they hated only the evil of the world and loved an ideal good incompatible with it. The antinomy, however, was not, as with Jehovah and Augustine, between God and men but between God and the Devil, that same Devil whom the orthodox Christians were declaring to be an agent of God. They too were trying to purify their

souls, but their method was by repudiating a world imposed on them by the Devil as a punishment, rather than by taking advantage of a world designed by God in order to facilitate that purification. Egypt had long been the centre of asceticism, first Neoplatonic, then Manichean. It is not surprising, therefore, that the most extreme Christian asceticism had its origin there too.

Monasticism proper—the cenobitic life in common—also originated, and not much later, in Egypt. It was devised in order to repress excesses which were rather harmful than helpful to sound piety. The idea spread fast. While Basil was drawing up a Rule in Cappadocia, Martin, coming west with the army from Pannonia, was founding a monastery in Gallic Tours, and Marcellina, sister of the great Ambrose, a nunnery in Rome. But it was only just before 400 that monasticism became a burning issue in the West.

c. On Trial in the West

The last martyrs had now been dead for nearly a century; it was a propitious moment for the discovery of a new kind of hero, and the stories of the Egyptian hermits, now first translated into Latin, caught the imaginations of the pious. Moreover, this was the very moment when Origen's Neoplatonic Christianity was being formally condemned, and the most concrete refutation of Origen was this very Manichean dualism which characterized the belief of these Egyptian monks.

In the West, therefore, this monasticism quickly took hold: Jerome embraced it and won his Roman aristocrats to the cause; the wealthy aristocrat Paulinus followed suit; Martin, the founder of monasticism in Gaul, was glorified by Severus and others. It almost seemed as if the rich, in their new-found piety, were trying to outdo the poor.

Naturally this overemotional revivalism met resistance, incidentally from certain of the heretically minded but chiefly from the priesthood, which represented the Church. For the monks were not only treating their authority too casually, they were necessarily insinuating that theirs was the holier life. Of the most influential among the higher clergy Pope Damasus

and after him Ambrose were favorably disposed, whereas Siricius had been disapproving. Again after 400, Innocent I had been favorable; Celestine, who died in 426, disapproving. Augustine seems to have been noncommittal. He did not like their exaggerated asceticism and their association of virtue with miraculous powers, yet at the same time he favored their spirit of unworldliness as a counterweight to the often over-secular clergy. Augustine indeed backed virtue regardless of its origin or respectability, only he was not sure how virtuous monasticism would turn out to be.

d. The Triumph

The key to the success of monasticism was the shift in emphasis from the hermitage to the monastery. The hermit was presumably chaste and obviously poor, but too often he could not resist the temptation of becoming a beggar, a hypocrite, and even a cheat. Furthermore he was, to the Latin West, a Greek and therefore, in this later fourth century, not quite trustworthy.

The change came first with the founding of a monastery at Marseilles by Cassian. A Greek to be sure (or, more specifically, a Scythian) but experienced and learned in monastic ways, he introduced into Western monasticism the third and decisive vow of obedience, obedience to a Rule and thereby to the abbot who enforced it. In addition Cassian introduced a sane Christian way of life, unexacting in asceticism and ritual, emphatic on the true virtues of humility, chastity, mercy, and love.

The second and decisive change came when, some years later, his example inspired Honoratus, a Gallic noble, to found a similar monastery near by, on the island of Lerins. This gave the Latins the assurance they lacked, and when six years later Honoratus the monk was elected bishop of the great see of Arles, monasticism had conquered. Thereafter the sons of many of the nobles of Gaul flocked to Lerins, and within a generation a dozen of these had become bishops in their turn of many of the chief sees of uninvaded Gaul. As a result, the monk, although still only rarely also a priest, became an integral component of the clergy. Recognized suc-

cessively by the pope shortly after 432, by the civil law in 434, by the General Council of Chalcedon in 451, the monks were already on their way to direct the destinies of Latin Christendom for the thousand years now to follow.

e. Caesarius and Benedict

Until after 525 each monastery had its own Rule as devised and enforced by its abbot and usually as approved by the bishop. Caesarius, bishop of Arles, drew up a Rule for a nunnery he had founded in 512 and another for a monastery which he started soon after. Far more complete was the Rule which Benedict of Nursia, eleven years younger than Caesarius, introduced about 526 for his new foundation at Monte Cassino; it was this which in later centuries became the prevailing one.

This so-called Benedictine Rule, whether inspired by Benedict himself, or by pope or emperor, was a judicious composite of earlier Rules, the good features consolidated and the less good omitted. It was a time when codification was in the air, when Dionysius Exiguus was publishing his collection of Greek as well as Latin canons and decretals, and when the Emperor Justinian was fathering his immortal civil code.

Many of the provisions in this Rule are so similar to corresponding ones not only in the Rule of Caesarius but also in the Code of Justinian that there was clearly a good deal of direct reproduction; it may well be that it was Benedict who produced the model and the others who made the copies.

Like the contemporaneous collections of canon and civil law, the Rules of monastic law compiled by Caesarius and Benedict were designed rather to consolidate than to break with tradition. Benedict's certainly owed much of its success to its virtual adoption by the Roman Church as the model for other Rules, present and future. Furthermore, because the monastic life was being more and more recognized as the surest road to salvation, these last Rules became the authoritative guides to virtue which antiquity was to bequeath.

Of the two original requirements of chastity and poverty, the former was now being relatively less emphasized. Caesarius, for instance, said that, unless accompanied by humility

and love, virginity was useless. The definition of poverty, on the other hand, was extended to include the relinquishing not only of income but also of principal or ownership. The transfer need not be to the monastery or even to the Church, but, unless the donor had children, one or the other was likely to be the beneficiary. The purpose of so drastic a requirement was to render renunciation of the temporal world and its temptations more complete and, as Benedict added, to clear away every obstacle to obedience.

This third basic requirement, obedience, was also made more specific. Previously each abbot not only drafted his own Rule, but was able to soften or stiffen it at will. This was probably desirable so long as his monks, if dissatisfied, could leave, because it encouraged competition and experiment and thereby the survival of the fittest. But the monastic vow was now for life, and it was therefore only just that it should be made to an unalterable Rule and not to the whim of the abbot. Benedict's Rule, indeed, clearly specified that no abbot could ask anything more of his monks than the Rule itself authorized. Supererogatory works were to be encouraged but not imposed; laxity, on the other hand, was not to be tolerated.

Without making invidious or even dogmatic comparisons, it may be suggested that whereas Caesarius stressed rather the virtue of charity or love of one's fellow man, Benedict particularly stressed humility. Caesarius rather favored individual initiative and good works; Benedict, submission and contemplative faith. This, however, would be due to a difference of individual temperaments only and not of principles or ends.

A word should be added, perhaps, on the temporal aspects of this sixth-century monasticism. The whole trend of the later empire had been to freeze the labor force in the hope of checking the economic decline. Occupations were even made hereditary. This was no doubt a contributory cause of the new requirement that the monastic vow must be for life, and also of the ready acceptance by the Church of slavery and serfdom. The latter had partly superseded the former because whereas the master could dispose of or transfer his slave at pleasure, the serf was bound only to a certain parcel of land, in order to ensure that it continue to be cultivated.

Now where large estates, often widely separated from each

other and from the monastery, were donated, all the serfs who worked on them were included, and the slaves, who were usually domestics and artisans, as well. For the monks, by contrast, were being given these properties precisely in order that they might be the better able to ignore temporal anxieties and concentrate on serving God and man by prayer. It was for these reasons that Christianity, while solicitous of the temporal as well as the spiritual welfare of their laborers, nonetheless discouraged their emancipation.

During the fifth century the monks were for the most part adults. Augustine's so-called Rule was designed specifically for spinsters or widows and the minimum age-limit was thereafter usually set at forty. Caesarius eliminated this stipulation, and cases now became more numerous where children were turned over to the monasteries, partly for the good of their souls no doubt, but partly too because monasteries often—though by no means always—commanded the respect of the barbarians. In this way the children received not only the maximum physical security but also an education which, although pretty much confined to learning the three R's and doctrine, was by that time, at least in the West, the only formal education still available.

As we shall see in a moment, the monks never lost confidence in Providence as a dispenser of temporal justice, and this was because they—the holy elite—were suffering relatively less than other men. Yet in this assumption they were only technically right: for their temporal advantages, even if indirectly due to God, were directly due to the generosity of the donors and the involuntary servitude of men in humbler circumstances and often perhaps in a humbler state of mind.

f. Geographical Variations

For a time after 550 a rather more ascetic Rule prevailed in Africa. Benedict's soon became the usual Rule in Italy and possibly in Spain. In Gaul there were more variations. Around Tours Martin was still the name to conjure with, but the monastery of Radegonde, the barbarian queen, at Poitiers followed that of Caesarius; near Bourges Benedict's disciple

Maurus founded Saint-Maur, and before the end of the century the Irish monk Columban had introduced his more ascetic Rule at Luxeuil in the Vosges.

2. FREE WILL

a. Early Beliefs

In the New Testament it was revealed that Christ had personally saved all those, but only those, who believed in him, but that he had promised salvation to as many more as should thereafter choose to be baptized by his disciples in his name. In so providing he indicated, according to Paul, that he "will have all men to be saved."

From this it was inferred, either that man, although he had never lost his free will, was now for the first time able to save himself because baptism was possible, or else that the Incarnation so divinized all men that they thereby regained the free will to accept, and retain, the advantages offered by baptism.

At first baptism was thought to assure virtue and so salvation. In time, however, many baptized relapsed into idolatry or heresy or sin. Such a man, it was therefore decided, could be saved only by submitting to a penance so severe that it both expiated his sin and offered adequate presumption of his contrition. It was in order to forestall the sin or, after the penance, to guard against recurrences that the sacrament of the Eucharist was now assumed to be doubly indispensable.

b. Difficulties

This early solution, however, presented two chief difficulties. The first was that in spite of the Redemption most men had still no practicable chance of so exercising their free will that they could get baptized. If the Jew had had every chance, the Chinaman had so far had none. The second difficulty was that if a baptized man only chose to behave himself, he, like the despicable Pharisee, had no further need of divine help in order to be saved.

c. Proposed Solutions

The first difficulty was met in the later fourth century by stressing the doctrine of Original Sin. Since Adam had personally sinned, his punishment was plainly just. But why must all his descendants be punished too? This, it was now explained, was either because all human souls derive from his and so are tainted or because, copulation being a sin, the soul is soiled by the very fact of its conception. This latter was the view of Ambrose. It served to explain why all men were already guilty at birth, but not why some were able to obtain pardon while most others were not.

In order to explain how God was nevertheless no respecter of persons—that is, was impartial as between one man and another—the theory of the transmigration of souls was in at least one case resorted to. But a more ingenious solution was an anonymous one that, since God had complete foreknowledge of all future events, He withheld baptism from those who He foreknew would sin even if they should be baptized. On this assumption even the unbaptized infant who died and was damned had no one to blame but himself.

This latter theory, although ingenious, was still unpalatable, not only as applied to the infant but also in general, because it did not seem fair to punish a man, not for a sin which he in fact did commit because he failed to resist it, but for a sin which he would have, but had not in fact, committed even if he had had the power to resist it. Furthermore if God really did punish according to how men would behave under any or all hypothetical circumstances, His creation of a temporal world would have been superfluous. Finally even if His foreknowledge was only of what in fact did happen, why did He bother to confer His prevenient grace on so many who then nevertheless sinned so grievously that they proved no more worth saving than the others?

This was the stage the problem had reached when Augustine came to consider it. The foreknowledge solution he wholly discarded, but he not only denied free will to the unbaptized, he denied it to the baptized as well. And this was at least logical, because if God could justly discriminate between two equally guilty unbaptized, He could equally justly dis-

criminate between two equally unworthy baptized. Indeed it was of the very essence of grace that it was bestowed freely—that is, as to Paul, unearned—and not so that man, by earning it, might claim it as of right. By the good luck of receiving prevenient grace whereby man was enabled to cultivate good intentions and perform good works, he presumably qualified as eligible for salvation, but he could still do nothing to enhance his chances by earning that further decisive grace which alone could save him. Since no man deserved salvation, he who, even though baptized, missed it could not complain of God's justice but only of his own bad luck.

That God is everything and man nothing, with the corollary that man proposes and God disposes, was easier, however—even if we substitute Stoic Nature for the Christian God—to profess than to believe. For, if man is a nothing, why was even Adam created, why were the earth and stars created, why a heaven and a hell? When Augustine said that God had done all this in order to produce enough saints to refill the depleted ranks of the angels he was oversimplifying what he was intuitively groping for; but meanwhile the bare fact remained that God did not want to save all men, that if He predestined a few to salvation He predestined the rest to hell. If Augustine had penetrated into the mystery of life more deeply than any Christian—or pagan—before him, he had not pierced it, and the less perceptive were the most impatient to contradict him.

If Augustine had seen fit to abide by the prevenient-grace doctrine of Ambrose, whereby, though perhaps not very logically, God was allowed arbitrarily to dispose of the unbaptized in consideration of His permitting the baptized to dispose of themselves, the ensuing controversy might never have arisen. But no sooner had Augustine alleged that God had chosen to dictate the fate not only of the heathen but of the Christians too, than the opposition protested.

At first the early solution, now called Pelagian after its new champion, was presented. But since this was, as we have suggested, too Pharisaical, a modified or Semi-Pelagian solution was offered by the monk Cassian, according to which man, although by the Fall he had not lost all power to initiate his own good behavior, could initiate only just enough to receive grace as his reward. This reward, however, which enabled him

to earn more merit and thereby ever more grace until he became virtuous enough to be saved, although indispensable to salvation, had first been made available only by the Redemption; and baptism, or rather the desire for it, was merely the effect of one of the earlier graces conferred on account of some first small meritorious effort.

The original objection to this view, however, remained unsolved. That the Chinaman, though he had free will to initiate merit, never got the reward which led him to baptism could be overlooked; but that once a man was baptized God lost all discretionary power to save or damn him could not be overlooked. To reduce grace from a cause, to an effect, of merit was to make God into an automaton.

An alternative suggestion was that by the Redemption all men received an equal and sufficient grace which by ill use they would lose and by good use would become saving grace. This side-stepped the formal objection that grace was bestowed in proportion to merit, but it served only to emphasize the substantial objection that man's fate was wholly in his own hands and not at all in God's.

d. Prevenient Grace Preferred

There is no need here of narrating the history of this momentous controversy. It will suffice to say that Africa held out for Augustine, Gaul for Cassian, and Italy for Ambrose; and that this last or compromise view finally, after over 100 years, prevailed. Officially Augustine was never abandoned, officially Pope Gregory followed him. But Gregory in fact went back not only to the Ambrosian, but even to the anonymous, view based on God's supposed foreknowledge of unrealized contingencies.

3. PROVIDENCE

a. Early Beliefs

Except to those Greeks whose beliefs were centered around their mysteries, the problem of temporal justice was not tantalizing because they closely identified Nature with the com-

mon notions of Necessity, or Law, or Chance. According to their mysteries, however, and more categorically according to the ancient Jewish belief, God rather than Nature, and therefore Will rather than Law, was sovereign. This Will could operate either justly or unjustly, as did a man's. Now it is possible that men at a certain stage of development transformed Nature into God because of their greater awareness of the importance of justice. In any case, with the advent of the new Providence as pure Will, men became more and more obsessed by it, and, as might be expected, they were particularly struck by the frequency and severity of the apparent injustices, which, rather than man's own sins, may have inspired the belief in the penalty of the Fall. Augustine, indeed, was later to carry this belief to its logical conclusion by alleging that although some of Adam's descendants got more than they deserved, none of them got less. But most other Christians were to continue to suppose that if a few got, while in the flesh, as much as or more than they deserved, the majority, at least of Christians, got far less.

Why this should be so therefore became the object of a most hypercritical scrutiny, and in the process men devised the methods, not always scrupulous, by means of which God could be induced, and even constrained, to deal with them as they, rather than He, thought fair.

It was perhaps in order to relieve Adam of some of the responsibility which seemed so undeserved that the afterlife, with its Last Judgment, was introduced. In effecting this change Christ, although not the first, proved the decisive factor. For to him most intensely did the temporal life seem not only incidental to, but the reverse of, the eternal. Any man who was contented in this life was, he thought, justly doomed to a miserable hereafter.

b. Belief in 400

Augustine—he so often could not resist it—here took an independent view. He started from the Greek belief based on opposites, that in this temporal life justice and injustice were nicely in balance, but he then attributed this not to Law but to Will, not to a natural equilibrium but to the calculated

design of God in order to better persuade men that since justice was inoperative here it must be operative elsewhere.

This was only another example of the degree to which Augustine was always trying to reconcile Revelation with experience. Unfortunately for him, however, most of his contemporaries preferred to believe that the purpose of Revelation was rather to contradict experience than to explain it. It was clear to Augustine, for instance, that just as heat was dry as often as it was moist, so virtue was happy as often as it was miserable and the rich man virtuous as often as he was vicious.

With this detached and perceptive approach most of his contemporaries had no patience. On the one hand men like Ambrose, Jerome, Prudentius, and Pope Celestine, taking such passages as that about Lazarus quite literally, believed that the poor man must be unhappy and therefore deserved a happy afterlife, and inferred from this that he must also have been virtuous. Such a person could expect at most only two temporal consolations: the happiness, first, of loving God and, second, of envisaging his posthumous fame as a saint.

This latter happiness was mentioned by the two monks Jerome and Cassian, and it bridges the gap between the first belief in the temporal life as systematically unjust and the opposite one, which was now to be popularized by many of the monks.

c. Monastic Belief

Theoretically the monks had chosen to sacrifice happiness in this world in order the more surely to secure it in the next. But already among the first Oriental hermits the coming paradox confronted them. For it was related, in a Latin text published in 395, that, hearing an idyllic description of certain hermits gathered around an oasis in the desert, a doubter expressed fear that the devil had devised it so.

For if, truly, as they say, it is a delicious and fruitful spot, what are we to hope for in a future life if we may enjoy such delights here? (Migne, *Patrologiae* . . . , XXI, 401B.)

A generation later, the Lerins monk Eucherius had resolved this doubt, saying of these monks that,

Through the infinite mercy of Christ they earn many things in the present life which they merely hoped for in the future life. Indeed they are already in possession of the thing itself while they are still pursuing the hope of it. (*Epistula de Laude Heremi*, §43.)

Here a cycle is almost complete from Epicurus to Christ and back again: virtue is that conduct which, whether by chance or design, is most conducive to happiness.

d. Temporal Justice Triumphs

Lending support to this incipient monastic view were two other factors. The hateful Manichees were still alleging that the true Providence was the Devil, and the now irresistible barbarians were in no mood to pray to any God who did not reward their loyalty by promoting their temporal ambitions. Indeed the barbarians were to be converted chiefly because they observed how the Catholic God had enabled those who believed in Him to become the masters of the mighty Roman empire.

So far it had been the monks who had flirted with the belief in temporal justice. It was next the turn of Roman priest and even layman to seek to apply it to all Catholics. Following casual references to cases of temporal justice in the years from 430 to 450, there appeared a book designed to prove it, by Salvian, a noble from Cologne and priest at Marseilles.

First he revived, theologically, the always plausible but by now generally discredited presumption that the Old Testament should be literally as well as spiritually understood. That this was to play into the hands of the Manichees does not appear to have bothered him. In this way he was able to argue that since temporal justice was operative before the Redemption, it was most unlikely that the effect of Christ's sacrifice was, unmercifully, to withdraw it.

Secondly he argued, empirically, that the events of the day proved it. Undeniably the heathen or heretically Arian barbarians were prospering; but this was only because, being doomed to damnation, they, as Christ had said, "have their reward." Many of those, of course, had suffered too, but in either case God had not willed it because their fates, whether

just or unjust, were mere by-products of the divine concern for the Catholic.

The physical sufferings of the truly holy were the least easily explained and therefore the least discussed. Salvian thought it enough to say that the happiness they derived from their love of God far outweighed their earthly tribulations. It was the fate of those Catholics who were less, or not at all, holy which chiefly engaged his attention. These, in spite of the favors which God had bestowed by granting them faith and His various graces, were showing nothing but ingratitude. It was particularly those on whom He had bestowed education, riches, and power who were the worst offenders. That Salvian had himself been born to these advantages made his castigation the more telling. His invective was too blatantly impassioned; nevertheless the effect may have been a salutary one. More judiciously he explained that the poor, who were suffering less because they had less to lose, were less sinful. To be sure, he said, if they too had been rich they might have been as bad as were the rich, but God punishes only sins actually committed, and not thoughts which hardly amounted to intents because the possibility of realizing them was so nebulous.

e. Mild Reaction

No Christian, apparently, ever again argued the case for temporal justice so confidently, but the principle was not soon abandoned—it was being maintained in the next two generations by such diverse figures as Apollinaris Sidonius, Pope Gelasius, Avitus, and Eugippius. But the tendency was henceforth to regard cases of temporal reward less as the rule and more as miraculous exceptions. Then, shortly after Eugippius, came Caesarius of Arles, whose views on this as on other matters will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

4. MIRACLES OF THE SAINTS

a. Pagan Models

The Christian belief in the power of men to perform miracles was not only facilitated by many precedents in paganism,

it was also stimulated by the wish to prove that Christians could and did perform miracles more remarkable than any of which the pagans had been or were now capable. Euhemerus had even alleged that the Greeks had so honored their wonder-working heroes as to worship them as their gods, and many pagans later thought that the Christians had followed suit. The Christian rebuttal here followed the tradition of the Oriental cults: their God had indeed once been a man, but before being a man he had been a God, so that his Resurrection was a mere resumption of his original and essential status.

b. The Christian Variation

But the allegation of Euhemerus struck nearer the mark as it applied to the lesser Christian heroes. The emphasis on individual immortality made this virtually inevitable. On every side the risen Christ was now surrounded by the heroic dead, not only by the greater heroes of the New Testament, like the Virgin, John the Baptist, Peter and Paul, and by the lesser victims of subsequent persecutions; there were, too, those of the Old Testament whom Christ had released from hell, and now the millions of other heroes who had since died, not as martyrs to be sure, but already cleansed of sin. For they too would have been martyrs had God willed it so. All these men, being, as souls, still alive and with their former virtuous inclinations intact, must still be no less eager to exercise them. And where there was such a will there was, presumably, bound to be a way.

c. Who the Wonder-Workers Were

The first Christian miracles, wrought by Christ, had been followed by those of his disciples before their martyrdom; and there was every reason why those who, living later, had no less willingly faced death, should have been able to perform others.

The wish of the saint to obtain an outlet for his benevolence is well described by Jerome: "If the Apostles and martyrs can intercede for others at a time when, being still in the

flesh, they have to be concerned for themselves, how much better can they do so after their crowns, victories and triumphs!" And it was perhaps only from modesty that he refrained from including the confessors like himself.

Once living men got the habit of invoking a certain saint he had only to respond as he had done while alive. The requests might come from a surviving friend or fellow citizen; towards these he would tend to be especially indulgent. But he would also be inclined to heed the prayers of strangers, if only because unless freely invoked he could not give help to the many who deserved it. The requests would be not only for temporal but also for eternal help: for forgiveness, for strength to resist temptation, and above all for the saint's intercession at the Last Judgment. In many cases the saint must, however reluctantly, refuse; in others he showed an indulgence which he must have come to regret.

In contrast to God the living saint could usually perform no miracle except when present himself. By logical inference it was thought that an equivalent limitation must restrict him when dead; and, by like reasoning, that as often as he felt it advisable to rely on his power as well as his prayer, he must effect a physical contact by means of which the power could be conducted from him to the person or thing that he wished to affect. By death, to be sure, physical contact between soul and body was broken. Nevertheless the corpse was thought to have retained its power because the soul, although detached, was now even more virtuous, and therefore more powerful, than ever.

To be sure, contact with or even propinquity of the corpse was not indispensable. In case of shipwreck for instance a saint could be effectively invoked simply by a prayer. But here there was the same risk as that of tempting God: the suppliant must also do his part to the extent of his capacity. It was easier for the saint to comply with the invocation if this was accompanied by the power emanating from his corpse.

Pilgrimage to the distant saint's tomb, however, was a privilege which only the rich could afford. Those of Peter and Paul in Rome were already a centre of attraction, and other cities and centres, envious of the native Romans, were tempted to possess corpses of their own. It was perhaps because of

this that those of two martyrs were revealed to Ambrose in Milan. Other relics, like the True Cross, or the clothing or other belongings of a saint, were becoming available and much sought after. Cut to conveniently portable size, they offered security to their wearers even in shipwreck.

d. Physics

These beliefs in the miracle have an unmistakable analogy to Aristotle's physics. For one thing, Gregory's distinction between the living saint's miracle by prayer and by his own power recalls Aristotle's distinction between desire and energy. Furthermore the need, where power was relied on, of a physical contact recalls Aristotle's belief that violent motion depended on such contact.

There were, moreover, further resemblances. Just as the living saint could normally perform a miracle only because, and so long as, his virtuous soul maintained physical contact, so could Aristotle's spear move only so long as it remained, through the circumambient air, in physical contact with the arm which had hurled it.

Finally, just as a relic could, on occasion, produce a miraculous effect even when no longer in contact with the saint because it had previously been infused with his power, so, according to Philoponus, a Christian commentator on Aristotle who lived in Alexandria in about 530, the spear continued in motion after being hurled, not because it remained in contact with the arm through the medium of the air but rather because the arm had infused it with an innate power or impetus which was now its own.

e. Chronology

In the year 400 all of these beliefs were held by some of the orthodox, though it is doubtful whether anybody had yet accepted them all. And many who accepted the principle or possibility were still reluctant to believe the reports of them which were then being circulated.

The pagans and heretics were skeptical on principle. Eusebius, writing within a generation to glorify the martyrs of

Palestine, told of a few miracles of God, but attributed none to the martyrs themselves. Pope Damasus, in about 375, merely expressed the hope that the Roman virgin martyr Agnes might help him to deserve salvation. But thereafter believers became more numerous, notably Ambrose, Jerome, Prudentius, Paulinus of Nola, and Sulpicius Severus. The wonders related of the martyrs and Egyptian hermits, of Bishops Felix at Nola and Martin at Tours, were becoming the favorite reading of the devout. At the same time, for this very reason, the skeptically minded rose in protest. The biographers of Martin let it be known that many who had been in a position to judge scoffed at the stories, and they also made it only too evident that on Martin's death in 397 his bitterest enemy Brictio (later known as St. Brice) was elected to succeed him.

The chief skeptic, however, if skeptic he may be called, was Augustine. By insisting that God was the sole and invariable cause of every event, he held that no event was more, or less, supernatural than any other. The so-called miracle was merely an unusual event, expressly designed to so startle men that they could not help but be reminded of God's overpowering will. Augustine thereby denied that the saints were involved; this was not only because God did not need their help but also because their apparent virtue was a pure gift or grace for which they could claim no credit or reward, either on earth or afterwards in heaven.

Augustine did not explain, however, how men might tell which events were designed to rouse and which not, nor how to tell whether the report of an allegedly startling and unusual event was authentic or merely a pious illusion of the imagination, or even a pious invention by certain men in order to startle other men. In most cases he inclined to one of the last two explanations, but even in the unmistakably authentic cases he denied that the saint had played any part, and he therefore concluded that to invoke the help of a saint was not only useless but also a sign of the suppliant's lack of respect for the just omnipotence of the one and only God.

Following the first flush of enthusiasm and the prompt reaction which was led by Augustine, the growth of the belief assumed a more normal pace. Few besides Augustine spoke out openly against it, although Cassian, without denying the

powers of the saints, deliberately belittled them as distracting the monks from their proper purpose of trying to cultivate and perfect a true spiritual humility.

Similarly the great Lerinian monks belittled, or rather ignored, all tales of such wonders. Until about 450, indeed, the accounts of miracles were confined either to the interpretation of such natural events as barbarian defeats or to coincidences or cures. These were represented as little more than reminders that God often conferred temporal benefits on the deserving. Indeed the miracle often consisted in the saint's power, by the outward manifestation of his inner virtue, to overawe the rude barbarian.

The dam first broke in Gaul. Martin had never been forgotten there, and his relics were doubtless working wonders. Perhaps it was envy, perhaps it was emulation, which precipitated the change: one or two miraculous *Lives* of martyrs appeared there in about 450. Shortly afterwards appeared a *Life* of Germanus of Auxerre, perhaps to show that his piety and powers were quite a match for Martin's, for it appeared in 462, or precisely the year after the rehabilitation of Martin began. The new bishop of Tours had launched it, and from that time on Martin's glory was never again obscured.

Neither Italy nor even Southern Gaul, however, was inclined to follow suit. Nearly a generation later an anonymous *Life* of Hilary of Arles was still in the sober tradition of Lerins. This was no less true of Africa, where of course Augustinian influence was greatest. At least until African civilization was broken by the Vandal persecutions there after 484, the Africans held out.

An early sixth-century *Life* of Severinus, the apostle of Noricum (now Bavaria) is thought to be of Italian origin and this described many miracles; they were, however, rather prophetic or telepathic than physical.

Moreover in contrast to the anonymous *Life* of Geneviève of Paris, the contemporaneous Italian and Lerinian writers of about 520 to 530—Caesarius of Arles, his biographer Cyprian of Toulon, and Ennodius of Arles in his *Life* of Epiphanius of Pavia—either omit or minimize miracles. There is no contemporaneous evidence that Boethius, Cassiodorus, or even Benedict was concerned with them.

Only with Pope Gregory does Italy at last clearly succumb. By him is Benedict first chiefly glorified as a wonder-worker, and, as in his other *Dialogues*, Gregory frankly admits that his purpose in writing them was to show that Italy had produced her share of miracles too, and therefore her share of holy saints.

Yet, even so, Gregory felt obliged to explain to his readers that he had taken the greatest pains to check the authenticity of every wonder. A few he had witnessed; the majority, which he had learned by hearsay, he justified by saying that Luke and Mark had based their Gospels on hearsay too. Most of the wonders which he alleged were of the usual kind, but two of them seem to break new ground. In one case Benedict recalled a dead nun to life, though she had already been damned; in the other he recorded what must have been a recent development of demonology. Here Gregory, after an introductory remark that the story is neither doubtful nor uncertain "because there are almost as many witnesses to justify the truth thereof as there be inhabitants in that city," goes on:

A Jew was traveling from Campania to Rome, who, drawing near to the city of Funda, was so overtaken by darkness that he knew not where to lodge, and therefore, not finding any better commodity, retired into a temple of the god Apollo, which was not far off, meaning there to repose himself; but much afraid he was to lie in so wicked and sacrilegious a place. . . . About midnight, as he lay awake for very fear of that forlorn and desert temple, looking suddenly about him he espied a troop of wicked spirits walking before another of greater authority, who, coming in, took up his place and sat down in the body of the temple, where he began diligently to inquire of those his servants, how they had bestowed their time, and what villainy they had done in the world. (Gregory, *Dialogues*, III, 7.)

Exactly how almost all the inhabitants could be so sure of the truth of this conference, which was witnessed only by this one tired and apprehensive Jew, Gregory does not say. Where he says that edification grows by the stories told of miracles we might be more inclined to infer that the miracle grows by the promptings of edification.

More to the present point, however, is his view of the efficacy of relics. That candid historian of the Church, Mgr. Duchesne, has said that

in the Christian religion the cult of the saints, of relics, of images is a contribution brought by the people. It is in the nature of things that religion should be affected by those who practise it. Why should the people not have put their mark on it? The thinkers had certainly put on theirs, and it was a more dangerous one. (Duchesne, III, 17.)

A pertinent illustration of this is given by Gregory the Thinker. In one of his *Dialogues* his disciple Peter asks him:

What is the reason that in the patronage of martyrs we often find that they do not afford so great benefits by their bodies as they do by other of their relics, and do there work greater miracles where they themselves are not present? [To which Gregory answers:] When the holy martyrs lie in their bodies there is no doubt, Peter, but that they are able to work many miracles, and indeed also do infinite works for those who seek them with a pure mind. But inasmuch as simple people might have some doubt whether they be present and do in those places hear their prayers where their bodies are not, it is necessary that they [the saints] should in those places show greater miracles where weak souls may most doubt their presence. (Gregory, *Dialogues*, II, 38.)

Here Gregory was trying, as it turned out unsuccessfully, to argue that God and His saints were trying to persuade the people that the miracles, having a purely spiritual cause, could not be more effectively induced by enlisting the co-operation of any material body. This being so, we may imagine Gregory to be countering the observation of Duchesne by observing that the material approach, even though championed by the people, was less wholesome than the more spiritual approach of the thinker.

5. CAUSES OF THE REACTION

Did Augustinianism mark a peak in the evolution of Christian dogma, as the Protestants were later inclined to believe, or was it rather an atavistic return to Oriental conceptions which, by the sheer power of its author, had for a time so hypnotized the Catholics that they lost their normal powers of resistance? The probability is that, although the impact was at first upsetting and even paralyzing, once it had been absorbed the permanent effect proved salutary.

For it seems clear that even before 450 pure Augustinianism had been repudiated. Born in 354, Augustine was already middle-aged in 400, yet so great was his renown that until his death thirty years later no official voice had dared to challenge him. Only then were the floodgates opened again. Sixtus III shortly after his accession in 432 became the first pope to recognize monasticism, and he was followed by the civil law in 434, by the General Council (that of Chalcedon) in 451, and, shortly after this, by the Latin Council of Arles in 453. It was also in 432, under Sixtus III again, that postbaptismal predestination was repudiated, cautiously at first, then more categorically after 440 by Pope Leo. At the same time the belief in a Providence which dispensed temporal as well as eternal justice was alleged—first by Orosius, a disciple of Augustine but a generation younger, next by Pope Leo, and, most categorically, by the monk Salvian. Such optimism, to be sure, was not generally shared outside the monasteries, but Augustine's idea of a deliberate divine intent to keep temporal justice and injustice in a provoking equilibrium was not again specifically defended.

Finally the wonder-working saints whom Augustine was at pains to discredit did not long remain in obscurity once he had died. This delay, however, was clearly due not so much to fear of Augustine as to an instinctive distrust of the stories. Africa seems to have doubted the miracle until the Vandal persecutions began in 484; Italy kept it at arm's length at least until the time of Benedict and perhaps until after 550. Even in Gaul the monastic tradition of Lerins held out against it. But after 450 the rest of Gaul, jointly seduced by the memory of Martin and the need to overawe the barbarians, had let down all the bars. As late as 590 Pope Gregory was still protesting that the absence of the power to work miracles was no evidence of defective virtue, but this was perhaps the last warning. Thereafter miracle-working was the decisive criterion of virtue.

In the reaction we have also to consider what was the part played by the monks. There is little doubt but that most of them, in choosing this strict vocation, had not done so purely out of love of God or even of their neighbor. They must also have hoped, if only incidentally, thereby to promote at once

their salvation, their temporal security, and perhaps even their posthumous fame. And unless there were free will, a certain minimum of temporal justice, and the chance that by receiving miraculous powers they would win fame before, and perhaps after, death, they would not have been so eager to take the vows.

To infer from this, however, that the decline of Augustinianism was chiefly due to the monks seems unwarranted. Almost everybody must have preferred free will and therefore supported belief in it; for almost all the true believers, at least, hoped to succeed in becoming pious, and they did not relish the idea that they would earn no temporal alleviations because they had succeeded. Perhaps the secular Christians longed less for miraculous signs. But we must bear in mind that the Lerinian monks long stoutly resisted the temptation, and that in the course of those two centuries of temporal horror faith in the periodic miracle came to be, pathologically, almost indispensable.

CAESARIUS OF ARLES

1. LIFE AND INFLUENCE

THE BEST SURVIVING EVIDENCE of the Latin beliefs of the early sixth century is in the works, chiefly in the *Sermons*, of Caesarius, archbishop of Arles from 502 to 542, whose effective authority included not only Gaul but also Spain at a time when in Italy the authority of the pope was enfeebled by the civil power of the Ostrogoths and his canonical difficulties with the Byzantine churches.

The beliefs of Caesarius, stemming chiefly from Origen, Ambrose, Augustine, Lerins, and Faustus of Riez, had a breadth, moderation, and simplicity which made them so widely acceptable that during the next 300 years—as the biblical and Augustinian texts became too hard to handle—the *Sermons* of Caesarius, together with the late sixth-century texts of Gregory the Great, persisted as the dominating source of Catholic opinion and guidance.

We have already spoken of the wide influence of his monastic Rule; he was also a leading proponent of the compromise doctrine of prevenient grace. We have now to consider his *Sermons* in order to see what had been the course followed by Catholic belief in general since the critical years of a century earlier when Augustine plunged orthodoxy into the throes of a dilemma from which, even today, it has not fully recovered.

2. THE DEVIL

To Caesarius, as to all but the Augustinians, the mousetrap theory of the Redemption was correct; although the Devil

was no longer a free agent, he could still bite as many as were reckless enough to approach him. This was a good Semi-Pelagian image, but according to the doctrine of prevenient grace the sons of Adam were born already bitten and were therefore themselves quite as ready to bite as was their evil master. For to Caesarius the unbaptized were still the Devil's agents. And since this Devil, although he hated Christ, at least believed in his divinity, the pagan or skeptic was an even greater offense to God. Predestined, as most of them must be, to evil, they were so many outlaws who might be punished with impunity. Those who died as Jews or pagans were not even to be tried at the Last Judgment.

Still more reprehensible and harder to convert were the heretics: the Arians, Priscillianists, Manichees, and 'Mathematicians' or Neoplatonists. These, even if properly baptized, were also, so long as they remained obdurate, more evil than the fallen angels. In virtually the same category were the indolent priests and monks who, knowing better, tried to cure the sick by prescribing the ligatures and amulets of black magic which they had sacrilegiously blessed. Even the orthodox layman, if he were proud, envious, adulterous, and prevaricating, had four devils in him.

It was bad enough that the Devil ceased to tempt such sinners because he felt sure of them. For, thus speciously reassured, they were deprived of the incentive to take proper advantage of their free will to repent and submit. But the worst of it was that the Devil, slave of God as he now was, could nevertheless cure as well as cause sickness, and indeed perform every other kind of physical miracle in such wise that it was virtually indistinguishable from those performed by God.

3. AUTHORITY

With the forces thus aligned so reminiscent of Mithraism it was not surprising that a trend towards military authority should result. In the fourth century this authority had been lodged in the General Councils of bishops, the fourth and last of which had been that of Chalcedon in 451. It was by now agreed that the canons of these four were the infallible com-

mentary on the canonical Scripture. To be sure, the bishops of the four great sees of Alexandria, Antioch, Constantinople, and Rome had spasmodically tried to challenge this authority, but their rivalries had discredited their efforts. Caesarius, although he recognized the superiority of these four episcopal sees over any others, conceded to them no right to challenge the canons of past and therefore presumably of future General Councils.

During these years, moreover, the see of Rome had become rife with bribery and corruption. Its only serious concern was to obtain more money. Actually the Arian Ostrogoths under Theodoric were for a time of more help to the Church than was the papacy. Caesarius therefore restricted authority pretty much to himself.

It is a curious fact that the cenobitic vows included not only chastity and poverty but also obedience. From this the inference might be drawn that, like chastity and poverty, obedience was in other cases not required. Caesarius admits that whereas for a monk the sin of pride was a sacrilege, for a layman it was a mere venial sin. The reins, however, were now to be tightened for the laity too: not only were the openly disobedient to be damned but also all those who might dare to harbor secret differences or even doubts. Had Augustine lived at this time he could hardly have escaped being charged with heresy and therefore treason.

Essential to obedience, therefore, was unquestioning faith. Credulity, says Caesarius, is salutary. For why should God have created men if He were then to deceive them? And was God not now speaking through His Church? Understanding, however, was not ignored when it was useful: Christ's Resurrection was apparently beyond doubt primarily because it had been witnessed not only by a few but by multitudes. The way by which the Father generated the Son, on the other hand, was a mystery, presumably because such knowledge would serve no edifying purpose.

4. FAITH, INTENT, AND WORKS

So long as Christ lived in the flesh faith in him was the only virtue needed for salvation—it was for this reason that he re-

minded Martha that "but one thing is needful." But already the apostles, and thereafter all who had faith, must also perform deeds. Augustine's doctrine of predestination was dangerously close to the Manichean advocacy of a trustful passivity, but at worst it effected only a momentary check on man's innate desire to choose not only to be good and to preach good but to do good.

Since the Platonic ideal of cultivating virtue for its own sake is not only irksome but also psychologically defective in so far as it seeks an exclusively personal reward, provision had to be made for the further human incentive of acquiring virtue by performing good deeds for others—for family and friends, for God, for those others who loved God, even perhaps for all men.

If God, however, were truly omnipotent would this activity not be rather make-believe than intrinsically fruitful? It may have been partly hostility to the Mithraic denial of God's omnipotence which kept this suspicion alive; and the Manichees, for all their professed fatalism, might now be doing likewise. Origen, Plotinus, the wrath-of-God theory of the Redemption—of which Arianism was now a feeble residue—were in eclipse; and, as they faded, the Devil stepped to the front of the stage again.

It was not difficult in this sixth century to persuade oneself, and therefore others, that the pagans and heretics who were engaged in destroying the Roman and now Catholic empire were agents rather of the Devil than of a mere false god.

Although Caesarius proclaimed God's omnipotence, his faith in it was surely feebler than Augustine's had been. For why otherwise was he so insistent that good works not only were indispensable to salvation but were the foundation of all other perfections, that it was actually better to do good and not pray than to pray and refrain from doing good? Surely he had in mind the perfection rather of Martha than of Mary.

The criterion of a good work was not, however, that it produced the most salutary effect but that it was performed with the purest intent. A man who with the best will in the world nevertheless produced a bad effect ought to be corrected lest he so err again; provided he thinks he is doing what the Church, and therefore Christ, approves, he commits no sin.

The determination of what constituted good intent of course formed part of the great Catholic tradition, which Caesarius not only now followed but even refined. The first requisite was humility: towards God because "only when you stop being pleased with yourself will God be pleased with you," and towards man because "it is best to hide your good deeds behind your back." The second requisite was forgiveness because "you can do no more effective penance than to forgive your enemies," and because "God will show you mercy according to the mercy you show to other men." And third, love, which first must be of yourself because until you love yourself enough to want to be virtuous you cannot love others enough to want virtue for them; and then must be of others because unless and "until you love what you can see, you cannot really love what you can't see." Thus the love of God comes only last, as a fulfilment of all the others.

Although it may be meritorious to acquire and possess only the first or second of these, all three are indispensable for salvation. This threefold love—as the Jesuits were later to repeat—is not within the power of man's free will to acquire, for it comes by God's merciful grace alone.

Including prayer, which is on the borderline between faith, intent, and works, all good works aim to further the salvation of oneself and of others, or else the temporal welfare of others. These aims are not mutually exclusive, but they do offer convenient categories.

In the first are the rituals centered around the sacraments: baptism benefited others only incidentally, the Real Presence in the Eucharist benefited others hardly more; and the Last Sacrament, we may reasonably suspect, was rarely envisaged as of benefit to any others than the recipient. The possession of relics or the accomplishment of pilgrimages also belong in this category. The same was true of confession, even if public, and of penance even if some or all of it was voluntary or self-imposed.

Caesarius did not in any way seek to depreciate the benefits of asceticism, for he said that it was good for the soul, but he cautioned against its excesses. The pleasures of the five senses were dangerous, but chiefly for monks. Thus although monks and nuns must be chaste, it was better to be a humble wife

than a proud virgin; although a layman must be charitable, not only ought he to keep his capital assets intact lest his future income vanish, he should also give away only so much of that income as he can reasonably spare. For Caesarius was aware that the goose that lays the golden egg must not behave like a goose. But of course it was as true of a layman as of a monk that unless he performed these various good works in a spirit of faith, humility, forgiveness, and love, none of them would be of the slightest use to him or anybody else.

Perhaps the most familiar category of works was of those which, if incidentally benefiting oneself, were most ostensibly aimed to promote the salvation of others. Among these were the obligation to warn, to exhort, to reprove, and to chasten. In case of mortal sins it was the duty of all to inform the priest; in the case of the capital sins of homicide, adultery, and apostasy—usually punishable by civil law as well—it was the duty of all to make the fact public, if only in order to avoid being implicated as an accessory.

Furthermore, provided a man has love in his heart, he may strike another in order to chasten him, and he should see to it that the unregenerates, such as those who at banquets drank bumpers to the angels or the saints, were exposed and put in chains, and that murderers, adulterers, and apostates were duly executed. Among other good works he who has his children baptized wins forgiveness of his sins, and he who succeeds in converting another greatly furthers his own salvation into the bargain.

As to the duty to further persecution, which at this time too often meant open war, the Old Testament offered ample good precedents. Caesarius justified certain of the massacres there described on the dangerous presumption that the perpetrators, such as Elijah and Elisha, were not morally responsible because they acted while 'possessed' by the Holy Ghost.

Most superficially humane, at least, was the third category: works ostensibly designed to further the temporal welfare of others. On these Caesarius laid abundant stress. Among them was the duty of visiting the sick and the prisoners; the duty of hospitality to strangers and travelers; above all the duty to give generous alms not only as tithes to the Church but, in addition, directly to the poor.

Almsgiving brought forgiveness of sins. How, then, could the poor obtain this boon? Not only as the widow gave her mite but also, since many did not have even a mite to spare, by asking God to forgive the sins of as many as had given their alms to her.

5. JUSTICE

a. Between Man and God

It was now generally agreed that, because the Redemption enabled God to confer prevenient grace on as many men as He chose, the Devil could no longer compel, but could only tempt, such men to do evil. As the Devil could not prevent them from being baptized, so he could not thereafter prevent them from repenting their postbaptismal sins and thereby obtaining, through the Church, not only forgiveness of these sins, but also a new, supernatural strength with which to resist the temptation to sin again. Absolution and the Eucharist offered the forgiveness, the Eucharist and the prayers of the saints offered the added strength.

But at the Last Judgment the Devil's old power over sinners revived. There Christ could no longer dispense mercy; as just judge he had to assume the role of his Father, the old Jehovah. There could be no forgiveness then, for the Devil must be given his due.

Caesarius is not entirely clear about the procedure at the Judgment: he says that Christ was omniscient, but he also says that men will testify there for and against each other. On the other hand, he does not suggest the presence of any Devil's advocate, or of any saint who might intercede in the defendant's behalf. On the contrary, Caesarius told men rather to "make your own past mercy your intercessor."

To be sure, the saints in heaven still grieved over the sins of the living and helped them to repent, but they played no further role. Mindful of Augustine, Caesarius warned that it was only the pagan who, as Euhemerus had said, made gods of his heroes.

There was, however, an echo of the belief in a *quid pro quo* in Caesarius' assertion that misery, in contrast to prosperity,

on earth was equivalent to merit. Other things being equal it was only just to favor those who had been the least lucky. Here Caesarius evidently had the purgatorial fire in mind: provided the defendant was found guilty only of venial sins his term in the fire was in inverse proportion to what he had already suffered on earth.

While still exhilarated by their recent triumphs over the pagan and heretical Romans, the Catholics, especially the monks, could for a time believe—as Salvian had argued—that virtue was receiving its just reward on earth. But, as the fifth century faded and the sixth began, the barbarians, who had hitherto deemed discretion to be the better part of valor, cast discretion to the winds, with the result that even the humblest and holiest monks and nuns were overwhelmed by the power-drunk bands of the conquerors. It was then the turn of the barbarians to imagine a temporal justice wielded by the God who had answered their prayers for victory, and it was the turn of the conquered to revise their fond belief in God as a Providence who was concerned to reward virtue in this world as well as in the next. Caesarius was thus at pains to disillusion the remaining optimists. From the sanguine expectations of the monks of Lerins he was retreating towards the stoic gloom of Augustine.

For it was becoming only too obvious that man was in no way better off than the first Adam had been; that he was indeed even worse off in so far as he not only could, but must, sin. On the other hand, he could now, as Adam could not, avail himself of various methods of counteracting those sins. For it was the divine strategy to induce the Christian—if need be, by the harshest kind of treatment—to make use of them. God was, among so much else, the supreme criminologist, resorting to various kinds of punishment, retributive, deterrent, or corrective, as each individual case required. Perfect voluntary contrition would, theoretically, have sufficed, but since even the holiest Christian was incapable of this, God was obliged, in addition, to impose involuntary penances in the form of plagues, famines, and even murderous barbarian incursions, in the course of which He permitted even the holiest to be massacred lest the survivors should otherwise let up in their efforts to earn salvation. And Caesarius believed that, as

between man and God, this was fair because all men had so sinned that they deserved all they got. If some got less, they were, as Augustine had so convincingly explained, just lucky.

Certain alleviations, however, unlikely and inadequate as they must seem, were nonetheless well worth seeking: by prayer, for instance, and by fasting and participating in the sacraments. John the Baptist, and doubtless other martyrs too, could probably confer certain minor temporal alleviations, but they were not to be invoked for such purposes because the suppliant was too apt to ask for favors which would, if granted, jeopardize his chances of salvation. Caesarius was even not unmindful of the further, rather questionable, consolation previously envisaged by Jerome and Cassian: that of winning a posthumous temporal fame.

Although it was only by divine permission and therefore for man's own ultimate good, the Devil nevertheless shared with God the control over the physical world. One of his most notable powers was, as we have said, to cause sickness in order that he might thereby tempt not only the patient himself but also those who tended him to resort to the diabolical cures of pagan magic. A Christian layman might perhaps do this with innocent intent, but because the priests and monks had been taught, and were therefore expected to know, that such remedies were in fact diabolical, Caesarius warned these that however pure their intent and however successful the resulting cure might be, the healer, if not also the healed, would be damned. Instead, he said, resort should be had rather to prayer and the sacraments or, at worst, to a reputable physician. In thus resigning himself the patient might be jeopardizing his recovery and so his temporal welfare, but this was the risk he had to run if he did not want to be damned.

With the unbaptized it was quite otherwise. So long as they remained ungraced Providence ignored them. Even the Devil did not bother to tempt them because until and unless God graced them they remained wholly in his power. Believing in Nature, they were left to the mercy of Nature, to fare either well or ill, and those who fared ill were no less surely damned on that account. For as they were not concerned about the Last Judgment, the Judge was not concerned about

them. These indeed had, from all eternity, been predestined to suffer for both their vicarious guilt and their unavoidable sins.

b. Between Man and Man

According to the principles of divine justice it was no doubt clear that God could not be unjust to men. But it was also clear that human justice was not so reliable. The defect was most glaring before the Redemption, when temporal injustices were not, except in the rare cases of certain patriarchs and prophets, corrected in the afterlife of hell. But it was regrettable that these injustices had not been wholly corrected as a result of the Redemption. Had Christ corrected matters as much as he could rather than as much as he must have wished?

All men having, even now, been born equally guilty, how was it that a few were nonetheless saved? The Semi-Pelagians had insisted that it was because everyone was now free to choose good or evil, but this view had been supplanted by the doctrine of prevenient grace. Even according to the Pelagian belief the Chinaman was only too clearly at so great a disadvantage that none had so far been able to overcome it. But according to the now prevailing belief he had, so far, been given literally no chance at all.

The conclusion must be that, although God wished to treat all men equally fairly, He could not, in view of the Devil's power, do more than draw lots. In order to help even a few God had, however reluctantly, to neglect the rest. Even Prosper of Aquitaine, an Augustinian who therefore regarded men rather than the Devil as the obstacle to the full realization of God's hopes, had had to come to this unsatisfactory conclusion, for who, he asked,

does not see that the variety of this world is embellished by the creation of such men—if only he observe how many conveniences of the present life have been taught by the efforts and activities of certain unbelievers, as in the invention of the arts, in the building of cities, in the drafting of laws, and in the international agreements? (*Pro Augustine Responsiones ad Capitula . . .*, 13.)

Christians were sensitively aware of the evil of slavery, but it was hard for them to envisage civilization without it: like

the American Southerners in the early 1800's, although they favored individual emancipation, they recoiled from advocating it as a principle. The tension is revealed by a canon of the Council of Agde in 517 which forbade emancipation by monasteries on the ground that since monks were forbidden to do manual labor, they would otherwise have to beg or starve.

Many other temporal inequalities were due rather to eternal than to temporal exigencies. Caesarius said, for instance, that God provided rich men with poor men and beggars in order to make their almsgiving, and thereby penance and forgiveness, possible. For no one can practice such charity unless there is need.

God also imposed temporal handicaps on some in order to teach salutary truths to others. For instance, some were born blind in order that, by curing them, God might thereby make manifest His power to others. Some were allowed to fall into heresy in order that the orthodox be thereby roused from their lethargy. Some, too, were victimized in order to punish others: as the children of unduly lustful parents were born lepers or epileptics. Caesarius was here probably thinking of the Old Testament precedent furnished by Elisha, who, having been mocked by some little children, "cursed them in the name of the Lord. And there came forth two she bears out of the wood and tare forty and two of them." For Caesarius interprets this as a punishment administered to the parents for having egged their children on.

The most disconcerting instance is Caesarius' interpretation of the Massacre of the Innocents. This expedient, he thinks, was devised by God as the best way to lull Herod into the conviction that the long-expected Jewish Messiah, if just born as was alleged, had been massacred with the others. In order to accomplish this deceit God had Himself promoted the massacre. Caesarius adds that this was lucky, not only for mankind in general, but also—because they were rewarded by salvation—for the massacred infants and their parents. How could Caesarius have come to persuade himself that these unbaptized children and their unbaptized and presumably also sinful parents were saved unless because he believed that there must be some limit to the divine injustice? He may even have

felt that God, having made these victims the innocent instruments of His deceit, must somehow have conferred grace on them while still alive in order to ease His own conscience. At least this may explain why Caesarius failed to suggest that the little children whom Elisha fed to the bears because they mocked him had not received a like compensation. For these were not the instruments of God's deceit but only the victims of His righteous indignation.

6. THE CHURCH IN 502-542

It was during Caesarius' forty-year episcopate that the Church finally consolidated and incorporated her government into law. A first step was to assure the supremacy of the bishop of Rome over all the other Western sees. The key figure here was Hormisdas, pope from 514 to 523. The second step, about 520, was Dionysius Exiguus' collection under the pope's supervision of all the authentic and therefore binding canons (the Greek in translation) and papal decretals. The third was to draw up a list, or index, of what texts might, and what might not, be trusted—this being inspired by Paul's "prove all, and hold to what is good." Somewhat later Cassiodorus drew up a list of his own of what texts his monks might profitably, or at least safely, read. Benedict's Rule was the fourth step, a monastic code of all previous such Rules, incorporating many judicious improvements of his own. The date was 525 or shortly after. Finally in about 530 the *Corpus Juris Civilis* of Justinian was compiled, a detailed abstract of the civil law of that time, incorporating those parts of the canon law—and including the monastic—which the State thereby undertook to enforce.

Dogmas, as distinguished from the canon law, had already been largely hammered out by the canons of previous councils, but about 535 appeared a Spanish *De Fide Catholica*, aiming so clearly to define the errors of the Arian and Manichean heresies, which were making their last stand in that country, that ignorance could no longer be pleaded in extenuation. For organized persecution was already in the offing.

The only important dogmatic issue on which Latin ortho-

doxy still wavered was that of free will, and it was here Caesarius himself who, at the Council of Orange of 529, carried the day for prevenient grace.

Thus with the death of Caesarius ended the relatively free creative era of those learned theologians of antiquity, now called the Fathers. Inventions and alternatives were again restricted, not only by Revelation now but also by the law. And, as the theologians' creative power was scotched, the people's creative power challenged it. We shall now consider first the last spasm of creative Neoplatonism in its new Christian garb, next the fruitful transitional efforts of Pope Gregory, and, finally, now at the brink of the Middle Ages, certain peculiar and significant developments of this transition which helped to shape the strange new barbarian world.

PAGAN RESIDUES

1. PSEUDO-DENIS

A SERIES OF TEXTS, first referred to in 533, appeared under the name of Denis the Areopagite, he who, when Paul left Athens, was among those few "who clave to him and believed." The texts, however, do not confirm this authorship but indicate that it was rather the work of a Greek of about 500 who, although converted to Christianity, would not deny his earlier Neoplatonic preconceptions. He wrote, in any case, in order to show how one might accept the one without repudiating the other and, wishing to lend his work greater authority, used the name of Denis, who, besides being like him a Greek, was also a firsthand witness of the doctrine which the great apostle had preached. That the pious fraud was eminently successful the Middle Ages would in due course prove.

His method of effecting this reconciliation was facilitated by the precedent set long before by Origen of interpreting the Bible symbolically; that is, of seeing in almost every sentence a true meaning underlying the literal. Since this literal meaning was not the one supposedly intended to be conveyed, commentators—provided they had the necessary prestige—could superimpose almost any other which seemed to be not only the most edifying but also the most corroborative of their own preconceptions. Pseudo-Denis therefore used this device, quite conscientiously no doubt, in order to confirm his own still unshaken pagan assumptions. As a beginning, of course, he was able to rely on certain premises common to

both beliefs, such as the deduction, from the premise that the cause of good was a One, that the cause of evil must be a multiplicity.

To Denis God is the antithesis of nature, reason, observation, and common sense. He is infinitely inaccessible and mysterious. By seeing what is, we can infer not what He is but rather what He is not. Thus He is neither Being nor non-Being, Truth nor Error, Unity nor Multiplicity, Positive nor Negative, Large nor Small, Equal nor Unequal, Somewhere nor Nowhere, in Motion nor at Rest. He has neither essence, form, life, power, nor wisdom, yet He *is* all of these, and is their one and only cause. The sensuous world is wholly concrete and consistent; God must therefore be wholly abstract and paradoxical.

Whence does Pseudo-Denis derive his premise, where is his starting point? He blandly assumes that this otherwise wholly unknowable God is pure Goodness and Beauty, and that, being such, He cannot help diffusing these qualities and thereby creating and maintaining the universe.

The Creation was from eternity, and by emanation because the Good must necessarily diffuse itself. To him the least inadequate analogy was that of the sun diffusing its rays. These rays encounter obstacles which, while absorbing some of the power and virtue, transmit the rest to subsequent obstacles which absorb more. Although this is not said, these obstacles must be matter, that which he prefers to call non-Being or privation in order to distinguish it from the independent, positive, evil matter of the Manichees. Even granting, however, that these obstacles were not evil, he did not explain any better than Plotinus had, how this non-Being could so seriously obstruct.

The first obstacle was a very tenuous matter which was capable of both absorbing and transmitting a maximum degree of the rays' potency. In this way the angels were created. Since, however, their superior status included not only a maximum knowledge of God but also a maximum free will, some turned this to evil account and thereby degenerated to the status of demons. Here it is worth observing that Pseudo-Denis said of these fallen angels what Augustine had said of fallen man: that having been touched by the divine rays, their intentions

not only had been, but still were, good; only they had become so weakened by their sin that they could no longer effectuate them. The good angels, on the other hand, did effectuate their good intentions, were even still striving further to perfect themselves.

Pseudo-Denis is best known for his division of these good angels into a celestial hierarchy of three orders, each subdivided into three classes. As the divine rays passed through these successive obstacles they lost more and more of their potency, so that by the time they reached man knowledge of their true source and origin had been all but lost.

In his *Divine Names*, Pseudo-Denis speaks of how

that perfect Goodness which fills the universe rules not only over those perfectly good essences which immediately surround it, but extends to the most distant. There [above] its immanence is complete, here [among men?] it is less, elsewhere [among the beasts?] it is minute, for this immanence measures itself to the capacity of each to receive it. (Gandillac trans., 113.)

Adam was created as an inferior angel. He, too, like the bad angels, sinned and thereby lost his free-will capacity to effectuate his good intentions. And so, moreover, did all his descendants.

As for Christ, he was not only inserted between God the Father and the good angels as a link between creature and creator, but was also designed, by his Incarnation and suffering, to inspire torpid men again to take account of and embrace, of their own free will, the divine rays striking against them. And Christ so inspired men that they regained the free will of the first Adam, not by force, pious fraud, or magic but only by following his mere example.

After a few feeble efforts to minimize temporal injustice, Pseudo-Denis admits that although God causes no evil, He does create beings who are liable to corruption—a rather disingenuous distinction. He further admits that evil “participates in the plenitude of all things and in this way contributes directly to the perfecting of the universe” (*ibid.*, 112).

Man, at all events, now had free will again. How was he to use it so as to increase his chances of salvation? Just as there was a hierarchy among the angels, so was there among men: first the high priests, then the ‘sacrificers,’ then the faithful in

good standing, then the catechumens and penitents, and finally the rebels doomed (unless they repented) to damnation.

The divine rays, having penetrated the successive orders of the angels, reached the high priests first, instilling them with that virtue and mystic knowledge appropriate to their superior human capacities. These in turn revealed or transmitted as much of their virtue and knowledge as the next order, sacrificers, was fit to receive and absorb—and so on down to the layman. Each transmission was of a secret, each time of a more easily grasped but also more incomplete secret. Also each superior might properly pray that both he himself and his inferiors might be vouchsafed more secrets in so far as they could prove themselves fit to be entrusted with them.

The sacraments, notably those of baptism and communion, were rituals revealed only to the faithful in good standing, as symbolic revelations of mysteries. They were a teaching but only to a qualified few. There was no magic in them; the effect depended entirely on the capacity, moral and intellectual, of the transmitting priest and the recipient. To the extent that either was not qualified the effect was negative.

This was the road to salvation. Apparently the priest who died in a state of grace had a higher rank in heaven, but no more chance of salvation, than had the layman.

The sole reward for the saints was to be at peace, to have nothing more to do or to worry about. In spite of the fact that they would soon regain their bodies, because these deserved the reward as much as their souls did, there would no longer be any occasion for exercising them. But evidently these saints could and would still strive, like the good angels, further to perfect their virtue and understanding for the pure joy of the accomplishment.

2. BOETHIUS

Boethius, whose texts were to be so influential in the early Middle Ages, was a Roman aristocrat who, after serving the Ostrogothic King Theodoric, was executed by him in 524, for reasons ostensibly political but perhaps also racial and even religious. Boethius was certainly a Christian and a Catholic, but he was also a layman and his writings indicate that

his education had been more pagan than Christian in spirit, or at any rate more philosophical than theological. He did write certain theological tracts, but they were dialectical rather than spiritual exercises.

Perhaps more than any other extant works his *Consolation of Philosophy*, written in his death cell, reveals the mental and moral processes whereby the educated pagan passed over to Christianity, reveals the nature of the current which carried the late Roman from Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics to Plotinus, Augustine, and finally well on his way to Pope Gregory.

The underpinning of his belief was that same pagan perfection whereby God was inferred from the imperfection of man; and this inference of God was here corroborated by the universality of men's belief in Him which could be accounted for only by assuming a persisting innate knowledge divinely implanted. This 'participation' in God was traceable to the soul before its separation or fall from God to undergo its successive incarnations. This was Plato's doctrine of reminiscence, and Augustine's "dim recollection of light unput out."

The perfection of God is described in Denis' Neoplatonic language: God does not possess but rather *is* goodness, wisdom, power, a simple One. He is the Creator, but not of something out of nothing; the Ideas were doubtless His own, but His Creation was as the Artificer who reduced the previously existing chaos of Nature to law and order. This world He now governed with absolute control; He did not need to rely on miracles or on the help of men.

Among other things God was the Unmoved Mover who transformed inert, timeless chaos to orderly motions in time. Here, more originally, Boethius distinguished God's plan or Ideas, which he called Providence, from the realization or execution of them, which he called Fate:

Whether Fate be exercised by the subordination of certain Divine spirits to Providence, or this fatal web be woven by a soul or by the service of all nature, or by the heavenly motions of the stars, by angelical virtue, or by diabolical industry, or by some or all of these, it certainly is manifest that Providence is an immoveable and simple form of those things which are to be done, and Fate a moveable connection and temporal order of those things which

the Divine simplicity hath disposed to be done. Therefore all that is under Fate is also subject to Providence, to which also Fate itself obeyeth. (IV, vi, 51-63.)

Whether God's instruments were stars, angels, or demons, His control over them was absolute and man was helpless to resist their power.

Pagan physics also led Boethius to an Aristotelian conception. According to it the four elements have a natural disposition to stay at rest at a certain altitude and, if displaced, they have a natural desire to regain it, as fire to rise and earth to fall, always in a straight line. It was only the motion induced by the Creation which had displaced them and thereby roused this innate desire. Boethius extended this "law" to the stars, which, being fire or spirit, wished also to rise. But by God's creation they too had been displaced.

Those things whose course
Most swiftly glides away
His might doth often backward force,
And suddenly their wandering motion stay.
Unless His strength
Their violence should bound,
And them which else would run at length,
Should bring within the compass of a round,
That firm decree
Which now doth all adorn
Would soon destroyed and broken be,
Things being far from their beginning borne.
This powerful love
Is common unto all,
Which for desire of good do move
Back to the springs from whence they first did fall.
(IV, vi, 38-45.)

Before the Creation the stars had certainly been at rest in their natural location. But motion had displaced them also, and they would have taken a beeline towards their natural location had God not forced their violence into a circular motion. The aim was doubtless to reconcile Aristotle's uncreated, Plato's ordered, and the Christian created, worlds.

It is also clear that this controlled motion was possible only because of the pre-existence of their desire as Aristotle understood it. God had transformed it into a desire for virtue as distinguished from the natural, amoral, desire merely to pre-

serve a state of flaccid immobility. As in Neoplatonism, this longing for perfection, originating beyond the stars, percolated down from heaven to earth, ever losing strength as it receded farther from its place of origin. Since this place, however, was the whole surrounding heavenly sphere, while the dissipation increased as it approached the central point of the earth, it must be supposed that the power was like that of light surrounding a sphere of water, the centre of which would be the least illuminated.

Here in this central darkness, least affected by perfection, lay the greatest imperfection, the least motion, the least law and order, the least health. Here lay evil, that nothing which is mere privation of good, ephemeral, with too many obvious remnants of the pristine chaos. It was here that man's soul was incarnated with a will not yet so tamed as that of the stars had been—still ignorant, rebellious, irrational. It was perhaps God's only unfinished task to tame and order these human unregenerates.

As to the early Neoplatonists so to Boethius there was no dualism; therefore God as Providence had no need of men's help. As Augustine had also supposed, because God's only struggle was against the evil in men, these had no intrinsic responsibility except to themselves. In devising ways and means of fostering virtue in men's hearts, God was often obliged to resort to harsh and even unfair expedients, for it was true that good could come only out of evil. But that was no business of men except in so far as it suggested that they might impose evil means on themselves in the hope of thereby helping to promote their own amendment.

That Boethius had great difficulty in ridding himself of pagan preconceptions is indicated by his reluctance to subordinate temporal or human, to eternal or divine, justice. He could believe in the Christian God only in so far as the divine justice accorded with the human, and he therefore took no account of the Christian doctrine of Original Sin, the Redemption, the Sacraments, or a Last Judgment. Men must win salvation by their own efforts which alone win God's grace.

Handicapped as their souls were by their incarnation in bodies, they were born guiltless and with an unimpaired free

will. Their only enemy was their own imperfection. As participants in perfection they invariably desired the good, but because of their ignorance they could not, without the greatest effort, approach it. This effort consisted in cultivating self-knowledge and self-sufficiency, that is, a right understanding of their relation to their environment, their place in Nature.

This effort, spiritually, Boethius likened to the secular labors of Hercules, no less arduous because contemplative rather than active. Prayer was no more than a gesture of respect; grace was no more than the automatic reward of merit. The alternative, whether in one lifetime or in a series of incarnations, was to become either more and more like a god or more and more like a beast.

Boethius, to be sure, envisaged a heaven, a purgatory, and a hell, but his mentor, Lady Philosophy, says, "I purpose not now to treat of those," and Boethius readily acquiesces. For his concern was rather with how God treated men while they were still alive.

Augustine had said that in the temporal life justice and injustice were equally operative, and that God had purposely designed it so in order to teach men that rewards and punishments were dealt out wholly in an afterlife. Boethius, however, observing this same mixture, at first supposed—as a pagan—that God either chose, or was compelled, to leave the fates of living men to chance.

Despairing in his death cell, however, he was visited by Lady Philosophy and the burden of the *Consolation* is her successful effort to convince him that justice prevails in the temporal, no less completely than in the eternal, life. Of course Lady Philosophy is no other than the miserable Boethius trying to persuade himself.

First, although Boethius is not at once convinced, she assumes that because God is outside of time, His foreknowledge is consistent with human free will. On this premise God knows what is in men's minds and therefore how, according to circumstances, they will react. It was recognized that He never rewarded or punished men for deeds which they might have wished to commit yet did not. On the other hand, God did reward or punish intention, for this was itself a sort of

deed, and the moral line between an intent and a mere disposition was possible to visualize. Salvian, as we have seen, had said that beggars rarely had an intent to be dissolute, though they were no less inclined or disposed to it than the rich. The mere inclination, however, was no sin.

That God foreknew not only everything which did happen but also everything which might, was assumed by every Christian. By His foreknowledge God perceived the inclination; He was unwilling to reward or punish it as such, but He was willing so to arrange the circumstances that the inclination was put to the test. He foreknew which men would resist, and which would succumb to, the temptation; but, perhaps out of deference to the inadequacies of human justice, He preferred to have men prove their capacities to themselves.

But Boethius had another theory, perhaps one of his own invention. God foresees that the saint is immune to temptation so He rewards him forthwith. Foreseeing, however, that another will succumb to adversity, instead of making him succumb in fact, He protects him from the adversity. In some cases his weakness is even catered to by providing him with a store of money. When, on the other hand, He foresees that if the prosperity of another is prolonged he will succumb to smugness or even pride, He plunges him into adversity; not, as He did Job, in order to prove his mettle, but rather in order to save him from actualizing his inclination to self-esteem.

Although Boethius does not say so, he here evidently has in mind only Catholics or those who will become such. The rest, whose conversion He knows that He either cannot or will not effectuate, He uses as a means of promoting the salvation of the others. Thus He sees to it that some of the wicked injure the potentially good in order to make these latter realize the enormity of certain deeds which they must otherwise have perpetrated themselves. Furthermore, when the hopelessly wicked are punished this is not only because they deserve to be but also in order to serve as a warning to others that such deeds will be punished now as well as in the hereafter.

From these examples it appears that Boethius believed that God was particularly anxious to save the well-intentioned but weak. It is true that the Church now also believed this; but, whereas she taught that God was successful because He was

able to forgive sins actually committed as often as the sinner could be induced to regret them, Boethius attributed much of God's success to His ingenuity in so rigging outward circumstances that the temptation to sin was minimized. This was obviously the case where God brought death to a baptized child before he was old enough to sin, but was this not rather the exception which proved the rule?

At first blush this theory may seem a travesty of the Christian tradition: God, instead of putting men to the acid test, is here engaged in providing ways of saving them from it. Traditionally, God made use of the Devil's malice in order that every man be tempted up to the very limit of his human capacity to resist. Yet now, according to Boethius, God was engaged, not in facilitating, but rather in thwarting the Devil's designs.

But was Boethius merely out of step, or was he a sign of the times? May it not be that the rigor of Augustine's belief was now being softened? Augustine had been wary of the incipient monasticism of his day; he did not approve of trying to evade rather than face the temptation which God had designed in order to prove the true quality of a man's virtue. And was monasticism not concocted for the very purpose of thwarting this divine purpose? For did it not seek to minimize the opportunity, and therefore the temptation, to enjoy riches or women? If the Church approved of this resort to evasion, surely God, as Boethius was saying, also approved. It is then perhaps not wholly a coincidence that the two old Roman gentlemen, Benedict and Boethius, were born the same year.

This new view already suggests a tendency towards dualism, for in trying to avoid temptations one is also trying to thwart the Devil. This subconscious premise is indicated further if we consider the problem arising from God's foreknowledge. According to the rigorous view, God knew who was to be saved and who damned, but He also knew that none were fit to be saved until they had been toughened by the ordeal of facing and resisting temptation. But, according to Boethius, God was eager also to save the many whom He foreknew would not be able to resist temptation. Why, then, did He bother to incarnate them, if only that they might be saved by being protected from the very temptations on account of

which He had incarnated them? The only possible assumption was that God had to incarnate them in order to save them, but in order to save them from the Devil He had to resort to a device whereby the Devil was cheated of his right to tempt. The Devil, to be sure, was still able to tempt even the monks, as by putting sinful thoughts into their heads, but he could not do so by putting the concrete objects of these thoughts at their disposal.

Boethius clung to the old Greek view that virtue was its own reward, and by this he can only have meant that it was the best way of securing happiness, in this life as well as in the next. How orthodox was this? Many of the early Christians had managed to persuade themselves that virtue was, in this life, the antithesis of temporal happiness, but by Boethius' day the monks and the barbarians had co-operated to dispel that belief, inviting the Christians to return to the old Greek belief they had once so contemptuously repudiated.

But might it not be that Boethius still harbored the old Epicurean belief that men should cultivate virtue only because it was the only way to be happy? To be sure, the Church claimed that the end was, in this world at any rate, not happiness but virtue, and that happiness was a mere by-product. But since, according to either view, neither can subsist apart from the other, the relation is comparable to that existing between God and the Devil: the two purposes are opposite, but the net results are identical. Here, therefore, we cannot know, even if Boethius himself did know, which of the two was his real belief.

Certainly, to judge from the *Consolation*, Boethius was obsessed by the apparent incongruity of human and divine justice, and he was more reluctant than most Christian writers to subordinate the present life to the future. Did this mean that he truly believed that the former was the more significant of the two? He barely refers to heaven, purgatory, or hell. He does not even mention the Last Judgment. Of the saints he says only that

if a guiltless mind freed from earthly imprisonment goes forthwith to heaven, will she not despise all earthly traffic who, enjoying heaven, rejoices to see herself exempted from earthly affairs? (II, vii, 82-85.)

Indeed, Augustine had said this too, but Boethius was writing 125 years later, when his Christian contemporaries were almost all attributing to the saints an intense interest in and concern for all that was still happening in the world below.

Was it not probable, therefore, that Boethius, great admirer as he was of Plato particularly, could not bring himself to imagine, as most Christians did, an afterlife in which the individuality of each soul subsisted unimpaired? Did he not think of it rather as an annihilation of personality by the soul's reabsorption into the One?

The dualism, in any case, which seems to be implicit in Boethius was probably only between God and matter. He hardly mentions the Devil; his only reference is to the possible share played in Fate by "diabolical industry." Whether his sense of the intrinsic significance of the temporal life was a cause or an effect of his doubts about the reality of a conscious eternal life is not clear. It is clear, however, that he gives us a last vivid glimpse of that pagan world which, in spite of its imperfections, had been so long cherished and loved. As the Christian Pelagius had already insisted, a living man could, of his own will, become holy because this world of which men were an integral part was, being also a creation of God, essentially holy too.

3. ARTS AND SCIENCES

a. Influence of Denis and Boethius

These two writers were Christians—perhaps this is why their works have survived—but Christians who, although sincerely such, could not shake off their pagan habits of thought. Not unlike Clement of Alexandria, one of Origen's masters, they were still trying to reconcile, and so cling to, both. There were other more or less pagan writers, but we have spoken only of these because they alone were constructive and at the same time influential in the early Latin medieval world. For Pseudo-Denis was translated into Latin by the Irishman Eriegen in 855, and about a generation later the Latin *De consolatione philosophiae* of Boethius was translated into English by King Alfred.

b. *The Greek Language*

One of the symptoms of decay in the sixth century was the neglect of the Greek language in the West. Augustine himself had not been too much at home in it, and as time went on the Westerners knew it less and less. Boethius is properly said to have been the last Latin to be familiar with Greek philosophical texts. How many Latins of his day could read the Greek theological texts we cannot say, but there were certainly very few.

The Latin officials of the Church like Pope Gregory, who as papal emissary had resided in Constantinople from 579 to 586, must have learned the Greek tongue. But it may well be that this accomplishment was confined to civil and ecclesiastical officials and did not include what was left of cultivated circles. Therefore the Greek texts which had not been translated into Latin by about 530 now became unknown in the West.

c. *The Transmitters*

Latin texts on pagan philosophy were scanty and not of the best quality. Cicero offered popularizations; Augustine often referred to pagan beliefs; and his African contemporary, Macrobius, a minor Neoplatonist, had written in Latin. Perhaps more valuable, however, were the translators. As early as 325 Chalcidius had found it desirable to make a Latin translation of parts of Plato's cosmological *Timaeus* dialogue, to go with his commentary on it. There was a Latin translation of Aristotle's *Categories*, attributed, at least, to Augustine. By far the most notable and influential translations, however, were made by Boethius, and it was these rather than his *Consolation* which made him one of the great authorities of the Middle Ages. It was primarily from these texts that they derived their first precise notions of classical Greek philosophy.

In one group were his translations of the more elementary logical treatises of Aristotle, with the commentaries which he appended to them. In the second group was his translation of Porphyry's *Introduction* to Aristotle's *Categories* with not only an anonymous commentary on it in Latin (translated by Victorinus) but also a commentary on it of his own. Porphyry, in his *Introduction*, had raised the famous medieval problem

of which were the realities: the ideas or forms—such as genera and species—or the individual sensible objects. Plato had inclined to the former view, Aristotle to the latter. Porphyry had been unwilling to decide; Boethius, although at first siding with Plato, later inclined rather towards Aristotle. One of the first philosophical disputes in the ninth century was this one, and it continued unabated for several centuries thereafter.

d. The Liberal Arts

The adoption by the Christians of the pagan Roman system of elementary education is too well known to require more than a word. Going back at least to Varro and the Republic, it was known to the Middle Ages chiefly through an interminable Latin allegorical poem by the fifth-century Martianus Capella, and by about 550 it was already the basis of the curriculum for the young monks in the South Italian monastery of Cassiodorus. The truth is, it had no pagan or Christian connotations, being divided into a Trivium of 'arts'—grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic—and a Quadrivium of 'sciences'—arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. At one time or another other disciplines had been added or substituted. In any case it had had no noticeable effect on belief one way or the other. To be sure, there were Latin works on astronomy, largely astrological in purpose, by Macrobius and Martianus Capella; and Boethius wrote on music and on the geometry of Euclid. However, the pagan disciplines apart from philosophy which would continue to be influential, were those of law and medicine, neither of which was included in the core of the liberal arts. Like the medieval disciplines of theology, law, and medicine, they were not elementary or liberal but rather advanced or vocational subjects.

e. Law

The legal beliefs embodied in the great Corpus Juris Civilis of about 533, now known as the Justinian Code, still embodied the fundamental principles of the pagan conception of law in spite of certain changes inserted by the successive Christian emperors since the time of Constantine. That this pagan conception of justice, in contrast to so many other pagan be-

liefs, had not been challenged but had even been wholeheartedly accepted, suggests that the two concepts were not unlike. A few illustrations confirm this. A notable one is Seneca the Stoic, who, born almost a generation before Paul, had already alleged, as Paul did after him, that until primitive man had been subjected to law he could no more sin than could a beast.

By the great Roman jurists of the years around A.D. 200, furthermore, the general notion of a natural law was developed, sometimes based on a Golden Age like that enjoyed by the first Adam or again, following Seneca, like Paul's post-Adamic but pre-Mosaic age of animal innocence. For the pagan jurists too had imagined a Fall: a period of deliberate flouting of the law and therefore of moral degeneration. Since the experiment of promulgating laws in order to invite a voluntary obedience had proved a failure, further laws were enacted imposing penalties on the recalcitrants, it being hoped in this way to effect an involuntary obedience.

Originally there had been private property, originally there had been rulers, but in both cases by popular consent. Later, although still theoretically by original consent, the people had irrevocably assigned their sovereign powers to a ruler, for their own common good. To be sure, this ruler was still no less obliged to respect natural law, but he was also empowered to suspend it as often as the concrete exigencies demanded. In order to avoid the embarrassing problem of the right to resist a wicked ruler, it came to be understood that he had somehow received a divine sanction. When such a ruler was overthrown or assassinated this was sanctioned not because the people had a right to get rid of him but rather because, the ruler having shown no respect for Nature's law, Nature herself, through her divine agents, had quite properly taken matters into her own hands.

Following the Stoic Seneca, the pagan jurists also recognized the natural equality and brotherhood of all mankind and, like the Christians, they justified slavery only as a temporary expedient indispensable to the design of raising civilization to the ultimate utopian goal—a second Golden Age, akin rather to that of the temporal Jewish Messiah than to Augustine's City of God, but inspired by the same idealism as the Christian.

Therefore, in spite of Christ's Revelation, the pagan idea of law survived basically unimpaired, first to color, later to challenge, and finally to supersede the feudal and customary law of the Middle Ages.

f. Medicine

Although by A.D. 200 Hippocrates, as clear-headed as his contemporary Socrates, had been eclipsed by the more intellectual Galen—the practical approach by the theoretical—medicine more than the other sciences continued to command the respect of pagan Romans, and for some time Christianity did not try to discredit it. If the Church recommended an appeal to God as more efficacious than one to a physician, she also fought to discredit the pagan magic which was gradually corrupting the Greek tradition. There was a chance, here, to purify the art or at least to go back to Hippocrates, and evidently Cassiodorus, born and bred in southern Italy, was trying to do just that in stressing diet and regime rather than therapy. The medical school at nearby Salerno, also in Magna Graecia, would never quite forget that tradition, but the rest of the West was already caught in the current which was to carry it into the Middle Ages.

So close is the resemblance between physical and spiritual sickness that no civilization, presumably, has quite ignored it. Caesarius, to go no further back, was constantly resorting to the physician's art as a symbol of the priest's, and Pope Gregory was to do no less. But Caesarius, in doing so, incidentally reveals certain particulars of the medical knowledge then still current. He refers, for instance, to the use of drugs in order to prevent or to induce conception, and to the fact that the poison extracted from a dead snake is an effective antidote to the bite of a live one. If a later text is to be relied on, a Greek physician, who as a Nestorian heretic had fled to still Arian Spain, had in 545 performed (with what success we are not told) a caesarian operation to remove a dead embryo from the womb of its still living mother.

Felix IV, pope from 526 to 530, built a church in Rome which he dedicated to the martyred physicians Cosmas and Damian, a sign that dead saints were beginning to take over

the responsibilities of the living physicians. One of the avowed purposes of Benedict in founding his monastic Order was to look after the sick. More and more, as the monasteries grew richer, hospitals were among the buildings erected, that the monks might the more conveniently care for the stranger, the old, and the sick. But these monks received no medical training. They prayed, consoled, tended, and exorcized, but they hardly expected, or even intended, to cure. Their purpose was to relieve the patient's last sufferings and above all, by bringing him to the altar of their church and to its relics, to see that everything possible was done to facilitate his salvation. A miracle might, for a time, effect a recovery; a painless and even a serene death might be divinely vouchsafed. But the hope was only incidentally for temporal alleviation; their devoted ministrations were rather inspired by the wish that their own no less than their patients' souls might thereby be the better prepared to face the Judgment of their God.

g. Astrophysics

In these same early years of the sixth century yet probably unknown to a single Latin, a Christian philosopher of Alexandria, Philoponus, glossing Aristotle, was asserting that the flight of the spear which Aristotle had explained as due to its contact with the surrounding air and so with the propelling bow, was due rather to the momentum or impetus with which the bow had infused it. It was then too that a Cilician Neoplatonist, Simplicius, teaching in Athens, was weighing, although only to reject, the heliocentric hypothesis of Aristarchus. In 529 Justinian ordered the closing of Plato's now 900-year-old Academy, and Simplicius had to go to Persia in order to continue his career.

Thus in that year Greek science, too, was abandoning Europe. The dreams which Paris and Oxford were to have in the fourteenth century and which Copernicus and Galileo were to transform at last into realities, were now to wander for over 800 years, from Persia and Alexandria to Arabia, to Egypt again, to north Africa, and finally, via Sicily and Spain, to the Occamites of the north. In Europe, even in the Greek East, science after a long languishing had died.

GREGORY THE GREAT

1. LIFE AND TIMES

GREGORY, called the Great, was a Roman aristocrat who, after being Prefect of the City, monk, and papal emissary to Constantinople, became pope from 590 to 604. The men who chiefly influenced his beliefs were Augustine, Pope Leo I, Caesarius, and Benedict. He doubtless believed that he was being true to their tradition, but the times were such that modifications had become more than ever imperative, and he was sensitive enough to feel, speak, and act accordingly. For when in 573 Gregory, at the age of thirty, became Prefect of the City, ancient civilization had ceased. In Gaul the barbarians had assumed spiritual as well as temporal control by 537; in Spain, soon after 550. In Italy the oppressive but nonetheless Catholic Byzantine regime was shattered by the invasion of the Arian Lombards in 568. Some of these barbarians had become Catholics, the rest were soon to become so, but Catholics so un-Roman that Gregory, if he was to keep even a tenuous spiritual hold on them, had in various cases to give ground. Caesarius before him had made some concessions; Gregory was obliged to make others. Was this because of statesmanship or contagion? Was it calculation or intuition? Probably rather the latter, because his genius lay less in intellectual detachment than in psychological perception.

2. EVIL

If the world had seemed evil to Jerome and Augustine, what must it have seemed to Gregory? The pre-Redemption days,

with the Devil in the saddle, might well be thought to have returned. During the centuries when Christianity was conquering the Roman world it was easy to believe that Christ had rendered the Devil helpless, but now this must have been hard for Gregory even to say, much less to believe. When he conscientiously affirmed that evil was a mere privation of good, may he not have suspected that good was no less a mere privation of evil? When he conscientiously repeated that everything that the Devil was now doing was wholly pleasing to God, why should he not have been wondering why God had created the world in the first place? For among those things which Gregory conscientiously classified as mysteries were that God had created man so certain to sin, and why it was, even now, the will of God that infants who died unbaptized were denied salvation.

The Devil, to be sure, could not perform spiritual miracles; but he could, quite as well as God, perform physical ones. Nor could, or at any rate did, the Devil ever chasten rather than tempt. But, quite as well as God, he could punish, and since he could only punish the guilty, and then only—like God—if it pleased him to do so, these two supernatural powers seemed to behave rather like allies than enemies—as indeed, except for their contrasting intents, they admittedly did. If further corroboration were needed, the Devil in the form of Antichrist seemed about to be loosed on the world as a prelude to its end. Although few enough now alive could escape damnation, of those who would then be alive, far fewer would resist and so be saved. God had for a long time chosen to save none; now He chose to save only enough to fill the depleted ranks of the angels, so that the fate of even the best of men was still precarious. Good, indeed, could come only out of evil, but what a lot of evil it was taking to produce so little good.

Gregory was able to reconcile the mercy of Christ with these horrors only by falling back on the prophecies of the Gospels and *Apocalypse*. Here the events immediately to precede the imminent end of the world were no longer to be the normal operations of a just Providence but rather an unprecedented supernatural convulsion, essentially cosmic in design and character and only incidentally, if at all, just or even didactic. As the Devil was to make his last desperate sortie before finally

succumbing, God was momentarily to reel under the force of the blow, for this period was to be marked by the coming and rule of the Antichrist. For a time, then, all the living would suffer, the innocent perhaps even more than the guilty. Then, as God counterattacked, every man would die and the whole visible universe cease to exist. Only the bodies of men would subsist by rising to resume their former living shapes, to encompass again the souls, whether in heaven or in hell, which had formerly inhabited them.

Thus the otherwise perspicacious Gregory described it:

Lo, as Scripture foretold all the glory of the world has perished. Cities are overthrown, camps uprooted, churches destroyed, no tiller of the ground inhabits our land. Against us—the poor remnants which are left—the sword of man rages incessantly, with blows of supernatural impact. Thus the evils of the world which we before heard prophesied we are now witnessing. (*Gregory the Great, Letters, II, 29.*)

As the miracles increased, including visions of heaven and hell seen by dead men who returned to life to tell their tales, the earth was seen to fade and the heavens to reveal themselves.

3. THE REDEMPTION

In expounding the causes of the Redemption Gregory listed not only the magic divinization of men, the dramatic teaching, and the desire to trap the Devil, but also the desire to appease the Father's wrath. This last hypothesis, which had not been taken seriously since the fourth century, had recently been revived by Cassiodorus, and Gregory now followed suit.

Augustine, as Gregory well knew, had tried to explain why Christ had wished to save all yet had so far not done so, by interpreting that to mean men of every sort and condition of life. May not Gregory, while concurring, nevertheless have hoped for a better explanation? The Semi-Pelagians had said it meant that Christ hoped to save all by restoring their free will, but with the dogma of prevenient grace now established, Augustine's dilemma had inevitably returned.

Under these circumstances may not the dualist solution of the Manichees, distasteful as it was, have affected Gregory's

judgment? In spite of the Redemption the Devil, although outwitted, was still actively at work; perhaps, then, the wrath of the Father too, although assuaged, had not been wholly appeased. And this seemed corroborated by the undeniable dogma that the Devil could do only what the Father authorized and therefore wished him to. Was it likely, then, that the Son, who had come in order to check the merciless behavior of both, was now still identical in will with the Father and therefore equally pleased with the Devil's present behavior? It was more likely, surely, that since the Son had paid the ransom to both, it was also the Son, and he alone, who had, so far as he had been able, saved men from both. Under the stress of the temporal horrors now running riot it was tempting, in order to keep one's faith in the Father's power, to fall back on Augustine's virtual denial of His benevolence.

4. PROVIDENCE

a. The Father and the Devil

In sharing the leading roles of Providence the respective parts played by the Father and the Devil were not easy to distinguish. The Father alone caused spiritual, but both caused physical, miracles, and both inflicted punishments for sin. Some thought the rule of an evil king ought to be resisted because he was inspired by the Devil, but Gregory said he must not be, because he had been sent as a punishment by God. The distinction here was between the ends or intents, not between the means or effects—a clear divine distinction which men were only too ready to approve.

To be sure, the Father alone chastened and the Devil alone tempted, but chastening is often indistinguishable from punishment, and temptations are often, as when prosperity comes, indistinguishable from consolations or rewards on account of merit.

b. The Son

The role of Christ the Son, on the other hand, was by Gregory's wrath-of-God theory of the Redemption clearly distin-

guishable: the fact that he wished thereby to save all was enough in itself to acquit him of any responsibility for evil. As a Providence at any rate he was negligible, though Gregory said, to be sure, that he could alleviate temporal misery.

c. Wholesale Justice

Providence, moreover, was suspiciously more rough and ready than meticulous; many of the punishments and even rewards were wholesale, hurting or helping both the innocent and the guilty quite indiscriminately. Just as the merit of King David had once eased the lot of many guilty, so now the malice of the barbarian kings was aggravating the lot of the innocent. To pass off the injuries of these men as a mere chastening process was, therefore, no longer so convincing.

Under the Old Dispensation the Father had employed the good angels as His agents to help Him to rule over and communicate with men. But at the same time the Devil had employed the bad angels to help him. Although the imperfections of this coalition government were the cause of the Son's intervention, the activities of both of these subordinates had subsisted.

In addition the Devil, according to Gregory, had enlisted the co-operation of all the unbaptized, the whole making a formidable array set to resist the New Dispensation.

d. Intermediaries

Therefore the Son, in order to counteract this opposition, really had no alternative but to enlist on his side the help of as many as came to be baptized. And if these could, so long as they were alive, do no more than counteract the activities of the unbaptized, they could, once they had achieved salvation, vie in power with the good and bad angels combined. For they became thereby, in all but name, the angels of Christ's mercy.

But, because the Son had acquired only a slight control over Providence, so too had his saints. These, if invoked, could indeed effect such miracles as to cure at least those illnesses which the Devil had caused. But on the whole they brought consolation and edification rather than any substantial tem-

poral benefits. Even today we hear chiefly of the mercy of Christ, chiefly of the Providence of God.

e. For the Unbelievers

For all others than Catholics there was not even God's Providence. These, said Gregory, were not only not punished; they were neither chastened nor tempted. They were the unlucky untouchables, ignored—because already in his power—even by the Devil. Their only Providence was chance. At least until and unless they should later become the wholly undeserving recipients of prevenient grace, their lives were like those of the beasts, their temporal vicissitudes mere by-products of the central supernatural struggle for the souls of the chosen few.

5. SALVATION

a. Faith and Works

Despairing of a Providence which showed such disregard of temporal justice, the Christian naturally sought to disregard it himself and to devote all his hopes and energies to the promise of a better afterlife.

During the years of Christ's Incarnation salvation had been a simple matter. Everyone who sincerely acknowledged his faith in Christ's divinity was saved. For a time thereafter this acknowledgment was valid for salvation merely if certified by baptism. Later, again, other requisites were added; these were called works and included prayer, participation in sacramental and other rituals, and the performance of good deeds.

b. Sin

By Gregory's time it had become generally recognized that baptism conferred free will. But, however well a man exercised it, he could not wholly avoid committing sins, and unless these were duly recorded as forgiven his salvation remained, if not hopeless, at least in serious jeopardy. Deep faith and meritorious works such as martyrdom would serve to cancel all previous sins; but in general the chance of any such cancellation became so small that a formal forgiveness

was deemed to be indispensable. Baptism alone, which had once assured salvation, now merely made it possible, provided recourse was had to many further expedients. These are to be best considered under the heads of contrition and communion.

c. Contrition

No one could now obtain forgiveness until he had become genuinely sorry for his sins. It was a great mistake to suppose that even a bishop could count on the prayers of others to further, much less to effect, his salvation. It was even a mistake to suppose that a man's power to prophesy or perform physical miracles was evidence that he was in a state of grace, for the Devil himself could also exercise this privilege. Conversely, it was no evidence of the absence of grace that a man could not perform these wonders.

Certain acts were so salutary in their effects that a meritorious intent could be presupposed, as when a conversion was effected; but even these most desirable so-called spiritual miracles mitigated rather than canceled the guilt of the sinner.

In describing what constitutes contrition Gregory gave two distinct requirements. The first was that the penitent must love God, the second that he must hate his sin. It may be hazarded that love was the requirement for one who was about to be, or had recently been, baptized—that he might have, as Augustine said, a good intent—and that hatred of his sin was the additional duty imposed on the mature and thoroughly conditioned believer. Let us see why.

In order to achieve the love of God a man must first cultivate a fear of hell. During this effort, although laudable in itself, he was merely in a state of attrition. Only when he had acquired a complete fear of it could he be said properly to love God, and, in achieving this, his attrition became a full contrition.

In order to hate his sin, on the other hand, more was required. The man must first of all recognize what his sins are. For he can love God and yet not be aware, as God is aware, that he has committed, indeed may still be committing, sins of a perhaps serious nature.

Now, since God is aware of them, the bishop, lest he tempt God, must try to help the sinner to become aware of them himself. Many things that God knows without effort man, with effort, can come to know too. But few sinners have either the will or the knowledge to analyze themselves. Why, then, was it not one of Gregory's undertakings by becoming monk and priest to ferret out men's unconscious or forgotten sins, that they might thereby be given the opportunity, at least, of hating them?

Inspired not only by Revelation but also by the Fathers and, above all, perhaps, by such Rules as Benedict's, Gregory wrote his famous *Pastoral Care* in order to teach his clergy how best to proceed. What his predecessors had written haphazardly and chiefly for the guidance of abbots in dealing with their monks, Gregory now wrote systematically and for the guidance of the whole clergy in their dealings not only with each other but with the laity under their charge. The physician, in shifting his attention from the body to the soul, had inaugurated the art of the psychologist.

The Greeks had stressed the importance of self-knowledge, and the Christians had likewise stressed what they more often called the examination of conscience. As we have seen, Caesarius had already recognized that the clergy could not safely plead ignorance as an excuse. But Gregory may have been the first to conceive of the priest's role as a director of conscience not for his fellow clerics only, but for all mature believers.

His method deserves to be illustrated by one or two quotations. This is his diagnosis of the dangers which confront the taciturn:

It often happens that in too much holding their tongues, they indulge more dangerously in chattering to themselves: with the result that, in their minds, thoughts ferment with a violence proportionate to the strictness with which they indiscreetly hold them in restraint. And these thoughts of theirs are usually all the more shameless, they deeming themselves the safer because they are hidden from those who could otherwise rebuke them. Wherefore it follows, that their soul often swells with pride, and scorns, as being imperfect, those whom it hears talking. By shutting the mouth of its body, the soul does not perceive to what degree, by thus swelling itself up, it opens wide the door to vices. To be sure it curbs its tongue, but it gives free rein to the vanity of its mind.

Then, quite blind to its own malice, it secretly accuses everybody else the more irresponsibly in proportion as it keeps its opinions secret. . . . Very often too, if the taciturn suffer any injustice they become bitter, and the more so the less they (openly) complain. If their mouths quietly poured out their misfortune, their bitterness would flow out too. (*Pastoral Care*, III, 14—from Boutet trans., 156.)

As with the taciturn so with the patient man: he must be careful not to fall into self-pity or resentment:

Patient persons must be told not to groan inwardly because of what they endure outwardly, lest they spoil, by the contagion of an evil disposition of the soul, the so great sacrifice which they outwardly appear to have made for the sake of their integrity. . . . And the malignity (of this sin) is aggravated in proportion as it is accompanied by a false air of virtue. . . . It also often happens that patient persons are not affected at the moment when they suffer a reverse or an injury. They thus prove their patience and preserve the innocence of their heart. But when, somewhat later, they recall to memory those same things which they had previously tolerated, they whip themselves into a fury of grief and seek out ways of revenging themselves; and, repudiating the gentleness they had retained during the outrage, they transform it into malice. (*Ibid.*, III, 9—Boutet, 129.)

Like the physician's diagnosis, that of the psychologist was often wrong. The way to find out was to explain it to the patient himself. If this failed to enlighten him, it was probably wrong; if it did enlighten him, it was probably right. But even if right, the hoped-for cure might take time. From the recognition must first come the secret acknowledgment of its truth to himself, and only thereafter the avowal or confession of it.

The penance would then, at the priest's discretion, be waived or set. In either case, however—and even after the ensuing absolution—the patient must continue to take to heart the admonition which Gregory derived from *Isaiah* xliii 25:

Counsel them to bear incessantly in mind the evil they have done, and so to conduct themselves that the inflexible Judge is no longer reminded of them.

Man must, therefore, to the last day of his life continue to recall and bewail even all those sins which God had forgiven him; for, should he forget them, God at the Last Judgment will then recall them Himself.

d. The Eucharist

After confession, and the assignment of penance, the priest gave absolution, a sort of certificate of good standing. But, since this procedure did not then constitute a sacrament, it did not confer forgiveness. For this could only be given by God, and, in order to obtain it, the person absolved must participate in the sacrament of the Eucharist.

If a man participated who was either not contrite or not duly absolved, God would surely punish him for his effrontery. If both contrite and absolved, his participation in this ritual produced a threefold effect: it forgave him his sins, it infused him with an added power to resist future temptations, and by adding to the merit of Christ it enabled Christ to be more generous in conferring that grace without which, in contrast to the strict Pelagian view, no man could be saved. These last two effects require further elucidation.

The Real Presence of Christ, effected, as was now generally recognized, by the transubstantiation of the bread and wine, enabled the communicant to participate, not only symbolically but also actually and therefore magically, in Christ's moral strength to resist temptation. But this, perhaps because it was too reminiscent of the Syrian and Mithraic ritual of the bath in the bull's blood, did not satisfy Gregory. To him Christ performed physical miracles only incidentally; his real power was spiritual and he had derived this power by his sacrificial Passion.

Recall now Gregory's belief that Christ had sought not only to shear the Devil of his power but also to assuage his Father's wrath; and recall, too, the Old Testament tradition that the beneficent after effects of David's virtue were rather temporary than permanent. What, then, if this consecrated bread and wine, now the literal body and blood of Christ, should, by being swallowed, have the effect of producing a renewal of the original Passion?

True, this would be a Passion induced by the initiative of men; but why should Christ not welcome this co-operation? There was an analogy here to the invocation of the saints. Furthermore it is to be observed that Gregory, though perhaps inadvertently, took a Docetist view of the Passion, accord-

ing to which Christ, although as a man suffering physically, did not, because he remained also fully God, suffer spiritually; that is, no anguish of mind resulted from the physical agony. This being the case, neither priest nor lay participant need have undue compunctions about initiating a renewal of that Sacrifice.

David, of course, had been only a man. The Son was God. Perhaps it was a lame parallel. At the same time the Catholic deities were anthropomorphic, and the Son therefore also a hero. A true hero, so long as he was alive, could not afford to rest indefinitely on his laurels. Should the Son do so, the admiration which, under the spell of the Passion, the Father had justly felt for His Son might gradually wear off, and His former wrath reassert itself. But by means of the constant renewal this risk would be averted, and the merit which the Son had originally earned would be indefinitely replenished. Even so the Son might not in this way save all, as he wished to. But at least he could by his constantly renewed merit continue to bestow as many and such graces, prevenient and for merit, as before. The contrite man, accordingly, who neglected to participate was neglecting to facilitate Christ's bestowal of grace, not only on himself but also on all mankind.

It is to be observed, however, that although the priestly celebrant and the lay participants thereby obtained forgiveness of past sins and a new strength with which to resist future ones, they did not automatically receive grace. Their part in the Sacrifice was merely to enable Christ to replenish his power to confer it as often as it had been earned. For the Son never conferred his grace directly but only indirectly, through the medium of the Holy Ghost, he who in the past had so often "possessed" the patriarchs and prophets.

Now according to Gregory, these were the works of, and therefore presumably the graces conferred by, the Holy Ghost. He inflames the mind, helps men to resist temptation and achieve contrition, and, further, bestows wisdom, understanding, counsel, might, knowledge, godliness, and fear of God. To the especially holy he bestows, in addition, the privilege of serving as a medium for God's prophecies and miracles.

e. The Last Judgment

In an earlier time, when the identity of Father and Son was being emphasized, the divine Judge, being omniscient, was thought to have prejudged every soul, and this Last Judgment was therefore no more than a final sentencing of those who had, to God's knowledge, already condemned themselves. However, it was now not the Father but the Son who sat in judgment, and, as we shall see, he was now being credited with a good deal less than his Father's omniscience.

We may observe further that at the time when the Father and Son were identical it was logical, if unfortunate, that at the Last Judgment no mercy but only the strictest justice was dispensed. For the patience of God was not inexhaustible. But, since the Son had come because he had wished to save all men, it was only natural to suspect that even as Judge on the Last Day he would still wish to save as many as he could.

It was therefore supposed by Gregory, as it had only occasionally been supposed—as by Prudentius—before him, that Christ was able to enlist the help offered him by his saints; that is, by his martyrs and by all others who had already won a privileged status because in life they had earned, like Christ—although in far lesser degree—supererogatory merits.

The psychology now attributed to these saints is of great significance: they too, like Christ, had not in their present blessed state lost their feelings of compassion; they too wished that all men might be saved; and furthermore they too had accumulated a store of merit not yet requited by rewards which, as a mere matter of justice, they deserved.

Men, however, must take the initiative. It was because the saints could not act unless invoked that Gregory says that "they beg of us to beg of them." Although they could serve as God's agents in order to cure illness, wide powers over the temporal life were not attributed to them—partly perhaps because, again like Christ, they would be too inclined, in their compassion, to interfere with the delicate machinery designed to keep men frightened, humbled, and keen.

There was no such objection, however, to their asking for their reward at the Last Judgment, when the souls of those who had invoked them were in danger of being condemned.

The precedent had been set by Christ, who had asked his Father, as the reward for his suffering, to be able to confer grace on men. As his reward had been earned, the Father had been bound in justice to confer it. Now by means of this grace certain men had in time been able to earn a similar reward, which the Son in his turn was also bound in justice to confer.

The borderline case was that of a suppliant soul who, by his misbehavior, had not earned enough merit to deserve salvation. The Son had been rewarded by being empowered to dispense his mercy only to the living; since this power was withheld from the saint, he could be rewarded only by being allowed to dispense his mercy to the dead. Both Christ and the saints dispensed their respective mercies with discretion, but both must naturally be inclined to favor those who had most assiduously asked for their help. This was based on the human, rather than judicial, principle that one good turn deserves another. This was why the suppliant, while alive, courted the Father's favor for temporal blessings, the Son's for grace, and the saint's for his assistance at the Last Judgment. By this means the integrity of the Judge's justice was not impaired: for he was merciful neither to the accused nor to the as yet not wholly rewarded saint.

Gregory's picture of the Court now becomes clear. In the presence of Christ as presiding Judge the accused is brought in at the instance of the accuser. This accuser is the Devil, who, as plaintiff, asserts his right to the custody of the defendant. Representing him is one who has ever since been famous as the Devil's Advocate. Who is counsel for the defendant? Up steps the saint whose favor the defendant has so assiduously courted. It is first the turn of the Devil's Advocate, who, recounting the multiple unexpiated sins of the defendant, seems to have won his case. But at the last minute the saint too demands his pound of flesh—the still unrequited reward of his merit. No more than the Judge does he question the defendant's guilt, but he asks, as his just reward, the acquittal of his client, for only in this way can his own supererogatory merit be requited.

To engage counsel for one's Last Judgment was not, to be sure, indispensable; many either would not be tried or would be acquitted because the Devil's Advocate failed to present a

convincing indictment. Because the virtue of humility requires a guilty conscience, however, Gregory very properly says: "Make the saints, beloved, your patrons in your trial before the severe Judge . . . fly to these to protect you in your guilt."

6. THE AFTERLIFE

a. *Heaven*

According to Gregory, many men in his day had had a glimpse of heaven and then returned to tell the tale, and knowledge of it therefore became more precise than it had been. Thus he tells of a certain Stephen who

said (as many report that know it very well) that he saw a bridge under which a black and smoky river did run, that had a filthy and intolerable smell: but upon the farther side thereof there were pleasant green meadows full of sweet flowers, in which also there were divers companies of men apparelled in white: and such a delicate savor there was, that the fragrant odor thereof did give wonderful content to all of them that dwelt and walked in that place. (*Dialogues*, IV, 36.)

Most of Gregory's information, however, was inspired by Christ's revelation that "In the house of my Father there are many mansions." On the basis of this he inferred that although the felicity and joy which there they possess is one . . . the reward which by divers and unequal good works they receive, is not one but divers. (*Ibid.*, 35.)

At least one scale of rewards was based on the two virtues of virginity and humility. The highest is reserved for the 144,000 humble virgins. These, forming a choir and perpetually singing a canticle, will accompany God wherever He goes. The rest of the saints will be content merely to listen to this singing. But within this lower group those who, although virgins, had taken pride in their chastity, will be even less exalted than the remorsefully unchaste.

b. *Purgatory*

Paul, in his *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, following analogous passages in the Old Testament, distinguished the

man who, because his works abide, "shall receive a reward," from the man who, because his work shall be burned, "shall suffer loss." This man too "shall be saved; yet so as by fire." Evidently the man whose works abide was saved without any ordeal by fire, and since this was not the fire of hell it was clearly a third destination which, if not corrective, was at least punitive only for a term of years. Therefore the later concept of purgatory was here already implicit.

But early Christianity would not brook any temporizing or compromise: the Christians were all as completely saved as the rest were completely damned. It was only later that many, although Christians, became scandalously sinful. This seemed so inexcusable that it was felt that, unless they fully repented and did not seriously sin again, they too deserved to be damned. To those many who persuaded themselves that substantial justice was operative in the temporal world the need for any other purgatorial experience was not envisaged.

In the sixth century this optimism faded, however, and the early fifth-century idea of the *quid pro quo* was revived. Caesarius was one of these, and it seems likely that he had in mind the passage of Paul, particularly the phrase "shall suffer loss," when he asserted that the term of a soul still guilty of venial sins would be in inverse proportion to his sufferings while alive.

Gregory now completed this supposition. He does not introduce the *quid pro quo* idea, but he specifies that the venial sinner who has nevertheless been snatched from the jaws of hell is sent to a purgatory, or house of correction, to do penance until he is fit to go to heaven. The time would apparently be in proportion to his sins. The term can be shortened, however, by the accumulation of the prayers of the faithful on his behalf—prayers of both the saints in heaven and the virtuous on earth. Here the so-called Communion of Saints, already long believed and practiced by the bereaved and sanctioned by the Church, became official doctrine.

c. Hell

Not much need be said of the damned. Most of them had so sinned in life that in death they were not even judged. The

Devil already possessed them and he now carried them off because no one chose to challenge him. An indication of how the Christian concentration on love of God and on those who loved Him as He wished to be loved could inspire a corresponding hatred of all other beings was Gregory's matter-of-fact observation that the punishments in hell had to be eternal because there was no other way of giving the saints the eternal satisfaction that their merits had so justly earned.

It had perhaps not always been so. In the apocryphal *Apocalypse of Paul* written shortly before 400 Paul, like Dante later, was privileged while still alive to visit hell—his guide an angel instead of Virgil. Here Paul is so shocked by the succession of tortures he witnesses there that he is in continual tears, and the angel is at great pains to explain how the various sins of the victims could not in all justice be otherwise expiated. But, according to Gregory, Paul must, now at least, surely be reconciled to the victims' fates.

7. CHRONOLOGICAL CONTRASTS

a. Plotinus to Augustine

In contrast to Plotinus, who thought that no man was saved until he had achieved moral perfection wholly by his own efforts, and in contrast to Augustine, too, who thought that no man, but only God, could do anything to promote his salvation, Gregory conceded to man, once he had been baptized, a substantial additional power to save himself by courting the good will, first of Christ, second of individual saints, and third of all the saints, both living and dead. He thought that man could at least go far towards saving himself by trying to persuade the virtuous that he was trying to emulate them. For it was now understood that a good intent was, in most cases, meritorious in itself.

To some, no doubt, faith and works themselves constituted an incentive to virtue, but to others they served as an impediment. By believing that it was an incentive it was easy to delude oneself into thinking that it was irresistible. For he who curries favor comes easily to believe that he for that very reason deserves it.

It was Iamblichus who first called this mechanical rather than ethical technique theurgy, but in his day the Catholics were already resorting to it in everything but name.

It has many times been argued that it was precisely in order to protest against this reliance on theurgy that Christ had chosen to die, and, whether this was true or not, it can at least be argued that Augustine supposed so. Certainly he insisted on the importance of the sacraments and ritual, but this was only because of their didactic effects—not to remind God of the suppliant's good intentions but to remind the suppliant himself of his own evil ones. Augustine admired Plotinus and Porphyry but despised Iamblichus; he worshipped Christ above all, and it was for this very reason that he reacted so violently against the tendency of the Catholics of his day to fall into the very error which was prostituting Neoplatonism. Whether or not Mary's was really the better part, by Gregory's time Martha's was already firmly in the ascendancy.

b. The Barrier

There was indeed, as all agreed, a barrier between man and salvation. The only questions were how high it might be and how best to surmount it. The earlier opinions had been that it was so high and so spiked that it could be cleared only by a man who, whether by will or grace, had attained a perfection approximating that possessed by Divinity. But, as time went on, the barrier was imagined ever less high and less spiked, so that by Gregory's day it had come to seem reasonably surmountable. Provided only that a man was believing and assiduously subservient he should be able, if not to clear, at least to scramble over it. Gregory, by sanctioning the doctrines of the Sacrifice, of the intercession of the saints, and of a purgatory, put what was to prove almost the final stamp on the Catholic doctrine of salvation.

8. AUTHORITY

a. Christ Triumphant

As one looks back over the evolution of Catholicism from the earliest Christian times, to where Gregory was now leav-

ing it, the change seems radical. This does not mean, however, that the Fathers had seriously or essentially distorted the original Revelation. For that throughout it all the figure of Christ had so steadily retained its prominence that all other factors, powers, and phenomena were consistently kept subordinated to him was surely the logical end towards which Revelation had originally pointed the way. That Christ first acquired divinity, that Greek philosophy and Persian theology were in turn discredited, that the City of God came to supplant the temporal State, that all Nature and even mankind itself became mere extrinsic symbols of the Word made Flesh, and finally that the Son became the true Savior of man even at the expense of the old Jewish Father Himself—all this was already implicit in the earliest Gospels. It had now merely become explicit by the study not only of the texts but of men.

b. The Role of the Priest

Who had done all this if not the priests who had derived their powers from the bishops as the bishops had derived theirs from the apostles, and the apostles from Christ himself? Priestly and episcopal authority felt it had served Christ well and was determined to persist in doing so.

Nevertheless Gregory was not disposed to autocracy. He was so little impressed with his own merits that he claimed no infallibility for himself or for any other bishop, or even for the General Council. These councils, to be sure, were the sovereign power of the Church but, being composed of erring humans, they had erred and would indubitably err again. As a statesman, however, Gregory also conceded that of all other powers they were the least fallible. For these men were for the most part virtuous and had for this reason received the grace to seek and achieve understanding as their reward. Many of them had first been monks and he wished that no one be consecrated bishop who had not first been subjected to that discipline. Further than this, Gregory had that faith in the body of enlightened opinion which was in time to result in a faith in popular opinion—the famous “universal consent”—a subsidiary but reliable mouthpiece of the God who never deceives men.

c. The Role of the Layman

At the same time the layman also had his part in the holy endeavor. To be sure, Gregory was insistent that men are naturally ignorant because the sin of Adam still lay heavy on them. For most of them, therefore, it was best to be merely humble and obedient to their betters. Only he who chooses to be a monk, to study as well as pray, is fit to undertake more. At the same time the layman is not less likely to win salvation. The surest way, indeed, to win it is to choose the vocation best suited to one's talents whether it be for prayer or charity or study or administration. And, if administration, the lay servant of the State who wins the confidence of the barbarian chief or king is earning a reward to equal the bishop's. About 450 Prosper of Aquitaine could still plausibly relegate the lay vocations to the unbelievers already doomed to be damned; 150 years later the Catholic was no longer scornful of the temporal life. Indeed he now saw that in so far as he did not dominate the State, the State would—as in so many respects it already did—dominate him.

Under the New Dispensation, therefore, the distribution of power resembled that conceived by Mithraism: Fate-Time produced both the good Oromasdès and the bad Ahriman and the equilibrium thereby established produced a bare and heartless justice corresponding to that described in the Old Testament. Then came the savior or redeemer Mithra. But even he could not effectuate his beneficent desires without the help of men. He therefore enlisted as many of these as he was able, to make common cause with him to overcome the others who, by rejecting his advances, remained the creatures of that just but merciless Fate which men, at least ever since the Pythagoreans, had been finding more and more intolerable.

These saviors, indeed, were worshipped because for men's sake they strove to, and were partially able to, resist Fate, because they substituted the rule of love and loyalty for that of justice, because, although Gods, they enlisted on the side of men—as a great noble will sometimes defend the popular cause of the oppressed against the entrenched privileges of the aristocracy.

d. A Joint Undertaking

Christianity triumphed, then, at least partly because Christ, by his double nature, seemed both the most capable and the most kindly commander. But he was nevertheless only a commander, and almost everything still depended on how well his men served. The enemy was not only powerful but deceitful. In order to get the better of him, commander and men must work as a team, rather each for all than all for each, for justice between man and man was not the main concern. It was a common, corporate, military undertaking for the salvation first of themselves and their cause, second for the salvation of all others. And, it being a common cause, the individual conscience must be subordinated to the corporate. A selfish end never justifies a questionable means, but a selfless end often may. As in a sovereign state, self-preservation—the *raison d'état*—may oblige individual conscience to give way to an unquestioning loyalty based on love.

To the merciless Platonic and Augustinian standard of love of perfection, therefore, had now succeeded the merciful standard of a perfection based on love.

MEANS AND ENDS

1. DIVINE JUSTICE

a. Eternal

BECAUSE of Adam's sin God, even had He wished to save men's souls, for many centuries had had no power to do so. Even after the Redemption He lacked either the power or the will to help save more than a few. In order to justify the ways of God, therefore, Christians were tempted to appropriate the belief of the Greeks that good can come only out of evil; that, as Gregory said, evil men were indispensable in order to perfect the good ones. These evil men, indeed, and not only the unbelievers but also the Christian heretics, schismatics, and even the impenitent, were permitted to be such partly, if not wholly, because knowledge of their impending damnation was a necessary deterrent to others inclined to follow their example. In order to save as many as He could God saw to it that there was always an adequate number of baptized as well as unbaptized on their way to damnation.

Why, however, might not Christ, as Judge, have secretly pardoned the accused? Because, even if he could do so, he was not of a mind to deceive men and, if this deceit were revealed, living men would be too ready to relax their efforts to be virtuous.

In terms of justice this might be understandable, but it was surely less so that the duration of the punishment should be eternal. Augustine had argued that because of the sin of Adam this punishment was deserved, but many Christians could not concur with equanimity; and in the sixth-century

Latin version of the apocryphal *Apocalypse of Paul* an angel was at considerable pains to convince the apostle that Augustine's explanation was correct.

The suspicion had already been entertained that God had had to resort to this extreme severity in order to instill the necessary fear into the hearts of men. But there was now an additional explanation. Augustine had said that the saints in heaven were wholly indifferent to the sufferings of the damned; this, if not flattering to the saints, was at least not unkind. But Gregory, cornered by his admiration for the saints, was driven to the unpalatable conclusion that the term of the damned had to be eternal in order to perfect the eternal happiness of the saved.

b. Temporal

If divine justice was puzzling in its eternal aspects, it was no less so in its temporal. The apparent defects in its operation before the Redemption—with its reliance on vicarious rights and wrongs—did not seem to have been appreciably reduced as a result of it.

Such convulsions as famines, plagues, wars, and tyrannies still affected the more and the less guilty indiscriminately. Worse than this, many were still being deliberately made to suffer not because of their sins but because they were needed as sacrifices for the good of the others. God, for instance, saw to it that there were poor men in order to make it possible for the others to further their salvation by almsgiving. He also saw to it that there were slaves and serfs in order that monks and priests need not be obliged, as the apostles had been, to earn their own living. Gregory insisted on the emancipation of Catholic slaves serving Jewish masters and that of all slaves who wished, and could prove themselves worthy, to become monks. But, although he was solicitous of their temporal as well as of their spiritual welfare, he assumed that the servile status had been purposely ordained by God.

God's temporal justice had still other seeming irregularities: the Devil was allowed to make an innocent man sick in order to tempt him, in his extremity, to resort to his diabolical cures. If the victim resisted, he might well die in con-

sequence and still have no guarantee of salvation. Not only might a child be born blind in order that God might, at some later time, manifest His power by effecting a miraculous cure, a child could be killed by the Devil in order that a saint might prove his power by reviving him.

c. Dualism

Paul had said that Christ "will have all men to be saved," and said also that "there is no respect of persons with God." Now, inasmuch as Augustine had in so many ways followed Paul, his divergences here can only have been because his experience allowed no alternative. For, given the premise of His omnipotence, God quite obviously did not choose to treat man impartially either in this life or the next. The later alternative, therefore, was to suppose that God was not in fact omnipotent, that He was therefore unable either to save all or to rule impartially, and that this was because of some obstacle such as the Neoplatonic matter or the Manichean Devil. Reluctantly, and perhaps even unconsciously, Augustine's successors accepted this dualistic solution.

2. HUMAN JUSTICE

a. Tempting God

The Augustinian assumption simplified men's duties. They had merely to cultivate good intentions, including a sincere participation in the sacraments. Only if thereafter they were the lucky recipients of free grace were these good intents transformed into good works, and these were not their own accomplishments but, like those of Elisha, God's. To act, not because one loved God but in order to love Him, was merely to make it possible that God would confer the love itself.

In so far as God really needed men's help, on the other hand, their salvation must depend on what kind of help they gave Him. In giving this help they naturally sought to employ the same means which they thought He was employing in order to further their common end. Therefore just as to the Augustinians it was tempting God to behave as if God

needed help so to the others it was tempting God to behave as if He didn't.

b. Works

This dilemma had of course already presented itself long before in connection with the martyrs. In the apocryphal account of the martyrdom of Peter, composed in about 250, Peter is leaving Rome in order to escape crucifixion when he meets Christ entering the city. Peter seeing him says, "Lord, where are you going?" and the Lord replies, "I am going to Rome to be crucified." Peter says, "Lord, shall you be crucified anew?" And he answers "Yes, Peter, I am crucified anew." Peter, coming to himself upon seeing the Lord reascending to heaven, returns to Rome, rejoicing and glorifying the Lord that he had said, "I am crucified"; and this was therefore what was to happen to Peter.

Probably it was only a coincidence that in this same year Cyprian of Carthage chose the alternative course—of evading martyrdom that he might in this way the better serve God. It marks the transition from the concept of works as a by-product of faith to that of works as a condition precedent to faith. We have already spoken of Caesarius' stress on the importance of works. Gregory's emphasis was less reiterated, yet he too resisted his longing to concentrate on self-perfection as a cloistered monk in order, at the risk of aggravating his imperfections, to help God by concentrating on works. And, since God so obviously needed help, Gregory might have faith, although no assurance, that God would, out of gratitude, prove indulgent to his still sullied soul.

Although many of the pagan Greeks had clung to the belief that virtue was its own reward and was therefore an end, Epicurus had thought that it was no more than the best means of attaining happiness. The Christians here rather followed Epicurus. Gregory, in his eulogy of Bishop Boniface, told of how "no sooner did he see a naked man, but he gave away his clothes, and put them upon him, to the end that himself might be clothed with a reward in the sight of God." Evidently, then, Boniface did not do this so much to please

himself, the naked man, or even God as in order "that himself might be clothed with a reward." Nonetheless Gregory classified this as a good intent.

c. Intent and Effect

Now it is true that, of itself, a deed has no moral significance; causing pain can be either merciful or cruel. But its effect, no less than its intent, does have such a significance because these contain no contingent alternatives. Plato had alleged that although an atheist may act with the best of intentions, the effect cannot but be harmful. To the Christians the effect was usually thought good or bad according to the goodness or badness of the intent.

But as time went on it became clear that some compromise was necessary. It was not only axiomatic that the evil intent of the Devil invariably produced a salutary effect; it was also coming to be realized that but for Adam there would have been no Incarnation and, but for Judas, no Passion. It could not be too categorically argued, therefore, that only a good intent could produce a good effect.

Furthermore practical experience led Christians to realize that what had been true in the past was still true. If evil intentions could thus unwittingly cause salutary effects by furthering God's purposes, might it not perhaps be that good intentions could, also unwittingly, cause injurious effects? This, as we have seen, was especially a problem for the clergy, who might not invariably plead ignorance as an excuse. But it might also be true of the layman. It was said that he who succeeded in converting an unbeliever thereby invited forgiveness of his sins, but the mere intent to do so, if it failed, promised him no such reward. In theory man proposes and only God disposes, but in practice it might sometimes be the other way about. Thus the means to the end was not always confined to intent: men must also, if they were really to help God and so themselves, look to the consequences.

Plato had thought that even an atheist could act with a good intent, but Catholics believed that not even a heretic or schismatic could do so, for good intent presupposed intent to obey the injunctions of the Church. Plato had had in mind

a conscientious and therefore innocent intent; Catholics had in mind an intent to obey not one's own, but a corporate, conscience. Plato might well have thought this position to be nearer to that of his unimaginative Sophists than to his own.

d. Persecution

Belief regarding dualism, intent, and effects made it almost inevitable that the persecution of pagan, heretic, and schismatic should be undertaken; and the strategy of Jehovah, who had infused Joshua with the Holy Ghost lest he should seem too bloodthirsty, offered an enticing precedent.

The co-operation of the civil law, however, had first to be obtained, and it was only shortly before the time of Augustine that Constantine's Edict of Toleration was repealed. The responsibility for persecution has often been ascribed to Augustine himself, but this was rather because he was its first conspicuous advocate. For it was surely those who repealed the law who were primarily responsible and hardly a Christian of that day dared, even if he had wished, to remonstrate.

Already in the apocryphal *Acts of John* of the second century the author supposes that God is quite ready to kill unbelievers, if only in order to manifest His might. Why then should not the Church, and now even the Catholic State, safely follow suit? For to refrain was to tempt God by withholding the power which God had presumably conferred on both for that express purpose.

Why was it, then, that Augustine, who held to pure monotheism and predestination, nevertheless favored persecution? It might be because intolerance was in his blood. At the same time he had said that God chose to confer His grace only on such men as were enlightened enough to accept it when offered. This being the case, the Church was as powerless as was the man himself to attract grace on account of his mere good intentions, but she might have the power, even if the man himself lacked it, to induce him to be converted and thereby to help him to replace his evil intentions with good ones. If this diagnosis is correct, the Church was

not able, indeed, and therefore should not try, to help God, but she could and therefore should try to help and even coerce men into cultivating that state of mind which at last rendered them eligible to be chosen.

If Augustine helped to set an evil precedent, however, he also set a good one: for he warned that the persecutors must consider not only their own good intent but also the effect of it. Had his admonition been heeded that the schismatic Donatists must be cajoled and seduced but not angered, the schism might well have been healed instead of becoming embittered.

In the century of the first invasions which now followed, these precautions became ever more necessary because the barbarians flouted not only the Church's but, more and more often, the State's authority as well. Caesarius, therefore, did not press the matter. He was fair as well as humane, without a doubt, but he was also aware that persecution was then impractical. These barbarians, moreover, even those now Catholic, were as unready to punish objectionable beliefs, and therefore intents, as they were ready to punish objectionable deeds.

In the middle of the sixth century, however, Italy as well as Africa came for a time under Byzantine sway, and it was then that the pope, Pelagius I, came out unequivocally for persecution. Writing to Narses, then the Byzantine governor in Italy, the pope said,

Do not be deterred by the silly objection that the Church is persecuting. . . . No man is a persecutor unless he constrains people to do wrong. He who punishes evil deeds or prevents their commission is not a persecutor but a friend. . . . That schism is an evil, and that schismatics should be put down by the secular arm, we learn both from Holy Scripture and the Fathers. But whoever is separated from the Apostolic See is undoubtedly in schism. . . . Do not hesitate, therefore, to repress such persons by your authority as governor and judge. . . . There are a thousand examples and a thousand decrees which clearly prove that those who cause division in the Holy Church should be punished by the officers of the State, not only with exile, but also with confiscation of property and severe imprisonment. (Pelagius I, *Letters*, 2.)

It was only a few years later, in 561, that the Frankish State, although officially Catholic since 496, became willing

to execute the sentences imposed by the Gallic Church. And in 589—or a year before Gregory became pope—the Visigothic monarchy in Spain abandoned its barbarian Arianism for Roman Catholicism.

Since it was probably Gregory more than any other who set the precedent for the medieval persecutions, his beliefs are of special importance. In his *Pastoral Care* he quotes David according to *Psalms* 139:

My God, have I not hated those that hate Thee, and have I not withered with horror at the thought of your enemies? I hate them with a perfect hatred, and they have become my enemies. (III, 22.)

To this song of hate Gregory gives this charitable interpretation:

To hate the enemies of the Lord with a perfect hatred means to love them as creatures of God and to reprove the sins which they commit. (III, 22.)

This was consistent enough, perhaps, with Christ's "Judge not that ye be not judged"; but Gregory was inclined to interpret *Acts* v 1-5 more literally:

When he discovered the sin of Ananias and Sapphira, Peter at once made clear the extent to which his power was superior to that of others. By a mere word indeed he ended the lives of those whose guilt had been revealed to him by the scrutiny of his own soul. (II, 6.)

On Gregory, as the successor of Peter, a similar responsibility now reposed. Accordingly he gave instructions, for instance, that

if any peasant shall be found so perfidious and obstinate as to refuse to come to God, he must be oppressed with the heaviest and most burdensome payments until he is compelled by the very pain of the exactions to hasten on the right way. (*Letters*, IV, 26.)

To the English King Ethelbert he wrote:

Hasten to extend the Christian faith among your subjects, increase your righteous zeal for their conversion, put down the worship of idols, destroy the temples, build up your people in all purity of life, by exhortations, by threats, by encouragements, by punishments, by setting a good example yourself. (*Ibid.*, II, 125.)

For the obstinate idolaters of Sardinia Gregory prescribes tortures as well and orders soldiers to proceed from Rome in order to coerce the Istrian schismatics.

For none of these did he urge capital punishment, perhaps out of kindness, perhaps because he could not count on the civil authority to back him up. He approved of it, however, in the case of sorcerers and wizards who used magic for evil deeds. Although in theory all non-Catholics were considered to be agents of the Devil, Gregory seems to have hesitated to demand the execution of those who, though without good intent, did not mean to do any harm.

For nobody has ever been more sensitively aware than was Gregory of the degrees and varieties of both good and evil. From the wicked witch to the merely guilty son of Adam, he proceeds to those good men who in their zeal had brought Jews "to the baptismal font not so much by preaching as by force."

I believe indeed [he says] that the intention is praiseworthy, and I acknowledge that it proceeds from love of our Lord. But unless that intention be accompanied by a corresponding influence of Holy Scripture, I fear that the act will bring you no reward hereafter, and that the result in some cases will be the loss of the very souls we wish to save—which God forbid! (*Ibid.*, II, 153.)

The faith of the Jews had been protected by the civil law, and since in this respect it had not been amended they still might not be punished as other nonconformists could be. Gregory's warning not to use force may therefore have been partly because of possible legal, as well as psychological, repercussions. But his special consideration for the Jews may also have been due to a sense of fairness—towards a people who were the first to worship the true God yet on whom that God had not deigned to confer His prevenient grace.

If Gregory was rarely disingenuous, he was often ingenious. We have seen how he designed to convert the peasants by taking away their property. This, however, could only be done by law, and the law protected the Jews. Gregory therefore chose the complementary alternative which was within the law:

We are not acting unprofitably in bringing them to Christ through the hope of having their rents reduced. For even if they themselves

come with little faith, there will certainly be more faith in their children who are baptized, so that, if we do not gain them, we shall gain their children. (*Ibid.*, II, 156.)

This passage incidentally throws light on the presumed efficacy of baptism. Clearly it was wholly effectual in the case of infants, who could neither assent nor dissent. Clearly too it was not rendered ineffectual, as the Eucharist was, by the absence of proper contrition. For baptism gave a man a mere chance, not an advantage, in the struggle for salvation. It merely conferred the free will which the Pelagians believed had never been withdrawn, and at the same time it made the twin testimonies of Paul—that Christ wished that all men be saved, and that he was no respecter of persons—more plausible. To be sure, the priests were thereby appropriating to themselves the right to determine on whom God's free grace was to be conferred, and this might seem like tempting God because they were doubtful of His power. God, however, had clearly indicated that He needed man's help, and how was a heathen, bereft of free will, ever to earn the requisite merit unless the priest stepped in to help? It was surely for this reason that, whereas in order that the Eucharist prove effectual the participant must have achieved not only attrition but contrition, baptism was automatically and so invariably effectual. The man about to be baptized need therefore take no precautions. These were required only of the officiating priest, who must see to it, first, that the coercion be not unseemly and, as a corollary, that the deed will not result in more harm than good.

3. DECEIT

a. Precedents

According to the New Testament, neither Christ nor his disciples (except Judas) resorted to guile or gave others any pretext for resorting to it. Nor was any guile involved in the theory that the Son sacrificed himself in order to appease his Father's wrath towards men. According to the mousetrap theory, on the other hand, not only the Father but also the Son had deceitfully conspired to shear the Devil of his powers. It was only the deceitful Devil who was deceived,

however, and it was axiomatic that God never deceived men.

Caesarius, the soul of honor himself, said that God had deliberately deceived Herod into causing the Massacre of the Innocents. To be sure, Herod was a scoundrel but he was also one of those whom Christ had wished to save. Finally, all the Fathers supposed that God had tricked the Jews into believing that the coming Messiah would seek to establish a kingdom on earth. Gregory particularly explained how God had so disguised the true meaning of the Old Testament in symbols that laymen could understand it aright only through the instruction offered by the priests.

Faced with such divine precedents and examples, it was natural that pious men, wishing in their humble way to emulate God, should be tempted themselves to deceive not only the Devil but also their supposedly less perspicacious fellow men.

Cassian, the monk of Marseilles, was perhaps the first to admit this. Having defended the deceits practiced of old by Jacob and Rahab (she who betrayed her fellow citizens to the Jews on their promise that in the ensuing slaughter she and her family would be spared), he draws the moral that:

Since we read that even those men who were holy and most honorable in the eyes of God took advantage of a lie, so that in doing this they not only committed no sin but actually attained to the highest justice, since [therefore] upon these a lie could confer glory, what, contrariwise, should the truth have imposed except a condemnation? (*Conlationes*, XVII, 17, §1.)

We do not know how well this was received. Did silence here mean consent? A hundred years later at any rate, or about 533, it was repeated, in an apocryphal 'addition' to the *Gospel of Matthew*, which was alleged to have been translated by Jerome and therefore deemed authentic. Possibly the author was a disciple of Caesarius at Arles; if so, he would have been familiar with Cassian's texts. It is there said that:

At times even the lie, although by its nature evil, seems under certain circumstances to do good. For if a man is able to hide from an enemy who wishes to kill him and this enemy asks you where he has gone, you will naturally not only deny but even perjure yourself. Here, indeed, are two evils, lying and perjury, and yet [in this case] both are shown to produce a good result. For God not nar-

rowly set limits to our works, lest you might find yourself at the Judgment saying "I was afraid to lie and thereby betrayed a man." (Quoted in Dufourcq, *Etudes sur les G.M.R.*, IV, 355.)

The justification in the specific case may be unexceptionable, for the alternative was physical death. But it could serve as a dangerous precedent because to the Christian the alternative of spiritual death was far more to be feared, and to save as many as possible from the spiritual death which awaited the unorthodox would seem to justify deceit in even greater degree. Whether or not it was to serve as such a precedent we may now inquire.

b. Texts before 400

Today the four Gospels raise the first problem of accuracy, if not of authenticity; but here it need only be observed that Gregory recognized that neither Luke nor Mark was a witness of any of the events which they described, having been apprised of them only by hearsay. Neither Gregory nor any of the other Fathers, however, thought for a moment of doubting them on this or any other account, and this was equally true of most of the other books of the New Testament, although Jerome did have qualms about accepting the *Apocalypse*.

Many other texts of later date were accepted, and rightly, as genuine and therefore also canonical, and to these were added in due course the canons of the four General Councils of 323, 381, 431, and 451. These texts, indeed, although only so many commentaries on the Bible, soon came to be regarded as no less divinely inspired than the texts on which they were based.

In deciding which texts should be declared canonical two Roman synods, of 382 and 495, had excluded many as not reliable enough. These, though not suppressed or forbidden, were thereby relegated to a sort of limbo. Nonetheless some of them furnished many of the very details which, to everybody's regret, the canonical texts had neglected.

Two early texts are particularly instructive. The *Gospel of Peter* was a work of about the year 120. It describes the Passion and Resurrection with many new details. The so-called

Proto-Gospel of James (the Lesser) of about 135 tells of the Virgin's birth and early years, of Christ's birth (and Joseph's suspicion), and of Herod's order for the Massacre. These early works were relied on by Origen, as in his effort to prove that the brothers of Christ were the sons of Joseph by a former marriage. Gregory of Nyssa also relied on certain apocryphas, but this, too, was probably before they were officially declared apocryphal.

If the theologians chose the texts they preferred, so did the laity; and many of these, if not specifically declared heretical, became an integral part of the popular belief. To some of these the Virgin owed her growing popularity. Thus in a text of about 400 her Assumption was described; and, perhaps as early, another told of how Christ accorded her prayer to save as many as offer him gifts in her name, and to heed as many as pray to him for help in her name.

Earlier than many of these texts are a few which assume the spiritual Sacrifice of Christ in the Mass and the efficacy of prayers said in the course of it for the succor of the dead.

These are only among the more significant passages which affected the later Catholic belief. From these texts, of questionable origin but of unquestionable pertinence, came much of what later became known as the oral tradition of the Church. But for some time they were officially ignored and received indirect recognition only after they had been so passed on by generation after generation that the theologians had to accept them at their peril.

Mark and Luke may not have been eyewitnesses of what they told, but there was no reason to suspect that they were trying to deceive anybody. So it was with the other canonical authors. But the rejected texts, although they claimed apostolic authorship, were seen to be of later origin, so that fraud, however innocent, was presumed, and the later their estimated date and the more alien their supposed origin, the less they were trusted. Most of these *Gospels*, *Acts*, and *Apocalypses* of the 'Apostles' are now thought to have been composed between 125 and 400, and the scholars of 500 were in at least as good a position as the modern have been to judge their true nature.

We may therefore say that until well after 400 very few,

and of these only the least controversial, exercised any decisive influence. It was only gradually thereafter that they began to react on official Church doctrine. Meanwhile, in the late fifth century, a much less innocent kind of apocryphas began to make its appearance.

c. Texts after 400

Before 400 the concoction and circulation of fraudulent texts had been resorted to chiefly by pious individuals or local groups; henceforth they were to be more and more resorted to by the powers governing the Church. Originally their authors aimed chiefly to promote Christian piety; henceforth they sought rather to promote Catholic and even papal dogma. These texts are therefore to be most fruitfully considered in respect to the purpose or end for which they were designed. The end of some was to enhance the power of the pope, or the bishop of Rome. The others were designed as corroborative and therefore decisive evidence that the popes had invariably initiated, or at least sanctioned and upheld, those doctrines which the Church was now at pains to defend.

An early deception was launched in 418 by Pope Zosimus, who tried to pass off a canon of the Latin Council of Sardica as a canon of the General Council of Nicaea. This was because the canon authorized the pope to order, or himself hear, appeals of deposed bishops. The Africans exposed the fraud, but Zosimus continued to cite it as Nicaean, and, what is more, several of his successors—Celestine, Leo, and Gelasius—were to do likewise. The fraud was so transparent that it may have been due to gross negligence rather than bad faith. In any case it was, as Duchesne has said, "a mistake that ought not to have been made."

The real epidemic of papal fabrications began only after 490, however, and the first claim which these texts sought to prove was that a pope, if accused, was alone empowered to pass judgment. In 501 Ennodius had cleared the decks by an *Apologeticus* in which he argued that, since Peter had been sinless and could therefore do no wrong, those to whom he had transmitted his power inherited that virtue.

Soon after this appeared the *Constitutum Sylvestri*, purporting to have been extracted from the papal archives. It

included a canon of an otherwise unrecorded Roman council held by Pope Sylvester in 284 which specified that superiors cannot be judged by their inferiors. Furthermore, in order to show that this canon had been enforced, the so-called *False Decretal* soon after appeared, which purported to prove that when about the year 300 Pope Marcellinus had been accused of malpractices—which was true—a synod had recognized that only he could pass judgment on himself. The same story was told in regard to Pope Sixtus III about 436.

In further support of Ennodius' *Apologeticus* were the passages in the *Constitutum Sylvestri* which purported to record that the Council of 284, by condemning the heresies of Hippolytus and various others, had anticipated the Trinitarian and Christological canons of the Council of Nicaea of 325, and that Constantine, although sanctioning the alleged Council of 284, had not sought to influence its deliberations. It alleged further that Sylvester had not only baptized Constantine but, in doing so, had cured him of leprosy, and finally that the Council of Nicaea had requested Sylvester to ratify its decisions, which the pope thereupon did by a Roman council which he convened in 326.

That such manifest frauds could seem worth perpetrating incidentally shows how badly all records were kept and how little communication there had been between the Greek East and the Latin West. For, even if the Roman councils of 284 and 326 really had been held, we may doubt that the Eastern Churches had any record of them.

Also in support of papal infallibility was the famous *Liber Pontificalis* of about twenty years later. The *Lives* of the earlier popes were declared to have been written by Pope Damasus, but not only are these very inaccurate, the events of the author's own day are almost as distorted. This book, nonetheless, circulated and was in honor as late as the ninth century, and this was certainly due in part to the fact that the biographies made it clear that the papal claims to sovereignty went back not only to Siricius and so to shortly before 400 but to the immediate successors of Peter himself.

That these fraudulent means of promoting the power of the papacy were resorted to purely on account of a lust for that power is surely untrue. The chief, the overpowering,

incentive was in order that by means of this power the dangerous heresies then flourishing might be discredited and extinguished. To be sure, there was a natural rivalry between the Greek and Latin Churches and this doubtless served to aggravate the incentive. But now more than ever before, dogma was the chief concern because it was universally believed that unless men accepted the true faith they would be not only damned but justly damned. At this time the Eastern Churches, and therefore their temporal ruler the emperor, were in various ways deviating from the conciliar definitions of the true nature of the incarnated Christ.

Since these deviations did not find favor in the Latin West they need not be detailed here, but they should at least be mentioned.

First was the Eutychian, which held that, although Christ's body was human, his soul or spirit remained divine. Therefore while his body suffered at the Passion, his soul remained divine and consequently unperturbed and without anguish. This belief seemed especially dangerous because it resembled not only the old Docetist heresy but also the still dangerous Manichean.

Second was the Nestorian, according to which Christ was born a man and only later assumed divinity. This in turn was uncomfortably close to the Arian belief that God infused the man-child Christ with His divinity, and seemed doubly sacrilegious because it denied the Virgin the honor of being the Mother of God.

Third was the Monophysite heresy, now close to domination in the East. It admitted that the incarnated Christ had always been both wholly man and wholly God; but it added that this was not in order that Christ might humble himself by assuming humanity but rather in order that he might thereby divinize man. This view was uncomfortably close to that of the Pelagians and even of the Neoplatonists. The dispute with the East over this deviation as incorporated by Bishop Acacius in his *Henotikon* raged uninterruptedly from 484 to 519.

These deviations continued to trouble the papacy for the rest of the sixth century but do not seem to have tempted Rome to further fabrications.

There was a serious heresy, however, still rampant in the West, the Manichean. Against it the papacy and indeed the whole Latin Church waged a war of false documents. It seems to have been the Manichees who, as the party out of power, first resorted to it, by circulating falsified copies of the biblical and other cherished Christian texts, with certain key passages so rewritten that they appeared to corroborate the Manichean beliefs. At first the Church was satisfied to counter this fraud by distributing the true copies. But since there was no way of proving their truth, and since many of the uncanonical texts were admittedly uncertain not only in wording but in origin, this first honest effort soon proved inadequate and it was then that the Church, too, resorted to fraud. To their more respectable earlier apocryphas they now added intentionally false ones.

Some of the most damaging Manichean texts were adaptations of certain early Gnostic *Acts* such as those of John, Andreas, James, and Thomas. In order to confute these the Church circulated *Acts* of her own. It was these which described the missions of these apostles to Ethiopia, Persia, and India. It was in this way, for instance, that James got to Spain and Compostela. A *Life* of Mani was even circulated in which he was represented as an agent of the Devil. The Manichees also concocted their own *Lives* of the martyrs and in these they so stressed the devotion of the victims to virginity and other hyperascetic practices that the Church felt obliged to incorporate these practices in their own *Lives*. It was indeed this emphasis which did so much to inaugurate the cult of the Virgin and to lift the virtue of chastity, in spite of Caesarius, Benedict, and many others, to the peak of Christian virtues. Nobody could now die as a true martyr who had not already lived as a true virgin.

Particularly interesting is the fabrication of about 520 which, in order to counteract the Manichean misuse of early apocryphas about the early lives of the Virgin and Christ, purported to be a hitherto unpublished part of the *Gospel of Matthew*. As proof of its authenticity the author said that Jerome had possessed the Hebrew original and, although Matthew had not chosen to publish it, Jerome had been persuaded to make this Latin translation because Leucius the Manichee

had, in order to justify his own evil beliefs, distorted the second-century apocryphal *Gospel of James*. This counterfabrication, needless to say, was also designed for the sole purpose of substantiating the orthodox belief.

Gaul had been Semi-Pelagian, denying any predestination; Africa had been Augustinian, denying such free will; the papacy, and probably most of Italy, favored prevenient grace. It was high time that this last remaining Latin difference be ended, and Caesarius, a Gaul but devoted to Augustine, offered the papacy her opportunity to settle the matter, and according to her own wishes.

The details are lacking, but a first indication was Caesarius' collection of Gallic canons up to 525, which omitted the Semi-Pelagian canons of a Council of Arles of 475. Evidently he was trying to discredit Semi-Pelagianism in Gaul, and we may presume that in doing so he had had the papacy's support. Since, however, the papacy was still afraid to commit herself openly against Augustine, a device was adopted which would cause the least offense. The pope forwarded certain extracts from Prosper of Aquitaine's extracts from Augustine. Caesarius then called a council at Orange, incorporated them into the agenda, and got them accepted. Most of the canons either expounded predestination or denied Semi-Pelagianism, but only one of them declared that baptism made any difference. This exception, however, reads:

The free will which was impaired in the first man cannot be restored except by the grace of baptism; because, having been lost, it cannot be restored except by Him who was able to confer it. (Canon #13, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, Legum Sectio III, Concilia, I, 49.)

Yet surely Augustine had never said any such thing, and if we search for it in the extracts of Prosper the one most resemblant reads:

Free will is then truly free when it does not serve vices or sins. It is a gift of God which, once lost by one's own fault, cannot be regained except from Him by whom it could be given. (*Sentences*, #152, taken from Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XIV, ch. 11, n. 1.)

That this change was deliberate is proved by the epilogue. It was designed to show that Rome's unpublicized view was,

after all, no more nor less than that of Augustine. How many of the Augustinians were thereby taken in, how many protested, we do not know. Most of the Semi-Pelagians must have been reconciled by the fact that free will for all those who had been baptized was affirmed. Only the unbaptized—and they were now both few and hostile—might have been resentful. That the device was successful was due partly to the imperative need of a reconciliation but partly also to the essential wisdom of the papal view. Fraud there was, but if ever there was a truly pious, or at least judicious, fraud, this was it. For the Augustinians could still assert a predestination to evil, since free will was still a free gift, and at the same time baptism now took the sting out of it. It was therefore only the dead Augustine who was cheated.

It is a curious fact that almost all these sixth-century texts were written in its first thirty years. They seem to have arisen between the earlier period of innocent moral edification and a later one which turned from issues of authority and dogma to other concerns. It was also perhaps a moment when the public was less aware than was the clergy of the possibilities of propaganda. To be sure, it was a period of great corruption in Rome; but the papacy was not at all alone in fathering these texts, and neither can the Manichees be made the only scapegoats. Nonetheless, Rome during these years was active in publishing collections or lists of texts which were trustworthy and other lists of those which were not. It cannot be supposed, therefore, that the inclusion of so many of the fabrications as trustworthy was due to either negligence or gullibility. In this connection it is to be observed that the Pseudo-Matthew, whose preface presented Jerome as the guarantor of its authenticity, was also the one which justified, if only in extreme emergencies, the use of the lie. The many miraculous *Lives* of martyrs and confessors—not to mention new-found relics—of the years after 500 must perhaps be similarly differentiated from their more innocent predecessors.

d. Gregory

Few men have ever exercised more influence for good than did Gregory. Unlike Cassian and the author of the *Pseudo-*

Gospel of Matthew, he denied that the lie was ever excusable. But he did make one concession: that there were times when it was wrong to tell the whole truth. Now this can prove to be a ticklish concession, and since Gregory was remarkably perceptive and subtle in matters of right and wrong it is worthwhile to observe how he practiced what he preached.

It is clear enough that, unlike the Jews but like every other good Catholic, he used the Old Testament prophecies as evidence of the divine nature of the New, and then interpreted those prophecies in reliance on the divine nature of what the New revealed. This was surely a defect of judgment rather than of candor.

But when he justifies his acceptance of the miracles which were told him by saying that what Mark and Luke told was also hearsay rather than eyewitness testimony, we come to more debatable ground. There is the same difficulty in his readiness to accept the edifying stories told in the various apocryphas and in the *Lives* of the martyrs and confessors. When, for example, he says that one of the most undeniable of the miracles which he relates was based on the sole testimony of a Jew who admitted that he witnessed it when trying to go to sleep, we realize that Gregory's idea of the truth needs explaining.

It is true that Christianity has never stressed the virtue of truth-telling the way the Persians and some others have done. This was doubtless partly because salvation depended on edification rather than veracity. But there was another reason too: God was as willing to deceive the Devil as He was unwilling to deceive the good: therefore whatever He caused the good man to believe must be the truth. Nor can we call this cant or self-deception because, granted true faith, it was calculated conviction. This is why Paul could say "Prove all things; hold fast to that which is good," and why Gregory could so confidently add that "Reason should govern the soul." For it would be unreasonable to believe that we should not so hold fast. Not until the nineteenth century were these certainties qualified as "adorable probabilities."

In dealing with his lay flock Gregory was as consistent as he was discerning. He approved of the way Moses persuaded the disgruntled Hobab to follow him through the wilderness

by falsely alleging that, without Hobab's guidance, the Israelites would be in danger of losing their way. In explaining how to handle those who belittled the dangers of divine punishment, he said, "Usually one must pretend to be indifferent to their welfare, but without actually being so." These are two good instances of how he thought that without actually lying one could withhold the complete truth.

In his various letters to rulers Gregory has been accused of a hypocritical fawning, as if to allay any suspicion they might harbor that he had been alerted to their past misdeeds and was therefore alert to counter their future ones. Such accusations, however, are not very convincing. In the first place letters to rulers, unless they openly denounce, are traditionally couched in flattering language. And if Gregory flattered the Emperor Phocas, it was because he as yet had no reason, as pope, to denounce him, as he did have in the case of Phocas' schismatic predecessor Maurice. Unless one wishes to be impolite it is best to be polite.

Furthermore it is to be remembered that Gregory regarded all temporal rulers and therefore especially the Roman emperor as no less divinely appointed for temporal, than he himself was for spiritual, leadership. His first letter to Phocas begins, "Glory to God in the highest, who, as is written, changes times and transfers kingdoms." Therefore a new ruler was to be treated as innocent until palpably guilty. The bishop of Rome, moreover, was not then regarded as the spiritual director of one residing in Constantinople. If he were a fomentor or abettor of heresy, as Gregory thought that Maurice was, he believed it his duty as pope to rebuke him, but not for his personal misbehavior, even if this—as in the case of Phocas—consisted in adulteries and murders.

Such indeed, as an old Roman aristocrat, was Gregory's respect for the imperial office that he claimed no right to ratify or veto an imperial election; he conceded—and in his case, we may presume, sincerely—that he had accepted the papacy because the emperor had so instructed him: "My Most Serene Lord the Emperor has ordered an ape to become a lion."

SYMBOLISM

1. IN THE BIBLE

IN EARLIER CHAPTERS we have spoken of the common reliance on symbolism by the Greek mysteries, the Oriental cults, and Neoplatonists, especially after Plotinus. The Christians were offered a unique temptation to resort to it because it was a cardinal principle of their faith that, by means of the premonitions vouchsafed to the patriarchs and prophets, the Old Testament prefigured the events recorded in the New. Since most of the passages did not appear to be relevant to this purpose if literally understood, it seemed imperative to search them for hidden meanings.

Origen was the first Christian to systematize the technique, but it was more than a hundred years before Hilary of Poitiers inaugurated it in the Latin West. It was probably through Ambrose that the device was popularized, and it was shortly after that Jerome, the greatest biblical scholar of the time, sounded his warning of the dangers to which this practice might lead. It was indeed because he respected the literal or historical meaning of the texts that he would not accept the *Apocalypse* as canonical. It was at this very time that in the East Chrysostom was sounding the same warning.

In his *Confessions* of 397 Augustine, describing the process of his conversion, says:

For first of all the things began to appear unto me as possible to be defended: and the Catholic faith, in defence of which I thought nothing could be answered to the Manichees' arguments, I now concluded with myself might well be maintained without absurd-

ity: especially after I had heard one or two hard places of the Old Testament resolved now and then—which, when I understood them literally, I was slain. Many places, therefore, of those books having been spiritually expounded I blamed my own desperate conceit, whereby I had believed that the Law and the Prophets could no way be upheld against those that hated and scorned them. (V, 14.)

It was not the Manichees only who were insisting that the Old Testament was to be literally, not symbolically, understood. The Jews did so too. It was therefore a double temptation to the Christians to accept the symbolical in order to evade the conclusions to which the literal meanings seemed to lead. The Manichean conclusion was that the text was of diabolical origin; the Jewish was that it prophesied a Messiah not yet come who was to rule over the temporal world. The only way out, therefore, was to reject both of these premises and, in place of them, to assume that a symbolical reading of the text would reveal an over-all prophecy of the coming of Christ and his Church.

Fifteen years after writing his *Confessions* Augustine thus explained his interpretive method:

Now that is not the sole meaning of the passage "the letter killeth but the spirit giveth life," which merely prescribes our not taking in a literal sense any figurative phrase which in the proper meaning of its words would only produce nonsense, but it also signifies that we should regard the underlying sense of the figurative terms. (*De Spiritu et Littera*, §6.)

In other words, even if a passage is itself palpably designed as a symbol it must nevertheless be symbolically interpreted in its turn.

Naturally enough the results of the application of these rules, even to the New Testament, were not so easily agreed upon. Ambrose, for instance, believed that Christ's words, "This is my body," should not be understood symbolically, whereas Augustine believed that they should be. Both of them seem to have agreed, however, that these words lend themselves to no more than a single interpretation.

Evidently the nature of truth was elusive: even with so abundant a Revelation as the Bible seemed to be, not only did the literal interpretation reveal God to some and the Devil to others, but even when the symbolic alternative was

recognized, it was not clear in what passages it was to be preferred.

In the *Sermons* of Caesarius are typical examples. One of these is his interpretation of *Genesis* xxiv where, as Rebecca finds the servant of Abraham at the well, so the Church finds Christ at the sacrament of baptism. The gold earrings he brings her signify the divine word the Church is to hear, and the gold bracelets the good works she will do with her arms.

This was the allegorical or dogmatic interpretation. An example of his moral interpretation is his commentary on *Genesis* xii 1, where the Lord says to Abraham, "Get thee out of thy country," meaning forsake thy worldliness; and "from thy kindred," meaning from thy sins and vices as by baptism; "and from thy father's house," meaning from the Devil whom men had served before the coming of Christ. Caesarius added that one person, such as Rebecca, often signifies different things in different contexts and circumstances.

Caesarius concluded further that since all the prophecies, thus interpreted by hindsight, have so far proved true, all the others, although they have not yet occurred, surely will. That all these prophecies are couched in symbolic and therefore obscure language is, he said, because God did not want the Jews, pagans, or other infidels, but only the Catholics (future as well as present?) to read His Revelation aright. For the others God had deliberately laid a false scent.

It was Gregory, however, who brought this technique to its fullest development. Whereas Caesarius had said that the symbolic meanings could be understood only by Catholics, Gregory, more aware of their esoteric potentialities, said that the literal meanings had been so designed not only to deceive the nonbelievers but also to satisfy the simple-minded believers.

Obviously many passages seemed sensible even when they were literally interpreted. In such cases it could safely be presumed that God meant them to be so understood. A good example is Gregory's use of such a passage in reproving a bishop who sold ordinations:

We know from the Gospel what our Redeemer himself did—how he went into the temple and overthrew the seats of those who sold doves. To sell doves is to receive a temporal advantage from the

gift of the Holy Ghost . . . whom God Almighty bestows on men by the laying on of hands. (*Gregory the Great, Letters*, V, 62-63.)

For this was at most a particular application of a general principle.

But the method, because frequently happy, was a temptation to its abuse. Thus Gregory, describing his purpose in writing his huge *Moralia* or commentary on the *Book of Job*, said to his friend Bishop Leander of Seville,

You laid this additional charge upon me that I should not only unravel the words of the story in their allegorical sense, but that I should also turn the allegorical sense into a moral exercise, and—what was still harder—crown the several meanings with testimonies, and, when those testimonies were difficult to understand, that I should disentangle them also by an additional explanation. At first I despaired, owing to the difficulty of the work. But then I raised my hopes to Him who “made the tongues of those that cannot speak eloquent,” and who has marked the undistinguishable brute brayings of an ass with the intelligible measures of human speech. So I took courage. (*Ibid.*, I, 192.)

Gregory, in his generous enthusiasm, took what must seem to us to be the last possible step:

In the interpretation of Holy Scripture whatever is not opposed to sound faith ought not to be rejected. For just as from the same gold jewellers fashion necklaces and rings and bracelets for ornament, so from the same Scripture different expositors, understanding it in innumerable ways, make as it were different ornaments, which yet all serve to adorn the heavenly bride. (*Ibid.*, II, 232.)

Evidently a single passage can have not only an historical, an allegorical, a moral, and—when all are combined—a fourth meaning; it may also have more than one of each of them. When Gregory raised his hopes to God for help he certainly set no limit to them.

Quite apart from the difficulty of such an execution, was there not also a difficulty in establishing a premise? As we have said, one of the proofs most relied on to establish the divine nature of Christ's Revelation was that the Old Testament had prophesied it. Yet Gregory's interpretations of the Old had to accord with his interpretation of the New. Therefore the meaning of each largely depended on that of the

other. This may have been one of the subconscious reasons why Gregory admitted the fallibility not only of his own interpretations but also of those of the General Councils. Faith or, if we will, common sense, told him that the biblical Revelation was of something divine; but his humility, bolstered by the example of Augustine, warned him that its precise nature was still obscure.

Surely Gregory was right. For the interpretation not only of the Old but also of the New Testament had only begun. The General Councils had determined the nature of the Trinity and of Christ once and for all, but these were only a fraction of the whole. As we have said, Augustine had taken Christ's words, "This is my body," symbolically—which was in time to be declared wrong. He also understood the Devil to be a mere symbol of human sin. Gregory on his part believed that the New as well as the Old Testament contained a kernel of deeper meaning, including a prophecy of the future glories to be enjoyed by the Church. As if as an echo of Gregory in our own day, one of the papal accusations brought against the so-called 'modernist' Catholics of about 1900 was that they thought that not only the Old but also the New Testament was to be best understood if interpreted in symbolic rather than in literal terms.

It is pertinent to quote the statement of Alfred Whitehead that,

The world given in sense-presentation is not the aboriginal experience of the lower organisms, later to be sophisticated by inference to causal efficacy. The contrary is the case. First the causal side of experience is dominating, then the sense-presentation gains in subtlety. Their mutual symbolic reference is finally purged by consciousness and the critical reason, with the aid of a pragmatistical appeal to consequences. (*Symbolism*, 49.)

The observation is acute, but it needs certain qualifications. As one example we may consider the impression made by a newborn child. The father will see it as a symbol of a happy addition to his family or of the coming life of his community, but the mother will see it as a unique individual—pretty, bright, happy, or the contrary—and as showing specific inherited traits. And the obstetrician will see it as a new

physiological specimen. It is therefore here the father who has the "aboriginal experience of the lower organisms."

But can we therefore conclude that Gregory was another one of these 'fathers' who typified the last stages of a dying civilization? To be sure, his biblical interpretations often bordered on absurdity, but we must not forget that it was also Augustine, possessor of one of the most powerful analytical minds of antiquity, who took "This is my body" and the Devil for mere symbols, and that it was the modernists of 1900 who were the first Catholics to so regard the New Testament as a whole. Were they then also specimens of Whitehead's lower organisms?

The fact is, of course, that we have a case here not of a natural but of an artificial or man-made sense-presentation—to either the eye or the ear. Even if the father of the newborn child does betray himself as a lower organism, it does not follow that Augustine or Gregory or the modernists did likewise. For it might well be that Christ, who spoke the words, *meant* them to be taken symbolically.

Another borderline case is offered by music. The physicist, if he has true pitch and a good memory, can distinguish and remember every note yet not react to it emotionally. An ignorant listener, on the other hand, may get only its emotional content. The true musician, however, will get both at once.

But to go back now to the natural sense-presentation, offered let us say by the stars. Who is the lower organism, the astrophysicist who sees them as luminous conglomerations of atoms, or the mystic who sees them as a divine revelation?

2. IN NATURE

Aristotle believed that Nature had a purpose, but only in the sense that each existing species—stones as well as men—aimed at self-preservation. This view was popularized among the Roman pagans by Pliny and others.

Aroused, perhaps, by their antipathy to the new Jewish-Christian view, the Neoplatonists after Plotinus reacted against any teleological theory of purpose. Thus Porphyry

said that God had no more created beasts in order that man might kill and eat them than He had created man in order to provide food for beasts. The fourth-century Neoplatonists declared that the gods of the various cults were symbols conceived by men in order to represent the various aspects of Nature, such as the four elements or the sun—a polite, but not a very polite, way of intimating that it was not Nature which had been created in order to serve as a symbol of the gods, but quite the other way about.

It was easy enough to suppose, as Aristotle and Pliny had, that certain animals, vegetables, and minerals had been designed in order to serve the needs and convenience of man. There existed, however, much else, such as mountains and serpents, which seemed to be either useless or harmful. Why was this?

The solution of this puzzle which baffled the pagans was easily found by the Christians because already in the Old Testament there were strong intimations that these things served the didactic purpose of teaching men what they must expect of God and what God expected of them.

Augustine had conceived of this solution in its widest aspect: the world as a whole and all that had happened there was meticulously designed by God in order so to educate man that he could grasp the true meaning of Christ's doctrine when it should be revealed. For, long before the medieval premise of *credo ut intelligam* had been adopted, Augustine had already prefaced it with what we may call his *intelligo ut credam*.

Furthermore if created things had, in the Old Testament, served as hints of the true relation between God and man, why should they not still serve, not only to remind man further of the truth as revealed by Christ, but also to enable man the better to comprehend the deeper truths which he might not otherwise be able to infer? Nature, as observed by the instrumentalities of sense-presentation and reason, would then constitute the third and final Revelation.

The heavenly bodies had constituted a vital element in pagan belief. By both the Neoplatonists and Manichees astronomy had become astrology and astrology Providence; by other pagans the sun had been divinized. This was no

doubt why Pope Leo had tartly declared that its only significance was to serve as man's clock. In the same spirit Caesarius insisted that an eclipse of the moon was a natural phenomenon and therefore of no symbolic, didactic, or other significance.

It was only by rather farfetched deductions that didactic lessons could be extracted from passive phenomena. As in the case of biblical, so in that of geological exegesis, Jerome cautioned the overeager that faulted rocks were caused merely by God's wrath and not by His calculated design so to reveal that wrath to men that they be constantly reminded of His wrathful propensities. With the dramatic or unusual activity of inanimate nature, however, it was otherwise. Whether an earthquake, a plague, or a modest physical miracle, God directly caused it, and the less obvious was the purpose of the physical effect the more obvious seemed its purpose to be to instruct by a symbol.

From time immemorial animals had been used as images of man, and, as the anthropocentric belief spread, the image tended to become a symbol. The reason was simply that the animal obviously behaved much like a man.

Here the Old Testament furnished ample precedents. A simple case was the maxim: "Go to the ant, thou sluggard, consider her ways and be wise." A more specifically biblical instance is the association of the serpent with the Devil. And a more concrete image is to be found in *Jeremiah*:

As is the partridge that gathereth young which she hath not brought forth, so is he that getteth riches and not by right; in the midst of his days they shall leave him and at his end he shall be a fool. (xvii 11.)

The great Christian text on zoology, however, was to be the *Physiologus*. Passages in it indicate a very early origin, possibly before A.D. 100. Far from having any connection with the zoology of Aristotle, Theophrastus, or even the credulous Pliny, it is thought to have originated as a primer for Christian children, in order to teach them morals by embroidering on selected biblical references to animals. At a later stage this material was probably used as a text for popular sermons. Scholars have detected the use of it by Justin Martyr in

about 150 and later by Origen, Lactantius, and Basil. In about the year 400 a Latin translation was circulated—probably further amplified—and this may have been the one used by Prudentius and Jerome. Use of the image of the doves, who if they fly in close formation are safe from the hawk, in order to teach girls how to evade the attacks of the Devil, is found in Jerome and also in the later *Physiologus* texts. Did he find it there, or did he himself insert it?

The fifth-century texts lack references to it. Salvian's ants and bees are not even symbolic, and in 496 we find the *Physiologus* text officially condemned by Rome, for reasons unknown to us. Nor does Caesarius show any familiarity with it; his reference to the infant serpent who loses no time in eating its mother is vivid edification but is not among the four attributes of the serpent of *Physiologus*. This does not mean, however, that Caesarius resisted the temptation to use animals as symbols: in expounding the ten plagues of Egypt he explains how the frogs represent the idle croakings of the poets, the lice the subtleties of the philosophers, and the flies the cynics who advocate wantonness. Here was another, if incidental, reason why the Catholics continued to cherish the Old Testament. As further symbols of vices Caesarius adds lions, bears, leopards, wolves, wild asses, vultures, stags, foxes, vipers, cows, goats, pigs, tigers, dragons, and elephants.

It is recorded that Cassiodorus, who lived from 485 to 565, wrote a new Latin version of *Physiologus*, now lost, perhaps in order to expurgate the condemned version. In any case the ban must have been lifted not much later because Pope Gregory seems to have made free use of it.

The text of *Physiologus* which has come down to us cannot be dated, but it is generally estimated to be approximately that of Gregory's day if not earlier. Up to then the animals had been used as symbols of moral truths only. In this later and more evolved text they begin to be used as symbols of dogmatic truths as well. The sections on the pelican and the elephant may be cited as illustrations. In the first story the snake gains access to the pelican's nest and poisons the young in it:

Now comes the Pelican and sees that her children are dead, and she looks up to a cloud and flies there; and, striking her side with

her wings till blood streams, she lets the drops fall through the cloud down on the young ones, and they come to life again.

The Pelican is the Lord, the children are Adam and Eve and their race. The snake is the Evil One; and the nest is paradise. (*Physiologus*, 230.)

In the second story the female elephant seduces the male by persuading him to eat of the mandragora tree. *Physiologus* then goes on:

The Elephant has the following attribute. When he falls down, he is unable to rise again, for his legs have no joints. But how comes he ever to fall? In this way. When he wants to sleep, he leans against a certain tree, and so sleeps. Now the Indian, who knows the sleeping place of the Elephant, goes there, and saws the tree partly through. The Elephant comes now to lean thereon as he is accustomed, and, as soon as he comes close to the tree, it gives way, and he falls with it to the ground.

Now after he has fallen he cannot rise again. He begins therefore to weep and cry aloud. Another Elephant hears his cry, and comes to help him; but he cannot raise the fallen one. Thereupon they both lament and cry aloud; and twelve more Elephants now come to help, but they are not able to raise the fallen one. Thereupon they all cry out. Last of all comes the little Elephant, and lays his trunk around the fallen Elephant and lifts him up from the ground.

The nature of the little Elephant is such that, if you burn his hair or his bones in any place whatever, that place is for ever free from Devils or snakes, nor will ever any evil thing be found there.

The pair of Elephants is like to Adam and Eve. Adam and his wife, as long as they lived in the plenty of Paradise, were innocent of all carnal desire; but, when the woman had eaten of the tree, the potent mandragora, and given it to him, then they fell to evil passions, and she bare Cain over the miry waters. As David said: "Save me, O God, for the waters rise to my soul."

When now the great Elephant, which is the Law, was come, he could not raise the fallen one. Thereupon came the twelve Elephants, namely the prophets, but these could not raise him. At the last came the true Elephant, Christ the Lord, and raised the fallen one from the earth. For the first of all was the smallest of all. He humbled himself and took the form of a servant that he might redeem all. (*Ibid.*, 202-203.)

Thus by the sixth century zoology no longer comes chiefly even from the Bible but rather from the folklore long current in the Greco-Roman world. This in turn becomes the raw material for a concoction to teach Christians not only

abstract good morals but concrete Catholic theology. It was no doubt skillful pedagogy, leading the pupil from the simplicity of the dove and serpent to the pelican and elephant, but the symbol which was at first natural and obvious had now become artificial and esoteric. The created world which Augustine could still imagine as a final perfecting of Revelation—perhaps even the *intelligam* which was to follow the *credo* as the *credam* had followed the Augustinian *intelligo*—had faded. The created world, once the respected ally of the Creator, was now demoted to the rank of a shadowy slave.

3. IN HUMAN AFFAIRS

If, as Euhemerus thought, men had created the gods in the image of their dead heroes, these gods would naturally be thought to have governed, fought, dealt out justice, and tended the sick as men did. Similarly, if, on the contrary, the gods had created men, these men would not less naturally have been inclined to govern, fight, judge, and tend the sick as God did. It was on this latter assumption that the Platonists as well as the Christians believed that by a scrutiny of the visible world men could achieve a true, if incomplete, perception of the nature of the invisible.

Perhaps it may be said that one thing is the image of any other in so far as the two resemble each other, and that this image becomes a symbol only in so far as the resemblance is not due to chance or even to nature but to design—that is, when the symbol is intended to resemble and therefore to suggest the reality. To Plato this reality was the Idea, to Aristotle the genus or species, to the Jews and Christians it was God. Of how far the heavenly bodies, the inanimate earth, and the animals were recognized as symbols we have spoken. Was this to be carried to its logical conclusion by including the affairs of men?

At least the Old Testament offered a tempting precedent: there the affairs of men were regarded as symbols designed specifically and even exclusively in order to prefigure the reality to be revealed by Christ. Yet the events there related had unquestionably really occurred. What then was the sig-

nificance of the analogous human affairs which had since occurred, and were to occur in the future? There was now, more than before, the exigency of sifting men for purposes of salvation or damnation, and since God's method of testing was by teaching, He must do this by utilizing the instruction offered not only by biblical but also by current events and affairs—which, indeed, were equally, if not even more, vivid and arresting. Why, then, should not these too be scrutinized as symbols, as a third Revelation to confirm those of the two Testaments? So, substantially, Augustine believed, regarding every human event as a miracle, a divine teaching, to which men should unremittingly give heed.

Was the emperor, then, a symbol of God? Were the wars a symbol of God's—and man's—constant war against the Devil? Was the Roman civil as well as canon law a symbol of God's justice, and its procedure a symbol of the Last Judgment? And was the art of the physician in tending the patient's body a symbol of God's art in tending His patient's soul?

This was rarely if ever categorically affirmed, but during these centuries the inclination is apparent. There is a wealth of imagery now, both ingenious and perceptive. If God did not intend these as symbols He certainly inspired His servants to perceive images which served His purposes quite as well.

In so far as we can answer this question at all we must have a last recourse to Gregory, he who carried symbolism to a greater extreme than had any of his predecessors. As the reality of the rest of the visible world faded the reality of man shone out the more. It has frequently been said that Gregory was as good a moralist as he was a poor theologian. It might here be added, if the psychologist will pardon the choice of terms, that Gregory was as good a psychologist as he was a poor scientist. This was perhaps because, rightly or wrongly, he saw man in relation not to Nature but to God.

Gregory, to be sure, took most of his images, as in his *Moralia* on the *Book of Job*, from the Old Testament and so as symbols; but in his *Pastoral Care*, written for the instruction of secular priests who must face immediate rather than ultimate realities, he also took many of his images from the phenomena of common, everyday observation. His military images he took partly from the Old Testament, for it offered

him an ample supply. No doubt he would have been satisfied to take them exclusively from that text. But in many cases images were suggested to him by his own observation which the Old Testament could not so well supply, and it may be significant that at least one casual reader was unconscious of which of the two he was using.

Of these images, the horticultural, agricultural, and anatomical are taken directly from Nature; but others are taken rather from the arts: musical, military, equestrian, or nautical, and above all from the medical. Indeed of these medical images only one in ten is suggested by a biblical text. Since Gregory seems to make no distinction between the anatomy of the patient and the art of the physician or surgeon, we may suppose that in his eyes even more than in those of Augustine, the behavior of men as well as of Nature, the arts as well as the sciences, were chiefly designed not for their intrinsic temporal, but only for their extrinsic eternal, significance. Since God created the world purely in order to save or damn men, they must err in supposing that any of this Creation of His had any other reason for being. Thus the soldier in fighting, the surgeon in cutting, serve no other real purpose than to keep alive certain symbols particularly well designed to remind men, and especially priests, of the niceties of God's true nature and intent.

B O O K I V

The Frankish State, 501-1050

MEROVINGIAN, 501-700

1. PAGAN ELEMENTS

DURING THE SIXTH century, antiquity, although still alive in Italy—dying only as Pope Gregory did—was already being buried in the North. With the conversion and subsequent conquests of the Frankish King Clovis after 496 the Middle Ages were born, and the dividing line, therefore, was as much geographical as chronological. Until about 525 the influence of such bishops as Avitus and Caesarius had held Southern Gaul to serve as a link between Italy and the North, but by 550 the Franks had shaken off any tutelage either of emperor or of pope. Under them the Roman leaders, whether temporal or ecclesiastical, were left to deal with the invaders unaided by the power or even by the prestige of Rome.

Gaul, having been Celtic before becoming Roman, was both before it became Christian. And, especially in the North, Celtic as well as Roman paganism continued to smolder—not only in the year 500 but, if more and more feebly, until far into the Middle Ages. How long the Druid practice of human sacrifice survived we do not know, but we do know that, in Brittany at least, stones were still being worshipped in 658, a time when the legends of Bluebeard and of Tristan and Isolde were probably being born.

There were naturally Roman pagan survivals too, festivals and feasts rather than clear-cut beliefs, and residues of Oriental cults, as of Isis and Mithra. Some of these can be traced down to the year 1000.

On the other hand, the more savage practices of the Gothic

barbarians did not long survive their contact with the empire and their consequent conversion; only their outer, still pagan, frontiers could long maintain them. Human sacrifice by the pagan Heruli, Pannonians, and Franks was reported by Ennodius in about 525; in 550 Procopius reported it likewise of the pagan Heruli, Franks, and Ostrogoths. And at about the same time Jordanes said the same of the "Getae." The reasons varied: suttee of the widow, disposal of the old and sick, and sacrifices (including women and children) to appease the wrath of their god. As late as 539 Procopius tells of how the Franks, already a generation after their conversion to Catholicism, "still practicing human sacrifices," massacred the women and children of a captured Gothic city as "first fruits" in order "to divine the future" (*History of the Wars*, VI, 25, §10).

As late as 520 the Burgundians were in the habit of exposing their infants, though for what purposes we are not told. Doubtless the Church soon discouraged the practice, but that the custom was not wholly forgotten is indicated by its recrudescence in 685 in order to escape the burden of a capitation tax.

All these pagan customs included festivals of one sort or another, and many of the anniversaries were of course transformed into saints' days. The practices, however, were not so easily changed. Caesarius had struggled to discredit them, but they were tenacious. Their gradual decline can be roughly gauged by records showing that in 566 it was still the practice to bring food and other offerings to the Church festivals; in 626 certain "Christians" were still attending "pagan" rites; and in 650 on the occasion of the dedication of a church or the celebration of a saint's day the populace insisted on their traditional pagan dances and songs in front of the portals (Saintyves, *Les Saints* . . . , 78-80).

Finally there was the innovation of the barbarian Ordeal, which, because it was so well suited to primitive instincts, continued in many ways to operate until far into the sixteenth century. This we shall soon speak of again.

2. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

Of the two always abiding problems, that of salvation was dominant among most of the true Roman Catholics, but that of temporal rewards most concerned the barbarians, and it was the latter concern which gave this Merovingian Age its special character. They accepted the Catholic faith but only on condition that its divinities sought to promote temporal justice. To a temporal ruler, whether it were Constantine or Clovis, his faith must be in a God who brought him success, especially in battle. The clergy were of course less insistent. Ambrose, for instance, writing in 379 to the Catholic Emperor Gratian, had said, "You know that victory is usually obtained more by the faith of the prince than by the courage of the soldiers." But writing in 384, he warned the still pagan Romans that victory "is given, not imposed; by the favor of legions, not by the power of religion." To admit this, however, was to play into the hands of the Epicureans, who denied Providence. Such mid-fifth-century Catholics as the unknown author of the *De Providentia Divina*, Salvian, and Sidonius were, like Ambrose, in doubt as long as it was the Arian barbarians who were winning. Therefore it must have been with relief that Bishop Avitus could write to the now Catholic Clovis that "your faith is our victory" and that "as often as you fight there we conquer." Nearly a century later Gregory, bishop of Tours, was still of the same mind:

I wish, if I may, to contrast for a moment the good fortune which has attended those Christians who confess the Holy Trinity, with the ruin which has come to the schismatic heretics. . . . The King, Clovis, confessor of this [Trinity], by its help conquered these heretics and extended his dominion throughout all the Gauls. (*Historia*, III, Prologue.)

Welcome as this triumph of the God of Battle might be to the sorely tried Roman, he must, at least for some time before Gregory of Tours, have had certain qualms as well. For, although it was no doubt a good thing that loyalty to God appear to be rewarded, there was danger that by the newly converted barbarians this loyalty might be cultivated at the expense of virtue. Christ himself had perhaps given counte-

nance to such a view, but since his time the Fathers had hedged it about with a succession of salutary reservations. Were these not now in danger of being swept aside?

What Clovis' clerical contemporaries really thought of his successive assassinations, which he perpetrated after as well as before his conversion, we do not know—perhaps because they did not choose to say. But much later Gregory of Tours did not hesitate to condone these enormities; for after recounting Clovis' treacherous assassination of Chloderic he points the moral:

Daily the Lord laid his enemies under his hand, and increased his kingdom because he walked before Him with an upright heart and did that which was pleasing in His sight. (*Ibid.*, II, §29.)

Contradicting Pope Gregory, Isidore, bishop of Seville shortly after, declared that a king even though admittedly appointed by God should be resisted if he becomes a tyrant. All this moralizing was a transparent disguise for a purely selfish policy of promoting the interests of the Church. The only question might be how often it was mere cant and how often it was calculated hypocrisy.

Needless to say, there were now plenty of cases of vicarious justice. Gregory of Tours tells of how innocent persons were born crippled, sometimes to punish their parents, again to warn others of their sins, or even for reasons he says he cannot account for. In one case Gregory purports to explain how the murderer of his own brother was punished:

In consequence of the crime which he had committed, he became a wanderer in various places, finding no fixed abode; and at length, the innocent blood, as I hold, crying to the Divine Power against him, upon a journey in a certain place he drew his sword against an innocent man. The relatives of this man, in grief for the death of their kinsman, made a riot, and cutting the murderer to pieces with their drawn swords, scattered his limbs abroad. Such was the end that by the just judgment of God befell this miserable man; he who had put to death his innocent neighbor might not long survive his guilt, for this happened to him in the third year after his crime. (*Ibid.*, V, 5.)

Thus God, in order to punish a murderer, has to induce him to commit a second murder. Could ingenuity conceive of a clumsier device?

But if innocent men were often made to suffer for the sins of others, guilty men often escaped punishment because of the innocence of others. Martin was reported to have preserved a whole district from injurious storms for a period of many years, and Geneviève, according to her anonymous biographer of uncertain date, saved the Parisians, one and all, from capture by the besieging Huns. It was now coming to be assumed that the temporal prosperity of a diocese depended in large part on the virtue of its bishop. These bishops often led their men into battle, and their virtue was doubtless assessed according to their success in the field. Such feats may well have persuaded many, even of the Jews, to seek baptism.

The city of Tongres, too, had a saintly bishop, yet the Huns, luckier here than before Paris, were able to capture it. How was the good bishop to be exonerated? Gregory of Tours tells us. As the invaders approached, the bishop went to Rome to appeal to Peter, only to receive the following reply:

Wherefore, most holy man, do you harass me? The Lord has already considered, and it is decreed that the Huns shall enter Gaul, which must be laid waste as by a mighty tempest. (*Ibid.*, II, 4.)

Peter then proceeds to assure him, however, that he will be spared the sight of the sack of the city by dying—as indeed he did—before it happens.

A story of Oriental origin which was already current in the Latin world before 700 shows one of the many ways in which Providence might now be thought to operate. A hermit, encountering an angel, asks if he may accompany him on his journey. The angel accedes but warns him that he will soon be too shocked to stick it out. The hermit accompanies him, notwithstanding, whereupon the angel first kills a poor man's cow, then builds a castle for an inhospitable noble who was already engaged in excavating its foundations. The hermit, incredulous, asks an explanation. The angel replies that the poor man's wife was about to die and he had managed to save her by killing his cow in exchange. And that he built the nobleman's castle overnight because, had he not, the next day's excavation would have unearthed an enormous treasure.

The castle, however, was so constructed that it would soon collapse, thereby burying the treasure for good and all (*ibid.*, 193-194, quoting Gaston Paris).

This is a variation of Boethius' solution: God possesses foreknowledge but lacks omnipotence. He foresees events which He disapproves of and therefore invents devices calculated to minimize or avert them. According to Boethius, God cannot, or will not, change a man's character, as by grace. In this story He can only forestall a greater evil by causing a lesser one.

The ways of God were admittedly mysterious, but in Augustine's day they were at least wilful. Now they do not seem to have been even that. Doubtless He was benevolent, but was He beneficent? Doubtless, too, He was omnipotent, but was He omniscient? Had the effects of the Fall been quite what He had expected or even what He would have wished? At all costs He had to keep men in constant fear; therefore He found it expedient not to try to be merciful, alleging that He must respect the law. Whose law? There were cases now where He refused to heed a prayer on the ground that punishment, having already been decreed, could not now be revoked. Was this decree that of the just Father which bound His merciful Son? Was it the only fair interpretation of the law? Or was it the formal decree of a celestial assembly by which God was morally, if not legally, bound? Gregory of Tours related a case which throws light on this problem: a certain man, while in a church dedicated to the apostle Peter,

perceived two persons who saluted each other with reverence, and asked each other how they did. The elder thus began: "I may no longer endure the tears of the wife of Aetius. She prayeth without ceasing that I may bring back her husband safe and sound from Gaul, when the divine judgment hath otherwise determined. Nevertheless I have obtained this immeasurable grace for his life. And behold I hasten thither now to bring him thence alive." (Gregory of Tours, *Historia*, II, 6.)

Here it was obviously Peter who was able to prevail on God to revoke the decree. In the other cases, therefore, God must have cited the decree merely as a pretext for refusing the petition.

Quite apart from the positive obstacles such as the law and the decrees, however, there was also the likelihood of negative obstacles—those imposed by time, space, and even God's own temperament. Speaking of the Epicureans of 415, the author of the *De Providentia Divina* had said that,

They who attribute to God an idle leisure are afraid, I suppose, that a watchful care and the difficult toil will tire [even] an attentive God or that only one God is unequal to so great a task. (Lines 156-158.)

It was in order to guard against the disastrous consequences which must follow if the Epicurean attribution should be true that the Catholics gradually evolved their elaborate hypothesis of the powers wielded by the saints.

3. SAINTS

a. Powers

Long before the Merovingian Age it was believed that a holy man received miraculous powers to further temporal justice. In Gaul it may be said to have begun with the *Life* of Martin as told by Sulpicius Severus about 400. The deep impression which this *Life* made, in spite of many scoffers not only at the time but for the centuries to follow, was surely because through the maze of the reputed miracles was a living and convincing story of as truly holy a man as history records. For, wholly unconcerned with himself, seemingly forgetful even of his own salvation, he cared only to exercise a mercy which was the spontaneous product of love. He did not even except the Devil, for on one occasion he said to him,

If thou, unfortunate one, wouldst cease to pursue mankind, if to-day, now that the judgment day is nigh, thou wouldst repent thee of thy misdeeds, I am so sure of the mercy of the Lord Jesus Christ that I would promise thee pardon and peace. (*Life*, §22.)

Towards the end of his life Martin got into trouble with the Church authorities—probably because he was too sorry for, rather than too fearful of, the Devil. But his good name was no sooner rehabilitated than he became the patron saint of Gaul. By his binding of miracle to mercy and mercy to

miracle he, more than any other, prepared Gaul to face the barbarians with a weapon which none could, and few even wished to resist.

During his life the sixth-century saint could further temporal justice by sheer power, but he could further men's salvation, whether by forgiveness of sins or by acquittal at the Last Judgment, only by the influence of his precepts and example—a limitation which remained as true then as it had been in the time of Martin or of Salvian.

Once he was saved, however, because still uncorrupted, his powers were much magnified. The pagans had already offered their dead sage or hero as a precedent; and before 400 Jerome, in speaking of the martyrs, caustically asked, "When once they have entered on their life with Christ shall they have less power than before?"

To be sure, there were limitations: they could not act unless they had been invoked. By the time of Gregory of Tours, however, this impediment was virtually eliminated by the recognition that the dead saint could appear to a prospective suppliant in a dream or by a vision in order to precipitate the desired invocation. Only the obscurer saints, however, had to resort to this expedient; to the more famous invocations poured in so copiously that their only problem was to determine whether and how to respond.

Naturally, following Jerome's assumption, the saint in heaven could continue to further temporal justice but, if he tried actually to forgive sins, he was encroaching on the sacramental prerogatives of the priests. Whether or not this was the reason, it would appear that this further power of the saint in heaven was first recognized by Gregory of Tours when he said,

We do not doubt but that, by their prayers, we may obtain the actual remission of our sins. (*Miracles of St. Martin*, IV, Prologue.)

Such was now the enthusiasm for the saints that even the sacraments, although still presumably indispensable, were coming to be regarded as inadequate unless supplemented by the invocation to a saint. It is true that theoretically the saint would forgive only those on whom he had already

bestowed contrition, but if this was only an indirect slight to the priests it was a direct challenge to God's prerogative to confer His grace. For to Gregory not only the priests but also God Himself was in need of the saints' help.

The power of a saint to intercede for his client at the Last Judgment had first been assumed long before by the layman Prudentius in his prayer to the martyr Romanus:

I wish that, being as I shall be on the left among the goats, I may be recognized from afar, and that, because of this invocation, the good King may say: "Romanus is asking it; transfer this goat to Me; let him be a sheep on My right hand; let him be clothed with a fleece." (*Peristephanon*, XIV, 1-6.)

The Church, however, had not accepted this belief at that time or for long thereafter. But the time had now come. This new role of the saint in such a case was presented most explicitly by Pope Gregory, as we have seen; but it was shared by his namesake of Tours, who was born in almost the same year. He cites the prayer by a condemned criminal to Martin begging that if Martin cannot save his life he may at least try to save him from damnation. He also prays Martin to intercede for him at the Last Judgment, and he ventures to believe that the cures which the great saints have effected in the temporal world are a presage of what help they can and will give men in the afterlife.

To the Jews, certainly, as later to the Moslems, a prayer must be directly addressed to and received by God Himself, because there was no other supernatural being in existence—unless it be the Devil—who could heed or even hear them.

As we have already sufficiently indicated, the Trinitarian doctrine had constituted an opening wedge to polytheism which even Augustine did not try to resist. The centrifugal tendency could be traced back to the *Gospel of John*, where the Son had said that "no man cometh to the Father but by me." In the mid-fifth century Pope Leo had added that:

The Holy Ghost is he by whom men must confess, nor will they ever attain to healing pardon who have no advocate to plead for them. For from him comes the invocation to the Father, from him come the tears of penitents, from him come the groans of suppliant. (*Sermones*, #75, §4.)

These passages are not to be taken too literally as dogma, but they show that the Platonic-Arian conception of a graded Trinity was at least implicit, and Leo's characterization of the Holy Ghost as an indispensable "advocate to plead" in men's behalf was particularly suggestive of what was now also in the minds of the orthodox.

Now in Gaul, at least according to Gregory of Tours, there were more rungs in the hierarchical ladder. Carrying further the tendencies already exemplified by Caesarius and Pope Gregory, a sinner seeking material or spiritual help could not afford not to seek the help of a saint. If this saint were alive, he should in his turn invoke the help of a dead saint of repute, preferably of Peter himself. If the sinner chose directly to seek the help of a dead saint, he would do best to choose a local one at whose tomb or relics he could offer his prayer, knowing that this friend would know how best to forward the prayer through the proper celestial channels. Only at the Last Judgment was the process simplified, the plea being made to his chosen saint to appeal directly to the Son as presiding judge of the court of last resort.

It was only in later centuries that these successive intermediaries were more and more consolidated in the Virgin. At this time she was still rather the intercessor in behalf of virgins, and there were few Merovingians, therefore, who felt that she would be ready to intercede for them.

What of the angels? It would seem that their role was rather the complement of that of the saints. Whereas the saints transmitted the prayers of men to the Father, the angels transmitted (chiefly by apparitions) the Father's instructions, such as warnings, threats, or judgments, to men.

Like monotheism, polytheism is a mere word to be defined at pleasure. Which is the more appropriate word to describe Merovingian belief can therefore properly be disputed. But it cannot be disputed that the belief in the One and Only God, as exemplified by Aristotle, the Jews, and shortly after this by the Moslems, was now being diluted by the underlying and still ineradicable beliefs of primitive and popular polytheism. Catholicism probably had to make this concession, radical as it appears to have been, in order that it might survive.

b. Psychology

i. While Alive. In place of, or at least superimposed upon, the Platonic concept of perfection as acquired by means of self-knowledge and self-control, the Christians had introduced that of humility and love. The perfection of these lay in their spontaneity, but many thought, as Benedict did, that it could be achieved only after an arduous and extended practice of the Platonic techniques.

One hundred and fifty years before Benedict, Martin, of whose parentage there is no record, settled in Gaul and became bishop of Tours. The accounts of his life written almost immediately after his death in 397 created a sensation, and because their new thesis was that a man's power to perform miracles was the direct result of his virtue, Martin's fame was for a time clouded, only to revive fifty years later on an unprecedented scale.

This new fame was partly due, no doubt, to the now uninhibited faith in the miracle, but it was equally due to the extraordinary quality of his virtue as depicted by his biographers. The miracles which the virtues of the martyrs had induced redounded to the credit of either themselves or God; the miracles of the hermits served chiefly to prove their own virtue. Even Benedict's concept of final perfection was the cenobitic one of a humility so instinctive and unself-conscious that the monk "even shows it outwardly to all who behold him." But, long before Benedict, Martin had capped this monastic achievement, which was to guarantee its possessor's salvation, with a more popular one, which was to seek not so much his own advantage as that of his fellow men.

To these other saints the end was the perfection of their own love of God. That they could thereby pray the more effectively for the perfection of others was relatively incidental. But to Martin this concern for other men took the form of a life of action—of tireless works of charity, mercy, and love in the field. To him this love of man was not a by-product of the love of God but its final consummation. In contrast to the priggish young saint who, Pope Gregory says, gave away his cloak in order to promote his own salvation,

Martin, although he gave away only half his cloak, seems to have acted out of spontaneous compassion for the man rather than to show God how much he loved Him. To suppose that God reads men's minds has its pitfalls: if a man thinks he loves men he can persuade himself that God, reading these thoughts, will be sufficiently convinced. The example of Martin taught many, for the first time perhaps, that the proof even to God was complete only when the emotions were translated into deeds.

This brief and tentative casuistic analysis is important because in so far as it is sound it helps to explain why Martin as depicted by his biographers became, far more than any other saint, the virtual God of Merovingian Gaul. More tender than Ambrose or Severinus as pictured by their biographers, for these could wreak vengeance on those who resisted them, and less sophisticated than Caesarius or Pope Gregory as revealed by their own texts, Martin furnished a model of virtue which even Italy and Arles could not equal. As we turn our attention from a crumbling civilization to a triumphant barbarism we should not forget that while every brutality—of war, murder, superstition—was most rampant, the memory of Martin lived on as the ideal which Franks as well as Romans acknowledged and which, if they did not respect, they feared. Although they were to honor him chiefly on account of his miraculous powers, greater now that he was dead than before, they knew nonetheless that the purpose and effect of these was invariably to ease the lot of miserable man in this life and, if possible, in the hereafter. This was an ideal which, if they did not comprehend, they could at least worship. At the very time when Christianity was in its greatest peril, Gaul was most concerned to honor perhaps her greatest saint.

Bearing Martin in mind, we may now consider the records we have of the later Gallic saints with more equanimity. For a debased age is likely to produce flaws in even the most potentially holy. Since, furthermore, we can know almost nothing of most of these saints except as described by biographers writing long after their heroes' death, our information is about the beliefs not of the heroes themselves but of their much younger admirers.

The *Life* of Geneviève, for example—she who is alleged to have saved Paris from the Huns in 451—was written very much later, perhaps about when Gregory of Tours was writing, near the end of the sixth century. As there described she was not an appealing character: not only are her miracles too miraculous, her gentleness is none too gentle. She tells the master of a guilty servant whose pardon she nevertheless wishes to secure, "If you scorn my supplication my Lord Jesus Christ does not scorn me, for he is merciful in pardon," which smacks rather of egotism than of compassion. On four occasions, furthermore, she miraculously inflicts bodily punishment on persons who do not treat her with the deference she thinks she deserves.

As another sort of instance Gregory of Tours tells of how a certain holy man, being on the point of death, had a vision of being led "into an abode whose floor gleamed like gold and silver." Having here been honored, he heard a voice saying, "Let this man go back into the world since our churches have need of him." Whereupon as he started to go back, the voice said again, "Go in peace, for I shall be thy guardian until I bring you back into this place." Gregory tells of another saint who reported how, in a vision,

I saw the Apostle Paul with John the Baptist, who invited me to an eternal banquet, and who showed me a crown ornamented with celestial pearls, saying "These are things which you are going to enjoy in the kingdom of God." (*Lives of the Fathers*, XVII, §6.)

If these saints had been more humble, they would have feared that such tempting visions were hallucinations concocted by the Devil for their downfall. But they were evidently so sure of their own virtue that they thought that God could not justly so imperil their already well-earned reward.

A still more disturbing case was that reported by Gregory of a certain hermit called Romanus. On being asked where he would like to be buried, he replied:

I must not have my tomb in any monastery because there women have no access, for, as you know, though I am unworthy and do not deserve it, the Lord has bestowed on me the grace of performing miracles; and many, by the laying on of hands and the virtue of the Cross, have been snatched from divers maladies. Thus there

is sure to be a great crush at my tomb when I shall have left the light of this world. That is why I ask that I may lie far from the monastery. (*Ibid.*, I, §6.)

The insidious influence of the miracle is here made fully apparent. Being now generally regarded as a proof of the humility of the performer, it comes to be so regarded by him also. Yet no man can believe himself humble and at the same time be so in fact. Thus even the potential or erstwhile saint is caught by that very vicious circle which Augustine, if he had not already observed, had so clearly foreseen. Was Martin really an exception to this rule? It was the precise purpose of his biographers to prove this, and, whether it was true or not, the result was vividly to portray a truly great saint, and yet at the same time to furnish a precedent which was now leading to disastrous consequences.

The miracles of most of the recognized saints had effected individual alleviations only, such as a rescue from oppressors, disaster, or disease. But it was now more and more generally believed that a bishop could effect alleviations on a large scale. Quite unintentionally, Martin, like King David of old, had secured the material prosperity of his diocese for a number of years. During the invasion of the Huns not only did Geneviève's virtue save Paris, that of Bishop Anianus had also saved his city of Orleans. These consequences can hardly have failed to tempt them into self-esteem. But did the failures of the bishops of Metz and Tongres to save their cities therefore remind them to be more humble? Not according to Gregory of Tours, at any rate, for he merely inferred that even the conspicuous virtues of these prelates had not been enough to outweigh the sins of the inhabitants.

If the Merovingian bishops, most of whom were powerful Roman nobles and soon to be powerful Frankish nobles as well, were not conspicuous for their humility or even humanity, these historical interpretations may well have been partly to blame. Probably the influential role now ascribed to them was designed as much to flatter the present incumbents as to honor the memory of their predecessors, but in either case it was a poor way of reminding them to be humble, as well as an outrageous way of consoling their poor subjects. For if things went well, their bishops were given all the credit; if badly,

they were told that they had no one to blame but themselves.

Nor, as we shall now see, was this wholesale acquittal of all bishops while they lived a very wholesome example to their successors, who were hoping some day to share their heavenly reward.

ii. When Dead. Psychologically the dead saint was now believed to have retained his personality intact; yet, in contrast to his painful compassion for others while alive, he was also supposed to be now completely serene and happy. It was true that Christ had somehow surmounted this paradox, but it was dangerous to suppose that any soul of purely human origin could do so.

The question had already been raised of how the dead saints viewed the eternal punishment of the damned: Augustine had said, with equanimity; Pope Gregory, with positive satisfaction. The further problem concerned their attitude towards the ephemeral sufferings of the living, and, as the belief in the discretionary power of the dead saints rose and spread, it was accompanied by a complementary belief that their merciful instincts remained intact. Already Jerome had initiated the belief, saying, "They will still be human, the apostle Paul will still be Paul, Mary will still be Mary" (*Letter* #75, §2). Prudentius soon after said of Cyprian that he is "not less present in the world, nor quits these earthly courts, but still discourses, prophesies, instructs, expounds, exhorts" (*Peristephanon*, XIII, lines 99-103). But it was only as the power of their miracles was fully recognized that their abiding humanity was clearly demonstrated.

Gregory of Tours relates that Abbot Liphard believed that Martin, like Christ, had delivered many souls from hell. This was excessive. But Gregory himself surely believed that Martin would still have liked to be so authorized; if so, could Martin be at the same time wholly serene?

This was a first breach in Augustinian doctrine: the dead saint was still eager to help his erstwhile fellow men. The indispensable complementary breach followed: God needed this help. It was now not only that God must allow the dead saints to help because this was the only reward they sought; it was also because, as the Epicureans had been so long but

ineffectually hinting, God had undertaken a good deal more than He was able, or at least eager, to carry out. Gregory of Tours tells of a man who, having prayed to God for many years without result, prayed to Martin and was at once heeded. It might be concluded from this that God had conferred this favor on Martin reluctantly and only because it was his due; but it was more natural to suppose that God had been just too busy.

Unlike God the Father, who could act; and all too often, alas, of His own initiative, unlike Christ; and unlike, at least in one case, the Virgin, the saint could not do so unless invoked. Usually he would make himself known only at or near his tomb or one of his relics. This in turn would soon arouse enough curiosity to inspire someone to write his biography (this was easier then than it would be nowadays) and it was then up to him to prove, by his response to the invocations which followed, that future invocations would not be made in vain.

The need of increasing or at least of maintaining his popularity required good judgment. The saint wished to please his suppliants, but he must be careful lest in doing so he displeased those whom the suppliant displeased. It was customary, for instance, to oblige a suspect to swear to his innocence before a saint's relic or tomb, the belief being that if he perjured himself the saint would punish him. But if his enemies believed him guilty, only to observe that no punishment followed, the saint was suspected of impotence and his shrines henceforth ignored.

The punishment, moreover, had to be prompt. Gregory of Tours, praising the martyr Julian, says that at

a town called Joué, which contains relics of the blessed martyr . . . when by the enemy of man a guilty person commits perjury, the divine vengeance so pursues him that at once a succession of disasters—either the loss of relatives or a consumptive malady—follow as manifest proofs: for the martyr will not allow the perjurer to escape punishment. Also, at this place, the rude brutality of the barbarians does not dare to perjure itself with the same impunity as elsewhere. (*Miracles of St. Julian*, §39.)

Julian must long have maintained this promptness, for his fame survives to this day.

Nobility was being diluted with frailty—divine aspiration with human ambition. But perhaps the saints' most common defect was arrogance. As an extreme case two virgin saints demand on pain of death that their tombs be no longer neglected, but that a church be built upon the site and consecrated to them by the bishop. In another case a "terrifying personage" appeared in a dream to one recently afflicted and said to him, supposedly with Martin's consent if not at his instigation,

"Why are these things happening to you?" He answered, "I haven't got the slightest idea." Whereupon the person said to him, "This wood that you have carried away from the bed of the blessed Martin you keep carelessly; this is why you are being afflicted." (*Miracles of St. Martin*, I, §35.)

Nor, according to Gregory, did the saints stop at making threats and causing afflictions. On one occasion, a bellicose bishop of Lyons, Nicetius, struck one who had offended him, whereupon "The saint turned towards the priest and struck him in the throat with his fist and hands." On another a saint appeared to a recalcitrant deacon in a dream and "struck him on the throat with his clenched fists. As soon as day dawned the deacon's throat was painfully swollen" (*Historia*, IV, §39).

Perhaps nowhere was their arrogance greater than when their churches or relics were involved, and this was natural because these were indispensable to the successful prosecution of their business.

In certain other cases, however, they were rather obsequious than arrogant. Thus, for instance, nearly two centuries earlier Paulinus tells of how Felix of Nola, when warned by a peasant that he will hold the dead saint to account unless he restores his stolen oxen, complies at once. But surely this was only because the peasant was testing the validity of the Christian claim to perform wonders surpassing those done by the pagan deities. Likewise, according to Gregory, Martin on two occasions behaved under provocation with similar affability, but in the one case his suppliant was a Spanish lady still weighing the respective merits of the Arian and Catholic faiths, and in the other, having cured a Jew, he

was heckled until he had also cured the ills of the Christian eyewitnesses.

Finally the saint was not averse to doing a good deed in consideration of a substantial fee. In one case the offer was made through the agency of a priest. In another Martin cured the son of the infamous Queen Fredegonde, but only after his agent had got the large sum demanded in his pocket. In a third case Martin gave a man and wife a child, but not until the wife had made a will naming Martin's basilica as joint residuary legatee. These flesh-and-blood agents had been judiciously chosen—to sell the saint's 'indulgence' for a price.

It is sad to see this travesty of Martin's memory in the hands of his successor at Tours over 200 years later, but we should in fact be thankful that this memory, like the ruins of the Parthenon, was preserved at all.

c. The Suppliants' Belief

The popularity of the saint is clear enough, but what lay behind it needs an additional word. For reasons now obvious the Father was rarely invoked, but why so rarely too was the Son, or at least one of the apostles? Partly no doubt because these seemed too aloof and rigorous but partly too, perhaps, because they were already so famous that they did not feel the need of courting popular favor. It was only the ordinary saint who still had his way to make and risked oblivion and thereby impotence if he were not accommodating enough. The suppliants therefore felt that they could bring a pressure to bear on him which they could not on the great saints of Scripture. These were the more theological reasons. But there was also a third more human one: that a saint of local origin would feel more generously inclined towards the survivors who were still in a sense his fellow citizens, those neighbors who were to be loved only after God Himself. Furthermore the tomb of a local saint was readily accessible—pilgrimages to those of the apostles were in these times out of the question—and, since such a saint obviously was having little enough to do, he would lend a ready, even an eager, ear to their complaints.

These Merovingian complaints and the miracles which they invited were, moreover, for modest favors. Not often for inter-

cession at the Last Judgment or even, in most cases, for remission of sins, but only that the suppliant and his family be clothed, housed, and fed that daily bread which was so often asked of God and in vain. If only, instead of being ruled by God and His Devil, or even by Christ and his Apostles, their saints would take full charge! Let them at least be given every incentive and pretext for doing the little that they could.

After all, how else did the little man appeal to the terrestrial hierarchy if not from the powers just above him to those next above: from priest to deacon to canon to bishop or from lord to duke to count to mayor of the palace? In this way the celestial hierarchy became more comprehensible.

Was the terrestrial world then the microcosm of the greater celestial? No doubt; but only a few any longer knew what the word meant. Was the terrestrial world then thought of as a divinely revealed symbol of the celestial? Was government, whether ecclesiastical or civil, seen the way Pope Gregory perhaps saw the arts of war or medicine, as visible counterparts of the invisible?

Most probably not, for to recognize even symbols requires a certain degree of speculative curiosity. More likely it was just the other way about: the Merovingians merely inferred the nature of the celestial world from the only world they really knew or had heard much of anything about. Their belief was as close to Homer as it was far from Augustine or even Pope Gregory.

4. DEMONS

The Merovingian texts have nothing very new to say about the Devil. That he acquired a great power by the sin of Adam, and that Christ had somehow scotched it, was taken for granted. It was also commonly recognized that the Passion had been as indispensable as the Incarnation, although it was embarrassing that both Franks and Jews continued to suggest that the indignity of the Cross cast serious doubt on Christ's divinity. That Christ was partly divine because sired by God puzzled nobody, however. Not only was this a commonplace in pagan classical tradition, it also tallied more or less with

the Arian belief which most of the barbarians had already embraced. Nor was it alien even to the pagan Franks, for according to their own tradition Merovech, the grandfather of Clovis and founder of the dynasty, was believed to have been born of a sea god by the wife of King Clodius. But, since it was to the advantage of Merovech's successors to foster or even launch this legend, there is no reason to suppose that its purpose was at all to put the founder of their dynasty on a par with the founder of Christianity.

What powers the Devil was thought to have retained we can infer only from incidental references. That he could henceforth do only what God wanted him to was certainly assumed. The division of labor seems to have been that God usually did the punishing because this was consonant with His majesty, whereas the Devil did the tempting because this was consonant with his meanness. That God, while castigating that meanness, at the same time took full advantage of it, occurred, apparently, to no one. The line, however, was not too rigidly drawn: God had created Eve in order that she might tempt Adam, and now, according to Gregory of Tours, the Devil did at times seriously injure the innocent. Either one of them, moreover, could punish by inducing sickness.

In order to refute the Manichees a Catholic council held at Braga, Portugal, in 563 had declared that the Devil had no power over the inanimate world of the elements. Nevertheless the Devil had considerable foreknowledge of God's future intentions—gained, presumably, by learning how to read the stars. In this way he could, when he chose to, forewarn men, though it was naturally suspected that if he told the heretics the truth, he lied to the Catholics. His chief power was psychological, that is, over the minds and so the intentions and deeds of men.

No more than God, however, did the Devil do everything personally; he too had his agents: his own superhuman demons and, on earth, not only the mere enemies of Catholicism but also the sorcerers, half-demon and half-human. This latter class was of course no new invention; Augustine himself had believed that, just as a god can have intercourse with a mortal woman, so can a demon. The pagan Romans had been told—on the authority of Virgil, who had it from

the Homeric Hymns—that a man, Anchises, had had intercourse with the goddess Aphrodite. According to Jordanes, moreover, writing in about 550, the Goths believed that the Huns were born of demons and female magicians. But only the Christians believed that God approved of all that these underworld characters were up to.

The idea of a formal Faustian pact does not appear. Spontaneous collusion would better describe the supposed alliance, for the sin of Adam had left every unbeliever helpless to do other than evil. Lending the Devil a ready ear, they were rewarded by receiving prophetic or telepathic powers, or a mastery either of magic arts, or of how to find, identify, and administer poisonous herbs. These powers were designed either to trap the man himself or to injure his intended victim. In almost every case the result was either to secure some soul's damnation and usually also—for temporal welfare was now of equal if not greater consequence—to bring his body to a speedy and miserable end.

5. SCIENCE

Just as the sun's course warns men of the future—of coming nights and seasons—so must the other heavenly bodies warn. The trouble was that men had not yet read their secret. In an age of both great faith and great disasters, however, this much was taken for granted, that the behavior of these bodies was the effect of God's will and therefore constituted omens—if only these could be understood—of His intentions.

God, therefore, being the cause at once of motion and of virtue, both of these had at once physical and moral characteristics. Already pagan antiquity had supposed that fire tended to rise and earth to fall according to the degree of their innate imperfections. But Gregory of Tours now told of how earth which had been laid on the tomb of the apostle Peter, on being removed was found to be not lighter because less imperfect, but rather heavier—on the assumption, we must suppose, that the virtue infused was at least heavier than air.

This problem was further complicated by the addition of a third theory, that of the Germanic Franks. In one of their

Ordeals they cast the suspect, bound hand and foot, into a body of water. If he floated he was adjudged guilty on the assumption that water, being pure, will reject what is impure. There was also the theory behind the Witch's Bath, according to which the suspect was proved to be a witch if her body floated because her imperfection made her lighter. This would tally with Gregory's belief that virtue was heavier, if not than water, at least than air.

Finally, in order to complicate matters further, the Frankish Ordeal by fire was based on the assumption that fire, being pure, will not burn an innocent person. But, if fire was so pure, why would it not have the same allergy to a guilty body that water had?

Still confining ourselves as much as possible to physics, we may next consider the nature of virtue in terms not of weight but of energy. It was transmitted from one body to another by contact or propinquity and thereby 'charged' it. If the body charged was alive, the energy tended gradually to run down; there is a biological element here, but not necessarily a supernatural one. But if the body charged was inanimate, it could remain so indefinitely.

So far we are still inside the frontier of physics because, although there is magic, the original energy is not infused but is rather, like a magnet—or, by analogy, like a precious stone—an inherent quality of its nature. But since the source of all energy is now attributed to a living God, the charge is presumed to be derived from Him.

Nonetheless, the divine miracle was still thought to operate by the help of physical laws, and it is this combination of causes which explains many of the theories and practices of this time. Christian dogma, for instance, taught that the divine grace was bestowed independently of physical laws; but it did not need contact with the barbarian mentality in order to imagine that for most other purposes God relied on less miraculous methods. For one thing, the virtue which His grace bestowed was transmissible chiefly by contact or propinquity; the relic would not otherwise have any effect. It was partly because the Father had provided no relics that He seemed unable to answer men's prayers. The Incarnated Son, to be sure, had charged the Cross with his great virtue,

but at this time its fragments were not yet accessible. The Eucharist purported to supply this deficiency, but to the literal-minded barbarian the relic, even of a humble saint, was thought so much more potent as well as so much less intangible that the Franks could use it, and apparently with success, in order to escape the consequences of a breach of contract. Contrariwise, certain perjurers escaped the consequences because they swore falsely on a reliquary which, on being opened, was found not to contain the expected relics. In both cases God, if not obliged, at least preferred, to acquit them on this technicality. It was, incidentally, by observing how often persons already strongly suspected took the oath on a relic with impunity that it was determined whether that relic was genuine or false.

The Merovingian change, therefore, was one not only in degree but in kind. According to the traditional Roman belief, the saint simply found that his relics—as God found that His stars—facilitated the execution of his will, but, in utilizing them, he did not divest himself of any of his powers. To the Merovingians, however, the saint's body retained a considerable share of his power but, being inanimate, none of his moral responsibility. The relic, therefore, was bound to exercise that power indiscriminately, to reward the deserving and the undeserving alike. The Roman power had been miraculous because it was the result of a moral judgment; the Merovingian power was magical because will was no longer involved. Our moral therefore, if there be one, is that in so far as religion ignores true science it finds itself saddled with another kind of its own making. The magical is just as hard to banish from human faith as is the miraculous.

Finally, it is well to bear in mind that this magic was no invention of the Merovingians. For what else were the rites of baptism and ordination, since in each of these a 'virtue' was effectively passed on from one person to another regardless of the moral character of either? The Eucharist did require real contrition in the recipient, but it was only the heretics who thought it must be possessed by the priest as well. The priest could of course refuse even to baptize, but if he did go through with it the effect was as independent of any moral element as was the effect of the relic. There was

also the difference that, whereas the relic served chiefly to satisfy temporal aspirations, the sacraments served chiefly eternal ones, but this was a difference of ends rather than of means.

It would seem therefore that the new Merovingian conception of the power of the relic was less a barbarian innovation than a barbarian extension of the conception of physical power already long attributed to the Roman Catholic priest.

Sickness, being both baffling and undesirable, was naturally supposed to be a punishment for sin and therefore caused directly, or at least indirectly through the Devil, only by God's will. To be sure, there was still a minimum of science—bloodletting, bone-setting, diet, and a recognition that plagues spread by contagion. There was still considerable surgery, especially for wounds. But for a physician to employ drugs was to risk tempting God by trying to thwart Him, though it must be added that drugs were so capricious in their effects that their use was identified rather with black magic. Where prayers, relics, and the like seemed to fail, however, the patient often took the risk of consulting a physician, who was usually a Jew because, unlike a Christian, he had nothing to lose and, if successful, perhaps something to gain.

It was a precarious profession, however, because if, under the physician's ministrations, the patient recovered, the saints or even God were given all the credit and usually also most of the fee; whereas if the patient died the presumption was that the physician was to blame and must therefore have been a practitioner of the black arts. The Jew of course was doubly suspect.

Even though it was assumed that God was the cause of every malady and that it was usually inflicted as a punishment for sin, it was not always easy to identify its nature. Gregory of Tours tells of how

a certain Piclus, cleric of Candes, lived since birth in this world of woe, with his hands so contracted that he could do no work. How did this come about? Was it because he, or because his parents, had sinned that he was thus maimed? We are unable to decide. (*Miracles of St. Martin*, II, §26.)

It was a cruel doctrine this, which taught a diseased wretch that he was stricken because of his own or his parents' sin. Yet probably the countless thousands who prayed month after month at a saint's tomb suffered no worse agonies than had they patronized a physician. For man, fortunately, is ingenious in seeking that way which is to him the least painful, and we, in his place, would probably have been equally tempted to patronize almost any saint rather than to subject ourselves to the mercies of a Merovingian doctor.

By the year 600 theology was in the doldrums, not only in Gaul but also, as the last Arians were accepting conversion, in Italy and Spain. Gregory of Tours was familiar with the Bible but he was never tempted to question the by now traditionally orthodox interpretations, and his Gallic successors knew and were tempted even less.

And in this Gaul philosophical activity had wholly ceased.

Now if philosophy may here be roughly defined as the inquiry into phenomena of which the Bible took no serious account, we find that the only part of the Latin West which did have some awareness of it was Spain. If we may indulge in a digression, it is to be recalled that the Byzantine Greeks continued to occupy southern Spain until 623, and that shortly before this time Isidore, bishop of Seville, wrote a work much read in the early Middle Ages which, although dealing with the profane arts because of their temporal utility rather than of their speculative fascination, nevertheless kept alive certain philosophic beliefs which elsewhere were now being quite ignored if not forgotten.

He held, for instance, certain purely astronomical views of the nature of the heavens in relation to the earth rather than to man; he likewise talked about animals without regarding them as of merely didactic significance. He visualized men as the microcosm of the universe, and he expressed the opinion that matter, being a mere emanation from spirit, would in due course be reabsorbed by it. He even took the trouble to correct Euhemerism by explaining that it was only at the Devil's instigation that the pagans had supposed that their dead heroes had become gods.

But most important, historically at any rate, was his per-

haps original belief that if only man could discover the real meanings of words all truth would thereby be revealed.

6. LAW

a. Civil

As completed in the Justinian Code of 535 the Roman civil law incorporated as much of canon law as the then Christian Romans had thought appropriate. Therefore when they now came into conflict with barbarian law, these two Roman laws not only presented a solid front but had furthermore set the precedent of committing the State authority to the duty of enforcing many of the canons and decrees of the Church. To be sure there remained many cases of duplication—legislative, judicial, and executive—but, faced as the Romans now were with the physical domination of the barbarians, these frictions were for the time being subordinated to the more pressing need of meeting the barbarian challenge.

One of the reasons why the Franks were so successful was that, as Catholics, they showed a respect for the Roman civilization which balanced the Roman respect for the naked barbarian power. The Roman courts were for many purposes allowed to operate where Romans were both, or even one, of the parties to a dispute. This so-called personal law was wisely allowed to continue until the fusion of the two peoples rendered such a distinction superfluous. In this new world, indeed, many of the provisions of both laws became inappropriate and new ones arose to take their place. Only the fittest of the old could long survive.

Roman law is still so familiar that there is no need to rehearse it here beyond reminding ourselves that, in contrast to the barbarian, the courts relied heavily on documents such as codes, contracts, and affidavits, and on the testimony of witnesses to the facts who were not parties to the litigation. The barbarians relied rather on unwritten or customary law, the testimony of the litigants themselves, the testimony—called compurgation—of witnesses to the credibility of the litigants, and finally, in cases of doubt, on the duel for the

free and the Ordeal for the serfs, slaves, and other incompetents.

For crimes they had no death penalty, perhaps because if there were one no defendant would voluntarily appear. There was banishment for the impecunious, but the usual punishment was a fine to cover the damage done. Since the State and the plaintiff or victim's family shared the fine, and the defendant usually preferred it to corporal punishment or exile, the system brought about at least a beginning of law and order.

We have already spoken of the Ordeals. The original Ordeal, that of battle, we have not yet outgrown; the later Ordeal or duel has only recently expired. But even if might makes right as between qualified warriors, it clearly does not if the parties are women, children, or unarmed serfs or slaves. It was for this reason that the barbarians were driven to put their trust in the underlying justice of Nature and therefore of her gods. The gods of water and fire were therefore invoked to render judgment as often as a reasonable doubt could not be resolved.

b. Canon

Regarding the Church's attitude to these methods there is more surmise than certainty, but some likely conclusions can be drawn. We may suppose for instance that the Church was not averse to the *wergeld*, or composition, provided she got a share of it. We may also suppose that she approved of the oath of compurgation provided she could transform it into a Christian rite. The Ordeal, however, had the double advantage that not only the verdict but also the execution of the sentence were not her responsibility but God's.

Although there were many cases of the use of the Ordeal in the Old Testament, the Church, long since accustomed to Roman law procedures, at first disapproved—it savored too strongly of pagan animism. But as soon as it, like the oath, could be transformed into a Christian rite, she acquiesced.

Was there not some danger that the procedure amounted to tempting God? Not if it was relied on only as a last resort. As it became more and more impractical to rely on docu-

ments and witnesses to the fact, and as the Roman use of torture was also alien to barbarian custom, such an alternative, crude as it appeared, was seen to be unavoidable. If so, it was best to recognize it and then to try to refine it. One such instance may have been those cases where the Ordeals were now so rigged that it was made as easy as possible for God to render His verdict. If the court leaned towards an acquittal, the Ordeal was so set up that acquittal would prove the rule and conviction the (almost miraculous) exception; and if the evidence of guilt was strong rather than weak, the Ordeal was rigged the other way. In this way every precaution was taken to avoid the risk that God should be asked to do for men what they could do themselves.

Furthermore there was the danger that the Devil would trick the judges. Or that God would take advantage of man's faith in His just Providence in order to punish one who, although innocent of this particular accusation, had earned punishment for a previous crime. It might even be that God would punish—as He was already punishing so many others—for no other apparent reason than because of Adam's sin. On the other hand, by enlisting the help of the inanimate relic or the Eucharistic wafer, both of which, like the pagan fire and water, were charged with an automatic virtue, the unpredictable will of God did not need to be invoked.

Lest anyone imagine that the Ordeal was a freak residue confined to the so-called Dark Ages, it should be added that in the year 1600 it had still not been wholly eradicated.

According to Roman Catholic law, confession was obligatory only in the case of mortal sins. The guilty party was made to realize that so long as he did not confess he was doomed to damnation, and that no subsequent conduct, however well intended, was of the slightest avail. Furthermore, if and when he did confess, he was liable to serve a penance, often for life, by observing a regime modeled on the monastic—of poverty and chastity and the eschewing of any temporal activity, such as engaging in business or war. He could receive absolution only when his penance had been completed and, if a life penance, only by being allowed to receive the Eucharist on his deathbed. Furthermore, if his

penance were only for a term of years, he could not thereafter, even after confession, be granted a second penance, for, as it was said, only a dog returns to his vomit. How strictly and universally these prescriptions were enforced we do not know, but at least the principle was almost everywhere recognized and respected.

For some time most of the barbarian conquerors had remained Arian, and what their theories and practices were was no concern of the Church. But the Franks, by becoming Catholic, subjected themselves to this strict law and the problem was how far to try to impose it. A foretaste of the difficulty was Caesarius' permission of a second, but of no third, penance, for he was among the first to come into contact with Catholic barbarians—Burgundians and Franks—and so to realize the necessity of making concessions.

In northern Gaul the problem was of course vastly more acute. Clovis and his immediate successors were recognized by the Church as temporal rulers, and these rulers therefore held the whip hand. Yet no one imagined that Clovis, or any other Frankish warrior who was committing murder and adultery as a matter of course, would be willing to confess and do penance for such peccadilloes. What apparently happened was that the Church under the Franks was content to try to impose only those disciplines to which the Franks were agreeable—outward observance rather than moral good conduct. Indeed, the words "as often as you fight we conquer" written to Clovis by Bishop Avitus probably give us the cue.

Patrick's first missionary work in Ireland was soon carried further by Roman Catholic refugees from the continent, and the native converts presented a problem similar to that presented by Clovis. It was nearly 200 years later that the Irish Catholics, led by Columban, returned, again as missionaries, to the continent; they brought with them not only Rules for the monks but also the detailed Penitentials for the laymen. These, the product of trial and error in actual practice, had been adapted to the mentality and needs of the Irish barbarians and were therefore not ill-suited to their Gallic counterparts.

That many of the Gallo-Roman bishops welcomed this strange yet Catholic practice is more than doubtful. They

seem, however, to have had no choice but to make the best of it, and soon what little was left of traditional Roman discipline had to give way. Only south of the Loire did the monastic Rules of Caesarius and Benedict continue to be observed. Had these Irish disciplines not been imported, the Gallic Church would no doubt have eventually evolved her own; nevertheless it was these importations which initiated and accelerated the new Gallic practice.

For as Christianity spread from a series of minority groups to embrace most of the Roman empire, the original practices of public confessions and even of public penances—which betrayed the seriousness but not the specific nature of the sin—had to be more and more abandoned. So long, to be sure, as penance involved exclusion from the Eucharist it could not be truly private. Yet if the truculent Franks, when they confessed, were to be exposed to a public humiliation, they were more than likely not to confess at all. Under the new dispensation, therefore, confession was made obligatory for everybody, but for most sins the penance could be so light that it was not perceptible to outsiders. For if a man turned to more ascetic practices, it might as well have been from a burst of piety as from the performance of a penance. Because no penance could be wholly private so long as it required exclusion from the Eucharist, or excommunication, however, it was further provided that, upon due confession and a promise to perform the penance imposed, the sinner was to be absolved forthwith so that he could continue to communicate, and this absolution would remain valid so long as he lived up to his promise. The obligatory confession, moreover, not only eliminated any presumption that the confessant had committed a serious sin, it also enabled the confessor to keep close track of what the confessant might be up to—not only his deeds but his intentions and even his thoughts. Since the last were also classified as sins—and very serious ones if not confessed—as the confessant became more compliant his confessor gained more control.

Things were made more satisfactory for both parties, moreover, by allowing a man to do penance, not only twice, as Caesarius had conceded, but as many times as he chose. Nor does it even appear that the subsequent penances must be

stiffened. The only way this could be achieved was by the discretion given to the priest to impose a lighter penance than the books prescribed. Thus if the first penance imposed had been very light, subsequent ones could be made heavier. But this device had its limits because no priest could impose a stiffer degree of penance than the specific sin called for.

Indeed as a guide to the many priests who were stupid or inexperienced both the duration and the severity of the penance were prescribed for all the most common sins. There were even tables indicating how the severity of the regime was to be relaxed as the time of fulfilment approached.

Naïve as these provisions may seem in many ways, they show a good deal of hard common sense as well as sincere devotion. There was more true statesmanship in them than meets the casual eye. At the same time there were deplorable, if unavoidable, abuses—how widespread we do not know. One of these was the provision in some of these Penitentials that a man on whom a penance had been imposed might fulfil it vicariously, by hiring or obliging another, if a serf or slave, to do the penance for him. That such an obligation was deemed assignable on the theory that God did not care, so long as the debt was paid, who paid it may well have been a sop to barbarian custom. At the same time this faith in the validity of vicarious justice was, as we have seen, also Christian. At its worst this abuse was at times carried even to the point of allowing the penitent a third alternative of simply paying a fine. That this was inspired by the Frankish acceptance of a composition, or *wergeld*, in place of corporal punishment is most likely, but it must be borne in mind that by adopting this practice the debt was being paid not to God but to His Church and therefore to His priests. If this was not a temptation of the Devil it was at least the origin of the sale of indulgences.

Still another abuse should be mentioned. It was being counted as a sin not to pay the tithe now legally owing to the Church, and also not to give alms for the poor through the Church. For these sins penances could be imposed. It was even dangerous to sue the Church as in matters of disputed ownership. For if the confessor was an interested party he would be too easily tempted to retaliate.

We have every reason to suppose that the monks and priests of this time were, by and large, better men than most of the laity with whom they had to deal. And this laity held the temporal power. It was therefore, if not excusable, at least natural that the spiritual power, if it was to promote its own interests, could not afford to be squeamish.

c. Church and State

The principle of the separation of the temporal and spiritual powers as we find it in the fifth and sixth centuries was never more than a truce recognizing a balance of powers, which satisfied neither pope nor emperor. For the separation was as alien to pagan Roman as to Jewish-Christian tradition and was equally so to the barbarians. One reason certainly was that all their many gods were deeply involved in the temporal affairs of men on earth: sacrilege was a civil crime because, unless punished, it was calculated to invite divine retaliation. The belief was now current that temporal prosperity depended on the good behavior not only of kings, and now of bishops, but also of every subject.

Another concern common to both powers was the need to instil fear into the people as a prerequisite of law and order. To this end a division of labor was evolved: the king was to instil, by direct action, fear of himself; the clergy, more disingenuously, fear of itself. Each power recognized the legislative power of the other in its own sphere, and the king was given the over-all executive power where the means of enforcement by the clergy were not adequate. This arrangement did not of course eliminate conflicts but these were confined to means rather than to ends.

Generally speaking, if the offenses were deeds, the State punished; if the breaches consisted merely in beliefs or intents, the Church did. But this was not invariably the case. For the correction of venial sins the penances imposed by the Church were usually effective, but for mortal sins such as sorcery, heresy, or idolatry they would not be. At first the Frankish State was unwilling to punish a man merely because it was evident that he possessed magical powers, and intervened, therefore, only if and when he made evil use of

them. So it was with heresy and idolatry: until about 561 the Franks would not condemn anyone on account of his mere belief.

The decline in the influence of Roman law is interesting in this connection: although many of the Fathers—and especially Augustine in a devastating passage—had condemned the use of torture in order to induce confessions, the Christian Roman State had continued to authorize it. Like persecution, torture was not employed by the Franks until about that same year, 561. As in the course of the seventh century Roman law faded, so did torture, because the Church as well as the Franks disapproved of it; but as Roman law faded, persecution did not, because this the Church approved of more and more.

A curious instance is offered by the Jews. Protected in their religion and even in many of their customs by Roman law, Pope Gregory saw fit to deal gently with them in the south as late as 604. But where, as in Gaul and as in Spain after 623, Roman law ceased to operate, persecution of the Jews quickly became active.

Barbarian law had remained largely oral, or customary, for some time after their victories, and this continued so long as Romans were allowed to live in many respects under their own law. But as the amalgamation of the two peoples proceeded their laws naturally also tended to follow suit. A consequence of this was the gradual emergence, chiefly in the seventh century, of a series of barbarian codes composed of those provisions in both of the laws which seemed best suited to the times. How and when each code was drafted and the degree of their enforcement have long been a matter of learned research and speculation. This is most particularly true of the famous Salic law of the Franks, where this erudition has so far led only to confusion worse confounded. It is the same difficulty that the Roman legislation used to present. Most of the barbarian provisions were re-enactments of laws first promulgated long before, but there is no certainty of how long before, and without this knowledge a study of its growth is hazardous. In the Salic law there is much that is surely old and much that is less so, but there is nothing so certain that inferences may safely be drawn from it.

In this dark age the canon law, too, becomes more obscure. Gaul, largely isolated from Italy, was itself so disunited that the practice in one area is no safe indication of its presence elsewhere. No council, indeed, so far as we know, was held in Gaul during the seventy-two years after 670. What monastic Rules were really operative and what Penitentials, if any, were being followed, we can hardly even guess. About all we do know is that the bishop ruled, and indeed owned, most of the towns and that the monasteries owned much of the arable countryside. Even the royal domain was small by comparison.

After Gregory of Tours we are told hardly more of men than their dreams: fairy tales, Christian and otherwise, and *Lives*, almost wholly legendary and improbable, of saints whose very existence is in many cases doubtful.

CAROLINGIAN, 701-900

1. REVIVAL

THE MEROVINGIAN PERIOD represented the inauguration and first stages of Latin-Germanic amalgamation, and perhaps the initial contact had been too violent. In any case after a short period of apparent success the situation so deteriorated that by the year 700 this Merovingian world out of which medieval civilization was gradually to evolve, instead of being a centre binding the old Latin West together, had become a divisive force, an obstacle, with only the tenuous link between the papacy and England tending to hold it together.

The Carolingian rehabilitation of the Merovingian West had the advantage that its society was no longer that of a late Roman, but rather of an already half-Germanic, civilization. Christianity could now be presented not so much as an alien, but as a half-digested, even a half-indigenous, cult. That it had had its origin in the fabulous Mediterranean, yet had its present reality in men of their own race, inspired their sense of both adventure and security. Boniface, the great apostle to the Germans, was indeed an Englishman, but his real name was not the Latin Bonifacius but the Germanic Wynfrith, and if he spoke good Latin when in Rome, he spoke better German when in Frisia or Saxony.

The turn of the tide might be symbolized by two very small indications: a chronicler, writing almost immediately after the event, referred to the victors at the battle of Poitiers against the Arabs in 732 as "the Europeans"; and in a letter

of 735 Boniface inquired "in what year from the birth of Christ" Pope Gregory I had sent the first missionaries to England. It was no longer Rome and the Mediterranean, no longer Romulus and Augustus, but Europe and Christ.

The papacy was amenable. A decade later an entente was formed between the Frankish king and the Roman pope and the obstacle which had held Latin Europe divided began to assume its natural place as her focal point. The way was thus being prepared for the coming of the Holy Roman Emperors.

To be sure, the menace of the Lombards to Italy and of the Arabs and Norsemen to the Frankish kingdom intensified the need for this entente. Nonetheless, a few great men were also present to see that need and to satisfy it: first Boniface, who virtually introduced king and pope to one another; then the kings and popes themselves. It was not so much an understanding between soldiers and saints as between men who each recognized the other as a Christian statesman trying to redeem the Latin world from barbarism.

2. THE CLERGY

a. *Lay Influence*

As Church and State drew closer together, so did clergy and laity. As the nobles grew more devout, the churchmen grew more worldly. Often, although not invariably, the king chose the bishops and the pope could only accede. He chose many who were monks, men of higher character and learning, but he also chose many who were nobles, because of their wealth and influence. Similarly the king often appointed men to be abbots whose qualifications were slight: Alcuin, to be sure, who was technically a deacon but in fact a grammarian, was appointed abbot of the great monastery of Saint-Martin-of-Tours. Angilbert, of the royal blood, and a disciple of Alcuin, became lay abbot of Saint-Riquier. These were both good men as were doubtless many of the others so appointed; nonetheless, they were the servants of the Church only in so far as the Church was the servant of the State. This was bound to affect all the lower orders of the clergy, and the property and purpose of the Church as a whole. It encouraged decency, but at the expense of any enlightened piety.

b. Monks

In the interest of order and uniformity the State co-operated with the papacy in imposing on all monasteries the Benedictine or Roman Rule. None more salutary could have been chosen and its regulations seem to have been fairly well observed. Still, times now required certain modifications. For one thing the vow of obedience to the abbot had not originally meant life imprisonment, if only because there was no physical authority empowered to return runaways, and it is doubtful if Benedict would have approved of using physical force, because he assumed that hell would provide punishment enough.

Now that the monastery was a State institution, however, not only were penitents sent there but men guilty of civil crimes, and often for life. The abbot doubtless exercised considerable discretion in allowing monks to leave for special reasons, as missionaries, as bishops, as emissaries, even as pilgrims; if monks left without his permission, he could not only have them excommunicated but, since such disobedience now constituted a crime by civil law, he could also have them either delivered back to the monastery or, if obstinate, banished as outlaws. Thus, without modifying the letter of the Rule, the Benedictine monastery was now a house not only of prayer but of detention. Still a haven for the saint, it was also a prison for the sinner.

Like the Irish missionary monks, the first English who, backed by Rome, gradually supplanted them had to persuade because they could not exercise duress. Their methods are therefore particularly interesting. Their appeal to the pagan Germans was as roundabout as it was ingenious a way of initiating men to the biblical Revelation.

First they sought to discredit the Germans' gods. Daniel, bishop of Winchester, wrote to Boniface that,

Thou shouldst not offer opposition to them concerning the genealogy of their false gods. Thou shouldst suffer them, rather, to claim that they were begotten by others through the intercourse of man and woman; then thou canst show that gods and goddesses who were born after the manner of men were men rather than gods, and in that they existed not before, had therefore a beginning. (*English Correspondence of St. Boniface*, Letter #5.)

It was the already well-worn argument of Euhemerus. Following this were the positive proofs of Christian truth. Daniel goes on to say that,

It would also be natural to infer that if their gods are omnipotent and beneficent and just, not only do they reward their worshippers, they punish those who despise them. But if they do both in the temporal order, why do they spare the Christians, who turn nearly the whole world from their worship and overthrow their statutes? And these too, that is, the Christians, possess the fertile lands and the provinces fruitful in wine and olives and overflowing with other riches, and have left them, that is, the heathen with their gods, only the frozen lands in which these latter, banished from the whole world, are wrongly thought to hold sway. (*Ibid.*)

So much for the advantages offered by the Christian Providence in the bestowal of temporal rewards. Finally came the rewards and punishments in prospect after death. Here Boniface (*Ibid.*, 8, 49) relied on the account a man had recently given him of what, having died, he had seen before he came back to life. This man told how, having sickened and died, his soul visited the other world where he witnessed the Judgment of men who had just died; how the demons put the Vices of the accused on the witness stand, and how the angels likewise summoned his Virtues in the hope of counteracting the evidence adduced by his Vices. He told further how those guilty of only "a few trivial faults not entirely washed away" had merely to pass through "a river of fiery pitch, boiling and blazing" where "some were entirely immersed while others were only partially covered—it might be to the knees, or to the waist, or merely to the ankles." Many, too, he saw fall directly into hell; others, guilty but not mortally, he saw who, "hanging for a little time on the edge of the pits, then, screaming, fell into the depths." Whereupon he heard one of the angels say

This moment of rest shows that the Almighty God means to grant these souls on the Day of Judgment to come, relief from punishment and (so) an eternal rest. (*Ibid.*, Letter #13.)

In order to give the story a final stamp of authenticity the man said that he witnessed the trials of some then still alive, and since the evidence there presented, although not known to anyone living at the time of the alleged experience, had

since become generally known, the truth of everything else the man had told could not be convincingly challenged.

It was by such ingenuous yet effective strategy that most of the east Germans were converted until the hosts of Charlemagne came to hasten the process by a resort to sheer terror.

In this eighth century was also re-inaugurated the effort to convert the *pagani* or peasants. Shortly before 800 Charlemagne gave his blessing to Theodulf, bishop of Orleans, to organize free primary education in the countryside and smaller towns of his diocese.

c. Bishops

Probably not too many of the monks lived what Boniface would have called exemplary lives. Nevertheless they behaved far better than did the secular clergy. The best of these had been monks before being consecrated bishops; the worst—and the majority—were rather great nobles or men still pagans at heart, or both. Because these did not have, at least until the ninth century, even the meagre education of the monks, they blundered even when they meant well. Their lesser sins, apparently, were fornication and adultery, fighting, and hunting, which they shared with the laity. Their worse ones were hypocrisy and sacrilege: “misleading the people by countless scandals and various errors” (*Ibid.*, Letter #26). Boniface, when later archbishop and papal legate, was at his wit’s end to decide how far he ought to reprove, discipline, or even associate with, them. Even though he could usually count on the king to back his decisions, there was the danger that by exposing and punishing he would be discrediting the whole clergy in the eyes of the still half-pagan people. Episcopal appointments, to be sure, were made by the kings with due regard to the welfare of the Church, but if they often chose powerful monks they also often chose powerful nobles, and in many cases, doubtless, they had to recognize those who had already been locally, or even self-, appointed.

d. Theological Learning

It was not really the fault even of the monks that their learning was so meagre. Manuscripts of any kind were hard to

come by, and, although the Bible texts were certainly the most available ones, the copies of Jerome's Latin, or Vulgate, translation, which was alone authoritative, was in a Latin now barely comprehensible even to those (and there were not too many) who were familiar with the debased Latin of the time. At least during most of the eighth century there must have been very few living in the Carolingian world who knew the Old as well as the New Testament as thoroughly as did Boniface, born and bred in the England which was at this very time producing the Venerable Bede.

Both Alcuin and the Spaniard Theodulf drafted simplified versions of this Vulgate, and about 870 the Gospels were translated into German. But the difficulties remained formidable and they were not made easier by the fact that for most passages it was not the literal or historical sense, but rather the spiritual, which was regarded as the only true and significant one, and this in turn was divided into the allegorical or prophetic, the tropological or moral, and the anagogical, which revealed the nature of the future life. It was because of the difficulties this presented when there were hardly any explanatory commentaries available that Alcuin and Charlemagne founded the various Schools, not only at the Court, but also at the ecclesiastical centres. Here the relevant texts, when found, would be assembled. Among doubtless many more, we know of commentaries on *Matthew*, *Apocalypse*, and *Genesis*, but there were probably few on the rest of the Old Testament.

We may well think this undertaking at such a time was overambitious, but only one person, apparently, protested. This was Agobard, a Spaniard who became bishop of Lyons. He declared that, although to seek a spiritual rather than the literal meaning of each passage was wholly sensible, to seek three such meanings was nonsensical, as the then current efforts were only too clearly proving.

It is true that many manuscripts of the Fathers were lying about and some, such as the *Sermons* of Augustine, Caesarius, and Gregory the Great, were in active use. In addition Charlemagne got hold of Augustine's *City of God*, which he read, or listened to the reading of, with avidity. But such texts contained no systematic commentaries on specific passages of Scripture, nor on the dogmatic or moral truths revealed by

them. A beginning was made, however, in about 850, by Walafrid Strabo of Swabia in his *Glossa Ordinaria*, which for its time was a remarkably good abridgment of patristic commentaries on all the books of the Bible.

Of course there were also the canons of councils and papal decretals as essential supplements, but, even when pertinent, their authority and even their authenticity were far from sure.

We may speak, if we like, of the Carolingian Renaissance as a revival of pagan antiquity, for such it also was. But it was primarily a revival of Christian antiquity, and the pagan revival was hardly more than a by-product. When, in their search for Christian texts, men happened upon a pagan one, they could cherish it only with a slightly guilty conscience.

3. DOGMA

a. *The Trinity*

The prevailing views of dogma which resulted were not of much originality or penetration. On the Trinity there were some irresponsible views floating about, but they made little or no disturbance or headway. In Spain, for instance, a certain Migetius alleged that the real Trinity was that of David, Christ, and Paul; certain Manichees, probably of Lyons, said that the Son was identical with the Father, and that Christ was to be identified with the sun—doubtless a Persian residue; and Alcuin, the well-meaning but unreflective first head of Charlemagne's Palatine school, tried, in imitation of Boethius' tract, to prove the dogma of the Trinity by logic.

The question of whether the Holy Ghost had proceeded from the Son as well as from the Father was a Byzantine affair. But it involved the papacy and thereby had an echo beyond the Alps. The Nicene Creed simply said that the Third Person proceeded *a patre*. Did this mean that he did not also proceed *a filioque*? This led to Leo III's declaration, which Ratramnus of Corbie approved, that the Creed, although of course itself dogma, did not include all dogma. The *filioque* was therefore no less dogma for having been omitted.

b. The Fall

The old Jewish belief, based on the moral unity of the clan, that the sons of Adam justly inherited the guilt of their ancestor until this was somehow atoned for, had not satisfied the Fathers. At the same time they were unwilling to accept the Greek belief that men's souls were now being punished for sins committed in a previous incarnation. Of the two alternative explanations to which the Fathers therefore resorted, Fredegise of Tours preferred the so-called traducianist hypothesis, according to which, in the words of Augustine, "God created a single soul out of which come the souls of all men." But Servatus Lupus of Ferrières preferred the other, or so-called creationist, theory that the sins of the parents in conceiving their child also infected the child's soul. The Church did not choose to approve or condemn either one, perhaps because she disliked these two alternatives hardly less than the others. Indeed the traducianist view was very close to Neoplatonic emanation, and the creationist to the Jewish notion of inherited guilt. And both contained the implication common to most oriental thought that copulation, and therefore the body rather than the soul, was the original cause of sin. Yet against this materialistic conviction the Church could not or would not now protest, and asceticism—long held somewhat in check by the Fathers—was once more gaining the upper hand.

c. The Incarnation

A much more acute dogmatic divergence concerned the nature of the incarnated Christ. This was the Adoptionist heresy originating in Spain, which was hardly more than a recrudescence of the still smouldering Nestorianism of the Byzantines. A certain Elipandus said that, whereas Christ as God was the Son by nature, as man he was the Son only by being adopted by the Father after his baptism. A certain Felix gave as his version that Christ, of his own free will, chose to become wholly human, and remained so until re-adopted by the Father only at the moment of his Resurrection.

When Alcuin in France heard of this Spanish eruption he wrote a refutation. But instead of holding to Pope Leo's and Chalcedon's decision that the incarnated Christ was at once wholly God and wholly a man, Alcuin was trapped—as Gregory I had been—into alleging, much as had the Euty-chians, that Christ was never quite a man like other men, that his sufferings had not been quite like ours. The Adoptionists countered by claiming that their opponents were guilty of confusing Christ's humanity with his divinity. Claudius of Turin probably revealed the underlying issue when he declared that Christ should not be worshipped as one who had been humiliated on the Cross.

If Leo I's solution was the best abstractly, Leo III's observation that many dogmas needed to be stressed more at certain times than at others was now the more judicious: in certain past times it had seemed important to emphasize Christ's unique wish to suffer for man's sake, but in the still half-pagan empire of Charlemagne it was imperative to stress his terrifying power to punish all who had not meekly heeded his commands.

The Virgin was of course also involved in the controversy: if she was the Mother of God how could she also be the Mother of a human being? In what obstetrical sense she remained a virgin was warmly argued, with the Manichees—who also regarded matter and therefore the body as a defilement—embarrassingly ranged alongside of Alcuin and the current orthodoxy.

d. The Redemption

The problem so much debated by the fourth-century Fathers of the purpose and effect of the Redemption, was now also, if only superficially, revived. An early effort was that of a certain Clement of Ireland, who was rebuked by Boniface for alleging that Christ, when he descended into hell, liberated all the souls which he found imprisoned there. The inference could be drawn from this that Christ thought that the descendants of Adam had been unfairly treated, but it did not suggest whether the injustice had been God's wrath or the Devil's malice.

Alcuin merely remarked, noncommittally, that Christ conquered the Devil "rather by justice than by violence," but Rhaban Maur said that, on the contrary, by taking advantage of the sin of Adam the Devil had usurped dominion over men "against all right and justice." This view bordered on the Manichean idea of dualistic violence and was not followed, for Paschasius Radbertus, Walafrid Strabo, and Eri-gena all said that because men deserved the penalty the Devil had not treated man unjustly in enforcing it. Paschasius further expounded the traditional mousetrap theory that Christ assumed the flesh in order that the Devil be tempted to tempt him, and that this was done "justly, in order that he (the Devil) should be conquered by infirmity of the flesh who had hurled the mass of our humanity into the infirmity of death." Here the fourth-century belief is revived: it avoided not only the awkward wrath-of-God theory but also the Mithraic view. For there *had* been a real dualism, but the struggle for supremacy had already taken place in the law court with justice presiding, and had there been decided, once and for all.

e. Salvation

The most widely agitated dogmatic issue in the Carolingian world, however, naturally concerned salvation. Possibly the curtain was raised by the desire to combat the pagan cult of the dead. When Clement was rebuked by Boniface for alleging that Christ had saved all those who had died before his coming, this was partly because of the implication that if Christ had saved all these ancients he must be doing no less for all who followed. For if he not only wished to, but could and in fact did, save all the former, surely he could and in fact did, save all the latter too. If Origen and the Neoplatonists had been right in denying the eternity of hell, the pagan cult of all the dead, indiscriminately, was also right.

Christ had promised salvation to all who believed in him. In time this promise had had to be interpreted to mean to all who not only believed in him but also succeeded in some degree in emulating him. We have seen that emulating him was too often interpreted to mean showing him a merely decent

outward respect. This ritual observance was still no less demanded than hitherto, but there was now added, in this material rather than spiritual battle against paganism, military observance. For it was argued, as by Rhaban Maur, and promised by Pope Leo IV, that all who died fighting the pagans would, as virtual martyrs, be saved. This offered the more pious so special an incentive that the clergy had to be forbidden to wear arms, even against pagans. This decree was promulgated by Zacharias, pope from 741 to 751, and it may have helped to decide Boniface, when attacked by pagans in 755, to suffer death rather than resist, even in self-defense. But it proved, certainly in the long run, quite unenforceable.

With the sharp revival of admiration for Augustine the problem of predestination was bound to be raised again. It was generally agreed that some men, like Paul, had been predestined to be saved, so that the argument was only about predestination to be damned. Augustine had thought there was no alternative, but the Council of Orange had declared that, although this was true of the unbaptized, those who were lucky enough to have *been* baptized acquired free will.

Following the Council, the first opinions, from Italy, were indecisive: Paulinus of Aquileia thought that he might well be damned merely because God "had not wished" to grace him; Claudius of Turin declared that Christ would hardly have urged men to try to become virtuous unless they had received from him the requisite free will.

It was not until about 850 that the debate began in the north. Gottschalk favored Augustine's uncompromising predestination for all. He had a good many influential supporters as well as opponents, but whether his belief in a predestination to hell was a defense of Augustine rather than of Orange is not clear. Prudentius of Troyes said that, although Gottschalk's view was not official, it was (presumably because Augustinian) not heretical either. Were the canons of Orange known, however, and, if known, were they understood? Probably neither. In any case Claudius' common-sense view prevailed. The popes apparently did not commit themselves but when Hincmar, archbishop of Rheims, forcibly silenced, scourged, and imprisoned Gottschalk neither pope nor anyone else seems to have objected.

f. Sacraments

Sacramental changes were few. Since absolution before the penance imposed had even begun was now general, not only the precise nature of the sin but often even the fact that any penance had been imposed remained a secret of the confessional. This undoubtedly served, as intended, to reconcile the still balky Christians to this otherwise humiliating obligation. It was a face-saving rather than a dignified expedient. On the other hand, the canons of many of the eighth-century councils now forbade the assignment of penances, as an abuse of the belief in vicarious atonement.

The Fathers had expressed a variety of views on the nature of the transubstantiation of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, but no open accusations of heresy had then been brought. The consequence was that no official definition had been made, and when the Carolingians became aware of the discrepancies among the patristic texts each felt free to choose his own solution.

The immediate occasion was perhaps the view of Claudius of Turin that since the *virtue* of the Eucharist depended on the virtue of the recipient, it must also depend on that of the priestly transmitter. For there could not, in so far as the *virtue* was physical, be any short circuit.

The nature of the *virtue* was soon after analyzed by two monks of Corbie, near Amiens. Paschasius offered as his solution that the change, although sensuously and naturally (because of its still natural appearance) a mere symbol, was in essence real. Each change constituted a re-creation of the original Incarnation because, as Gregory I and now Alcuin had supposed, Christ too had had at least the appearance of being a wholly natural man. It was of course, he said, a miracle but not an illogical one.

The other monk, Ratramnus, had taken issue, declaring that the very fact of the Eucharist's power of moral discrimination proved that its *virtue* was not physical or at least not essentially physical. The phenomenon was not, therefore, a mere philosophical or magical, but a theological or supernatural, miracle, illogical and therefore a true mystery.

Whether Ratramnus knew it or not he was defending Leo I and Chalcedon against the Eutychian Greeks.

g. Last Judgment

No open controversy arose in regard to the Last Judgment. If, however, Boniface's story of the man who witnessed the proceedings was to be accepted, no saint intervened at the trial but only the angels. Since, nevertheless, the saint's power of intercession in behalf of the dead was now generally assumed, we must suppose that this was in order to recount not so much his client's stalwart virtues as his groveling appeals for mercy.

4. TEMPORAL POWERS

a. Miraculous

It was taken for granted that, since God was Perfection, He must also be not only complete Goodness and Wisdom but also complete Power. As He had created the world, so He maintained and ruled it. He was sole Cause. Every good Christian said so and thought that they believed so, but only Augustine and his followers proved that they really believed it by proceeding to explain what, on that assumption, the world was like. To Augustine every event was a miraculous didactic revelation, the Devil was a mere symbol of man's sin, and man had no free will not to sin. In heaven, moreover, the saint had no more of a will of his own than had the angels.

Yet, strangely enough, while the Merovingian and early Carolingian world was floundering deep in the polytheism of the cult of the saints, who should spark the ensuing revival but this same Augustine! Was this chance, the accessibility of his texts, or a natural revulsion? Gottschalk, to be sure, had been chastised for his presumption; Agobard, on the other hand, who had minimized the powers of the saints, was not, at least openly, reproved. Nor was Paschasius for saying that every event was equally and wholly caused by God.

And the ascendancy of God was otherwise revealed. Pope Gregory II forbade the isolation of the plague-stricken be-

cause this would be tempting God; Boniface attributed all the hardships that he and his fellow missionaries suffered to the will of God; and Servatus Lupus said that when men died it was by God's hand. It was even under the auspices of God that the Ordeals were being employed, although in this case His judgment was believed better revealed to men if they set up the machinery for Him.

The problem now raised as the revival unfolded was therefore less of His omnipotence than of His omnificence; not, that is, of His ultimate power so much as of His disposition to exercise it; of how far, in a word, His agents—angels, saints, demons, priests—were being allowed to exercise any discretion.

It was agreed that the angels were given no discretion and that the clergy could not use their sacramental powers to serve temporal ends. The faithful could and should pray to God for temporal relief and rewards; but how far was this anything more than a right of petition? It all depended on whether the dead saints were also possessed of discretionary and miraculous temporal authority. The dogma was that their wills would in any case invariably coincide with God's, but the belief was that God permitted them to bestow mercies because in justice to them He could not, whether He liked it or not, refuse.

If this was the popular and prevailing view, however, there were now Augustinian dissenters. Claudius, of Spanish origin, active in Aquitaine, and made bishop of Turin by King Louis, attacked not only image- but also relic-worship because reliance on these deadened men's own efforts to become virtuous, which was the only way they could hope to be saved. He was obliged to retract. Agobard, bishop of Lyons, probably also of Spanish origin, spoke more cautiously, admitting that according to the Old Testament it was possible to obtain temporal help from one of "those saints of God who have received, and will receive many things." But he also said that to invoke a saint in order to check an epidemic was a waste of time. Finally Erigena, who was condemned, although he did say that even the damned may be helped by the merits of the saints, insisted elsewhere that salvation is not won by appeals to others but only by the automatic operation of an intrinsically acquired virtue.

If God does not need, or even tolerate, the help of saints, was it not tempting Him to invoke them in preference to Him?

It is commonly said that this period was the heyday of fabrications, for the art of fraud had by now far outpaced that of detecting it. The 'planting' of the false relic was so easy that in 794 the Frankish Church forbade the cult of any alleged saint whose merit was not authenticated by a biography. The only result, however, seems to have been a spate of new biographies which had the authentic ring only because they were a patchwork of episodes copied from older and therefore generally accepted ones. It acted as an incentive rather than as a deterrent to fraud. Agobard of Lyons protested against this rampant credulity, but the far more influential Hincmar of Rheims soon afterwards wrote the famous biography of Bishop Remi, also of Rheims, in which it was described how, as Remi was about to baptize Clovis, a white dove was seen descending from Heaven bearing a phial containing a holy oil. With this Remi thereupon administered the royal baptism. If not the purpose, it was at least the consequence, of this fraud that no subsequent Frankish king could be crowned without a similar anointing. If we may be allowed a digression, it was in 830 that the relics of James the Apostle were 'discovered' at Compostela in Spain, and in 850 that the story first gained currency of how they were translated—that is, transported—there from Jerusalem.

The Franks had become so obsessed by the power of alleged relics that one might expect them, when the iconoclastic controversy of the East came to their ears, to side with the so-called Image-Worshippers. The contrary, however, was the case; and this may have been partly because they felt the cult of images would tend to reduce the value and repute of their hard-won relics. There were doubtless other reasons too: for one thing, they had few images representing their favorite saints; for another, the relic's peculiar virtue depended on its having been in contact with the saint's own holy soul, whereas, since an image presumably never had been, it had first to make its own way as at least a miraculous healer. A few, such as Dungal of Ireland and Jonas of Orléans, favored the cult but Charlemagne was hostile, and responsible feeling seems to have been that if tolerated at all it would soon be abused.

b. Magical

The Fathers were sure that the Roman pagans had mistaken the demons for gods and had therefore greatly overestimated their powers, especially since the Redemption. At the same time the evil which was now befalling a Christian people was not so easily attributed to Christ as it had been to Jehovah. The hand of the demons, even if only Germanic gods, could not be denied. Where, then, was the Church to draw the line? Pope Gregory II had attributed a plague to God, but the later Frankish Council of 794 blamed a famine on the Devil. Servatus Lupus had said that only God could cause death, but a chronicler of about 727 and Pope Nicholas in about 862 said that civil wars were caused by the Devil. There was also the question if the Devil could interfere with the mechanics of the Ordeal.

There was no doubt but that God chastised whereas the Devil tempted. Which of them, however, punished? This was important where the king was allegedly misbehaving because if God were the cause, the king should not be resisted; whereas if the Devil were, he should be. And this was not all. Agobard said that the Devil had no physical power over Nature but only a psychological power over men's imaginations. It was by this power alone that he could induce kings to err or Christians to fight each other; it was by this power also that he could make men believe in sorcery and in other falsehoods and heresies. Now this, too, was an intelligible distinction; but again the difficulty was to recognize it in a concrete case. The famine which the Council of 794 had attributed to the Devil occurred because the stalks had produced no grain. Yet this could hardly have been because the Devil had hypnotized the stalks. In order to cover such a situation it was alleged, if perhaps only later, that although the Devil could do nothing contrary to Nature and therefore miraculous, he could so cleverly manipulate Nature that men could not see that it was mere magic. If this were so, the Devil would be not only a hypnotist but a real magician.

Could the Devil impart any of his diabolical arts to men? The pagans, whether Roman or Germanic, had thought so, and there seemed to be plenty of cases tending to substantiate

them. It was now generally taught that all pagans served, however unwittingly, the Devil's interests, and this was why the Jews, even if royal physicians, were always under suspicion. This could be interpreted as due to their evil dispositions rather than to their possession of specifically diabolical powers: as where the 'magicians' who, according to the royal capitulary *De villis*, were suspected of sowing the grain seed so deep that it did not sprout, for these could well have been merely deluded saboteurs. The pagan Saxons burned alleged sorcerers alive, and, in order to stamp out this survival of pagan superstition, Charlemagne's *Saxon Capitulary* of 787 made it a crime to burn, or even to accuse another of being, a sorcerer. For to him the Devil's domination over men had long since been forfeited to God.

Agobard, bishop of Lyons (which city, it is to be observed, was a centre of Manichean activity), did not wholly agree. He said that although the Devil had been deprived of his power over Nature, he still retained as a Tempter a great psychological power over men. In so far as the account he gives of what happened in Beneventum, in Italy, is accurate, he had every reason to suppose so:

Not many years ago when there was a great mortality among the cattle the absurd rumor was spread that Grimoald the Duke of Beneventum, because he was the enemy of the most Christian Emperor Charles, had sent out men charged to scatter throughout the plains and mountains, the meadows and springs, a powder which, being thus spread, was deadly to the cattle. We have heard it told that many persons were on this account seized and some massacred, and that many were also tied to planks and then cast into the river to drown. And, what is more remarkable, these men, upon being seized, bore witness against themselves, saying that they had had such a powder and had so scattered it. For the Devil, by a just Judgment of God, so skilfully utilized the power which he had been given to deal with these wretches that he made them bear false witness against themselves for their own condemnation, and neither chastisement, nor torture, nor (the threat of) death itself could dissuade them from bearing false witness against themselves. (Yet) such was the universal conviction that there were barely a few who saw the absurdity of it. For they surely were not reasonable in thinking that it was possible to concoct a powder such that the cattle alone, and no others, would die of it, or how it could be carried throughout such wide territories that men could scatter the powder over them, even if all the men and women of Beneven-

tum, old and young, went over the region each with three cartloads. So great a madness has come over this unfortunate century that Christians now believe absurdities which aforesometimes even pagans who were ignorant of the Creator of all things could not have been induced to believe. I have wished to speak of this circumstance because it resembles that of which we have been speaking, and because it can serve as a proof and example of vain seductions and divergences from common sense. (*De Grandine*, XVI.)

Since it was now a crime even to accuse another of sorcery, the true crime was no longer the deed but the false belief in the possibility of the deed. So to believe was indeed heresy, and the heretic was a virtual pagan and therefore an idol- or devil-worshipper. Just as the difference between a worshipper of God and of the miracle-working saint was merely one of degree, so must it be between the devil-worshipper and the sorcerer.

This seems to explain why, two generations after Charlemagne and one after Agobard, a series of synods declared magic to be punishable, for what else could the wizards be if not the Devil's agents? Hincmar, archbishop of Rheims, declared that demons could and did copulate with both men and women. He tried, however, to save his orthodoxy by adding that the then great activity of the magicians was to be taken as an unnatural omen of the imminence of the Antichrist as a just punishment for the sins of men. By 890 the pope was declaring that magicians should be punishable by death.

Who was to blame, then, saboteurs, hypnotized men, devil-worshippers, the Devil, or God? The Carolingians, at any rate, were understandably confused.

c. Human

During much of the Merovingian period virtually no law had proved effective except that of violence. Might hardly even bothered to think of right. This remained true until shortly before 750 when an entente, successful because mutually advantageous, developed between Church and State or, more specifically, between pope and Frankish king. Both were equally anxious to promote law and order, and both were therefore equally hostile to certain basic offenses such

as murder, robbery, adultery, perjury, and magic. Furthermore, as the bishops, abbots, and papacy were becoming more involved in territorial and other material possessions, so the kings were becoming more worried by the defects of the canon law. The *modus vivendi*, roughly speaking, was established by recognizing the pope's legislative, and the king's executive, priority. Sacrilege, accordingly, was accepted as a civil offense, and, in some cases at least, a sentence of excommunication, even of a penance, was enforced by the State.

But if, accelerated by the pressure of Lombard, Arab, Dane, Saxon, and Avar, there was harmony, there was also dissonance, and the Gallic episcopate, with its own prestige to defend, produced many three-cornered controversies. Thus the kings, and notably Charlemagne himself, claimed that in temporal matters he was the specially appointed vicar of God, and that in so far as canon law dealt with temporal matters he, rather than pope or Church council, had the duty not only to interpret existing canon law but also to veto new enactments. On this principle he claimed the right to appoint his own bishops and abbots, and even alleged that the duty of the clergy was not so much to govern as to pray. Two generations later, moreover, Archbishop Hincmar made the claim that, within his archdiocese at least, he was sovereign as against both king and pope. He doubtless fabricated the story of the dove with the phial of ointment in order to show that the king became legally such only if and when he had been so anointed, as Clovis allegedly had been in 496, by the archbishop of Rheims. Up to this time the pope had been discreet, but now, in rebuttal, Pope Nicholas, reviving the old claim that the pope was superior to both the king and the episcopate, openly demanded that the Frankish king, whose power was by then feeble, obey his orders; and he followed up these claims by successfully deposing a considerable number of Frankish bishops in favor of others more pliable. Actually these conflicts were important only as later precedents because, soon after Nicholas, the prestige and power of the popes followed that of the kings into a century and more of relative impotence.

With clergy and king openly at odds, was there any legal way out? Bishops could certainly be ousted; the only question

was by whom. Could a pope be also? This latter question, except locally in Rome, did not now really come up, for if the pope resisted he could simply be ignored. But it was otherwise when in 830 King Louis the Pious was threatened.

Just as it was thought that the prosperity of a diocese depended on the virtue of its bishop, so it was thought that at the Last Judgment a bishop was held responsible not only for his own conduct but for that of the people of his diocese. This belief was extended to the king. But the fate of either bishop or king at the Last Judgment concerned the people far less than what would then happen to them. For might they not there be held to have tempted God by supinely obeying a bad king?

The problem was, as so often now, whether the badness of the king was directly caused by God in order to punish a sinful people. If so, the people could be relieved only by their own amendment. This view although held by some was rejected by others: the popes thought that at least they themselves, as popes, had the right to depose such a king; others, like-minded but not so sure of themselves, claimed their own right to disobey on the ground that a king by doing evil automatically forfeited his throne.

The more supine were undoubtedly being the more faithful both to the Old Testament and to the "thou shalt render unto Caesar" of the New; they showed more trust in God's omnipotence by their reluctance to act as if they were wiser or stronger than He. At the same time they were abetting the ambitions of Caesar and helping restore the divine right of David the King.

It was generally believed that the power of Church and State was justified by the consequences of the Fall. By natural law as it was then understood all men were created equal; there would have been no slavery, no private property, no government, but for Adam's fault. Yet the voice of one Smaragdus was at this time the only one raised in favor of the emancipation of the slaves and no one advocated either communism or anarchy. The law, civil as well as canon, had been imposed by God to fit men's fallen state, and Charlemagne himself was one of the few sanguine enough to believe that as a result of the Redemption the natural law might possibly

again become practicable before the end of the world. For he seems to have extended Augustine's view of man's increasing enlightenment before the Redemption to cover the post-Redemption era as well. It is possible, moreover, that his ally, Pope Leo III, in his own realm shared this view, for he was reported to have told certain of Charlemagne's legates that all stages of culture could not take the same attitude to dogma, and that accordingly what was important in some stages might not be in others.

Leo, by justifying according to time, place, and circumstances a strict enforcement of certain dogmas and a neglect of others, was envisaging legislation. He said that the articles of the Creed were imperative but that other dogmas were, although not ephemeral, at least elastic. Charlemagne, too, recognized certain laws to be so fundamental that they should never be altered, whereas others—temporary, as for an emergency—could be enacted and later repealed. Did not God also perhaps create fundamental laws of nature, permanent and unamendable, yet, where the occasion required, temporarily suspend or alter some of them by a miraculous intervention?

What, then, of the fabrications? Most of them were local and popular both in origin and in purpose, but a few were virtually constitutional amendments in disguise. The older the law, the harder it was to change: the New Testament had had to incorporate the Old; the Fathers and councils had had to incorporate both; and the popes had now to incorporate them all. Therefore what a new pope or other authority wished to say or do could win confidence and respect only in so far as it seemed consistent with the ancient tradition. The fabrication, therefore, was a device designed to circumvent this obstacle by being passed off as a neglected or newly discovered original.

An eighth-century example was the *Donation of Constantine*, purporting to be a grant by that emperor to the then Pope Sylvester of temporal sovereignty over the whole Roman West. Almost 100 years later a succession of further fabrications was circulated, and presumably concocted, by the Franks in order to serve ends of peculiar pertinence at just that time. Some were designed to establish that the clergy had always been outside the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and therefore exempt from trial by Ordeal. Others purported

to show that bishops could not be browbeaten by their archbishops. Still others that archbishops outranked the king, or that the pope outranked both. Many of them were to be recognized for centuries as 'genuine antiques.'

Still following the old Germanic law, criminal penalties varied according to the status of both the perpetrator and the victim: the noble could do almost no wrong and the slave almost no right. Because of their vows the severest standards of conduct were demanded of monks, and then of secular clergy. Apart from the usual civil law felonies such as murder, the offenses most often specified and for which the laity as well as the clergy were held liable were participation in the persisting pagan rituals and superstitions—Celtic and Roman as well as Germanic—such as magic, drawing lots, and being or consulting a soothsayer. Specifically forbidden were concerted wailing, drinking toasts, wearing masks, and lighting bonfires. Among other offenses were shouting at the moon to check its waning, and beating drums or ringing bells in order to prevent the demons from producing hail or wind storms. Many of these enactments were based on the pertinent passages in the *Sermons* of Caesarius. They were, at best, symptoms of an incomplete conversion and, at worst, of an insincere one. They were the religious misdemeanors, as dogmatic divergencies were the felonies, of heresy; yet persistence in these too could end in excommunication.

Early laws had naturally been applied to the pagans at a time when wholesale conversions were still impractical—laws against human sacrifice, forced suicide of a widow on the funeral pyre of her husband's corpse, cannibalism, and the selling of human flesh. Much of this, indeed, had already been punishable by Roman law even earlier.

The time had now come, however, when anyone unbaptized, even if he observed all these laws, was not to be tolerated. For now, by the Saxon Capitulary of 782, a man could remain a pagan only so long as no missionary requested him to submit to baptism. Should he refuse he was to be executed. It was by this drastic method, which we may fairly believe that Boniface would not have sanctioned, that his saintly efforts were so promptly brought to a triumphant conclusion. For Church and State had now combined to form what was proba-

bly an unavoidable, yet nonetheless hardly an entirely holy, alliance.

The punishments prescribed naturally varied in severity. A priest was to be defrocked for fighting even if against pagans. Nobles could usually get off with a fine of *wergeld*, serfs or slaves were often merely whipped or mutilated. Soothsayers were liable to be reduced to serfdom. The only prisons were the monasteries. Since the lower the status the more severe the penalty, Jews received especially severe punishments for offenses committed against Christians or Church property.

d. Natural

As the Roman Church and the Frankish State came into direct contact a curious contrast was revealed by the different methods of obtaining the evidence required in court in order to determine innocence or guilt. Following the Roman tradition the canon law relied, as our law does today, wholly on natural evidence, that is, on the testimony of witnesses and documents. But as civil order had receded both became more difficult to produce in court, and the other expedient, torture, was, as Augustine had said, as unreliable as it was cruel. The Franks, on the other hand, were trusting to their Ordeals which, as we have said, were based on the faith that their nature gods, present in such elements as fire and water, could be induced to make the fair judgment of which human judges were incapable.

During the eighth century most of the Frankish customary laws were embodied in written codes, and here the various kinds of Ordeal were described: by battle, by duel, by lots, and especially by fire or water. The Church heartily disapproved of them, as unreliable as well as idolatrous, but the times were now such that she could no longer employ the Roman methods effectively. The best she could do was to insist that her clergy should not be tried by any such devices. Instead these were simply required to swear to their innocence, either on a relic or before receiving the Eucharist, on pain of the dire consequences of perjury to God.

Might the priests, however, officiate at Ordeals—in order to sanctify them? This was evidently tried because a canon

of 807 forbade their using holy oil in order to influence the outcome. There was a curious case recorded of 794 where Peter, bishop of Verdun, on trial for treason by the royal Synod and being unable to produce enough compurgators who were willing to swear to his good repute, volunteered to have another man submit to the Ordeal in his behalf, while he prayed (and indeed successfully) that this would prove his innocence. In still another case a relic was somehow subjected to an Ordeal in order to test its authenticity.

The Church was evidently fighting a losing battle, but it was not until after 900 that the Ordeal gradually came to be accepted by the Church as another of her many devices for inducing God to manifest His will and powers at man's behest.

The Ordeal by battle, on the theory that right makes might, was now generally accepted. It explains the importance which was attached to the possession, after the battle, of the battle-field. If one side could continue to occupy it, in spite of enemy counterattacks, for three days, it was assumed that God had thereby rendered judgment. In order to avoid tempting God, therefore, the enemy at the end of that time must desist either by retreating or by submitting to terms.

Everybody was of course well aware that, in contrast to the ordinary run of events, there were others which were extraordinary. In the case of these latter the problem was merely to determine whether the direct cause was God, a saint, or a demon.

But what was the direct cause of the ordinary event? Here, too, God was certainly the indirect cause, but perhaps only Paschasius adopted Augustine's extreme view that these events were no less directly caused by God's fiat or will. For their characteristic was that they were recurrent, routine, and therefore, although in varying degrees, predictable. It was indeed hard to suppose that God was continuously willing the motion of every one of the stars and planets in order to keep them in motion, and, in regard to the sun, it was hardly likely that God directly caused the recurrence of the days and seasons. These, therefore, must rather have been infused with certain innate powers of their own. In that case the inanimate world, at any rate, must function somewhat as the Devil did, not because God was now willing it but rather because He once had

willed it. The repetitions, therefore, had no new significance.

This could certainly be, and was, generally recognized, but it was of limited help in determining to which of these two categories a concrete event belonged. Those whom Rhaban Maur ridiculed for shouting in order to check the waning of the moon were merely superstitious pagans who did not realize that this phenomenon repeated itself every twenty-eight days. Storms too could be counted on, although less regularly. Hail, on the other hand, because it could do serious damage, seemed clearly to be a divine intervention. Opinion varied according to who was affected: he who contracted a disease felt God's hand on him, but this was of no significance to strangers. Lepers were segregated because theirs seemed a familiar and routine disease to all but the victims. Plagues, because they were as unpredictable as hail storms and usually more widely devastating, had struck a pope as miraculous and therefore not to be resisted. Agobard ridiculed the belief that insanity was a premeditated divine chastisement, but he might well have thought otherwise had he experienced a spell of it himself.

These problems were all involved in the theories about the Eucharist. Was God the direct or only the indirect cause of its mysterious effects? If only indirectly, how was it that the inanimate *virtue* could always be possessed by an evil priest yet could never be transmitted, even by a good priest, to an evil communicant?

5. SECULAR LEARNING

a. Language

In the Frankish State the written language, secular as well as ecclesiastical, was now usually Latin; but the oral tongue, although in certain regions still a debased Latin, was chiefly that of the Franks; and this, under the regime of the eastern Carolingians, became the official oral language of the court. A third language, which may have begun with the Roman conquest of Gaul but was long unrecorded, we are now made aware of in a biography of Adalhard, who was a member of Charlemagne's Palatine Academy. It was there said that al-

though Adalhard knew Latin best of all, he also spoke *roman* as well as *francique*. This *francique* was the native speech of the Franks and has given modern Franconia its name; *roman* was the Latin as corrupted by the Romans of Gaul and is the origin of modern French. Fifty years later, or in 842, appeared our first written specimen of these vernaculars, and in about 870 Otfried of Weissenburg translated the Gospels into that *francique* which is the origin of German. It was after another thirty years that King Alfred was to translate certain Latin-Christian texts into Anglo-Saxon. Such translations into *roman*, however, were made only much later, presumably because Latin came much more easily to those who spoke *roman* than to those who, like Charlemagne, spoke only *francique*.

The Carolingian schools are now often spoken of as humanist because they tried to revive the classical Latin of Cicero's day, which was almost as different from that of Gregory the Great as Gregory's was from the current *roman*.

Another dead language which was now revived, by the Irish scholars in the continental schools, was Greek. In the later ninth century King Charles the Bald tried to promote its study; and some scholars, such as Notker Balbulus and Heiric of Auxerre, acquired some knowledge of it from Irish teachers. But only the Irishman Erigena seems to have put this knowledge to constructive use.

The language sections of the liberal arts were three and therefore came to be known as the Trivium: grammar, rhetoric, and logic. Originally so divided by Varro, the ninth century knew them chiefly through the allegorical work on them by the fifth-century African Neoplatonist Martianus Capella. Their study was encouraged by the Carolingian clergy only in order to help them in clarifying the various symbolic meanings of Scripture, but Charlemagne also encouraged their study by the lay nobility because, as prospective statesmen, they ought to learn to speak and write correctly and persuasively, and to think straight.

These were the official reasons given by Church and State for sanctioning the study of classical pagan texts, but in doing so they opened the door to what was later to be called humanism—that is, the study of what pre-Redemption man, ignorant even of the Old Testament, conceived himself and his

world to be. This was, like the Old Testament, an historical Revelation, but with the difference that there was not the same obligation to interpret the texts symbolically.

The immediate consequences, however, were far from shattering; at most they set a precedent which was to bear fruit only many centuries later. Curiosity, however, was enough to cause the monks to make copies of many of their available classical texts, and it is through these copies—not through the models, which have not survived—that at least the more important contemporary records of pagan Rome have come down to us.

To some, logic already seemed to be the most important discipline of the three. We have seen how men had struggled with it in order to prove that the dogmas—of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Eucharist especially—were at least not irrational and so impossible, and, as wider fields of speculation emerged, logic assumed an even greater role. For, to the extent that dogma did not seem to be involved, reason could feel freer of its duty to subordinate itself to Revelation.

Alcuin was one of the first Carolingians to make the experiment, a feeble effort which merely repeated such commonplaces as that death and darkness were not realities but only privations. Soon after him, Fredegise, also of English origin but abbot at Tours and later chancellor of the Franks, got in deeper, saying that a nothing is nonetheless a something, for if it were not it could have no name. He was perhaps trying to define formless or potential matter. Soon after, logic was so far in the saddle that Rhaban Maur declared it to be the “*disciplina disciplinarum*”—next below, and indeed on the verge of challenging, the old theology which had been so solidly grounded on Scripture.

Next, as the Carolingian climax, came John Scot Erigena with his logical observation that, since God was the Creator of all Being, He must Himself be non-Being. With him we shall shortly deal further.

b. Sciences

The other sections of the liberal arts, which were to be known as the Quadrivium, consisted of arithmetic, geometry,

astronomy, and music, with further disciplines frequently added as the need required. The study of these four 'sciences' was equally encouraged, and for the same reason. Arithmetic was considered especially indispensable in order to grasp the full significance of the numbers cited in the Old Testament. Geometry, although it sometimes included geography, was chiefly utilized in order to measure the duration of the hours, which, being always twelve for both night and day, necessarily varied daily according to season and latitude. Astronomy was similarly utilized, only it was to calculate the time not of the day but of the year, to serve, that is, as a calendar rather than a clock. Music, finally, was becoming an essential element in the ever-evolving ritual.

Medicine was one of the disciplines most often added to the Quadrivium. The fundamental quandary is well illustrated by Gregory II's instructions that the plague-stricken should not be segregated and by the almost contemporaneous Carolingian law requiring that lepers should be. What, then, was a physician to do? He might safely try to cure leprosy because this was a natural disease, but should he try to cure anyone of the plague he would be tempting God and thereby inviting the courts to condemn him as a magician. No wonder, then, that it was tempting even for one of a compassionate nature to tend the sick by prayers rather than by *art*.

There were still, however, some exceptions. Rhaban Maur encouraged the reading of old medical texts and the study of herbs, and we may infer from Agobard's insistence that leprosy and insanity were natural diseases that he must have been of like mind. For to him these were neither the Devil's work nor, at least directly, even God's, but rather, as Erigena might have said, an accident of the Creation.

There were, roughly, three categories of doctors: the monk, the empiric (who was an unlettered leech or surgeon), and the Jew. The monks, as we have said, maintained their own hospitals and provided relief, to body as well as mind, such as was not obtainable elsewhere; among the empirics there were doubtless both secret skills and hardly less secret rogueries; Charlemagne, at least, preferred to patronize the Jews. Medically, these Jews were probably the least useless, but they could rarely if ever have been admitted to the schools, and

they were under a constant threat, whether their patients died or recovered, of being condemned as practitioners of diabolical magic.

Cosmological questions aroused very little interest: opinions largely depended on what particular classical texts were read. Even the shape of the earth was of incidental concern. Augustine had not been able to make up his mind; Isidore of Seville was inclined to think it was flat; Bede thought it was spherical. The later Neoplatonists had also thought it spherical, and those now attracted to them, like Rhaban Maur and Erigena, agreed. But the vast majority were doubtless undisturbed in their belief that because the earth looked flat, it must be flat.

A closely related problem concerned the antipodes. A certain Virgilius, an Irish bishop of Salzburg, claimed—although not necessarily on the assumption that the earth was flat—that there existed a subterranean antipodal race which had another sun and moon of its own. This was denied by Boniface, who was doubtless following the better English tradition as exemplified by Bede.

A century later a certain Rimbert alleged that there was a race of Cynocephali, or dog-headed men, inhabiting a region of Africa, for he had read this in a certain (apocryphal) *Act*. Of this Ratramnus was skeptical, but added that if this should by any chance prove true, even as monsters they must be assumed to be reasonable, and therefore redeemable, beings.

As an introduction to Erigena it may be added that he adopted the astronomical theory—now called geo- or heliocentric—which supposed that, whereas the sun circled around a stationary earth, four of the planets (Mercury, Venus, Mars, and Jupiter) in turn circled not around the earth but around the sun. Although by adding Mars and Jupiter he went beyond his authority Martianus Capella—who had in his turn followed Heraclides of Pontus, an eccentric disciple of Plato and Aristotle—Erigena did not explain why he had added them, and it is unlikely that he attached any significance to his variation. The next adjustment, by those who continued to assume the earth's immobility, was not to be made until, about 1600, Tycho Brahe added Saturn as the sun's fifth satellite.

6. ERIGENA

a. General Observations

John Scot Erigena was Irish and perhaps a layman who was on the continent intermittently from 845 on and whose doctrine was there twice condemned during his lifetime: by the Councils of Valence in 855 and of Langres in 859. He is here treated separately not because of his contemporary fame but because of the influence that his doctrine exerted during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. He in turn had been chiefly influenced, apart from the Bible, by Augustine and some of the Greek Fathers, and by Pseudo-Denis and some of the other later Neoplatonic Christians.

Unlike Augustine, he was not concerned to keep pagan beliefs at arm's length; but also unlike Pseudo-Denis, he was a serious and informed Christian who knew his Bible thoroughly and accepted it blindly as Revelation. His trouble, scarcely his own fault, was that, like everybody else, he had been taught that the truest meaning of the Bible text was that which was furthest removed from the literal. Being metaphysically rather than ethically or institutionally minded, and believing that Pseudo-Denis was the disciple of whom Paul spoke, Erigena simply chose his doctrine as the truth of which the Bible text could be construed to be the mystical symbol.

Also Erigena was an Irishman, and at this time the Irish, partly because of their familiarity with Greek texts, were as independent of, as the English were subservient to, the Latin Church. To him the widely disparate interpretations of the Fathers and of the canons of councils and decretals of popes seemed to be just so many opinions advanced by men no more infallible than he, and, to the extent that he might be smarter and better read than they were, his own views might well be sounder than theirs. He liked Augustine and the Greek Gregory of Nyssa chiefly because they too had been impressed, as he now was, by Neoplatonic ideas.

His fundamental premise, like Augustine's (and indeed everybody else's whether they knew it or not), was that 'even if I am deceived, I am.' Then followed the rationalization that 'I am least deceived by Scripture.' Only then came the

credo ut intelligam, that 'I (choose to) believe in order that I may understand.'

Since virtually no one, pagan, Jew, or Moslem, disputed God's existence, and since no beast even suspected it, this human knowledge was assumed to be natural or innate. The only problem, therefore, was to discover further what He was like. All men also agreed that He was not only wise and powerful but also good, and that He would not, therefore, deceive men but would rather seek to enlighten them within their limitations.

The natural Revelation of the created world offered little more than negative information, and it was because it only served to lead men badly astray that the divine Revelation followed. But this was in fact hardly less obscure, and the reason was, Erigena concluded, that God's nature so far surpassed anything of which men could conceive that He tried to explain it in Scripture as best He could by resorting to a variety of symbols, the abundance of which would compensate for their lack of intelligibility.

Most of the earlier Christian commentators were chiefly curious to find out how they must feel, think, and behave in order to be saved. Erigena is now regarded as the first medieval philosopher because he wanted to find out not only what God willed to do but also how He managed to do it. The best, if not the only, available explanation of this was the Neoplatonic. This, then, must be the key by which the symbols of Scripture could be most correctly read.

By means of grace certain privileged men had been, and could be, illuminated to learn more, but Erigena was too modest to suggest, or probably to believe, that he was of that number.

The task that Erigena set for himself, therefore, was not an easy one, but as Gregory I had already discovered, it was extraordinary how many symbolic meanings one could, with God's help and by trying hard, extract from the divine text.

b. Creation

God, although He was not Himself Being, was the Creator of Being or of all Creation. Erigena also readily accepted the

Trinity, but since the Neoplatonists had a Trinity of their own, theirs seemed to be the best explanation of it. The Father, accordingly, was the essence of the Creation, the Son the power, the Holy Ghost the executant. Being was produced out of nothing, but was this not that non-Being which was no other than God? It was also necessary, in the sense that God, as Goodness itself, could not help but choose to create. It followed that everything which was created was good. To the Father was the capacity, to the Son the will, to the Holy Ghost the obedience. In order to obey, the Holy Ghost had simply automatically to actualize all the Father's and Son's ideas.

This involved first the production from the Trinitarian One of a multiplicity. From this in turn came the abstractions, of time, space, and motion, of weight, density, form, color, and temperature, and also the concrete things, such as matter—including the two sexes—and spirit; so that the soul, indeed, differed from its body only in appearance, that is, accidentally but not substantially. This matter, indeed, was of itself formless, a mere possibility; it was constituted only by the concourse of immaterial and intelligible qualities, and perhaps God's only purpose in creating it was in order that man, by means of his bodily senses and the rest of nature, might obtain that first Revelation which introduced him to the existence of his God.

c. Evil

But was this matter in the Neoplatonic, or any other, sense the cause of evil? Erigena did not think so. He of course said that evil was a nothing, a mere absence of good; but he was nonetheless worried by it, and particularly by the fact that he was not willing, as Augustine had been, to dismiss the Devil as a mere symbol. He was therefore driven to the already familiar expedient of saying that, since God had created the Devil, his nature or substance was good, and that it was only his will which, having been free, had produced evil.

Just as Lucifer fell, so did Adam. Here again Erigena refused to follow the Neoplatonic condemnation of matter—perhaps because it seemed too close to the Manichean belief. Instead he followed Augustine in cutting the Gordian

knot: man had no one and nothing else to blame but himself. To be sure, Erigena sugared the pill by such commonplaces as that evil was indispensable in order to high-light the good by contrast, and that evil was relative anyhow because the ferocity which was a sin in man was a virtue in the beast. Nevertheless he was worried, and he had every right; for if God could prevent the good angels and the dead saints from ever sinning, why did He not deal likewise with all his creatures from the beginning? Unless He had shown a lack of foresight or wisdom, He must have lacked either the power or the goodness. Why then did Erigena not call it a mystery? Because, we may surmise, as a good Christian he recognized that a mystery concerned only God's apparent but inexplicable perfections.

d. The Redemption

To Erigena man, even after the Fall, retained his free will and therefore his capacity to earn merit, but this had never, or hardly ever, been enough to warrant his salvation. For although the natural Revelation of the created universe and the Revelation (to the Jews at least) of God as Jehovah, coupled with man's natural reason, gave him an inkling of truth, these factors, with his own small merits added, were still woefully inadequate.

The Redemption largely removed these handicaps. The Devil's evil will had thereby been harnessed to further God's purposes, and grace could now be justly bestowed as a reward of merit. This grace enhanced not only man's virtue, but also his intelligence, so that, coupled with the further Revelation of the New Testament, any man could save himself; and a few could be so enlightened that they could come to know not only of God's existence but also something of His essence, that is, of the so-called theophanies, which were otherwise not perceivable except by the angels.

e. Salvation

Nowhere is Erigena less respectful of the current beliefs than in his theory of salvation; for he says that a man is saved

or not entirely because of the merit which his free will has earned. Claudius had felt much the same way, and this belief was at least analogous to the ancient Greek belief that virtue, like fire, tended naturally to rise. It is true that this merit had to be supplemented by grace, but this was now generally understood to be automatically bestowed.

Unlike Claudius, Erigena acknowledged the saints' power of prayer, but rather for the souls of the damned than for mercy to living sinners. Of the humanly devised mechanics for salvation Erigena barely speaks: baptism does wipe out the inherited guilt but the Eucharist is a purely symbolical affair, and so is the so-called Last Judgment. Of works he says nothing, but we may infer that he thought of them as by-products, and not as the raw material, of virtue. The priests, therefore, as well as the Fathers, councils, and popes, had really no powers which laymen—such as Erigena himself—were bound to respect.

Where and what was hell? It could not be physically located in the ephemeral world or anywhere else. Both heaven and hell, indeed, were purely psychological, for, as Augustine had said, the same light which delights the healthy eye pains the eye which is diseased.

f. Cosmic Reunion

With Origen and other Greek Fathers, and also with Neoplatonists like Pseudo-Denis and Maximus, a seventh-century Greek commentator, Erigena believed that the Creation—of so-called Being and Multiplicity—was an ephemeral phenomenon which would pass out of, as it had come into, existence: time, space, motion, weight, density, form, color, temperature, sex, and even matter, would cease to be. Everything would become first spirit, then non-Being again as Multiplicity gradually returned to Unity.

In the meantime—for this might be a very long time—what happened to the souls of the dead? Being now bodiless they would be outside of time and space. It would be then, presumably, that the good would enjoy the light and the bad suffer from it, but only then. For as the Creation gradually faded so would individual happiness as well as misery.

Only here does Erigena make a small concession: although by the final reunion the souls are sublimated into "causes" or "grounds," their individual substances remain intact; the Oneness is therefore not quite what it had originally been. This was one of his few substantial sops to teleology: God, or the One, will be, as was the purpose and end of the Creation, enriched by possessing souls which had enjoyed an experience which God had conceived of and made possible for others but had never, nor ever could have, enjoyed Himself.

7. HIERARCHIES OF PERFECTION

a. God

In neither Testament was there much stress on categories or degrees of perfection: God was a One, the angels and demons were rather nebulous beings, and men, although obviously more perfect than the rest of nature, were, among themselves, potential equals and, during life, readily interchangeable according to their faith and behavior.

But surrounding the Jewish was a Graeco-Roman world still bound to polytheism. Already in Homer, as later in Plotinus and Iamblichus, there were swarms of lesser gods, and above these had evolved the Neoplatonic hierarchy even of the supreme gods, from the One to the Nous to the World Soul to the stars and planets. The Trinity, according to Nicaea, had been the Christian effort to block the adoption by the Arians of this Platonic interpretation of Revelation.

b. Men in the Afterlife

"In my Father's house are many mansions." The most detailed account of these is in Dante, but they were already now beginning to be distinguished. Already the Virgin had been assigned the top one, and the apostles quite as surely came next. The martyrs followed, but there was here a question of who actually were such. Certain Apocrypha had insisted that only those who died as virgins could qualify, but it was now being alleged that any laymen who died fighting the infidel should be so regarded. Gregory the Great had distinguished between the saints who could sing and those who could merely listen; Gregory of Tours had been inclined to

rank them according to the posthumous fame which they were, or should be, enjoying on earth. Angilbert dedicated his three churches at Saint-Riquier to Christ and his saints, the Virgin and apostles, and Benedict and the holy abbots. The bishops were ignored. Pseudo-Denis was now known to have stated that, although it was harder for a priest than for a layman to win salvation, those who did win it enjoyed a superior status.

The hierarchies of purgatory and hell were as yet barely formulated. In Boniface, however, the severity of the purgatorial fire was supposedly gauged to the severity of the still unatoned sin, and the duration of the punishment in hell, although eternal for some, was for others only until the end of the world.

c. Men in the Flesh

To the degrees of perfection possessed by those enjoying eternal life, degrees corresponded among those still alive in the flesh. As God enjoyed perfect power, virtue, and wisdom, so mortal men participated in these attributes not only imperfectly but also in varying degrees of imperfection.

To whom belonged the highest degree of power was now again, as in Roman days, in dispute. Charlemagne claimed that his office, as emperor, was superior to that of either pope or council; Hincmar, as archbishop of Rheims, claimed that the bishops outranked both the emperor and the pope; and Pope Nicholas I countered by reasserting the claims of papal sovereignty. Below these peaks were the hierarchies below each bishop, and those below each abbot, where, even below the monks proper, were the penitents, the criminals, and finally, no less under the authority of the abbot, the serfs and menial slaves.

In the lay world were similar degrees: feudalism was evolving fast in the later ninth century; a man's rank depended on the nature of his land tenures. And these tenures in turn determined his liabilities for criminal offences: a noble could victimize a slave with virtual impunity; in the reverse case the slave was sentenced to die.

Salvation depended on virtue. The more spiritually ambitious became monks, and some of these became missionaries,

hoping to win martyrdom. Here the hierarchy was as highly evolved as it was ill-defined. From the true saints there followed the exemplary orthodox—those in a state of grace—and, below them, the catechumens, penitents, schismatics, Jews (who were tolerated), heretics, pagans, apostates, and magicians (not all of whom were tolerated).

According to Servatus Lupus and Erigena, there were also degrees leading from human imperfection up to virtually divine perfection, though they do not make it quite clear how far these rungs of the ladder could be reached during life on earth. Servatus gives four steps: from civil, purgative, purged, to unity with God. Erigena gives six stages by which the soul eventually mounts from complete disunion back to final reunion. His upper rungs, however, are rather cosmic than moral.

That man had a certain innate awareness of divinity was not disputed, and this was coupled with the natural Revelation which the created world presented to his senses. Next was the historical revelation of the Greek and Old Testament texts. Lastly came that of the New Testament. But true knowledge was to be acquired only by reading the two Testaments symbolically: after the historical, the allegorical, tropological, and anagogical meanings. Beyond the anagogical was personal experience, vouchsafed only by grace, which revealed to certain men the theophanies or truths known naturally only by the angels.

d. Being

The Carolingian revival also became more aware again of many of the old Greek hierarchies of Being. To the more familiar notions of the superiority of the eternal to the ephemeral, of spirit to matter, of the One to the Many, were now added those of substance to accident, ideas to things, essence to appearance, form to matter, potentiality to act, and of the stages of Being: from non-Being to Being or existence, to life, to sensation, to reason, to understanding or intelligence, to God. To Erigena reason, or man, composed equally of soul and body, was exactly halfway from the top to the bottom and, as such, was recognizable as the microcosm or miniature of all reality ranging from God down to nothingness.

NOTES ON PERSONS MENTIONED
WHO FLOURISHED 500-920
(Western Mediterranean During Invasions; Frankish State)

*Approximate
birth & death
dates **

- | | |
|------------|---|
| 465-511 | CLOVIS. King of the Franks. Succeeded his father, Childeric, in 481. |
| 540-604 | GREGORY I. Patrician Roman family; gave immense fortune to Church. |
| 559-593 | GREGORY OF TOURS. Active scion of illustrious family, he defied the king. Historian and something of a classical scholar. |
| a570-636 | ISIDORE OF SEVILLE. Spanish encyclopedist and historian. |
| ? -a584-90 | SMARAGDUS. Exarch of Ravenna. |
| a580-662 | MAXIMUS, SAINT. ("The Confessor"). Greek theologian much persecuted by Constans II; wrote "Solutions of Doubts on the Holy Scriptures." |
| ? -a670 | MIGETIUS, SAINT. Bishop of Besançon; apparently a reformer, changed liturgy. |
| ? -731 | GREGORY II. For eloquence surnamed "Dialogus." Contested with the emperor. |
| 672-735 | BEDE. Historian and theologian. Invited by Pope Sergius to Rome, refused to leave peace of Jarrow. Believed usefulness as well as piety, wisdom and modesty to be clerical necessities. |
| ? -744 | LUITPRAND, KING OF LOMBARDY. Brought Lombard kingdom to greatest splendor, laid down basis of "Lombard Law." |
| ? -745 | DANIEL. Bishop of Winchester. Learned, energetic and influential. "Encourager, counsellor and correspondent" of St. Boniface. |

* a, after; b, before.

- ? -752 ZACHARIAS. Became Pope 741; supported Pepin's claim to French throne.
- a680-755 BONIFACE, SAINT WINFRID. Sent to Germany by Gregory II; made Archbishop and Primate of Germany by Gregory III; martyred by Frisians.
- fl. 8th cent. FELIX. Bishop of Urgel. Condemned for Nestorian-type heresy, abjured—but insincerely. Deposed 799.
- fl. 8th cent. ELIPANDUS. Bishop of Toledo. Blamed by Felix of Urgel (q.v.) for influencing him to heresy.
- ? -a782 VIRGILIUS, SAINT. Native of Ireland, became Bishop of Salzburg.
- a726-a802 PAULINUS OF AQUILEIA. Trinitarian writer.
- 735-804 ALCUIN. Archbishop of Canterbury, called to France by Charlemagne, founded Palatine School. Theologian, philosopher, orator, historian, poet, mathematician.
- 742-814 CHARLEMAGNE. Properly given title of "Restorer of Letters," he attracted most distinguished scholars, delighted in their company, founded schools of theology and humanity in cathedrals and monasteries.
- ? -814 ANGILBERT. Abbot of St. Riquier. Disciple of Alcuin.
- ? -816 LEO III. Became Pope 795. Notable for sweetness, wisdom, purity.
- 753-826 ADALHARD. Cousin german of Charlemagne, Abbot of Corbie, principal minister of Pepin. One of first to oppose pretensions of nobles. Teacher of Paschasius Radbertus.
- ? -834 FREDEGISE. Writer, disciple of Alcuin. Talented but erratic thinker; some heretical views.
- ? -840 AGOBARD OF LYONS. "Impetuous" against ordeals.
- ? -843 JONAS OF ORLÉANS. Called, for reasons now unknown, "another Homer," contested Claudius of Turin *in re* images.
- ? -855 LEO IV. Became Pope 847. Roman-born, emulated Gregory the Great. Concerned with reformations and instruction of priests.
- ? -861 PRUDENTIUS, SAINT. Bishop of Troyes. Wrote against Erigena on predestination.
- ? -867 NICHOLAS I, THE GREAT. Became Pope 858. Anathematized Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople, author of Greek schism.

*Approximate
birth & death
dates **

- fl. 9th cent. JOHN SCOT ERIGENA. "Little and merry," he said true philosophy and true religion are identical. Developed Neoplatonic mysticism.
- fl. 9th cent. CLEMENT OF IRELAND. Succeeded Alcuin as Charlemagne's intellectual leader; advocate of Alexandrian Platonism.
- fl. 9th cent. CLAUDIUS OF TURIN. Criticized pilgrimages and veneration of images.
- ? -812 or 813 WILLIAM, DUKE OF AQUITAINE. Count of Toulouse; warrior.
- ? -820 THEODULF THE SPANIARD. Bishop of Orléans.
- ? -849 WALAFRID STRABO. German monk; wrote theological, botanical and other works.
- 877-856 RHABAN MAUR (MAGNENTIUS). Archbishop of Mainz, scholar, theologian, teacher. Opposed Gottschalk.
- 805-864 SERVATUS LUPUS. Abbot of Ferrières. Most polished writer of his time.
- 806-867 GOTTSCHALK (FULGENCE). Imaginative, wilful, ambitious, curious, restless, fiery, "invincibly opinionated," he was condemned and spent his last days in a cachot.
- fl. 811-827 DUNGAL OF IRELAND. Contested Claudius' attacks on images. Famed for scientific knowledge, not satisfied with Ptolemaic theory.
- ? -865 PASCHASIUS RADBERTUS. French monk of Corbie. Advocated dogma of transubstantiation.
- ? -after 868 RATRAMNUS (BERTRAM) OF CORBIE. Wrote treatise, "De Corpore et Sanguine Domini."
- ? -870 OTFRIED. German monk and scholar, wrote "Liber Evangelorum" to supersede obscene ballads.
- ? -888 RIMBERT. Archbishop of Hamburg-Bremen.
- 830-912 NOTKER BALBULUS, SAINT. "The Stammerer" of St. Gall.
- 834-881 HEIRIC. Trained by Benedictines; mediocre poet.
- ? -882 HINGMAR. Archbishop of Rheims. Contentious, quick to excommunicate, contended with Gottschalk *re* "two predestinations."
- 849-900 (?) ALFRED. 6th King of England. Translated Bede and others; stimulated learning.
- ? -915 REGINO, ABBOT OF PRUM. Wrote chronicle history from birth of Christ to 907.

- | | |
|---------|--|
| ? -919 | SALOMO. Bishop of Constance; Abbot of St. Gall 890-920. |
| 879-943 | ODO I, SAINT. Abbot of Cluny. Wrote hymns etc., opposed logic. |
| ? -947 | RATHERIUS. Bishop of Verona and of Liége. Learned. |

CLUNY, 901-1050

1. CONDITIONS IN 900

a. War

DURING THE YEARS shortly before and after 900 the invasions by Normans, Hungarians, and Saracens were at their worst. It was not until about 950 that the Norman leaders were converted; in 975 the Alpine passes were still so infested by bands of Saracens that Majolus, the great abbot of Cluny, was held for ransom there while returning in state from Rome; and the Hungarians were not badly enough beaten to submit to baptism until after the year 1000.

These pagan incursions, moreover, were facilitated by the feudal wars constantly being waged among the Christians. From about 850, indeed, until after 950 anarchy was as much the rule as under the Merovingians, the chief difference being that the quarrels were now under color of feudal, rather than tribal, law. In 962 the first Saxon emperor, Otto I, gained a new ascendancy in Germany; shortly before 1000 the new French dynasty of the Capets began to retrieve some of the prestige which the last Carolingians had lost; but if these new rulers did something to lessen the feudal anarchy, they aggravated the total violence by quarreling over their common frontier west of the Rhine.

b. Catastrophes

These wars also brought the usual catastrophes in their wake. The soldiers consumed or burned the crops, razed the towns, and killed not only each other but almost everyone

else. The margin of subsistence being thereby lowered, plagues and famines followed, often resulting in the cannibalism whose echo has come down to us in our fairy stories.

c. Architecture

One result of these new wars was the substitution, as often as practicable, of stone for wooden construction: wood was not only easier to tear down, it was easier to burn down. Thus as the clergy began to rebuild their churches of stone, so did the nobles rebuild their castles, and the townsfolk their old Roman walls. The monasteries, too, many of which had been founded in rustic areas, built walls and prepared to defend them by force of arms.

d. Beliefs

That during this time even the monks became ignorant was inevitable. It was reported that they were usually familiar only with the Psalter. Belief was largely compounded of oral tradition and superstition. Miracles—whether induced by relics, Ordeals, or incantations—were almost daily occurrences, and portents were recognized not only in eclipses and comets, hail and thunder, but in dreams and visions. These wonders, if they did not always bring hope, at least brought some relief to the monks' bewilderment before the enormities to which they were being constantly subjected. It was probably better even to be assured that it was the Devil who was to blame, than to try to comprehend why an event had been caused by an all-wise Providence; and had it not been for the ever-present ghost of Jehovah, we might well wonder how, through all this, Christianity was able to survive at all.

e. Behavior

It was inevitable under these circumstances that most of the abbots and bishops should have been laymen at heart, feudal lords who coveted the power which the offices conferred. These offices were either seized by violence or purchased, whichever was easier. Although sometimes a local leader might be popularly elected, he, like the others, had to rule

a military rather than a religious community. It was not necessarily by choice, therefore, that he worked his serfs in order to obtain money, and his clergy in order to obtain soldiers. Even so, the safety of his community had in many cases to be enhanced by buying the protection of a still more powerful neighbor. That avarice and greed, including openly held private property, was the rule, and that the clergy, when they were not fighting, occupied themselves in the pursuit not only of beasts but of women, is not surprising. But it was nonetheless shocking, and the time now soon came when first a few and then more and more men determined to put a stop to it.

We ourselves are chiefly shocked by the behavior of the clergy, but we must remember that the laity, from which the clergy were necessarily recruited, were behaving, if less hypocritically, far worse. Brazen brutality, including torture, mutilation, and murder, were regarded as so many proofs of valor; hate, thinly if at all disguised as righteous indignation, was uncontrollable. One such case in 943 is told by Raoul Glaber:

As to Héribert, he had died a cruel death. After a prolonged and painful illness he was surrounded by his family who urged him to give thought, in his last hours, to the salvation of his soul and the disposition of his private affairs. But no response could be extracted from him other than these few words "We were twelve, who had sworn to betray (King) Charles," and these words were still on his lips when he died. (*Chronicle*, I, 3.)

In this case even the appeal of the women closest to him was resisted. But surely this could not always have been so. Women were constantly raising children to see life from another angle, and those of them who hearkened became monks because only in that way was this other angle bearable. The part which women played in the reform now to come is as certain as it is unrecorded.

2. REFORM

a. Monastic

As there are exceptions to almost any rule, so now there were doubtless still many men who were pious and a few un-

corrupted monasteries. One of these was the monastery of Saint-Gall high above the shores of the Lake of Constance which, under Salomo, her abbot from 890 to 920, became a refuge for piety and culture. Here, besides much prayer, there were music, illumination of manuscripts, carving, and a smattering of pagan as well as Christian literature. To the copies made there we owe the survival of many of our precious pagan texts.

The monastery of Saint-Denis, just north of Paris, and that of Saint-Benoit-sur-Loire were also exceptions. Both of them followed, or at least respected, the Benedictine Rule, which Charlemagne had tried to diffuse but which had since become almost everywhere defunct.

Naturally the monasteries most exposed to the ravages of the pagan invaders had suffered most. It is also thought that the central areas, as of Auvergne and the Bourbonnais, were not only the least exposed to the pagans but were also, because perhaps less Germanized, less feudal and therefore less torn by domestic anarchy. In any case the fact is that William, first Duke of Aquitaine, founded, for the salvation of his soul, a new monastery at Cluny, just east of these territories, with the specification that it was to adopt the Benedictine Rule. This was in 910. In 928 Odo, a monk from Le Mans, became abbot, and in less than a century the Cluniac reform, based on the Benedictine Rule with minor variations, had spread to the old as well as to the new monasteries, not only in France but also to many in Germany, Italy, and Spain.

The father of this first great abbot of Cluny was a jurist, familiar, it was said, not only with Roman law but also with classical Roman literature. Odo himself was therefore well taught, and we are told, more specifically, that he was familiar with some of the works of Gregory the Great and even with Aristotelian logic. Then he turned away from worldly culture to religion, declared war on the Devil, gave lavishly to the poor, turned against all profane studies, rejecting not only literature and science but the employment of logic even in theological inquiries. Power, he said, led to evil, and evil to power; and we, aware of what he was witnessing, cannot blame him for so concluding. Since, as Jerome had once said, this world offered nothing, the only tempting end was to seek

the good life promised in the next world, and to persuade others to do likewise, with the help not only of Christ but also of the Virgin and Martin.

Now when a man turns to virtue, though his purpose is to make men ultimately happier, it is also to make them, and himself above all, temporarily miserable. Thus Odo, turned ascetic, introduced silence in place of talk, dirtiness in place of cleanliness, vegetables in place of meat, vigils instead of sleep, and he preached chastity for all, even in marriage—perhaps because all these required only a minimum of imagination. For he was not, apparently, a mystic striving exclusively for communion with God, but rather an ascetic reformer who was convinced not only that since the world was evil the less men had to do with it the better for them, but also, more specifically, that merely by disobeying the Prince of this world they were automatically obeying the King of the next one.

About thirty years later came the second great abbot of Cluny, Majolus, a noble born in Avignon of Roman and Burgundian parents. Learned in the patristic texts and the canons as well as in the Bible, and hostile, like Odo, to profane literature and philosophy—to which he said that he preferred the wise folly of God—he nevertheless warned against the stress on asceticism, saying that it led to vainglory and hypocrisy as easily as did a worldly career. He prayed and wept much, but only in secret. Before men he dressed as befitted his station, drank wine, consorted with the great, built fortifications, adapted his monastery outwardly to the feudal system, and in this way set an example of how to live in the temporal world without being of it.

Fifty years after Majolus came the third great abbot of Cluny, Odilo, from Brioude in Auvergne, who died only in 1049. Under him the monastery reached, if not its peak, at least its maturity. Sprung from a noble and pious family, he was on the one hand an ascetic and even a mystic, and a champion of the oppressed and of the cause of peace. On the other hand he was also a statesman who saw the value of the pagan as well as the purely Christian virtues. He realized that the latter had been superimposed on the former, as the New Testament had been on the Old, in order not to supersede but to perfect. Just as the laity must first master the four old pagan

Roman virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice before they might safely be encouraged to aspire to the higher Christian virtues, so no less must the monks. To be sure, these famous cardinal virtues had already been incorporated into Christianity, but only after being understood as the pagans had understood them could they be sublimated—could prudence become obedience, temperance become humility, fortitude become will power, and justice become mercy. It may indeed be conjectured that Odilo attributed the miseries of his time to a neglect of this precaution, concluding that, until the virtues of the old Romans revived, Christendom could not even equal much less surpass them. And would not Augustine and perhaps Pope Gregory, had they been alive in the year 1000, have been tempted to concur?

b. The Secular Clergy

i. Chronology. The desire for reform was soon after shared by some of the bishops. In fact, the recognition that decency rather than asceticism or even mysticism was first to be promoted was perhaps initiated by them rather than by the monks. And this may also have been true of support for learning. Ratherius, although three times bishop of Verona, was brought up as a monk near Liège, and was bishop there too. Older than Majolus, he too had sounded a warning against the abuse of fasts, penances, and pilgrimages, had stressed the importance of morals rather than works, of merit rather than rank. Although he insisted that the mysteries of the faith were to be believed and not subjected to logic, he was not ashamed of his familiarity with the pagan classics.

Then in 962 came the first great Saxon emperor, Otto I, to tip the scales in favor of moderate reform. He appointed to the see of Liège a fellow Saxon, Heraclius, who was to make the cathedral school there the most learned in the West. Otto also appointed his own brother, Bruno, to the great see of Cologne, with virtual temporal as well as spiritual authority over the whole lower valley of the Rhine.

Bruno might have been quite as happy as a monk: he wept, he pardoned, he prayed, he dressed as a peasant, and never washed or laughed. He especially cherished stories about the

miracles of the martyrs and their relics. But although he helped the monasteries and even, in their wars against the Devil, the hermits, his brother Otto had instructed him to set up his school, in the tradition of those of Charlemagne, as one for statesmen as well as clergy, to teach the liberal arts, theology, and even, with the help of Byzantine and Irish scholars, something of Greek.

In this way Otto and Bruno raised the standard of both behavior and learning not only in the bishoprics but also in the monasteries. In the center of this Saxon civilization, in what is now Hanover, Widukind, abbot of Corvey, was familiar with pagan as well as Christian Latin classics; and Hrotswitha, a nun of Gandersheim, in her plays after the manner of Terence, showed not only a considerable acquaintance with dogma, but also, through the liberal arts, a smattering of classical learning.

Besides Byzantine and Irish influences on these Saxons it is clear that the contacts which Charlemagne had made with Italy persisted in the imperial tradition; these Saxons, indiscriminately massacred by Charlemagne less than 200 years before, had now become the heirs of that great but abortive leadership. A generation later Bernward, bishop of Hildesheim, was building there his modest imitation of Trajan's column in Rome.

A generation after Bruno came the other great bishop of this period, Gerbert. At first a monk at Aurillac in Auvergne, he lived for a time in Spain and Rome, then settled in Rheims, first as teacher then as archbishop; finally, in his last years, he became pope under the name of Sylvester II. His interests as well as his travels betray a wide and restless curiosity. Technically orthodox, he was nevertheless strongly attracted to certain pagan traditions, above all to Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*, with its Stoic view of the cosmic conflict between Nature and God, between Fortune and Providence. In morals he was close to his contemporary Odilo, also from Auvergne (may they not both have been Gallo-Roman residues?), relying on earned merits rather than on merciful pardons, following, as Ambrose had, the ideal of self-respect, of conscience, as exemplified by Cicero and

Seneca. Gerbert was even familiar with Juvenal and Lucretius.

About the year 960 Abbot Majolus had disapproved of the episcopate as too worldly. Sixty years later the tables were turned by bishops Adalberon of Laon and Fulbert of Chartres, who protested to the king that, with the exception of the holy Odilo, the Cluniac monks were getting too rich and powerful, and were paying but slight attention to their Benedictine Rule. Others were complaining that the effete civilization of the South, introduced into the North by Queen Constance of Arles when she married King Robert in 1003, was demoralizing the unsophisticated northerners, not only the laity but also the monks.

ii. Celibacy. By the Roman laws enacted in the fourth and fifth centuries the clergy could not marry, so that their children, if any, were bastards and could not claim any rights as heirs. But since then this precaution had been ignored, the more so now that many of the bishops were nobles who already held family estates and whose instinct was to pass them on to their descendants. Thus many of the sees had become virtual hereditary fiefs.

Resistance to this practice was first made by the German emperors. Soon after the year 1000 first Burchard of Worms and then a Council of Bourges exhibited the texts of the old Roman canons to prove that the children of bishops could not inherit any episcopal office or property. It was not insisted that bishops, like monks, be always chaste, but only that even their own children could not inherit Church property. This reform was only to be a first step; once celibacy was fairly re-established the next resistance would be against nepotism and finally against unchastity.

iii. Simony. The practice of simony, or the purchase of ecclesiastical offices, was closely connected with inheritance. Since the office of abbot and especially of bishop was enormously remunerative, it was natural that it should be correspondingly sought after; and, since the lay fief was admittedly hereditary, the power of appointment to fill ecclesiastical vacancies was one of the most valuable perquisites at the king's disposal, and he was therefore as reluctant to give away

these offices as the aspirants were ready to pay for them. Purchase, therefore, had become the rule. Influential voices were first raised against it when, in about the year 1000, its abuses were becoming a scandal, but its eradication was painfully slow. The German emperors were the first effectively to combat it because they needed to control the Roman popes, for this exalted office was currently being bought and sold by Roman nobles. The righteous indignation of the emperors was not lessened by their wish to obtain more control not only of the prestige attached to that office but also of the revenues which were accruing to it from its temporal possessions in Italy and spiritual primacy in the West.

As simony began to be outlawed the type of the bishop changed. The fact that soon after 1000 not only Odilo the abbot, but also Gerbert, who from bishop became pope, raised their voices against simony showed that the Church's resistance to it was already now taking shape. Instead of the see being sold to the highest bidder, who was necessarily a rich nobleman, it was now more often given, as by Robert the Pious, to men of little or no worldly importance, in the hope that these would at least prove more pliant to both the Church's and the king's will.

iv. Peace. The origin of chivalry and feudalism may be traced to both the Roman and the Germanic social structures, according to which one man furnished protection to those who would promise him certain services in return. At first it was the Germanic relationship which prevailed in so far as the bond was a personal and voluntary one; now it was becoming rather the Roman one, based on hereditary landholding. As the hierarchies were now everywhere evolving, so here: except for those at the top or bottom almost everyone was at once a lord with respect to his vassals, and a vassal with respect to his lord. Since a vassal owed obedience only to his lord and so owed none to his overlord, if anyone refused obedience to his lord all his vassals must do likewise. Thus war might break out at any level and the revolt of a vassal holding directly from the king often carried whole provinces with him.

Until far into the tenth century the clergy, abbots as well

as bishops, fought in these wars like any layman. Unless they could buy effective protection from a neighboring lord they had no temporal alternative but to strengthen their fortifications in order to defend themselves and fight in the open to defend their serfs and lands.

This, however, accorded with neither the canons nor their conscience. Beginning in 989, therefore, various councils, held in Southern France under the leadership of the bishops rather than of the monks, decreed that whoever caused wilful damage to Church property or personnel or to peasants or other poor was to be excommunicated unless he made prompt restitution. At the same time certain abbots, notably Odilo of Cluny and Richard of Saint-Vannes, in Verdun, urged a resort as often as was practicable to the courts.

The effect of these bolder measures was apparently more psychological than physical. A generation later, however, it led to the further declaration by various councils that there should be no fighting, on any pretext, during the holy days, which included every Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday—again on pain of excommunication. In one or two instances violations of these prohibitions led the bishops to declare an interdict, or wholesale excommunication, of every layman in his diocese; as a positive inducement, those feudal lords who respected these pronouncements were promised absolution for all their past sins.

Further than this the clergy sought to enlist volunteers who would not only respect these restrictions themselves but chastise those who did not. At first these volunteers were asked to sign their names under seal, later they were required to swear under oath before the relics of a saint. In this connection the bishops alleged that these demands for peace had been communicated to them by a special revelation of God—whence the designations Peace of God and Truce of God.

That the results were disappointing is not of course surprising: physical force still ruled because neither Church, peasant, king, nor court had the power of enforcement. The only effective check on the violence of one feudal lord was that of another; and since both of them, if often childish, believed their grievances just, they concluded that God himself must be on their side. This being their state of mind,

threats of excommunication usually did not deter them, for self-defense is every man's privilege, and to right a wrong is every man's duty. To ask a feudal lord to refrain from fighting was as useless as to ask a monk to refrain from praying.

In addition to these expedients the Church devised another. As it had long been the custom for the prospective vassal to take an oath of fealty to fight for his lord, so the Church now sought to persuade the young knight also to take an oath of fealty to fight for God. This oath was pictured as naturally superior to, and yet not inconsistent with, the other. To fight for God was understood, however, to be not only to fight abstractly for justice but also concretely for the Church and so to fight against any and all of whom the Church disapproved, including, if necessary, the very lord to whom as vassal he had also sworn fealty. By this effort to replace vassalage with chivalry, the anarchy of rampant feudalism was ultimately to be replaced by the cohesion of an almost complete theocracy.

c. Emperors and Kings

That the laity as such contributed anything to reform is doubtful: the peasants and other serfs manifestly had no influence one way or the other, and, since the young nobles who were timid or pious usually entered the Church, the others regarded fighting as not only their prerogative but their professional duty.

Even the younger sons of royal blood could, like Bruno, brother of the emperor Otto I, take orders, but he who inherited a kingdom was under every pressure to accept it. In doing so, however, he assumed the double obligation to further the temporal welfare of his people and the salvation of his own soul. This conflict was apparent in the cases of Otto III and Hugh Capet, but was most acute in the case of Hugh's successor, Robert, surnamed the Pious.

Two instances may here suffice. On one occasion, at least, being mindful no doubt of the divine injunction to "forgive those who trespass against us," Robert not only set free a thief who had been caught in the palace but ordered that he be obliged to keep his loot. Robert was evidently more con-

cerned to please his God than to set a good example to those charged to enforce law and order.

Furthermore he sought to please his God by encouraging the emancipation of serfs. A century earlier the canonist Regino of Prüm had cited canons forbidding any wholesale emancipations on the ground that it was unfair to allow serfs an idleness which no monk could indulge in. Adalberon, bishop of Laon, now castigated Robert for giving way to such sentimentality. In support of his denunciation he relied on the traditional conception of hierarchical status: just as the clergy outranked the nobility, so both outranked the peasant or serf. Since it was the duty of the clergy to pray as hard as they could, and of the nobility to fight as hard as they could, so must the peasant or serf work as hard as he could, in order to feed and tend those who were serving him by their prayers and swords. If he did no work, they would have to do not only their own but his work too. Robert's fault, therefore, was to favor his own salvation at the expense of the general welfare. His may have also been the serf's idea of reform, but it was not that of either the nobles or the clergy.

3. WORKS

a. For Temporal Relief

As a result of the pagan invasions and feudal wars, there were not only raids, sieges, and battles but also, as indirect consequences of these, conflagrations, plagues, and famines. It did not require any great revelation by the Old Testament to make it clear that these catastrophes were inflicted by God in order to punish the aggregate sins of the victims. Jehovah, very evidently, had not abdicated.

Theoretically the remedy was for everyone affected to repent of his misdeeds; but there was no time for confessions, penances, or absolutions, and, in addition, most of the victims had no certainty of what the precise sins were which they had committed. The next best remedy, therefore, was to organize wholesale public demonstrations of repentance which consisted of a succession of Masses and processions in which all available relics or images should be exposed.

At the siege of Chartres in 910 the inhabitants, whose church was happily dedicated to the Virgin, found that their most precious relic, her shirt, was exposed and honored with satisfactory results. At the siege of Auxerre in 1015, after Abbot Odilo had seemingly prayed for relief in vain and exposure of the relics of the patron saint, Germanus, had done no better, resort was again had to the Virgin, who, in spite of there being no relic of her available, thereupon achieved the raising of the siege. At two sieges of Paris, in 912 and 949, prayers to the Virgin were also effective, but here the prayers before the relics of Germanus of Paris and of Geneviève, the city's patron saint, claimed a share of the credit.

Raoul Glaber related that when in 993 the church of the apostle Peter in Rome caught fire, the people prayed to him, without success at first, at least to save his own church. Whereupon in despair they coupled their prayers with the threat that if he did not heed them, many of his servants throughout the whole world would stop professing the faith he had taught. Only then, apparently, did he deign to comply. To be sure, this was a Roman crowd, perhaps unduly disrespectful of their own saint. But the Frenchman Raoul showed no disapproval of a technique which at least *had been* used in France, and was probably familiar still.

If the visitations of this time were so often wholesale, they were no less often individual, as in loss of property or health. Although this could not be passed off as a vicarious punishment, the precise sin which warranted it was not always identifiable. As Job had been puzzled so would others be: was God perhaps correcting, or even warning, rather than punishing?

Where the sin was publicly known the courts could often be relied on to act. If the sin was unknown except to the confessor, at least the priest could act, so that God theoretically had no need to. But, if the sinner alone was aware of his guilt, God's intervention must be momentarily expected and the only recourse was to a prompt confession and a truly contrite penance. The case is recorded of a bigamist who escaped God's wrath by confession and a public penance. But in other cases men who had taken false, that is insincere, oaths on a relic, were immediately punished, as by blindness.

Here there was no time to confess, and this may have been because God perceived that the culprit had no intention of doing so.

In this connection the purpose of the Ordeal becomes clearer. A crime has been committed and a suspect arrested. If he were in fact the criminal, why had God not already punished him? The theory must have been that God preferred, wherever the crime was civil rather than religious in nature, merely to render judgment on the suspect, leaving it to the courts, in case of guilt, to impose and execute the sentence. Indeed, it would have been tempting God had the courts refused to assist in every way that they possibly could.

Whether the problem was how to avoid future or how to obtain release from present visitations, the difficulty was that God seemed as reluctant to show mercy as He was prompt to impose justice. Since, furthermore, contrition was bound to be inadequate as often as the sinner was unable to identify his sin, recourse was naturally to the saints and their available relics. For to the extent that he felt incapable of earning a just, he must make every effort to obtain a merciful, pardon.

In Merovingian times the only available relics had been those of local saints or martyrs. Now, with a wider horizon, more potent relics were sought after, and these were being imported, by purchase, gift, or theft, especially from Rome and Jerusalem.

In 910, as we have seen, Chartres was saved by the shirt of the Virgin. In 922 the acquisition by the church of Gésède, a suburb of Paris, of part of the beard of the apostle Peter was followed by many miraculous cures. In about 975 Bruno of Cologne acquired, with equally happy results, the coat and chains of Peter. In 1008 the cathedral of Sens obtained a fragment of the rod of Moses. In 1020 William, fifth duke of Aquitaine, presented the monastery of Saint-Jean d'Andely with the head of John the Baptist, an event honored by the presence of many of the greatest nobles of France, including the king and queen. If for the moment King Robert was envious of William's good fortune, he was surely soothed when soon after he received, as a gift from the emperor, a fragment of the True Cross.

b. For Salvation

If there were still some who preferred to escape temporal rather than eternal punishments, there were many more now who held the opposite view. Some of the latter took the monastic vow and even became missionaries, like Adalbert of Prague, who died a martyr at the hands of his still pagan fellow Slavs in 997. Still others, whose profession was arms, relying also perhaps on Leo IV's earlier assurance, invited a martyr's crown by fighting, as now in Spain, against the pagans.

But most men hoped to win salvation by the less drastic means of holding to orthodox beliefs and behavior, of trusting to absolutions, and of courting influential friends who could defend them at the Last Judgment.

Hrotswitha, the Saxon nun, had averred that prayers sometimes induced God to reveal by a vision that the penitent was forgiven, but this was not to be depended upon, and as often as it failed the dreadful uncertainty must remain. This was especially true now that civil and canon law tended to overlap. Under civil law, evidence of repentance for a crime could not be introduced as an extenuating circumstance. Was it certain, then, that according to the divine law it could be? By this time successive penances and absolutions, if not specifically authorized, were tolerated; but how far could God's patience be counted on?

Fortunately there was another analogy to the civil law according to which an accused could be acquitted provided that he could produce the required number of qualified compurgators who were willing to swear to his good repute. Might not the presence at the Last Judgment of saints who were willing to assure the Judge of the good works and intentions of the accused have the same happy effect? If one could not be wholly innocent, one should at least not be wholly friendless.

How the saints were courted by prayers in the presence, if possible, of their relics has been told. Now, however, almsgiving, from a free gift to the poor, was becoming more and more a bargain which the saint was bound to honor. Gifts to churches and monasteries in honor of a saint were made on the condition, not always even tacit, that this saint reciprocate.

cate. If the saint's relic might help to save a man from temporal peril, money, land, or buildings dedicated to the saint should help to save the donor from eternal peril. The saint, indeed, could decently refuse to carry out his part of the bargain only if the conduct of the donor had been scandalously unpardonable.

A poor man who had no money to give away and had no time to make a long pilgrimage may often have felt at an unfair disadvantage. He had no real reason to despair, however, for the saints did not play favorites at the expense of others. According to Raoul Glaber, Martin of Tours had revealed in a vision that he sought to save all virtuous Christians but that the saints could save the worldly and bellicose only with the greatest difficulty. Further than this, the Cluniac and other Benedictine monks had taught King Robert that Benedict always had a sure access to God. And Helgaud, in his *Life* of Robert, tells how Adelaide, queen of Hugh Capet and mother of Robert the Pious, had showered presents on the martyr Denis,

hoping in this way to obtain the favor of this saint, to whom God had promised by a solemn oath to accord any favor he should ask for in another's behalf. (*Life*, 380.)

Overshadowing all these, of course, in power and therefore in popularity was the Virgin. For whereas Denis, for instance, would presumably dare to ask for mercy only in behalf of his Parisians, or others who venerated his relics there, the Virgin could obtain boons in behalf of anybody anywhere. No petitioner to her need worry that she might be out of earshot or that Christ would hesitate before granting her request.

Even with these new relics imported from abroad the demand was not satisfied: these shirts, beards, coats, rods, skulls, and other appurtenances of the saints could hardly produce the maximum possible effects. Those who lived in Rome or Jerusalem, where the bodies of the great saints lay, had a great advantage, and if the local pilgrimages to Tours, Paris, or Andely were worthwhile surely the greater ones must prove even more so. The pilgrimage, moreover, was itself a sacrifice and so a work. The longer and more arduous it was, the more

the saint to be thereby honored was put under obligation to return the favor done him.

Although bands of Saracens long blocked Alpine passes Rome was more or less accessible, but access to Jerusalem was only by sea, a voyage not only perilous but expensive. Shortly before 1000, however, the Saracens were finally dislodged; and the Hungarians, who had been blocking the land route to the East, had been defeated, pacified, and even partly converted.

The land route to Jerusalem being thus opened, pilgrimages there became a passion. Even the poorer classes saw their way to getting there cheaply, and the Church added greatly to the incentive by declaring that those who undertook the journey and died in the course of it should win the martyr's crown, while those who successfully returned should win complete absolution. Of course the nobles, who went fully armed to protect not only themselves but their unarmed convoys, were assured corresponding rewards if on the way they killed any pagans who resisted their demands.

The incentives thus offered, however, were soon to prove excessive: before 1050 the thousands of pilgrims to Jerusalem included not only sincere penitents but a larger proportion of undesirables: profiteers, adulterers, thieves, fugitive monks, and condemned outlaws, all of whom sought to obtain the double advantage of temporal and eternal rewards. The Church was not slow to recognize these abuses, which had already manifested themselves in the local pilgrimages. But, not being equipped to separate the goats from the sheep, and fearful, if too harsh, of offending the great saints who were the ostensible cause of the trouble, she found herself powerless to prescribe a remedy.

As the reform spirit spread, chiefly from Cluny, to the other monasteries, the prestige of the monks rose. As their merits became more conspicuous so their powers were presumed to have increased. But what precisely might these powers be? The relics of the saints served to ward off temporal visitations; the sacramental powers of the priests served to obtain pardons for past sins and strength to resist future ones; and the gratitude of the saints promised the sincere believer a potent bulwark against damnation. But if the

intercession of the saints in behalf of still sinful souls could often save them from hell, it was too much to expect them to request, much less to obtain, a release from purgatorial pains. Why, then, should not the prayers of the holy monks be put to use in order to lighten or shorten the purgatorial sentence?

Whether the new emphasis on this technique was chiefly fostered by the Cluniac monks themselves or by their lay patrons, the belief now became more and more general that the cumulative effect of collective prayers for the relief of souls in purgatory would satisfy this need. Some persons of course remained skeptical, and it was doubtless in the hope of disabusing them that Raoul Glaber chose to relate the story of how it was revealed to a hermit in far-off Africa that:

There is not in the whole Roman world a single monastery which releases a larger number of Christian souls from the power of the Devil (than that of Cluny). They there perform the Sacrifice of the Mass so often that hardly a day passes that their care does not snatch one or more souls from the power of the evil Spirit. (*Chronicle*, V, 1.)

It is to be observed further that in the quotation the great success of the Cluniacs was attributed, not to their superior merit, but rather to the frequency with which they performed the Sacrifice of the Mass. Does this mean that, relying on the doctrine, now generally accepted, that the bad priest had no less power than the good one, the Cluniacs claimed no superior powers as a result of their moral reform? Surely not. But it might mean that the prospective lay benefactor relied more on the efficacy of their ritual than on that of their virtue.

There was doubtless ample good will among the monks, who were as eager as Martin had been to save every decent man irrespective of what advantages they might have received or be about to receive in return. But, from the point of view of the patron who hoped thereby to benefit, it was only human for him to believe that the more he gave the monks the more he would receive, and the monks had at least no incentive to try to disabuse him.

In any case, whatever the exact motives and expectations, the result was that Cluny, and thereafter most of the other

monasteries, received, as the laymen too reformed, a succession of gifts and legacies as advance payments for their Masses and prayers. These were chiefly of land but also of money for building churches or for saying special Masses and, in addition, of immunity from paying taxes or fulfilling any other feudal obligations. Since the effect over the years was cumulative, as the monasteries grew richer and more powerful the laity grew relatively poorer. Like a snowball rolling up-hill, the monks found that the holier they were—or at least appeared to be—the more enviable became their temporal lot, “for whosoever hath, to him shall be given.”

4. DOGMA

a. Resolved

Some of the dogmas had now crystallized, at least for the time being, for there seems to have been no serious controversy regarding them. Since the *Filioque* ratification, the Trinitarian doctrine was generally accepted; since the Adoptionist agitation was quelled, the Incarnation doctrine was not questioned. Since Radbertus the Real Presence had been taken for granted: there were simply a few not very spiritual refinements such as Gerbert's assertion that the blood and body were somehow not excreted and Raoul Glaber's account of how one who partook of communion in bad faith was betrayed by the fact that the body and blood at once leaked out by his navel. The incapacity of a sinful communicant to absorb the blood and body was no more doubted now than was the capacity of a sinful priest to effect the transubstantiation and to transmit its virtue unimpaired.

The doctrine of the Last Judgment likewise received merely some picturesque refinements. Flodoard, for instance, told how the soul of a deacon about to be damned by the just Judge was saved by the joint intercessions of the Virgin and Bishop Martin, with the result that it was sentenced to return to its body and the earth in order to do penance there till all its sins should be expiated. The vision of a certain Poppo should be added, in which he saw the great Archbishop Bruno about to be damned for his vain pursuit of

philosophy, only to be saved by the timely intercession of the apostle Paul.

Finally, the eternity of the punishment was no longer in dispute. Here, nevertheless, there is a sign that its justice was not regarded as self-evident; for Raoul Glaber felt it worthwhile to explain that it was unavoidable because it served as a salutary warning to the living. Those, moreover, who might still harbor qualms were to be persuaded that these had arisen solely at the Devil's instigation, and as proof of this Raoul told how the Devil appeared to a monk in a vision and revealed to him that since nobody was really sentenced to hell for more than a year he would be foolish if he didn't start right in to enjoy himself.

The classical faith that virtue had an intrinsic value and was therefore worth cultivating for its own sake, now long since discredited by the apostle Paul, still showed no sign of life.

b. Unresolved

If these dogmas were now reasonably well defined and generally accepted, there were others not well defined and which therefore allowed considerable free play for alternative interpretations. Among the more important were those regarding free will, Providence, the Redemption, and the Devil.

The condemnation of Gottschalk had eliminated Augustine's belief in an over-all predestination, for that the baptized, at least, enjoyed free will was now undisputed. But did the unbaptized also, as the Semi-Pelagians had averred, enjoy it? The Council of Orange had said no, but it is not clear to what extent any of its canons were now known and therefore how they may have been interpreted. There is one indication, however, that tradition had remained faithful to Orange, and since this bears on the further problem of Providence or temporal justice it is worth quoting. Meditating on the successful efforts to convert the Saxons, Normans, and other Germanic and even Slavic peoples in contrast to the resistance everywhere offered by the Saracens, Raoul Glaber says:

It is a matter which well deserves our attention that while the universe was thus witnessing the conversions of the infidels to the

faith of Christ multiplying in the North and West, the East and South were not offering the same spectacle. (*Chronicle*, I, 5.)

After showing how this was foretold by the fact that Christ on the Cross faced northwest although the reason of this was obscure, Raoul goes on,

In any case it belongs to God alone to know why the human race is more or less worthy of entering the way leading to eternal salvation according to what region of the earth it lives in. (*Ibid.*, I, 5.)

Raoul is sure that this inequality of opportunity is by God's deliberate design and is by no fault of men. Therefore he follows the tradition set by Orange. For according to the Semi-Pelagians, God had conferred free will on everyone equally, which subsequent events had effectively proved false. Since, therefore, men's chances were so obviously unequal, God had some good reason for arranging things so, but, for an equally good reason, He was unwilling to reveal what either of these good reasons were.

The ways of Providence were also still an open field for speculation, and every man, so long as he did not doubt God's over-all solicitude, was free to interpret the cause of any specific event about as he chose. The various choices may be fairly represented under two main headings, each divided into two subheadings.

According to the two main headings God was not only omnipotent but also omnificent: His will was the sole and direct cause of every event. On the one hand, Odo supposed that God had designed life on earth as a teaching, as an illustration of everything that heaven was not. As evil, he said, led to power, so power led to evil. On earth, therefore, might makes right. Abbot Jean de Vandières thought that matter was the instrument of the Devil. Such would appear to be the normal ascetic diagnosis.

On the other hand, however, the equally ascetic nun Hrotswitha of Gandersheim—high priestess of virginity—pointed to the might of Christianity as proof that it was right. Raoul Glaber, a monk, although perhaps not a wholly exemplary one, cited various battles which the Christians won over the pagans only by the miraculous intervention of God.

Between these two extremes were two further beliefs which

were based on the reluctant conclusion that not only God's omnificence, but perhaps also His omnipotence, was not complete. We have already dealt with both. One of them goes back to the wrath-of-God theory of the Redemption, according to which Christ, by his Sacrifice, had put Jehovah under a moral obligation to bestow free will, and so to allow the bestowal not only of grace for personal, but also of pardon for vicariously earned, merit.

The other intermediate belief was based on the assumption that God's omnipotence was limited by certain laws of nature which, although as Creator He had put into operation, were now not wholly under His control. This was the conclusion to which Boethius had been driven, and, although Odo had deplored the interest now being taken in Boethius, partly because of his texts on logic, it was also partly because in the *Consolation* Odo's sensitive nose detected a distinct odor of Neoplatonism.

Odo's warning, however, was not too well heeded: Poppo of Fulda soon after wrote a *Commentary* on the *Consolation*; in about the year 1000 Notker Labeo of Saint-Gall translated most of Boethius' works into German; and the irrepressible Gerbert, soon to become pope, sought his consolation rather in Boethius than in mystic contemplation. According to Gerbert, God indeed played the major role, but the minor one was played by Fortune.

In reviving the unsettled question of the true causes and effects of the Redemption the Carolingians had not gone beyond the conclusion that by it the Devil had been overcome not by violence but by justice. Bruno of Cologne, inspired probably by the example of the Englishman Bede, made a more determined effort.

In this connection it is to be observed that Odo of Cluny had said that the causes of evil were threefold: first God's punishment for Adam's disobedience, second the effects of the Devil's cunning, and third man's inhumanity to man. Then, fifty years later, Bruno explained that the Redemption had been designed first to assuage God's wrath towards man, second to strip the Devil of his irresistible power to tempt, and third to enable men to receive the grace—to love God and each other. The similarity of these two views is striking but

so, too, is the difference: for the three evils which, to Bruno, Christ had come to cure were the very ones which, to Odo, still subsisted. It was true, of course, that those who were lucky enough to get baptized were cleansed of guilt and given the free will whereby they could acquire merit and so earn grace. On the other hand, even among these baptized the temptation to sin, quite apart from the Devil's prompting, remained strong, and the fact that since the Redemption the Devil was doing no more than executing God's will seemed rather to indicate that God's wrath had not been noticeably assuaged.

No wonder pious men saw their responsibility clear, to save not only themselves but the rest of mankind. As Fulbert of Chartres was saying, it was men's duty to recover from the Devil what he had wrested from them by the Fall. The Redemption had been incomplete; it was therefore necessary for the Christians to complete it, by example and persuasion where possible, otherwise by fire and sword.

From the Penitentials in the canon law collections of Regino of Prum of about 905 and of Burchard of Worms of about 1015, we learn what men should and should not believe in regard to the powers which God had delegated to the Devil and the other fallen angels. Without the help of men he and his minions could do much physical damage. Under the year 944 Flodoard says that it was reported from Montmartre

that demons in the guise of horsemen were seen to demolish a nearby church and to knock down the walls of a house with battering rams. It was said that they also uprooted the vines on the hill and ravaged the crops.

They could also effect medical cures. Raoul Glaber tells how, someone having planted certain false relics in a church, many of those who came to venerate them were cured of their infirmities, from which he concluded that

sometimes God allows evil spirits to effect prodigies in order to tempt men as a punishment for their sins. (*Chronicle*, IV, 3.)

The Devil could also produce illusions in the human mind, as when men believe they have flown or been transported through the air. Raoul says that occasionally monks who had

gone to sleep in one place on waking found themselves in another. He is puzzled, not as to whether it was a practical joke, but only as to why God, or possibly the Devil, had taken the trouble.

It was no less important that men should be apprised of what the Devil cannot do, for penances must be imposed for each specific overestimate of his powers. It was important, for instance, to believe that he cannot save anyone from death, because he was constantly tempting men to do evil by his promise to save their lives if they would comply. It was equally forbidden to believe that the Devil could turn men into beasts, or that he or his minions could copulate with men. Therefore as often as any devils promise such things men are to believe them at their peril.

Indirectly—that is, through the instrumentality of men—the Devil could do somewhat more but it was only rarely that he could force them to serve his purposes. He could not, for instance, turn their love of another to hate, or vice versa. That this needed to be emphasized is illustrated by the story of how a certain nun presented Poppo, the archbishop of Trier, with a pair of boots which he had no sooner put on than he fell—or at least felt—in love with her. Dismayed, he asked some of those about him also to try them on, and, each in turn complying, said he immediately began to feel the same way. Had they trusted their canon law they would have known that neither the Devil nor any nun had any such power, and so saved themselves a mortifying confession.

Possession by the Devil was another matter, however. That it happened was undeniable; that it was irresistible was equally so. But here it could be said that it was, if only indirectly, resistible because it could be presumed that the Devil could only possess one who had already rendered himself defenseless. If, therefore, he could not possess men by compulsion, he could persuade them to choose to be possessed and so to do their new master's bidding, in which case they were rewarded by receiving from him certain superhuman or demoniacal powers. These were the true sorcerers.

Just as in the case of a miracle, so in that of the demoniacal deed, it was often not clear whether it was due to the initiative and will of the superhuman principal or of his human

agent. Where, as at Montmartre, the demons destroyed the church and house, it was reported that they also uprooted the vines and ravaged the crops. But may it not have been there suspected that this latter was the work of conniving sorcerers? For it was recognized by canon law that sorcerers could steal milk and honey from their neighbors, and it was also canon law, in spite of Agobard's earlier denial, that they could destroy cattle. Certain cases, on the other hand, were clear: when a person, posing or not as a physician, administered drugs which caused abortions or impotence, that person rather than the Devil was the culprit and could be summarily dealt with. In still other misfortunes it must remain doubtful whether there had been any culprit at all.

However, if a penance was to be imposed for doubting what the canons said that the Devil and his human agents could do, there was also a penance for believing they could do what the canons said that they could not. The canons said, as had Agobard, that the Devil could not give any men the power to control the weather nor give any women the power either to fly through the air on the backs of beasts, or to fly in the clouds and there fight each other, or to leave their husbands' beds in order to go out and kill men, eat them, and then bring them back to life. Nor were there such beings as elf-women who seduced men against their wills.

Therefore in these matters, more perhaps than in any others, it was equally inexpedient to believe either too little or too much.

c. Heretical

Before the year 1000 Gaul and Germany had not been seriously troubled by heresies. There had been nests of Manichees around Lyons, individuals like Gottschalk and Erigena had had to be disciplined, and the Jews closely watched. But that was all. Of the pagan invaders, moreover, neither the Normans nor the Hungarians, once the fighting had stopped, had troubled much to resist baptism. And even the Saracens, though adamant in their Mohammedan faith, followed Jew and Christian in acknowledging the Old Testament Jehovah as the true God.

Travelers to Italy, however, like Ratherius of Liège, who was chosen bishop of Verona three times between 931 and 968, were shocked by the many survivals of old Roman paganism there. It was reported that in about 980 a certain Vilgard of Ravenna and others were exterminated by either fire or sword because they alleged that they preferred Virgil, Horace, and Juvenal to the Bible. There was similar trouble at Asti in 1027. Finally, it is not to be overlooked that Gerbert d'Aurillac, admirer of all the Latin classics, including Lucretius, had already resided in Rome before he returned there as Pope Sylvester II in 999.

As the eleventh century opened, in any case, heresy and persecution began in earnest at Orleans. First in 1010 there was a massacre of Jews in that "royal city of the Gauls," pretty evidently on trumped-up charges. Then, twelve years later, with no suggestion that there was any connection between them, a shocking heresy was also uncovered in that same city, the ringleaders of which were highly regarded priests. Here, as so often, Raoul Glaber is our informant. They believed, he said, that:

It was necessary to regard as delirious dreams all that the ancient and new canons teach in regard to the Trinity of persons within the unity of God. . . . They alleged further that the heavens and earth had always existed exactly as we now see them, without (having had) a creator. Finally, after having howled like dogs and, in their madness, breathed forth the accumulated horrors of all the heresies, they concluded by professing the heresy of Epicurus in that they alleged, as he had, that excesses and crimes need have no fear of either punishment or vengeance, and that all the works of piety or of justice, by means of which the Christians believed that they would earn eternal rewards, were a mere waste of time. (*Chronicle*, III, 7.)

Even the Devil himself in his appearance to the monk, had admitted that punishment in hell could last as long as a year. The influence here was therefore not so much that of the Christian Devil as of the pagan Roman classics, including, doubtless, Gerbert's Lucretius.

In due course King Robert was apprised of this scandal and, at the instigation, it was said, of the monks, he ordered an investigation. Most of the accused freely admitted to these beliefs. Therefore, after

having all been given ample instruction and opportunity to retract, those—and there were many—who persisted were thereupon burnt alive. (*Ibid.*)

Whatever may have been Gerbert's reaction to Lucretius, he had no sympathy with the Manichees' condemnation of marriage and meat, their rejection of the Old Testament, or their belief that the Devil ruled the temporal world about as he pleased. Yet it was only a generation after him that Manichees, too, reappeared and rebelled.

Unless we are to conclude that Raoul's account of the Epicurean beliefs was pure invention, this Manichean outbreak, which, if not contemporaneous, followed close on its heels, was of a quite opposite character. For one thing its origin was far in the North, around Arras, Cambrai, and Liège. But most striking is the dogmatic contrast. Both, to be sure, repudiated the Creation as described in the Old Testament, but whereas the Epicureans denied the immortality of the soul, the Manichees, following rather the Neoplatonic tradition, were so eager for salvation that, like Plotinus, they were "ashamed of being in the body." As the Epicureans took the present life as the only real one and therefore devised ways and means for making the most of it, the Manichees carried their revulsion so far as to deny that Christ ever became incarnated or that priests had any sacramental powers such as of transubstantiation.

With the blessing of the pious King Robert, the monks and the aroused populace now proceeded to burn these Manichees too. Nor did most of the secular clergy call for self-restraint and mercy. Only Wazo, who was bishop of Liège about 1044, called for leniency. Writing to a fellow bishop, he said that

Christ forbid men to separate the chaff from the wheat, lest in uprooting the chaff the wheat he uprooted too. (Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, II (2), 196.)

He recalled the merciful example set by Bishop Martin of Tours. Furthermore, according to the *Chronicle* of Liège,

Wazo strove in this way to check the blind rage of the French thirsting for blood: for he had learned that men suspected of heresy were being condemned merely on account of their pale color (due to their abstinence from meat). (*Ibid.*)

5. TEMPORAL AUTHORITY

a. Canon Law

According to the canon lawyers Regino and Burchard, the fundamental law was the Bible and the interpretation of it was embodied in the canon law. Since the Bible as thus interpreted recognized the need of fallen man to be controlled by force as circumstances required, the canon law could and should, not only interpret the meaning of the Bible, but also enact what further laws—lax or strict—were at any given time or place best suited to the temper and capacities of the people. This amounted to claiming for the Church legislative as well as judicial sovereignty.

b. Civil Law

To the kings and emperors, therefore, was left only the duty to enforce the canon law. For this purpose the people—which was understood to mean the two Estates of clergy and nobles—were authorized to elect a ruler, and because in this mysterious way it appeared easiest for God to make His choice, this ruler was then recognized as God's appointed (temporal) vicar on earth.

Theoretically he had no legislative power, but although he was bound to obey the law rather than change it, there arose many cases not covered by any canons. To fill these gaps there were only the customary (virtually unwritten) laws, and in such cases the canonists said that the civil courts could treat these as appendages to the canon or divine law. In this way the civil courts could exercise at least some minimum of discretion. Further than this, in order to obtain effective compliance with the law, administrative directives had to be enacted dealing with taxes, penalties, and the delegation of a multitude of subordinate powers and duties.

Nevertheless the ruler had to watch his step in order not to tread on ecclesiastical toes because, according to the canon law, any civil legislation which conflicted with that canon law was null and void.

c. Bishops

At this time the ruler did not have to worry about what a pope might say, but the bishops, whose feudal powers rivaled their spiritual prestige, were both wary and dangerous. If they wanted to intimidate or discredit a ruler, they could always point, if only as a pretext, to something he had done which was at least a technical breach of their canon law. About the year 1010 indeed these prelates had become so powerful and arrogant that the pope sided with the king and the monks against them. It was just before this that Gerbert had insisted that the Church was as obligated to keep her hands off temporal affairs as the State was to steer clear of spiritual. That a king was eager to appoint his own nominees to the great episcopal sees was not therefore only in order to make them pay him for the privilege but also to make them obey him. If he was to execute the laws, he felt he must have a hand in choosing those who had the right to enact and interpret them.

d. Deposition of a King

But if the king went too far; or if he seemed openly to flout them? It was at this point that the issues were raised: first, could he be deposed; second, if so, by whom? Some said that as vicar of God he could not be deposed because he had been anointed as a punishment for his people's sins; but others argued that he could be, because by breaking the law which he had sworn to respect he had ceased to be king. Of those who held the latter opinion some said further that, since the people had elected him on the condition that he obey the law, they could themselves oust him, whereas others thought that only pope or general council could do so because only these could properly decide whether he in fact had broken the law.

e. The Impending Crisis

Shortly before 1050 the tension began to increase. The German emperor had grown stronger even in Italy, and the pope, representing no more than one of the feudal factions in

the city of Rome, was still weak. Thus it came about that on the one hand the emperor, claiming the right to deal with the pope as he might with any one of his German archbishops, proceeded in 1046 to depose Pope Gregory VI; and on the other hand it was asserted that, in contrast to any temporal ruler, no one but God could judge a pope. Among those holding the latter view was Bishop Wazo of Liège, who outdid even the claim made long before by Bishop Hincmar, by declaring that every priest outranked any ruler. The reason he gave was a cogent one for its time: while a ruler merely has the power as the executive to kill sinners, the priest, no less than the bishop, has the power by means of the sacraments of restoring a sinner to life.

f. Legislation by Subterfuge

Marcel Bloch, in his *Apologie pour l'Histoire*, observes that:

The Middle Ages knew no other foundation for either their faith or their laws than the teachings of their ancestors. . . . Inevitably, therefore, the periods which were the most bound by tradition were also those which took the greatest liberties with their true heritage. It is as if by a curious compensation for an irresistible creative urge they were naturally led, by the sheer force of their veneration of the past, to invent it. (*Apologie* . . . , 95.)

We have already given certain illustrations of this tendency. A few more should now be added.

In Regino's collection of canon laws he included an alleged canon of the Council of Ancyra of 314. This canon forbids the belief that women can go on journeys through the air. It may well be that the canon itself was an authentic one and also that his attribution was made in good faith, but if it was authentic it was not a fourth-century canon but rather a much later one, enacted by some Frankish council whose canons have not otherwise survived. In order to impress to-day, science is obliged to cite a recent authority; in the tenth century faith was obliged to cite an ancient one.

We have spoken of the *Donation of Constantine*, an eighth-century fabrication purporting to be a conveyance by that emperor to Pope Sylvester of all Italy in gratitude for the

pope's part in his baptism. The purpose was clearly to justify the eighth-century acquisition of the papal states. These lands being now threatened by the armies of the German emperors, the fabrication was produced in evidence and for a time perhaps had a deterrent effect. But the Emperor Otto III's mother had been a Byzantine princess and the young Otto was doubtless educated in some degree by Byzantine ecclesiastics who had never heard of any such *Donation*. In any case Otto in due course issued a diploma branding the document as a shameful forgery. Again, as in the case of Regino, the pope may well have relied on it in good faith, but since Otto would not be persuaded, it could only be refiled 'for future reference.'

The ninth-century Pseudo-Isidorian decretals, on the other hand, seem to have fared better. Simply because their date and place of origin were not given, they were presumed to be very old and, because venerable, to be regarded with veneration. These decretals declared the papal power over the bishops to be absolute. The original purpose had evidently been to show that the bishops were free from all control not only of any temporal authority but also of their own archbishops. Originally fabricated for the benefit, and probably by the hands, of the bishops, they were now resurrected by the papal party in order to confound the imperial; if Wazo of Liège was indeed the perpetrator of this ingenious adaptation of the original fabrication, he might be called the founder of the later Ultramontane party.

6. SECULAR LEARNING

a. *The Liberal Arts*

Again, as before under Charlemagne, the liberal arts were now receiving more attention; but the revival was not, as then, imported and centralized, but indigenous and scattered. Nevertheless this secular learning was still a by-product of a purely religious reform. The earliest centre was perhaps at the monastery of Saint-Gall; probably the most advanced of the centres was at the episcopal school in Liège, although those in Rheims, Orleans, Toul, Cologne, Chartres, and in

many monasteries, too, shared in the revival. It was generally agreed that these arts were part and parcel of God's natural revelation, but, whereas some interpreted God's purpose as confined to furthering the understanding of the Bible text, others thought that it was also in order to help to make nature, including even human nature, more intelligible. When Helgaud said that King Robert the Pious "was remarkable for his perfect knowledge of all the sciences," he presumably meant all the sciences needed for salvation, but others, like Gerbert and Hugh, bishop of Sion, took science to include the study of nature for its own sake, intimating, if innocently enough probably, that since nature was also divinely revealed, it could not—as Roger Bacon was later to suppose—lead anywhere but to God's truth.

b. Literature

The revival of Greek in the later ninth century had survived precariously under Irish and Byzantine influences, but it never took root and had faded before 1000 leaving no visible trace.

Of Latin classical literature Saint-Gall added to the patristic texts the Christian poets: Sedulius, Juvenius, Arator, and especially Prudentius on the martyrs. But curiosity did not stop there. Since the Latin Fathers' familiarity with the pagan literature had not harmed them, why should it now be proscribed? And if it was not inspired by the Devil, it must have been, in its own fashion, inspired by God. Surely such writers as Seneca had been a final preparation for man's introduction to the Christian truth.

Among the texts appreciated were those of Terence, Livy, Horace, Lucan, Juvenal, Suetonius, and, above all, Virgil. Already in the fourth century, moreover, his famous Fourth Eclogue had been interpreted by Lactantius, Eusebius, Prudentius, and Augustine as a divinely inspired prophecy of the Redemption. Must not the Aeneid, therefore, especially if the Dido and Aeneas romance were understood symbolically, have been divinely inspired too? For such great poetry was surely not of purely pagan, and therefore of demoniacal, inspiration.

c. The Laws of Nature

i. Theory. The studies of the so-called Quadrivium—arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music—raised at least two different problems. In the first place, if nature was to be studied only as a revelation, should it not be invariably and exclusively understood symbolically? Those—and there were many even among the orthodox—who thought that matter was evil took this gingerly attitude. It was that of the nun Hrotswitha, whose theory of opposites explained why the body must be the antithesis of the soul, and so why the whore was the only alternative to the virgin. And it was that of Raoul Glaber, who saw the hand of Devil or God in every phenomenon or event.

But there were others who, if they did not go so far as to suppose that God had left all the details to either the Devil or Fortune, nevertheless perceived an undesirable and radical distinction between the routine and the startling event. No doubt the latter was miraculous and therefore to be symbolically understood, but if the former was to be similarly interpreted, why was the distinction so sharp?

The frequency of miracles at this time is hard to gauge. Odo of Cluny spoke of their rarity and supposed that this was because God thought them to be no longer necessary; Raoul, struck by their much greater frequency in the Old Testament, said that the (outward) miracle had been superseded by (inner) grace. This conclusion must have been based on the frequency with which their own, or others', prayers went unheeded, for the record indicates that miracles were still extraordinarily abundant. True, most of those recorded could well have been mere coincidences, as the raising of a siege or the cure of a disease. Nevertheless the atmosphere was not yet favorable to a study of how even Gerbert's Fortune could be reduced to predictable laws.

The premises being thus established—of the twin contrasts of matter against spirit, and of the natural against the miraculous phenomenon—let us see how these affected appraisal and analysis in men's concrete approach to astronomy, cosmography, and medicine.

ii. Concrete Cases. In astronomy the stage had long been reached when the orderly recurrence of the motions of the stars and planets was tacitly if not openly recognized, and the usual explanation was that the nearer phenomena were to God the more invariable and so predictable their behavior must be.

But it was otherwise with eclipses and comets. About 961 Heraclius of Liège, while in Italy, reassured his soldiers that the eclipse of the sun was a natural because recurrent affair. Much later Raoul, though he was unsure of an eclipse's immediate or physical cause, was so convinced that its original cause was the will of God that he unhesitatingly accepted it as a miraculous portent. That a comet might have *any* natural cause apparently did not occur to him.

That perhaps Abbon de Fleury, who is said to have been learned in astronomy, and that surely Gerbert, who had read Macrobius' *Commentary* on Cicero's *Dream of Scipio*, were both rather of Heraclius' opinion we cannot doubt. It was not that they doubted God to be the original cause but only that they did not think He was using the celestial bodies in order to communicate with men by symbols, whether to warn, threaten, or otherwise enlighten them.

Curiosity about and therefore knowledge of the sublunar world was slight, based, at best, chiefly on the credulous *Natural History* of the elder Pliny. Raoul Glaber speculated on the fire which produced volcanic eruptions and on the rain water which visited the land with floods and so with famines. Gerbert, much more discriminating, studied the meteorology of the air, and the geography and contours of the earth. Both sought for natural as well as miraculous explanations; but in so far as either sought for anything more than the didactic purpose and so for the symbolic meaning, they laid themselves open to the reproach of indulging in an idle and even impious curiosity. For the so-called natural revelation was still officially regarded as hardly less supernatural in essence and purpose than the biblical.

Just as the astronomers had Macrobius to guide them and the cosmographers Pliny, so the physicians had Hippocrates and Galen, both in Latin translations, perhaps by the hands of the Irish Hellenists as Pseudo-Denis had been Latinized

by the Irishman Erigena. This would explain why at the monastery of Saint-Gall, which was still under Irish influence, Notker Labeo was credited with diagnosing pregnancy from the urine, and the imminence of smallpox by blood analysis. This was about 950. About 990 Heribrand of Chartres was reputed to be skilled in botany and pharmacy and familiar with both Hippocrates and Galen. Thirty years later Fulbert, also of Chartres, was held in equal repute, and, since he was of Italian and perhaps Roman origin, it may well be that the skills of Chartres had been imported from the South. For it was hardly another twenty years after Fulbert that the medical school at Salerno, not far south of Rome, is thought to have approached its peak under Petroncellus and Gariopontus. That of the medical centres in the West Salerno alone was free of all clerical restraints, may have been the cause of both her early rise to pre-eminence and her seemingly premature decline.

d. Refuge from the Miracle

To such physical sciences as astronomy, cosmography, and medicine there was the obstacle that, dealing as they must with inferior matter, men's calculations were likely to be at any moment upset by a miracle. With the mathematical sciences such as music, arithmetic, and geometry, on the other hand, there was no such embarrassment. Therefore we should expect to find these in greater favor as not only more spiritual but more reliable. It is true that, according to Aristotle at least, the superlunar world of the astronomers was unalterable, but as yet only Aristotle's logic was familiar; and the Bible had revealed a God who could arrest the course of the sun and indeed alter or abolish both earth and sky as He pleased. This Christian God could even abolish time and space, but He could not alter, even in the smallest degree, the truths of mathematics.

As to the science of music God could abolish not only our ears but also sound itself. He could not, however, abolish the inner ear which hears without ear or sound. For pitch is, as men already knew, not primarily physical but mathematical. What else but this was the music of the spheres? The content

of the Quadrivium was mathematics: not only arithmetic and geometry but astronomy and music.

During the tenth century music was chiefly cultivated at Saint-Gall. As the liberal arts were coming into favor again in the eleventh century music began to receive attention in France as well, notably from Odo of Provence, Gerbert, Fulbert, King Robert, and Odo II of Cluny. The last, perhaps inspired by Guido d'Arezzo, who was much in France, is supposed to have initiated the revival there which was shortly to supplant the immemorial plain chant with such innovations as polyphony, measure, and notation.

If astronomy and especially music offered a reasonable protection against supernatural interference, arithmetic and geometry offered complete immunity. God could destroy the universe but He could not prevent two and two from making four. Nor, in geometry, could He make space so curved that a straight line was not the shortest distance between two points.

We hardly know more of this geometry than that, like music, it was being studied again; only of Gerbert do we know further that he so fully mastered the texts of Boethius that he detected and so corrected some of the errors in them.

Finally logic, destined to become the uncrowned king of medieval disciplines, was already coming to the fore. Reactivated under the Carolingians but perhaps suffering a check as a result of Erigena's temerity, it was now again challenging symbolism as the more sensible technique for interpreting the various divine revelations.

It was true that the earlier Fathers had stressed the irreconcilability of reason and Revelation; but many of the later ones, notably Augustine, had made a discreet use of reason. Since the whole weight of pagan tradition was to regard man as essentially a rational animal, there was a patent absurdity in maintaining that he need not, and so should not, reason. This reason was, of course, not to be so abused as to raise doubts regarding the faith. Gerbert specifically objected to cultivating the art in order to be able the better to prove, as lawyers must, either side of a disputed point; rather it should properly only be used to prove the truth, or, at worst, the reasonable possibility, of Revelation.

In spite of the great victories of orthodoxy, moreover, such help was still needed, for not only must the now more sophisticated unbelievers who were alleging the irrationality of the Christian faith be disabused, so also must those who were already Christians by baptism be reassured against their possible reservations. The new heresies made this the more imperative. Therefore, with the tools now readily available in the logical texts of Aristotle, Porphyry, and Boethius, the temptation to experiment with, and if possible capitalize on, them was becoming every day more irresistible.

Among the proponents were Jean de Vandières who used logic to prove the Trinity, Hrotswitha who favored the formula of the harmony of opposites, Notker Labeo who wrote treatises on the subject, and above all—as usual—Gerbert who employed it, much as Abelard was later to do, in order to try to reconcile the conflicting conclusions to be found in the patristic texts. Probably Hugh of Sion, who wanted the liberal arts to be studied for their own sake as well as in the interests of biblical exegesis, should be classified with these.

The forces of resistance, however, were still formidable. Odo of Cluny was against the reading of Boethius; Ratherius of Liège insisted that the mysteries of the faith should not be argued; Majolus urged men to trust only to the wise folly of God; Fulbert said that truth lay in Scripture and not in logic; and Eihhold, a monk of Cluny, around 1020 forbade the study of logic there even though it was said to render some of Augustine's texts more comprehensible.

What was this logic? Its machinery was the syllogism, but the power which drove it was the premise: that is, the traditional and already familiar body of Greek axioms which were formed out of categories or, more specifically, out of words. Now these axioms varied in reliability. No one can deny, for instance, that a whole is larger than any of its parts, or that there are contrasts or differences such as between one and many, large and small, hot and cold, high and low, and—if today with less certainty—between spirit and matter, good and evil, potentiality and actuality. On the other hand, the further premises, that opposites are always utter and infinite, that together they form a harmony, and that between these

opposites there are stated degrees of each of these in hierarchical sequence, are not so certain. The over-all illustration here is the extreme opposition between perfection and imperfection. If this opposition be taken as only relative, it seems valid enough; if it is taken as absolute and infinite, the proof of the existence of both God and Devil is made to order. But here it was the Christians who followed, for it was the Greeks like Plato who led, by congealing the free pre-Socratic speculation into a system. But, once armed with the Platonic absolutes, it was easy for the Christians to prove that God was pure spirit, wisdom, virtue, power, and Being.

B O O K V

Early Medieval France

ANSELM

1. REASON AND FAITH

a. In Antiquity

IN ADAM man was created wholly rational, but by the Fall his powers of reason were much weakened. A prime purpose of the Redemption, therefore, was to induce faith as a partial substitute for this lost capacity. What remained of reason was still trustworthy because God-given, but it was quite insufficient as a means of discovering and recognizing truth unless faith was added. This was well explained by Augustine in his critique of Porphyry.

The precise difference between reason and faith, however, was not then resolved. At first it was thought that the truths of Scripture had to be divinely revealed because they were irrational, later these truths were preferably described as superrational. Human reason, therefore, although it must fall far short of the truth, did lead towards it. So, at least, Augustine believed.

This shift in attitude was partly because it was found that the conversions effected by reason—that is, by human persuasion—were far more numerous than those effected without such help, and therefore presumably by God's grace alone. The conversion of the apostle Paul became famous partly because such occurrences remained rare.

b. Credo ut Intelligam

That understanding must usually precede faith was, furthermore, long taken for granted, and Bishop Daniel's letter

of advice to Boniface on how best to convert the Germans indicates that this traditional belief long subsisted. We come now, however, to the crucial standard of Anselm, *credo ut intelligam*, which meant demoting reason to the status of a handmaid of theology.

The change was apparently brought about by the fact that by the eleventh century almost everyone had been baptized in the faith before he could understand anything at all. There was therefore no occasion to acknowledge that reason must come first. What Anselm really meant was that a man could not really understand any truth until he had applied his reason to the elucidation of the obscurities and embarrassments offered by the Sacred Text.

c. Symbolism

If *intelligo ut credam* had been a familiar sequence in antiquity, *credo ut intelligam* had also seemed valid in the sense that, just as *intelligo* must usually precede *credo*, for a fuller access to the truth a further *intelligo* was required. This second *intelligo* was no less a rational procedure than the first one.

It was now confined, however, to the interpretation of the text of Scripture, to what might be described as the employment of reason in order to approach as far as possible the superrational truth, and this resulted in the extravagant use—as by Ambrose—of the symbolic interpretation of Scripture whereby most of the superrational truths were now thought to have been extracted. Protests against the abuse of this technique had from time to time been heard, like those of Agobard, but without discernible results. The *credo ut intelligam* therefore meant that only if I believe that Scripture incorporates all truth can reason lead to it. Only by using reason in order to read the symbols aright will it lead men to truth rather than to error.

d. Two Kinds of Reason

Porphyry's reason, however, had been of another sort: it had started from scratch—and Porphyry had not been wholly for-

gotten. There was not much left of his own work, but reason as he understood it was also expounded in other surviving texts, such as those of Aristotle's elementary logic. It could be seen in other texts how the logic was employed in the search for truth, in Plato's *Timaeus* and in various Neoplatonic texts like that of Pseudo-Denis. It was this latter which had fascinated Erigena, and, although he himself was discredited, Pseudo-Denis, as the supposed disciple of the apostle Paul, could not be. This text was the missing link connecting Greek reason with Christian faith, and Christian reason was now to be challenged. Augustine had not distinguished between them nor, perhaps, had Erigena, but the discrepancy was now to become evident.

e. Three Schools of Thought

As is usual in such cases, there were the conservative, moderate, and radical views. All were agreed that the authenticity and therefore the divine authority of the canonical books of Scripture could not be questioned by reason, and further that their meaning was usually to be symbolically understood. But were the Fathers always right in deciding not only where a given passage was symbolically intended but also whether their understanding of the symbol was—even when they agreed—necessarily correct? For after all, as Erigena had said, why should we believe that the Fathers were divinely inspired and we doomed to be uninspired? It could be admitted that the canons of the four great councils should not be impeached, yet it did not follow that this was equally true of all the succeeding canons and papal decretals. For the popes were still regarded as far from infallible. None of these, indeed, had ever turned to reason in order to see what results it might furnish. Such, at any rate, were the arguments used by the new radicals.

When, in about 1050, this issue was first seriously raised, the conservatives clung to the very early view that the significance of Revelation lay precisely in the fact that it contradicted reason, and thereby discredited reason as the specific pagan error. Truth was irrational and therefore designed by God as a mystery which men pried into at their

peril. The more mysterious were the conclusions of the Fathers' exegesis, the more certain it was that these were right. The dogmas of the Trinity, Creation, and Incarnation were indisputable proofs of this. To apply reason to them and therefore to all the others was, if not a sacrilege, at least an impertinence. Alger de Liège said, more specifically, that although the opinions of the Fathers might be diverse they were never discordant.

The moderates, among whom were Lanfranc and Anselm, recognized the utility of reason, but only either to corroborate or to clarify obscurities, or, on occasions, to explain the *why* as well as the *what*. In other words reason was to serve dogma only as dogma had served Revelation, as her docile handmaid. Here Ivo and Bernard, both of the School of Chartres, went a step further by alleging that where patristic authority was conflicting, the matter should not, as the conservatives maintained, be left in doubt but should be resolved, when possible, by reason.

The radicals, on the other hand, as we shall soon have occasion to see, set reason on a par with, and even above, dogma. Of the two chief radicals the first, Berengar of Tours, used reason in order to determine whether a given Scriptural passage should be literally or spiritually understood. The second, Roscellinus, used reason in order to claim that an irrational dogma was necessarily false: where the interpretations of the Fathers were conflicting it was only by reason that they could be reconciled or harmonized. For God was not, and therefore did not create, anarchy, discordance, or—what all the schools were now denouncing—absurdity.

Gaunilon, the third notorious innovator (he who sought to refute Anselm), was in fact more conservative than the conservatives because, in contrast to most of the others, he was neither afraid of nor tempted by Greek reason. He did not reject the use of reason but he did believe that he and his contemporaries were as capable as the Greeks had been of exercising it. Christ came rather to discredit or at least to correct the Greek errors. Why then should we be so bold as to use their reason in order to correct, or even to authenticate, what Christ had been at such pains to reveal?

2. GOD

a. Existence of God

i. Antiquity. In antiquity the existence of a god or gods was taken for granted. Even among the Greeks, if we except a few like Euhemerus, this was acknowledged. For what else but God was Plato's Artificer, Aristotle's First Mover, or the Stoic Macrocosm? The Epicurean gods were no less real for being oblivious to the affairs of men. It was only the nature, not the existence, of Divinity that was in dispute.

Those who were most theologically inclined relied for their knowledge of the divine nature on history—that is, on traditional authority, oral or written—or on personal experience, as by visions or miracles. Such was the Jewish faith and, in due course, the Christian. The Greek philosophers, however, had sought divinity by reason only and it was against this as well as against the contemporaneous theological approach that the Christians were then contending. No sooner, therefore, had they conquered the rival theologies, as of Mithra, than they were faced with Greek philosophy, and, since it was rather the method used than the conclusions arrived at, which seemed to be wrong, this philosophy they accepted, although tacitly and even unconsciously, as the corroboration or at least (as in Augustine's case) as the springboard of their faith.

In the fourth century the Greek philosophy was, on the whole, the Neoplatonic, as influenced, but not radically affected, by Christian thought. It was based on the supposedly rational premise that reality was composed of opposites, that is, of every conceivable degree of perfection and imperfection. The great categories were three: divinity, humanity, matter. Man, being in the middle and therefore able to look both up and down, could discern what was perfect and what was not.

These were the opposites: the eternal and the ephemeral, the immutable and the mutable, Being and non-Being, spirit and matter, the rational and the irrational, the simple and the mixed, the One and the Many, freedom and necessity—in other words, Good and Evil. Through Pseudo-Denis,

Erigena, and many more, these *conclusions* had been incorporated into the body of Christian theology, but the rational *method* on which they were founded was only now, under the spell of Aristotle's logic, becoming a serious issue. For it was now being suspected that to the extent that logic was able to strengthen faith it might equally be able to undermine it: if what was true could be proved, perhaps what was not true could also be.

ii. Anselm. Anselm, born in Aosta about 1033, became a monk in 1055 at Bec in Normandy, where he remained for thirty-eight years. Then, as abbot and famous theologian, he was reluctantly drafted by his Norman sovereign to become archbishop of Canterbury, where he served until his death in 1109.

Since the death of Gregory the Great in 604 no one had been honored by the appellation of Father of the Church. Anselm was to receive a new title, that of Doctor. Why was this?

We may only surmise, but one thing stands out. Faith and dogma depended on the premise that God existed because, if He did not, Scripture was not a divine Revelation. Even if the *historical* proofs of Christianity were not conclusive, the Christian *experience* was. This experience, however, was unconvincing to as many as had not had it, which included all the pagans. Could these, however, be convinced by Greek reason? Anselm thought not. So vital it was, however, to find an effective proof, that he sought to evolve one by combining personal experience with Greek perfection. We have faith that God is real; reason also tells us that there must be an absolute perfection. We therefore have only to try to conceive of the highest possible degree of perfection; for since this highest degree would not be the highest unless it was real, it must be the very same God of whose existence Christians were having a personal experience. Anselm even adds, if perhaps inadvertently, that, as absolute perfection, God must even be that which is beyond our capacity even to conceive—a momentary dip into Neoplatonism.

Thus while to Anselm himself reason was still only a corroboration of faith, the skeptical reader was supposed to be

in this way convinced, as the Greeks had long before convinced themselves, that since absolute perfection must exist our idea of it must be of this very reality.

If Anselm was the ancestor of the thirteenth-century Scholastics, his opponent Gaunilon, a monk in Alsace, was the ancestor of the Scholastics of the fourteenth, for he denied the age-old Greek premise that there *must* be any absolute perfection or imperfection. Our only experience, he contended, was of different degrees of imperfection, and since our ability to conceive of absolutes was not the slightest evidence of their reality, it was the part of discretion to remain satisfied with faith.

b. Nature of God

Since both Greeks and Christians conceived of the necessity of an absolute perfection and so of God, it is not surprising that they should also have similar conceptions of what perfection was. Some of these we have summarized, and the Neoplatonists and Christians alike classified them under the three heads of power, wisdom, and virtue or, as the Christians also termed them, omnipotence, omniscience, and love.

In theory all of them were absolute, but in practice there were complications. Few agreed with the Italian, Peter Damian, for instance, that God can cause past events not to have happened; He cannot prevent evil intents in others and therefore could not have forestalled the Fall of either angels or man; and, finally, He cannot change His mind. The will of the Christian as well as of the Jewish God was declared absolutely free, but whereas that of the latter had been uninhibited, that of the former was under restraint because having once freely willed, He was deemed incapable—as if by a vow—of thereafter changing His mind.

Now the reason for this limitation was that God was perfect not only in power but also in wisdom, so that He possessed a perfect foreknowledge of every future event. It is true that He was usually thought to lack the wisdom which would have enabled Him also to foreknow the unrealized contingencies—those which might but in fact were not to occur—but this seemed a purely academic and even irrelevant limitation. One may say, then, that just as God possessed, if

not all power, at least all the power He needed and wanted, so He possessed an entirely adequate wisdom.

Thirdly, God was perfect virtue. Here, however, was a serious stumbling block, over which Greek reason was rather a hindrance than a help. For it introduced the premise of opposite absolutes and so of absolute good and evil. The Neoplatonists had called evil non-Being, a nothing, but Christians said, more sensibly, that evil was not only real but necessary, because it was only out of evil that good could come. This did not mean that God, too, came out of evil, for God was uncreated and eternal, but it did mean that His creatures, both angels and men, were so necessarily subject to this law that God could not abolish or circumvent it. He had therefore created with full knowledge that His angels and men would fall because He was either unwilling or unable to prevent them. His virtue, therefore, although perfect, must consist in resorting to whatever means best lent themselves to the realization of His end.

c. The Trinity

The Trinity tallied not only with God's nature as Power, Wisdom, and Virtue but also with the Neoplatonic hierarchy of Unity, Word, and Soul, and even with the law as embodied in the old Roman *Corpus Juris*, knowledge of which was just now reviving in France thanks to Ivo of Chartres. For was the nature of human law not also threefold, dealing as it did with justice, equity, and mercy?

That natural perfection, pagan philosophy, and Roman law should each be threefold seemed to be ample corroboration not only of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost distinctions in the New Testament, but particularly of their respective roles in current dogma: the Father had come to represent the arbitrary, immutable power of justice, the Son of wise equity, and the Holy Ghost of the virtue of a merciful, loving soul. The triune God thus became almost an accepted philosophic premise.

Since we are dealing with the Trinity, we may appropriately also divide the various opinions now being held regarding it into three: first that it can be positively proved,

second that it can be proved to be at least not illogical, and third that it can be proved to be illogical.

Anselm took the first position, basing it on the rational deduction from God's three natures. He admits, however, that the proof defies human articulation, and it is just as well that he made this reservation because he often refers to the Father as memory rather than power and to the Son as the articulation (*locutio*) of that memory rather than as wisdom.

In arguing more modestly that the Trinity, although it cannot be positively proved, can be proved consistent with logic, an anonymous text of about 1120 retains the sequence of power, wisdom, and virtue. This text and those of Guitmund d'Aversa and Alger de Liège all echo Anselm's claim that the Trinity is no mystery, but they add that the proof is incapable not only of being expressed but also of being perceived.

The third position was that the Trinity, as dogma defines it, is positively illogical and this for the simple reason that nothing, not even God, can be both a One and a Many at the same time. This was the brazen declaration of Roscellinus of Compiègne. He did not actually deny the dogma's truth, but he did say that it was not only a mystery but a wholly illogical one. Either, he said, there were three distinct persons and so wills or else there was but one, and he added that it was absurd to personify God's power, wisdom, and virtue, since these were merely His attributes and therefore, by definition, inseparable from Him.

d. Creation

To Erigena, following the Neoplatonists, the intrinsic essence of God made the Creation inevitable, but this assumption was unacceptable to Christians because God had always been free, and therefore free to create or not as He chose. That He did choose to create showed that He did so for a purpose, and because He was free He also created precisely as He chose to and not otherwise, this being the most perfectly suited to the accomplishment of that purpose.

Anselm's identification of the Father with memory is partly explained by the Neoplatonic theory of Ideas. The memory

was of these Ideas and it was the Son's office to execute or realize them. In this sense it was the Son who was the Creator.

Most important, however, was the determination of how the Creation was achieved. First God created space and time, then the universe to be contained in them. That God could create the containers out of nothing was apparently not hard to believe, but that He could similarly produce the universe was a mystery. And Greek reason did not help. It was now a time, however, when men were becoming impatient of mysteries. If only from a desire to prove the Christian superiority over the Greek, men felt that with the advantage of possessing the *credo* they could come to understand more than had their pagan predecessors. When Bernard of Chartres declared that he and his contemporaries could see farther than had the giants of the past because they could stand on their shoulders, he can only have meant to echo Augustine's estimate of Porphyry, and to reaffirm Anselm's *credo ut intelligam*.

They were not then to be stumped by the mysterious *ex nihilo*. Instead they seem to have groped for a plausible compromise. The first Creation was not only of space and time but also of a formless, chaotic, and apparently inert kind of matter. Some thought it to have been a conglomeration of atoms, and even of the four elements. Then came a second Creation—reminiscent of Plato—when, following the six days of *Genesis*, these amorphous things were given shape, order, actuality, and so the matter and even life of the sensible world. It was a way of conceiving Creation by easy stages none of which did unnecessary violence to natural reason.

3. GOD AND DEVIL

a. *The Fall*

Since God could not create anything equal to Himself, Adam, like the angels, must have had the free will to sin or not to sin. Therefore that the Devil, now free only to sin, was envious of God, and that God, in order to test Adam's loyalty, permitted the Devil to tempt him, and further that Adam thereupon succumbed and was for this reason punished—all this was conceded.

That Adam deserved to suffer the consequences was also not disputed, but the admitted fact that his descendants inherited his suffering raised serious problems. This too was admittedly just, and Anselm explained that this was because the human species was substantially, and therefore morally, a unit. The inheritance was of Adam's own soul, which is the old traducianist view.

Now here, as elsewhere, Anselm was trying to explain reality by means of Revelation, but the difficulty of his task is shown by his reliance on reality in order to support Revelation; for he cites the customary or feudal law decreeing the children born of parents who had been punished by enslavement to be also slaves. Thus he takes the justice of an imperfect, fallen humanity as evidence of God's perfect justice! This was an acknowledgment of natural Revelation with a vengeance, but it is not really surprising because the punishment of an innocent person on account of another was then an everyday occurrence. In the fictitious epic of Roland, all of the traitor Ganelon's family, held as hostages, were hanged, and Guibert de Nogent records a typical case where even the Christian inhabitants of a captured city were all put to the sword. Justice, according to all the Revelations, was wholesale until the Last Judgment.

One of Anselm's disciples, Odo of Cambrai, repeated this explanation, but in this age of mounting asceticism the alternate creationist one, based on the sin of the parental copulation, was more than holding its own.

At least one man, however, could not reconcile this with his notion of God. Hildebert de Lavardin, bishop and humanist, said he thought that although the Devil had had the right to punish Adam as he did, in dealing likewise with all his descendants he had acted beyond his authority. A bold hypothesis, certainly, thus to question God's omnipotence, but it seemed to him the only way of explaining how the punishment incurred by the Fall was consistent with the divine justice.

b. The Redemption

i. Purposes. On the purposes of the Redemption, Anselm now took a decisive step. By saying that in regard to certain

matters of dogma "opposite opinions may be held without hazard" he was justifying his boldness. That certain details were still mysteries he admitted, but he claimed that his general position had been reached by "infallible reason." It was probably his invincible faith that God was omnipotent which led him, in spite of the difficulties, to his famous conclusion.

The Devil, he said, had the power to tempt men because God had willingly conceded it. Actually, since he recognized that God could not create good without evil, Anselm may have thought that God had had no alternative. The Fall, however, did not necessarily add to the Devil's powers, it only reduced those of man; therefore the Redemption, in restoring man's powers, did not reduce the Devil's. God had merely counteracted the Devil's undiminished powers by canceling the weakness man had suffered as a result of the Fall.

The purpose of the Redemption, therefore, was not really to avoid treating the Devil with less justice than he deserved, but rather to make it possible to treat men with more justice than they deserved. This God appropriately achieved by resorting to the identical vicarious justice which He had employed against the sons of Adam.

Now these sons of Adam had been deprived of the free will to resist the Devil's temptations, and their inherited sin had, according to Anselm, been a double one. Through Adam's disobedience they had sinned against both God's justice and His honor, and the Redemption had been designed to atone for this. By means of the Incarnation Christ vicariously paid the debt which Adam had incurred; by means of the Passion Christ had revealed to men the true nature of God. If they took heed, they would receive an eternal reward; if they repeated Adam's mistake, an eternal punishment. By the Incarnation a sinless man had canceled the sin of Adam, by the drama of the Passion man was given the opportunity of worshipping God according to His dignity and deserts—it would relieve Him of what Anselm called not His wrath but His anguish. For such indeed was His anguish that He had chosen to die in order to prove to men that if, like Jehovah, He was a just Judge, He was also a loving Father.

Anselm's view was not quickly accepted: Alger de Liège recognized the affront to God's honor as well as to His justice, but for a time the other theologians continued to regard the Redemption as designed to reduce the Devil's power rather than to increase man's. They were still disagreeing about whether the Devil had acquired his power by right or by violence and therefore whether God could justly deprive him of it by violence. But they agreed that God had in fact deprived him justly by the expedient of the Incarnation. Although Anselm was kneading the wrath-of-God and the didactic theories into a consistent whole, the mousetrap theory was not to be so easily or quickly discredited.

ii. The Virgin Birth. That certain mysteries remained, nonetheless, all were agreed: the fact of Christ's dual nature, for instance, and the Virgin birth. But on these long resolved dogmas even the most rationally minded were discreetly silent. On at least one point, however, a rational explanation was sought: how was it that the Virgin, though born of human copulation, nevertheless gave birth to a sinless son? The creationist view was that, although sinful herself, she had borne her son without that copulation whereby the guilt of Adam was renewed. This solution, however, was most distasteful, not, apparently, because the traducianist theory of a single human soul had discredited it, but rather because the devotion to the Virgin had now reached such a pitch that it would have been thought a sacrilege even to suggest that she had, or ever could have, sinned. Yet, after all, if the Virgin could not sin, why did she not herself suffice to redeem mankind? Nowhere, presumably, was this query raised. Yet the time was coming when she was to rival, and even eclipse, the glory enjoyed by her Son. For Christ was, after all, primarily the Son of his Father Jehovah, whereas she was the daughter of man. He was primarily divine justice; she exclusively human justice or mercy, and not for a time only but for all time.

iii. Effects. Although the purposes of the Redemption were undeniably all achieved, certain of its effects required further elucidation.

A preliminary problem was presented by a tradition that

the antipodes were inhabited. Now were this true, and were the Cratesian theory also true—namely, that the equator was too hot to be crossed by men—how could the Apostles have been expected to convert these people? Was not the belief in their existence therefore heretical?

For no longer was the wholly free grace accorded the patriarchs, prophets, and the Virgin available. Since Christ's advent grace was conferred, or at least rendered effectual, only by a baptism which, by canceling guilt, restored man's free will. But of what kind? Fallen man had retained a free will, but only to sin. By the Redemption, however, God was induced to confer on certain individuals the grace of choosing to be baptized and thereby of regaining the free will of the first Adam.

Free will, however, also had a third meaning: God had free will because He could not sin, Adam had had only the free will to choose whether to sin or not. But according to Anselm, Adam's free will was not real free will, but only the will power which could enable him, if he tried, to acquire the real free will of God—which was to make sin impossible. It was this that baptism conferred.

What were the manifestations of this free will? The first was the wish to be baptized, then, following this, love and knowledge and, thereby, virtue. The only disagreements seem to have been as to whether love preceded or followed knowledge. The unlettered did not need formal knowledge, but the prospective theologian believed that knowledge, if not indispensable, certainly added intensity to love. For was it not true that since man must try to emulate the saints, he must seek to acquire their perfect wisdom as well as their perfect love? Most perspicacious, perhaps, was Guitmund d'Aversa's conclusion that free will was one of the mysteries.

In an age which seems really to have believed that God was the cause not only of every outward event but also of every inner thought and intent, man, believing himself incapable of self-help (was not this his self-knowledge?), was bound to rely on prayers and sacraments. For these were the only means by which he believed himself capable of promoting, whether as merit or grace, his own virtue. Man did not himself possess the free-will power to resist the blandishments of

the Devil, he could only call on God or a saint for help and especially on the Virgin, who, more than any other, combined the power and the eagerness to thwart the Devil's cunning. Even the prayers and Masses of the Communion of Saints were perhaps more effective if transmitted through her.

Most appreciated of all the benefits conferred by the Redemption was the new possibility of attaining paradise. Anselm justly observed that even the knowledge of Christ's sacrifice was not enough to entice men to love him in return were it not that he thereby opened the way to immortality. For God knew that man could not be expected to love Him for the mere happiness of it. It was true that most men were still being doomed to damnation; but if only a man could somehow extract enough grace he would now become one of the chosen happy few. And to the good man was thereby offered the further inducement to virtue that he might, after death, not only be happy himself but also continue to do his part in helping others to deserve to share his blessings.

There was even a further effect, and no negligible one, that the more the living cultivated virtue, the less occasion there would be for God's wrath, so that even the ephemeral sufferings of the temporal life would be mitigated. And, since this divine wrath was usually manifested rather vicariously and even indiscriminately, it was vital to entice as many as possible of the laity to take vows, if only in order to offer the virtuous a more tolerable life here and now. If the monks sought the eternal well-being of the layman himself, they also sought their own temporal well-being. They feared the unregenerate layman because of the temporal harm he was likely to do them not only directly but also indirectly by bringing down on all of them the just wrath of God.

4. PROVIDENCE

a. Mystery of

Augustine's belief that every event was as miraculous as any other was, for most men, as easy to misunderstand as it was difficult to comprehend. That is, it could appeal only to either the skeptic or the mystic. But even on the assumption

that only certain kinds of events were miraculous, the problem remained whether these were effected by the medium of God's saints or of His demons. For, since the saints could inflict apparent punishments and the demons bestow apparent rewards, even the most perspicacious interpreter was often left in a quandary.

Guitmund d'Aversa said that Providence was one of the mysteries. Hildebrand, the great Pope Gregory VII, said that Providence was lax. By which he probably only meant that God expected men to act themselves rather than merely pray to Him to act for them. Or did he impute divine negligence? And, at the other end of Europe, William the Conqueror was acting on the belief that God left it to him to win his own battles if he could.

Furthermore, even when it could be determined whether the divine agent was a benevolent or a malevolent one, there was still the baffling fact that in either case it was the same divine will which was the basic cause. Such being the case, it did not really matter which agent had been employed; a correct interpretation of any specific miracle, therefore, depended only on how just Providence was trying to be. Jerome, we may recall, had thought it consistently unjust in order that this might teach men, by contrast, what eternal justice really was. Salvian had thought temporal justice to be the foundation of the Christian faith. Augustine had supposed that temporal justice and injustice were in equilibrium, because if the justice were invariable there would be no need of eternal justice, and if the injustice were invariable there would be no evidence that there was any Providence at all. There is little indication, however, that this basic problem was yet being envisaged. The approach was still only the empirical one of what in each specific instance the purpose of God might be.

b. How to Ascertain God's Will

The miracle furnished evidence of God's intentions past, present, and future. But it was about His future intentions that men were naturally most concerned. Divination was the method employed by the pagans, but this was now for-

bidden. Where there is a will, however, there is usually a way. It could not very well be thought a sin, for instance, to pray to God for such a revelation, nor could it be a sin to believe that God answered the prayer, as by causing a dream, vision, apparition, or even a public miracle such as a portent. Revelations of most of the details about the Last Judgment were almost wholly obtained from such sources. By a curious contrast the untutored Norman William, disdaining portents and prophecies, conquered England, whereas the great Catholic leader, Bernard of Clairvaux, was soon to rely, with disastrous consequences, on God's private revelation to him that, if a Christian crusade were only undertaken, the conquest of the Holy Land was guaranteed. Evidently God was not to be counted on to win battles for men, a perhaps salutary, but quite unsolicited, revelation, and this time not to Bernard alone but to the whole medieval world.

c. How to Influence God's Will

It was certainly desirable to ascertain God's will, but far more so to learn how to influence it. This was the art which the Greeks had called theurgy.

i. What God's Will Was. Theoretically and dogmatically both the saints and the demons did no more than execute God's will. Practically, however, it would have been regarded as virtual heresy not to believe that there was a difference between not only their purposes but their effects. Granted, though most reluctantly, that the Devil did only what God wanted him to, it could not be granted that the saint was equally bound. If it be said that it was God's will that the saints do what they please, but the Devil only what God pleases, God becomes synonymous with the Devil. If it be said that it is God's will that both do as they please, it is tantamount to saying that God has no desire of His own except, with His foreknowledge of what the outcome must be, to enjoy watching these antagonists fight it out.

ii. By Appeal to the Saints. So it seemed that God—and also Christ, if only as an accessory—approved of everything that saint or demon was able to do. Yet it was equally cer-

tain that neither of these agents approved of anything that the other did. Both, therefore, needed help, and in this lay men's opportunity and risk. They, too, could do only what God wanted them to, yet God also wanted them to do what they liked—at their peril.

Most men, being mindful of their salvation, wanted to enlist on the side of the saints. Since only the Virgin had a power comparable to that of the Devil, it was her favor, above all, that was to be courted. As the prestige of the august Trinity faded, hers rose. The new Order of the Cistercians wore a white rather than the traditional black garb, and every church of this Order was to be dedicated to her. And every new cathedral, too, was to be so dedicated. It was at this same time that her Miracles were first collected in books—by a certain Hugues Farsit of Soissons. True, she was still the great Advocate at the Last Judgment, but she was now also in charge of the temporal world, sharing with the Devil the responsibilities of Providence. It was pre-eminently her mercy rather than that of the lesser saints which was pitted against the Devil's malice.

The powers of the lesser saints, indeed, had much depended on their relics. Even Christ's prestige had suffered for a time because he had left none. Now the Virgin's body as well as soul had presumably (though this was not yet a dogma) also risen, yet as a mere saint she could not act until invoked. Here the pilgrimages to Jerusalem came to her help. In due course appeared in the West fragments of the True Cross and, what was even more welcome, a shirt of the Virgin. This had become the possession of the Cathedral of Chartres, which led to its becoming, at least in the popular mind, the holiest shrine in France. True, she was the Mother of God rather than God Himself, but this rendered the veneration she received hardly less legitimate, for how could Christ not rejoice that his mother was now receiving, if vicariously, the loving adoration which his Passion had originally evoked only for himself? If, as seemed most likely, she had wished for his death as much as he himself had, was not her sacrifice, as mother, at least the equal of his?

Anselm's disciple Guibert de Nogent is witness to the pre-eminence which the Virgin was now acquiring at the ex-

pense of the other saints. (He gives her a new title, "Queen of the Martyrs.") At Noyon, he tells us, there were relics of the martyr Nicasius, and a church there was dedicated to him. Now it happened that on his feast day a poor girl made so bold as to engage in needlework and was duly punished therefor by having her needle so catch in her tongue that it could not be extricated. She at length invoked the help of the Virgin, with the usual happy result.

What was the moral? The Virgin

had proved herself the Queen of Martyrs by avenging herself on a crime committed against a martyr, and yet, when satisfaction was given, allowing her wrath in the end to be assuaged. (Guibert, *Autobiography*, II, 18.)

Lest he leave the impression that Nicasius himself had been helpless, Guibert adds that, by this miracle,

not a little was the fame of the martyr made manifest who by punishment of the poor, humble woman, made known how great an adversary he is of the proud who are adverse to him. (*Ibid.*)

The impression is, nonetheless, that the power of Nicasius depended wholly on the fact that he was important enough to invite the intervention of the Virgin. For it was not only she who had pardoned but also she who, in behalf of Nicasius, had punished the affront. His vaunted power, therefore, lay only in the fact that he was one of the Virgin's clients.

How typical was this interpretation of the miracle it is hard to say; it is, however, a further sign of the growing tendency to elaborate the celestial hierarchy by subordinating the lesser saints to the Virgin as the bishops were being subordinated to the pope. Hitherto it had rather been the lesser saints who were solicitous of men's temporal welfare, while the Virgin was concerned only with their salvation. But the Virgin, for all her eminence, was also a saint, not a judge but an advocate. Since the Devil was concerned to make men miserable and so rebellious, who was most likely to thwart him but she who was most concerned to make men happy and thereby submissive?

iii. By Appeal to the Monks. That the prayers of the holy monks could do much to further a man's salvation had long

been recognized, and those of Cluny, because of their reputation for virtue, had been thought particularly effective. It was indeed largely on this account that the Order had so greatly prospered. At first their service seems to have been chiefly aimed to help the dead, and perhaps only later to promote the virtue, and thereby the absolution, of the living. Now, however, it becomes evident that they were regarding themselves, and being regarded, as able to mitigate temporal misfortune as well.

This step seemed natural enough in so far as it was believed that their virtue earned them this privilege. For by increasing a man's good name they were also likely to be promoting his temporal welfare. This belief, however, was still far from universal, for it seems, at least, to have been chiefly for the temporal welfare of rulers and popes that the Cluniacs prayed. For the poor and obscure, the saints, with the help of their relics, were still thought to offer the best temporal protection.

It is easy to assume that this was because only the great had given, or might in the future give, substantial donations. But although this was no doubt partly true, it may also be that, whereas the temporal welfare of a poor man had little or no temporal effect, that of a ruler and especially of a pope affected everybody, and this specifically included the privileges, prestige, and security of the monks themselves. Some the monks might prefer to see dead, but to those towards whom they were well disposed they could only wish a long and happy life—"God save the King." Thus King Alfonso of Spain credited his Cluniacs with having effected his escape from prison; the Emperor Henry III with having restored his health. Henry IV asked, and presumably persuaded, them to pray that Pope Urban II cease to persecute him; Pope Gregory VII asked them to intercede for him because his anguish—over the opposition to his reforms—was fast becoming unbearable.

Why were these great ones not satisfied to invoke their respective patron saints, or the Virgin, or even Christ, to give them relief? Presumably because they believed that the prayers of these monks were more likely to be heeded than their own and also that the immense quantity of the com-

munity's prayers must more than make up for any deficiency in their individual quality—an early tendency to what we would now call mass production.

iv. By Consecration. That only the priest had the power to consecrate objects was of course an old tradition, but this power had long been confined to ritual observances and so to specified objects such as water, oil, or the bread and wine, although these now included images, as of the Cross. In the hands of heedless priests, however, abuses had gradually crept in: they were emboldened to bless the water or fire to be used in an Ordeal, and other such dubious practices became more frequent.

A curious instance is to be found in the famous *Lapidary* of Marbode de Rennes. In describing the magical powers of various gems he asserts that sapphires, if only they have been duly consecrated, enable their possessor to sway God's will. That the Church ever sanctioned such a superstition is impossible. The book, nonetheless, was not condemned nor was Marbode reprovèd; and, although it was clearly a relic of paganism, the faith which the Church had fostered in the magical powers of priestly consecration rendered her not a little responsible for the persistence of many such ill-begotten beliefs.

v. By Appeal to the Devil. It was of course also believed that men could influence God by influencing the Devil. This was usually done inadvertently, however, either by impulsive malice, by failing to observe the prescribed ritual, or by conscientiously but unwittingly adopting a heretical belief. The cultivation of virtue was a conscious effort to influence the saints; the cultivation of sin was perhaps an effort, however unconscious, to escape the notice of both saints and demons.

Occasionally, however, a deliberate effort was made to get the help of Providence indirectly through the instrumentality of the Devil. At this time it was made chiefly in sickness (one's own or another's) after prayers to the saints had proved unavailing, although to resort to the evil powers in order to get revenge on an enemy must also have occasionally been an overpowering temptation.

In spite of the efforts of the Church to discourage such beliefs, laity and clergy almost all believed that the Devil could, and often did, accede to such invocations. At the same time a few believed further that the Devil could grant men's requests to be given certain of the Devil's powers in their own right—that is, by means of a pact. They might acquire the persuasive powers corresponding to those of the living saints but hardly the delegated powers of consecrated priests.

When men became 'possessed of the Devil' it might be thought that they had so far committed their souls to him that he was enabled to take possession. But it could also have been that by their sin they had automatically fallen into his power. What we might call their insanity seemed, except to a few like Agobard, to be a divine reminder that sin is often punished here and now.

The theory that the sacrament of marriage became valid only after consummation by sexual intercourse is thought to have evolved out of the belief that impotence was the effect of the Devil's magic. Therefore, unless and until the spell was lifted, the couple were not bound. Only in this way might the malice of the Devil or his human accessories be thwarted. What the canon law was or should be in this matter was being discussed at this time by the canonist Ivo of Chartres and by Guibert and Hildebert.

As an indication of how uncertain the Church still was in regard to actual sorcery, Ivo, while denying that men could be empowered by the Devil to control the weather or that even the Devil himself could do more than transform men into the *appearance* of animals, said that night-flying by women was, whatever the explanation might be, an incontestable reality. Guibert believed that a man, too, could turn another man into the appearance of an animal, and perhaps attributed this power to actual sorcery. He believed further, on what evidence he does not say, that women, by means of a pact with the Devil, can and do have sexual intercourse with him.

Ever since antiquity the State had treated damage caused by means of magical powers as a serious crime and punishable accordingly. So long as the Church feared pagan superstition she forbade the belief that men could possess such powers.

Now, however, with these fears allayed, she was herself succumbing to the very belief she had before condemned, for it had gradually become adopted as an integral part of the orthodox conception.

The Church, as we know, punished intent rather than deed. At first a magical intent was merely evidence of a false belief. But it now appeared to be based on a true belief and therefore to be a temporal threat to others as well as a mere spiritual danger to the believer himself. Now since the deed, when done, was ample evidence of intent, the State was not averse to transferring its jurisdiction over magic to the Church, with the dangerous result that the intent became synonymous with the actual deed. This transfer was effected about 1100. The State, to be sure, still executed the sentence imposed, and the crime of sorcery, now grounded on the slippery charge of intent, was in this way to be gradually introduced. The belief that the intent, however sinful, could not be effectuated, though once a dogma, was before very long to become a heresy.

5. SALVATION

a. Requisites

The Redemption had conferred on men three requisites for salvation: the free will to choose or not choose virtue, the knowledge of what that virtue was, and the availability of grace which enabled the requisite will and knowledge to actualize their new potentialities. That these steps constituted the foundations of salvation was by now no longer a matter of dispute.

But the very human question had remained of how to know whether a given person was in fact conforming to this technique. Was he properly exercising his free will, was he seeking the true virtue, and was he in fact receiving the grace which constituted the assurance that he had been doing the best he knew how?

It was in order to resolve these uncertainties that the sacraments came into being, inaugurated, indeed, by Christ himself: baptism as assurance of free will, confirmation as assur-

ance of the requisite minimum of knowledge, and the Eucharist, if received in good faith, as assurance of grace.

What had originally been a convenience for orientation and navigation—to fix one's position—had soon evolved into an indispensable means of propulsion. In principle baptism was simply a proof, but soon became a requisite, of free will. And so with the others. Omission of these three sacraments became so many proofs of the absence of free will, faith, and grace.

This evolution of course all began long before. It is perhaps the more surprising, then, that the efficacy, at least of baptism and the Eucharist, now became subjects of bitter controversy.

b. Baptism

In the case of baptism it is true that the issue was brought into the open by certain heretical sects. It was, nevertheless, a cause of disquiet among all but the most submissive. According to many of the early Fathers, the effect of Christ's Incarnation was so universal that it repaired Adam's guilt in all men, but it had long since been interpreted rather as determining God to give certain men the will to choose to ask for pardon. Yet even then so many men clung to the pagan faith that good will could itself constitute virtue that they chose to postpone baptism until late in life rather than risk the danger of sinning more than once thereafter, because in those days no second mortal sin could be absolved. It was only later that the priests were authorized to impose any number of successive penances—a change which made it easier for men to recognize that, since no virtue was possible for the unbaptized, all who died unbaptized were inevitably and automatically damned.

That in a wholly Catholic world this was fair enough to those who had attained the age of reason was now no longer disputed. The embarrassment was that the infant who died unbaptized had not even a Chinaman's chance of salvation.

It was only by some of the heretical sects that this was openly repudiated, but that many of the orthodox were also troubled is indicated by the effort of Anselm, bishop of Laon,

the most prominent theologian of the early twelfth century, to mitigate its severity:

It is asked regarding catechumens whether if they die before baptism they may be saved. Answer: If necessity should interfere they are saved, but if negligence shall have interfered they will not be saved. (Grabmann, *Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode*, II, 154, n. 4.)

c. *Eucharist*

i. The Problem. The problem of the Eucharist was of quite another character and, perhaps because infants could not argue as could grown-ups, it caused a far greater furor. Yet it was a question not of justice but merely of physics.

Whether the communicant received grace itself, or only a supernatural strength which made it easier for him to earn that grace, was not now the issue. It was rather *how* the fortification was transmitted, not only a theological but also a dialectical or 'scientific' question.

The theological one was what Christ meant when, according to *Luke*,

he took bread and gave thanks and brake it, and gave unto them, saying this is my body which is given for you: this do in remembrance of me . . . (and) This cup is the new testament in my blood which is shed for you. (xxii 19-20.)

Or when, according to *Matthew*,

he took bread and *blessed* it and brake it and gave it to his disciples and said take, eat: this is my body. And he took the cup and *gave thanks* and gave it to them, saying, drink ye all of it; for this is my blood of the new testament. (xxvi 26-28.)

Or when, according to *Mark*,

he took bread and *blessed* and brake it, and gave it to them and said, take, eat, this is my body. (xiv 22.)

Or when, according to *John*,

Except ye eat of the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day. For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. (v 53-55.)

Many even of the Gospel passages lent themselves to a multiple interpretation, but these surely did not. To which single one, then, did they belong? The Fathers, and most notably Ambrose and Augustine, had differed; so, much later, had Radbertus and Ratramnus. Although the literal interpretation was now favored by current authority, was not the symbolic one the more reasonable?

ii. Humbert. Most of the clergy were at this time taking the literal view of the Real Presence of Christ in the consecrated bread and wine: an identity of substance. Such a one was Humbert, a Rhenish bishop who in 1050 was a very influential cardinal in Rome. Indeed he declared this identity to be so complete that the communicant actually ground Christ's body with his teeth.

iii. Berengar. It was this belief which Berengar of Tours could not stomach. Citing Christ's admonition in *Luke* xxii, 36, "He that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one," he declared that if the passages regarding "my body and blood" were to be taken only literally, as the Jews took the Old Testament, "I blush to own that such laws were given by God." He cited the statement of Origen (which he thought was by Jerome) that the text of the New Testament as well as of the Old kills unless spiritually understood.

At the same time Berengar admitted that such New Testament passages as that "Christ, being raised from the dead, dies no more," and that "now know we Christ no more after the flesh" must be taken literally, even though this may have weakened rather than strengthened his case. For his opponents could fairly retort that if these passages may be understood only literally, by what logic must the other be taken only spiritually?

Berengar also said that Christ first blessed the bread and wine in order to consecrate it, as the priest first blesses the water of baptism. The effect, therefore, was intended to be only spiritual.

Thus in these brief passages both Humbert and Berengar interpreted the blessing phrases literally and the salvation phrases spiritually; they differed only regarding the phrases

concerning the bread and wine. If the help of reason was ever to seem needed, it was here.

We need not be surprised, therefore, to find Berengar appealing to it. To apply reason to the solution of this problem was, he said, not only a right but a duty. For why, otherwise, had God given to man, and to man only, the power of reason? He, therefore, who refuses to use it is dishonoring Him who bestowed it.

His rational arguments were two. His first was that since no substance can exist apart from its form or attributes, these alone reveal the identity of the substance or matter to which they are attached. The appearance of the bread and wine was therefore the only proof of its substance, and this was corroborated inversely by the fact that in all recorded miracles the change in the appearance is taken as conclusive evidence of the change in substance. This was not, to be sure, regarded as true of magic because, as Guibert reported, the Devil (or his accessory) could cause a nun to assume the form of a dog. But it was a valid argument in the case of the bread and wine because, unlike magic, the miracle, being directly caused by God, was never designed in order to deceive.

Berengar's second argument may be paraphrased by a syllogism: (a) since Christ's body must, by definition, be material, it cannot be both in heaven and on every altar at the same time; (b) although a miracle can change one kind of thing into another, it cannot change it into an already existing thing; (c) therefore the bread and wine cannot be changed into Christ's material body. Even God cannot do what is clearly illogical.

The change by consecration is therefore no more one of substance than is the change made in the consecrated water used in baptism. For both of the changes are sacramental in nature and therefore not only invisible but also immaterial. At the same time, however, Berengar agreed that, although there was no change of substance the effect was not, as in baptism, to benefit only the guilty but, contrarily, to benefit only the innocent. Since the effect was admitted by everybody, Berengar argued that if the real body and blood were present it would, being material, affect both guilty and innocent indiscriminately, whereas being spiritual it had the

power to discriminate. This, however, was far from convincing because the relic, although admittedly material, could also discriminate.

iv. The Church. Two of Berengar's opponents said that the change was a mystery not to be solved by men because it was at once a material and a supersubstantial or superrational one. Another one said that at least the process, if not the effect, was a mystery. Others, again, declared that a mystery did not need to be irrational so long as it was hidden, as by the persisting appearance of the bread and wine. A miracle was distinguishable from a mystery precisely because the change in the substance was revealed by the change in the appearance.

At least one man tried to solve the difficulty by alleging that just as the incarnated Christ was at once wholly God and wholly man, so it might be that the Host was at once wholly bread and wine and wholly body and blood. But this impanation or consubstantiation theory was generally disregarded.

How, then, if the change was not to be left as an irrational, or at least as a hidden, mystery, were Berengar's objections to the Real Presence to be met?

That the Scholastics were at least as fertile in expedients as Ulysses had ever been is well known, and their refutation of Berengar offers a classic illustration of some of their methods. Berengar had insisted first that substance and its attributes or accidents cannot be rationally separated, second that a material body cannot be wholly in more than one place at a time, and third that if a thing already exists it cannot thereafter be created.

Being unwilling to admit that the change was irrational, one man insisted that although the body and blood were material, they had only a spiritual effect. Another weakened to the extent of saying that the change was only into 'proper' body and blood. A third was willing to admit that the change consisted not so much in material substance as in creating new principles of action. This was the transitional stage. From this point onward the blunt assertion of Humbert—that the change produced the identical material and historical body and blood—was abandoned. The change still produced

a Real Presence, but it was no longer of Christ's material body and blood but of a third, not otherwise existing, body, which was not corporeal but spiritual and therefore not bound, as corporeality must be, by any accidents or by any space.

How was it described? Lanfranc said it was not a mere new principle of action but a new principle of being, material—but not corporeal, supersubstantial, a mystery and so perhaps illogical, but not a hidden mystery. Guitmund d'Aversa said that it was not the historical, yet nonetheless the proper, body because it was that of the Church, that is, of the faithful in unity. Alger de Liège said that this new body was like the historical body except that it was wholly spiritual and supersubstantial. Finally Honorius (usually called of Autun) said it was constituted of the union between the historical body of Christ and the mystical body of the Church.

Thus it was that by 1125 the dogma of the Eucharist was approaching its final form.

v. Practical Consequences. To many in more recent times this issue has been regarded as something of a tempest in a teapot. But surely there was a wide discrepancy between the flat denial of any change, which was made by many heretics, and the crudely realistic conception of Humbert. That historically at any rate the issue was vital is shown by the fact that of the various solutions four were to be defended to the death by innumerable sixteenth-century Christians. Zwingli chose to confine the significance of the rite to its psychological effect on the communicant, Luther preferred the theory of consubstantiation, Calvin's receptionism was close to the theory of Berengar, while the Council of Trent virtually reaffirmed the new orthodoxy of 1125. Obviously the purely psychological theory, Augustinian though it might be, was not suited to the supernaturalism of the twelfth century; only less obviously the consubstantial theory, which applied the supreme miracle of Christ's double nature to that of the apparently humble bread and wine, seemed inept if not positively sacrilegious. The orthodox compromise, on the other hand, offered certain advantages. For one thing, by complicating the issue it not only avoided the crudity of

the literal interpretation but also heightened the sense of mystery.

But its chief advantage was that it strengthened the conception, already so deeply rooted, of the Church, or body of all the faithful, as a joint or corporate entity. This had been noticeable at least as early as the fourth century, and the palpably vicarious nature of God's justice had kept the view alive. It is a plausible supposition at any rate that, whereas the concentration of the Eucharist on Christ himself made the relation between him and the communicant a personal one, substituting the Church of all the faithful made the relationship a corporate affair—of all for one and one for all. That this had resemblances not only to Mithraism but also to military organization as such is not to be denied, and it doubtless seemed salutary that men be reminded that they were all soldiers of the Church militant. The relation of this controversy to the contemporary First Crusade was in no sense one of cause and effect, yet each phenomenon seems to throw light on the nature of the other.

Finally, it may be observed that it was also at this time that the orthodox were insisting that only universals, such as the species Man, were real, while the unorthodox were identifying reality rather with the individual. This controversial issue was as old as the Bible and the Greeks yet it is also as fresh as that between socialism and capitalism or between the State and individual; the medieval conflict about the Eucharist may therefore be included among the always recurring manifestations of the eternal conflict between the One and the Many.

d. Works

i. Asceticism. Since the Eucharist benefited only those communicants who were in a state of contrition, they must know what constituted those sins which they must regret and be resolved to eschew in the future. Whereas for a layman, exposed as he was to all the temptations of the world, it could seem enough if the obvious temporal sins were eschewed, for the cloistered monk further restraints were thought to be imperative—not those of chastity and poverty only, but others

even more severely ascetic such as fasting, vigils, and even self-inflicted punishments. For monks must not only avoid causing others to suffer, they must also impose suffering on themselves. That it made them happy to suffer physically did not, however, detract from their virtue.

To them matter was still identified with sin and evil, and probably too many of the monks shared the Manichean view that it was positive evil. At the same time the saner view of Gregory I that matter was rather a distraction than a temptation had not been wholly forgotten, even by the more violently inclined.

On the other hand, the belief that the more unhappy one could manage to be in this world the happier one would deserve to be in the next, was a not uncommon one. Guibert tells how his pious widowed mother rejoiced in her various miseries because she hoped that by her prayers the miseries of her dead husband would thereby be lessened. In the same way Hugues, abbot of Cluny, hoped "to transfer to himself the expiation of his father's sins" (Smith, *Cluny*, 224). These were merely individual efforts to achieve what the Communion of Saints and participation in the mystic body of the Church were hoping to achieve on a universal scale.

This belief that the virtue of the living can compensate for the sins of the dead rings strangely in modern ears. For, according to modern logic at least, one might well conclude that a sin—such as a curse—by the living must be correspondingly effectual. The concentration on such problems, however, while leading to many dubious conclusions, also led to as many admirable ones. Guibert's mother, although of high rank, refused to use her influence in order to obtain a privileged preferment for her son. It was, says Guibert, "as though she had said: 'that which [in conscience] I am unwilling to do for myself I will not do for another'" (*Autobiography*, I, 7). And who of us will cavil at that!

These illustrations introduce us to the heart of the early Middle Ages. Moderation, compromise, calculations of practical consequences, the weighing of better and worse, the Golden Mean—all these subtleties were yet to come. Until the days of *courtoisie*, the women were offered a single alternative: to emulate Eve or Mary. The men also faced such a

choice: that of being a killer or a monk. To family life the monk would give no quarter. Read the holy Anselm's letter of condolence to parents who had lost their sons:

Know that if God, in taking away your two sons, has left you alone in this life the cause is not His anger but His grace; left without worries, with nothing left to love, you are now free to hurry to Him, to give yourselves to Him, both yourselves and your wealth. (Filliatre, tr., *La Philosophie de Saint Anselm*, 419.)

The family must be destroyed in order that the monastery may prosper, for such is the will of God.

That monastic asceticism was now more than ever in the ascendant is also indicated by the new Orders which were being founded. The old Benedictine Orders, Cluny included, had in too many instances fallen into disrepute. They had slipped into a groove which was not edifying. Rather than try to enter them in the hope of reforming them from within, the young enthusiasts preferred to found Orders of their own, and among the most notable of these were the Carthusians, whose Rule permitted them to live in proximity and yet, like hermits, in separate cells; the Cistercians, whose Rule was only slightly less severe; and the Canons Regular of the so-called Augustinian Rule, for secular priests whose vow was in many respects monastic, although their duties as priests required them to serve physically in the temporal world. For they were dedicated to serve the laity by their deeds as well as by their prayers.

ii. The First Crusade. For the laity, on the other hand, who could not resign themselves to chastity, poverty, or obedience, or often even to law and order, the Eucharist was, at least technically, unavailable. Although they believed, with few exceptions, sincerely, they did not have the will to be truly contrite or the patience to do penance. Many probably relied, if without too much assurance, on a deathbed repentance with its last Eucharistic rites, but this was of even less advantage to whoever had to deal with them before this gratifying end. Some means had therefore to be devised for reconciling such persons to the Church less tardily, and since they were not to be easily frightened—as by the threat of ex-

communication—into contrition, some other way had to be found by means of which they could earn absolution.

The vow of chivalry was an attempt to appeal to their better natures, but because it only made their subsequent misdeeds so much the less rather than the more excusable, it had not sufficed. Then the solution was found—in the granting of indulgences.

Now pilgrimages had long ago been imposed as a penance, but although it was an edifying experience for the devout, it had become a demoralizing one for too many even of the monks and nuns. Especially for the knight, whose profession it was to kill, the temptation to pick a fight on the way was hard to resist. For on the pilgrimage route, whether to Compostela or to Rome, the plea of having fought in defense of self or of the other pilgrims was hard to disprove.

In earlier times the lands of many a feudal lord had been invaded by pagans—Saracen, Hungarian, or Norman—and to fight against these constituted a welcome penance for all the Christians concerned. But once they had been expelled or converted, the lords had no one to fight but each other. This practice had now become a serious plague, and the Church, as one of the chief victims, was in no mood to encourage it by handing out indulgences.

It is striking that it was the Normans who initiated the idea of hunting down the infidel wherever he was still to be found, which in the earlier eleventh century was chiefly in southern Italy and central Spain. According to canon law, a Crusader, in order to qualify for the indulgence, had first to confess and allege remorse for his past sins—though it is doubtful whether many of them conscientiously did so, or cared much to get their ‘penance’ authenticated on their return. Then, quite abruptly, the situation changed.

In 1078 Jerusalem passed from the possession of the tolerant Egyptian Moslems into that of the intolerant Turkish Moslems, who proceeded to persecute and even murder many of the Christians whom they found there. Earlier the pilgrimage there had been a personal adventure, but it had more recently become a penance recommended, and often even imposed, by the Church. As Rome was the temporal, so Jerusalem was the spiritual, capital of Christendom. To Chris-

tians, therefore, the capture seemed a slap in the face, and within a decade Pope Urban II, a French Cluniac, began to organize what was to be the first of the great medieval crusades.

As a recruiting measure indulgences were so extended that all who took part in it were absolved of their past sins in advance, and that those who in the course of it died sword in hand were promised salvation, regardless, apparently, of what further sins they may have committed after their absolution. Of the vast number who were by this means induced to take part, many, said Albert of Aix, were "adulterers, murderers, robbers, and perjurers." These, of course, were supposed to confess all their unexpiated sins, and with due contrition, in order to validate their absolution. But how often were the priests satisfied with their professions, and how often did they make it clear that the absolution was valid only if the penitents henceforth behaved as penitents should? At least there seems to be no surviving record that any absolutions were withheld before departure or, having once been given, were subsequently revoked.

When Berengar chose Christ's admonition "He that hath no sword let him sell his garment and buy one" as indisputable proof that Christ often meant his words to be understood spiritually, he could not foresee how soon a pope would choose to understand the quotation literally. That one must invariably turn the other cheek had long been taken not to forbid the use of the sword in defense of self, but now for the first time the buying of the sword was taken to command the physical use of it in defense of God.

In 1088 Guibert was thirty-five years old. Did the agitation for a crusade remind him of his mother's refusal to do for others what she would not do for herself? Even had he felt so he would have recognized that 'others' did not include God. Only a cynic could have been tempted to observe that God would not in conscience allow a man to do for himself or others what He commanded them to do for Him.

iii. Local Crusades. Although the infidels could now be hunted down only by distant crusades, there remained plenty of enemies of the Church at home: robber barons, recal-

citrant temporal rulers and even bishops, misguided theologians like Berengar and Roscellinus, and finally—to say nothing of Jews—outright heretics who were particularly dangerous because they professed to be Christians and were therefore in a position to seduce believers from the loyalty they owed to the Church.

These local heretics did not yet seem to be a menace, however, and the erring theologians were still easily brought to heel. It was rather the orthodox but recalcitrant temporal powers which required immediate correction. The centre of this conflict was in Germany and Italy, and the climax was the submission of the Emperor Henry IV to Pope Gregory VII at Canossa in 1078. Because Henry had insisted on treating his bishops as his own, rather than the pope's, subordinates, Gregory had excommunicated him and such was the psychological effect that Henry had finally to yield. Gregory was not fighting for money or power as such. He was a sincere spiritual reformer who wanted to rid the Church of bishops who bought their offices and who, as appointees of the lay ruler, intended to continue to live as laymen—with ample revenues and armed retainers, with wife and thereby heirs.

The Empire contained the worst offenders and since, in addition, the emperors had acquired temporal control over much of northern Italy, Pope Gregory wished first to frighten them. France, therefore, did not feel the brunt of his attacks, although several of her bishops, too, were now excommunicated by Gregory for refusing to obey his decree that, having illegally bought the office, they must renounce it.

The pope himself was helpless to execute his decrees in France by armed force, but it was otherwise with the French prelates. These, in their quarrel with the lay barons, could match sword with sword. Not only did they have vassal knights at their disposal, they had an infantry of their own, recruited locally and often led by their parish priests—armed bodies which had perhaps first been formed as a defense against those who, defying the Peace of God, were raiding the lands of the Church.

Thus forearmed, a bishop in some cases dared to excommunicate a lay offender, sometimes even laying an interdict

or blanket excommunication on the whole offending population, and then, if this were defied, sending forth his armed men to chastise the offenders in the field. Here again the bishop's other spiritual weapon was employed; when excommunication failed to demoralize his enemies, indulgences were offered to win over his friends. Those who would fight for him were offered the same inducements for local, factional fighting that were being offered for joining the prolonged and arduous crusade to the East: absolution for fighting and salvation for dying.

Once when, according to Guibert, the Church was pitted against an alleged scoundrel, at a critical moment of the assault on his castle the archbishop (of Laon) and the bishops

going up on high platforms, invited the populace to join, and, after admonishing and absolving them from their sins, ordered them as an act of penitence in full assurance of the salvation of their souls to attack the castle called Crecy . . . promising the kingdom of heaven to those who should die in the assault upon it. (*Autobiography*, II, 14.)

e. The Last Judgment

Exactly what was the procedure at the Last Judgment had never been officially declared. Speculations were therefore free, and in order to render these plausible much reliance was placed on the accounts of those who had supposedly died only to be later restored to life. They were cited chiefly to throw much needed light on what sins led to condemnation and what to acquittal. The same Guibert tells us, for instance, of a monk who, having been deceived by an apparition of the Devil in the guise of James the Apostle, obeyed his command to commit suicide. After his burial, however, he returned to life and told how

I was brought before the throne in the presence of Our common Lady, the mother of God, St. James the Apostle too being there. When it was debated before God what was to be done with me and the Blessed Apostle, mindful of my intention, sinner as I was and corrupt hitherto, prayed to that Blessed one in my behalf, she out of her sweet mouth pronounced my sentence, that I, poor wretch, should be pardoned, for that the malice of the Devil had by evil chance under holy guise brought about my ruin. And so it was that

for my amendment in this life and for a warning to these by God's command I returned to life. (*Ibid.*, II, 19.)

It is to be observed that although Christ was present on his throne and doubtless did his just duty in condemning the monk according to his law, he left it to the Virgin to impose the sentence, and the Virgin of course exercised her mercy. Christ did not need to accede, but since he apparently always had, it was most likely that he always would. Christ's judgment of guilt was mandatory whereas the Virgin's sentence—far more important—was discretionary.

In a companion case a monk had abandoned his monastery for another where the Rule was stricter, but he had done so without first getting the consent of his abbot. Having died and then returned to life, he related how he had been brought before "Peter, the doorkeeper of heaven," who forthwith referred his case to God for decision.

And when it came before Him, the Lord said, "Go ye to Richard, the Justiciar, and take his decision for sentence." Now this Richard was a man of very great power through his earthly possessions, but much more powerful in his firm adherence to right and justice. To Richard they go and state the case and sentence is pronounced by Richard. "Whereas," said he, "he is charged with breaking his vow, he is certainly adjudged guilty of manifest false swearing, nor have the devils an unjust case, although the very righteous conduct of the man is against them; but my decision inspired by heaven, is that he must return to the world to amend those faults." (*Ibid.*)

Guibert was prudent to add that he did not vouch for this "tale often told," if only because this Richard was a strange substitute for the Virgin. The story, however, is interesting as an illustration of how far the popular mind, if unrestrained by dogmatic limitations, could circulate beliefs which, however unwarranted, would catch the popular taste and in some cases force the Church's hand.

That problems of law were now in men's minds is suggested by the introduction of Richard. Christ was of course bound by the strict law of justice; the Virgin, in contrast, was free to exercise mercy. But Richard was quite obviously introduced as the representative of neither but rather as a judge in equity, that is, to determine whether the spirit of the law might not here be more just than the letter of it.

6. DAMNATION

Nothing particularly new was now added to the dogma of damnation to eternity. Even most of the heresies accepted it. One might have thought that the difficulties of explaining the justice of original sin, and therefore of damning infants because of their parents' negligence, as well as all others who in fact had not been apprised of the Redemption, would have led to misgivings. But this was as yet rarely the case.

Anselm, the most distinguished and admired of the theologians of this time, was only enough concerned to offer a few justifications. Two of these were coldly dialectical: first, that since the innocent souls of the uncreated were doomed to nonexistence, the guilty souls of the created must be made to suffer a far greater deprivation; second, that since the saved were rewarded by eternal bliss, it was only fitting that the damned be punished by eternal misery.

To Anselm's question "Whence does that joy which one has over another's fall seem to arise?" his submissive disciple Boso replies:

Whence, to be sure, but from the fact that each individual will be certain that, had not another fallen, he would never have attained the place where he now is. (Deane, tr., *St. Anselm*, 216.)

Anselm here has in mind the famous doctrine known as the *felix culpa* or blessed sin of Adam. Had men not sinned, there would have been no certainty that Christ would reveal himself and, had he not, every man would have been doomed to live ignorantly and yet eternally in the Garden of Eden.

But because true good can arise only out of evil, God saw to it that Adam would sin, that Christ must then appear, in order that men might realize how evil they had been, and that some might thereupon seek true virtue. Other men, however, must still sin, as ever-present examples of how not to behave.

How close the God so understood was to Nature as others have understood her! To the competitive survival of the fittest, to the contrast between failure and success as the necessary incentive to a maximum excellence. To spiritual, not material, excellence, yes. But if right makes might, so in turn does might make right.

ABELARD AND HUGO

1. THE MEN

IN THE LAST QUARTER of the eleventh century a remarkable group of men were born who together brought theological studies to a new peak. They came from England, Germany, and Italy as well as from France, but the centres of their activity were at the schools of Chartres, where the scientific approach was inaugurated, and at Paris, where the purely traditional approach was to receive its finishing touches.

The first of the Chartres school was Gilbert de la Porrée, born at Poitiers in 1076, a pupil of the Breton-born Bernard of Chartres and later his successor as head of the school. He taught there from 1120 to 1140, then in Paris for the next two years, finally returning to Poitiers, where he was bishop from 1142 till his death in 1154. He was the great master of a dialectic whose subtle distinctions appalled and dumbfounded the traditionalists.

Next was Adelard of Bath, born in 1080, who was already studying in Tours before 1100, and was soon after teaching at Laon. Remaining a layman, he was able to travel freely, to Salerno and Sicily, probably to Spain, and also to Cilicia, Antioch, Syria, and Palestine. There he came into contact with Arabic, and thereby with Greek, learning. He was one of the many Latins of this time who traveled and translated from the Arabic, but he was also a writer and thinker. He is now usually identified with the school of Chartres, but perhaps because of the propinquity of his ideas rather than of his body.

Guillaume de Conches, born near Evreux in Normandy in

1080, was another pupil of Bernard of Chartres, where he himself taught during the years from 1120 to 1125. He was attracted by Plato's cosmology as expounded in the *Timaeus* and, like Adelard, would not concentrate on purely theological questions.

The last of this group was Thierry of Chartres, born in Brittany and a younger brother of Bernard. The date of his birth is unknown. That Bernard was born in 1067 and that Abelard was a pupil of Thierry's indicates an early date, but that he died only in 1155 suggests a date after 1075. In any case, as a cosmologist he was part and parcel of this Chartres school, interpreting the biblical Creation in terms of a physical and even mechanical evolution.

As there were four conspicuous figures whose activities centered around Chartres so there were four even more conspicuous figures whose activities centered around Paris.

The oldest of them was Abelard, born at Nantes in Brittany in 1079. His extraordinarily dramatic life, much of it recorded in his own words, is well known; his equally dramatic ideas will be a central topic of this chapter.

Next came the most famous figure of the whole twelfth century, Bernard of Clairvaux, born near Dijon in 1090, founder and abbot of the famous monastery with which his name has been associated and, after Augustine, the most redoubtable champion of Christianity in recorded history. He was, however, remarkable as an orator, mystic, and a leader. For our purposes, therefore, he is of less importance than his predecessor Abelard or his successor Hugo of Saint-Victor.

This Hugo was born in Saxony, but before he was twenty he was already in Paris as an Augustinian canon of the abbey of Saint-Victor, where, becoming its abbot in 1133, he remained until his death in 1141. During his life, his fame as a theologian far surpassed that of Bernard of Clairvaux; and more than a hundred years later Thomas Aquinas spoke of Hugo's theological works as authoritative. With Abelard—from whom he had learned much—as his foil, he climaxed the evolution of pure theology as a self-sufficient entity, before logic and philosophy had eaten into its vitals.

The fourth theologian has acquired a posthumous fame for rather extrinsic reasons. Peter Lombard, born in Novara

about 1100, was educated in Bologna. The earliest record of him in France is as a student in Rheims in 1139. He studied under Hugo too, however (perhaps also under Abelard), and was apparently influenced by both of them, presumably before his stay at Rheims. By 1140, at any rate, he was teaching in Paris, in 1145 he was writing his famous *Sentences*; he was in Rome from 1148 to 1150 and finally became bishop of Paris from 1159 to his death in 1160.

These *Sentences* were to inspire *Commentaries* by theologians for the next 400 years. This was not only because the Church soon after declared them to be authoritative, but also because they were an ideal textbook, impersonal, and often noncommittal, with ample quotations from the Fathers and raising many kinds of questions without—on the disputed or unresolved points—giving the answers. Whereas Abelard and Hugo had in most matters expounded their own ideas, Peter rather presented the evidence, thereby inviting his readers to work out the answers if they could.

There were of course many others, French as well as foreign, whose beliefs and influence were also important, but we can mention them here only incidentally, when particularly pertinent. The real protagonists were Abelard and Hugo, with the rest playing only minor roles.

2. KNOWLEDGE

a. *How Acquired*

A first question which concerned them was the sources of man's knowledge. There were those within man himself: intuitions about himself and about how he came to be what he was, including, as Hugo said, his aspirations. There was also his innate reason, especially significant because it was this reason which, it was generally agreed, distinguished man from the other animals, which made him recognize good and evil and thereby rendered him eligible for salvation.

The other sources were rather his senses and memory: man could observe the outer world of nature; by reading and listening he could also learn about the past—about the heathen or pagan past, the past as revealed by the Bible, and the re-

cent past since that divine Revelation. These taught him philosophy, science, history, and theology.

The next question was how one might best appraise the knowledge which these various sources were able to supply. The first requisite was to cultivate virtue: to avoid evil deeds, and even evil intents or thoughts, by choosing the ascetic and contemplative life. For wisdom was a gift of God, a grace withheld from all but the holy.

But to this moral virtue, intellectual virtue was now being deliberately added. This included the study not only of the Bible and the Fathers but also of science, especially as represented in the *Quadrivium*; of philosophy, especially as contained in the *Timaeus* and other Platonic texts; of logic, especially as Aristotle had expounded it; and, although less consciously, of history. Both Abelard and Hugo insisted on right thinking, and Abelard said further that this was obtainable only by men born with talent and trained in disputation. He even added that it was because of this that Plato and Aristotle had been wiser than Moses.

b. Reason vs. Revelation

i. Priority in Time. Anselm's *credo ut intelligam* had gained a wide currency. Almost all the conservatives were now proclaiming it—Suger, Albert, Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, Bernard of Clairvaux, Robert de Melun, Ackard, Peter Lombard, and Adam de Petit Pont. Bernard even alleged that his faith gave him an understanding which was superior to that shown by the recent Council of Sens.

It was a good slogan because it declared the superiority of the Catholic belief to all others but, like all slogans, it was misleading. For after all, a mature unbeliever, unless so violently converted as the apostle Paul had been, could hardly have freely chosen to be baptized unless he had already possessed some degree of understanding. Was it not precisely because of his superior understanding that Augustine came to desire to be baptized?

Abelard said that his students refused to believe in anything they could not understand. And he obviously concurred. For otherwise how could Plato or Aristotle have been wiser

than Moses? Why were the liberal arts considered a prerequisite to theology? And what, otherwise, was the use of Nature's revelation, or of man's natural reason?

Guillaume de Conches was even more insistent, saying, as almost all really recognized, that it was only by a knowledge of the created world that men could attain to any knowledge of its Creator. Of some of his adversaries he said:

They ignore the forces of nature, and in order that they may have others as companions of their ignorance, they want us to believe as peasants do, without concerning themselves with reasons. (Gilson, *Philosophie du Moyen Age*, I, 63.)

The orthodoxy of Abelard and Guillaume was suspect. That of Hugo, however, was not. Yet he for his part said that

Faith is a kind of certainty of the mind in things absent, established beyond opinion and short of knowledge. (*De Sacramentis*, I, 10, 2—Deferrari trans., 168.)

Nor does he distinguish knowledge from understanding except to say that it is of things present. It is the raw material of understanding, and surely unless it is in some degree understood faith cannot follow. For he says:

First teach, afterwards baptize. . . . The one to be baptized is catechized that he may be moved to faith by the decision of his own will. (*Ibid.*, II, 6, 9—*ibid.*, 297.)

The recognition that only through the understanding as well as knowledge of things present can men, by abstraction, come to a knowledge and so to an understanding of things absent, and so to faith, was now first being consciously admitted and proclaimed. That only after faith could there be the further understanding required for salvation nobody questioned, but if *credo ut intelligam* was true, the *intelligo ut credam* was also true and an indispensable prerequisite to the other.

Peter Lombard, who followed Abelard and Hugo only less than he did Augustine, summed it all up very well by saying:

Wherefore it is to be inferred that it is not possible to know or to understand certain things which must be believed unless they first are believed, and that there are certain other things which are not to be believed unless first understood, and then, through faith, more completely understood. (Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 300.)

In this connection it is to be observed that Charlemagne, in demanding that the Saxons believe or die, probably acted on the premise of *credo ut intelligam*—that is, that they could only begin to understand after believing. The medieval persecutors, on the other hand, by first trying to persuade the heretic, were acting on the assumption that understanding could, and even must, precede belief. Yet the net result was about the same: for most of those who did retract and accept baptism showed an understanding rather of the consequences of not understanding than of the cogency of the arguments offered.

ii. Priority in Weight. Where reason and Revelation clashed, which was nearer the truth? It was a bold step when Guillaume declared that in regard to philosophical questions reason was to be preferred, and when Adelard said the same in regard to scientific questions. It was an even bolder step when Abelard joined Adelard in alleging that since the Fathers reached their conclusions as mere men like themselves, by the use of reason, their opinions could properly be tested by reason and, if proved faulty, should be corrected accordingly. For why in the world might not good reasoning be used in order to expose bad reasoning? Scripture was of divine origin, but its Revelation was based on God's assumption that men would use their God-given reason in trying to understand it. If, as a result of the deeper understanding made possible by faith, reason could arrive at proofs of some of the truths which Revelation had made known, these were no longer to be believed on mere faith but on rational knowledge. For, after all, of what use otherwise was the faith given except in order to make such further understanding possible? Like a problem in mathematics, faith reveals the answer by means of which the proof of it can, as every schoolboy knows, be far more easily worked out.

To be sure, as Guillaume said, if the apparent proof disproves the revealed truth it is a fallacious one. For it does not come out with the correct answer. Or it may be that, even with the answer given, the proof cannot be worked out. In that case the answer remains a matter of faith, remains a mystery.

c. Philosophical

Gilbert declared that in matters of philosophy reason was independent of faith. By this he presumably meant that Scripture revealed no philosophical truths and that those who tried to extract any such truths from it needed to be disillusioned. As to philosophic truths, he must have had the Greek conceptions chiefly in mind.

Actually many of the most fundamental of these premises had long ago become as Christian as they once were Greek. Truth is reality and reality is identifiable by its essential characteristics of unity, eternity, unchangeability, and perfection. From this evolved the hierarchy of opposites leading to the virtual unreality (by which was meant insignificance) of multiplicity, ephemerality, change, and imperfection. This was tantamount to saying that the hierarchy of reality was from pure spirit to pure matter.

In the schools we now encounter more philosophical terminology. The top spiritual reality was described as a superessence or supersubstance which was the domain of Plato's divine Ideas. It was these, when actualized, which became the essences and substances proper, descending from the universal to the substantial forms or souls: first the world soul, then in turn the rational, sensitive, and vegetative. These, being the realizations or exemplars of the Ideas, could be recognized as such by men's rational souls, that is, the original Ideas could be inferred from the models. For once a man became aware of his own soul he must infer that its origin and cause were not only the world soul but the Idea behind it. If, however, the awareness of the soul was of a thing inferior rather than superior to it—that is, of something that was in fact not its origin—then the awareness might well be of something not real, such as, said Abelard, a hippogriff.

Corporeal things, those which had matter as well as spirit and accidents as well as substance, were less real to the extent that, as such, they were multiple and ephemeral. Thus the species Man was more real than the individual because the different species were fewer and lasted longer. And the genus Animal was therefore more real than the species Man.

But here came a disagreement. Abelard, relying partly per-

haps on the belief now suggested that matter, although created, was indestructible, declared that the individual men, consisting of indestructible matter as well as of indestructible soul, had a greater reality than had the species of either Man or Animal because these were mere concepts depending on the prior existence of the individuals. God's Ideas were certainly real as Ideas, but man's ideas were real only as derived from the individual, sensible, and even corporeal, models. They were not innate but abstracted. We may therefore say that whereas Gilbert sought reality by synthesis, inferring the whole from its parts, Abelard sought reality by analysis, inferring the parts, as of man's form and matter, from the whole: if the whole man were unreal, at least his component parts were indestructible. No whole, in a word, could be quite so real as its components.

So far the static reality. There was also the dynamic. Here again the Greeks furnished the answers. There were the original cause and the proximate causes; there were now Aristotle's four causes—efficient, formal, material, and final. There was also his superlunar cause of sublunar events, with the stars as the energy which came from the First Mover. There were even the seminal reasons and the creative fire. All these were made possible by the existence of time and space. In a vague way the static world was thought of as the work of Christ, the dynamic as that of the Holy Ghost.

d. Scientific

i. Approach to Nature. The traditional Christian concern with Nature was to divine why God created it as He did. That it was roughly purgatorial in purpose, and that some of it was designed to enable men to stay alive long enough to purge themselves if they wished, everybody conceded. Much more of Nature, however, such as oceans and mountains, did not directly reveal their purpose; it had therefore been thought that, like so much of the Old Testament, these phenomena were designed rather to contain symbolic or hidden meanings.

The Fathers had been tempted to interpret natural phenomena, as well as the Old Testament, as symbols, and the

Bestiaries had carried on the practice; but Jerome had warned against such extravagances, and the scholastic texts rarely indulged in them. Even the mystics were restrained: Bernard of Clairvaux tended somewhat to despise Nature, and Hugo, although more aware, used her not even symbolically but only as imagery, in order to make his expositions of theology more vivid and comprehensible. Most of his images, furthermore, were drawn less from Nature than from human activities.

They were taken chiefly from family life (*De Sacramentis*, II, 14, 8), the law (II, 14, 9) and medicine (II, 13, 2; 11, 18, 22). In one of his few images from Nature he likens the departure of the soul from the body to that of moisture receding from a dying tree (II, 16, 2), and in another he neatly likens God's omnipresence to sound, which is no less present because the deaf cannot hear it (II, 1, 13). But in this instance as in the others Hugo, while certainly assuming that God created sound for men's temporal convenience, had no intention of inferring further that God also created it in order that it might be recognized by men as a symbol, and therefore as a reminder, of His omnipresence.

It is curious then that Hugo, while refraining from such symbolism, was not more roused to speculate as to what purpose these miscellaneous phenomena really were designed to serve. It was here that the more scientifically minded, like Adelard of Bath, stepped in to argue that, since there was a *why*, and yet a *why* which was not to be explained by symbolism, the procedure should be to study the *what* and the *how* of Nature, on the chance that once these had been determined the *why* might reveal itself. His was one of the earlier medieval perceptions of what Roger Bacon was later to make explicit.

ii. Translation from the Arabic. It was at this time that many Greek texts on science, translated into Arabic (often with Arabic commentary), were being retranslated into Latin. How much this was due to increased opportunities for travel and how much to the new curiosity which was rousing such men as Adelard of Bath, cannot be determined; each doubtless played into the hands of the other. Probably the most prized texts were certain of the scientific ones of Aristotle and Ptol-

emy. Here were texts which dealt specifically with the what and how of Nature, and the Latins quickly began to draw on them.

iii. As Biblical Exegesis. Naturally this lore was to be used only to interpret and thereby clarify existing Christian dogma, and for the scientifically minded the brevity of the biblical accounts of the Creation offered an ideal case in which these Greek texts could be used to advantage. We shall speak of this shortly. But Nature as it was now manifesting itself could also take a little more explaining. Adelard of Bath was now claiming that in matters of science reason could not, and therefore should not, be obstructed by beliefs which depended only on faith. By this he presumably did not mean that science could or should prove Scripture in any way wrong, but only that it might be able to prove that a judiciously symbolic interpretation of certain passages could be proved to be nearer the truth than the traditionally literal one. Often, moreover, their quarrel was not so much with the text itself as with the debased science of late Roman texts which had gradually become stock Christian beliefs.

iv. Learned Science. Hugo, being very casual about science, accepted the old belief that the earth was a flat oval and the universe shaped like an egg. He doubted that fire tended to rise or earth to fall, for these elements could move only as God specifically willed that they should.

The scientists by contrast were convinced that the universe and earth were both spherical, that the stars rotated indefinitely at a uniform velocity. There was a difference of opinion, however, as to whether, being intelligences, they moved by their own power or only because kept in motion by Aristotle's soon-to-be-famous First Mover.

Guillaume alleged that fire vaporized water and that when this vapor rose the cold congealed it to form clouds; that this cold existed because, due to the lesser humidity above, the heat of the sun diminished. Thierry even came to the conclusion that the velocity and solidity of a body were complementary. Neither Adelard nor Thierry could conceive of any void or vacuum, and therefore explained change by the theory (which Descartes was to revive 400 years later) of vortices

which allowed simultaneous exchanges of place in a plenum. Both accepted the Aristotelian theory of fire rising and earth falling, and Adelard averred that a stone, if unobstructed, would continue to fall till it reached the centre of the earth. On this same Aristotelian assumption that like seeks like he explained that where water fills a narrow vertical tube closed only at the top, it does not run out because the air below, instead of rising, clings to the air around it, and the water, instead of falling, clings to the water above it.

These problems, important as they would later prove to be, were still purely academic. The average man largely ignored them because he could not see that they had any bearing on either his temporal or eternal welfare. This was not wholly unfortunate, because as soon as the belief became general that the stars and planets caused the motions, and therefore the changes, occurring on earth, men tried, as the pagans had, to recognize the causes and astronomy was for a time neglected in favor of astrology.

v. Popular Science. Of the physics of the relic we have spoken. But there was also the physics of medical cures. To the extent that inanimate things were thought to have a property potentially capable of affecting man's destinies, this property was regarded as magical.

As the bread and wine had come to be recognized as potentially magical, so did herbs and other reputed medicines. Ever since classical antiquity this lore had been collected into *Herbals* explaining what herbs had the power of curing what diseases. There was always a ritual to perform, rendering them efficacious. That the priests declared any such ritual, unless performed by them, to be the Devil's work, did not, however, always deter the sick man or his friends. For in most cases the purpose, although a temporal one, was merely to promote the temporal, without affecting anybody's eternal, welfare.

In addition to the *Herbals*, now appeared a French translation of an ancient *Lapidary*, containing a list of various minerals or precious stones together with their magical properties and the way to render these efficacious.

The properties of many of them were also therapeutic, but less for diseases than for special cases, such as childbearing,

impotence, insanity, and enchantment or 'possession.' There were, here at any rate, no love potions (perhaps these were herbal), but some had the analogous power of persuasion or wish-fulfilment.

Of the other stones some had rather vague powers such as to confer happiness, success, or victory over an enemy. One served to turn the enemy into a coward, another counteracted a curse which would otherwise prove fatal. Others served as insurance by warding off flood, fire, or poison; still others could destroy flies or other vermin, or could untie knots.

Many gave their possessor power of prophecy or of invisibility. Only one, however, which promised success in trapping birds or other game, indicated that stones were in demand which could be used to produce food. Among even more miscellaneous properties, one served to test the fidelity of a wife, another a woman's virginity; one could test the health of a slave, another guaranteed the possessor the benefit of the Last Sacrament.

Finally there were stones available for the criminally inclined: one for breaking chains, another for opening locks, and finally one for robbers who

use it in order to terrify the inmates of a house they want to burgle; for this stone, if placed on hot coals, gives all who breathe its fumes the illusion that the house is about to crumble. (Langlois, *La Connaissance de la Nature et du Monde*, 40-41.)

We may well ask how these stones were to be found and identified. Presumably, as in the case of false relics, through the intermediary of a good salesman. Were it not for the fact that early translation and wide diffusion of this *Lapidary* indicates a popularity hardly less than that of the Bible or the *Lives* of saints, we might expect that there would have been a gradual disillusionment. Yet might not the same have been expected in regard to relics? But hope springs eternal.

e. Historical

i. Revelation and Dogma. An infinitely more decisive form of knowledge than either the intuitional, rational, philosophical, or scientific was the historical, because the divine Revelation was a purely historical one, and faith was prima-

rily a belief that the biblical account of what this Revelation in fact revealed was the true account, down to the last detail.

Empirically the patristic interpretations had become the decisive ones; it was on these that the dogma had been based. But as a practical matter how could one be sure not only how well the Fathers had been correctly understood by the later Church, but also how well the Fathers themselves had correctly understood Scripture?

These problems were now for the first time categorically faced by Abelard. The first question he asked himself was, What were the authentic patristic texts? That of Pseudo-Denis he thought more than doubtful. Many of the texts allegedly by Augustine were clearly not by him because later writers had circulated their works under his name in order to add weight to their own ideas. Another similar doubt was based on Augustine's *Retractions*, in which he corrected the errors he found in his own earlier texts. Did other Fathers perhaps also write *Retractions* which had been lost? Also, as Peter Lombard was to repeat, the Fathers often used the same word in different senses, and they also often quoted the opinions of another in order the more fairly to refute them. Furthermore, as Ivo of Chartres had shown in regard to the canon law, in the patristic texts many opinions were merely advisory or else intended only to apply to a particular temporary situation. Finally, how was one ever to know when the many copyists had changed the wording of these texts? Then, even if one had the Fathers' opinions as precisely as if from their own lips, how far was one obliged to prefer their opinions to one's own? And, even if one were so obliged, which of the Fathers, when they disagreed, should be followed?

These were thoroughly embarrassing questions and they show why Abelard was so sorely tempted to resort to the rational methods of the historian or judge, why the less acute of the clergy felt the need of resorting to the pope, and why, soon afterwards, the popes in turn felt the need to create, under their auspices, the University of Paris, where a corps of the most trustworthy experts should undertake to advise them on every knotty question.

Just as there were doubts about the authenticity of many of the patristic texts, there were also doubts about the accu-

racy of the texts of Jerome's Latin, or Vulgate, translation of the Hebrew and Greek original. For the many available manuscripts of it were being found to differ among themselves. Abelard was among the first to see the need of collating the various texts in order to determine at least what Jerome had understood the original of the Revelation to have been.

ii. Symbolic Meanings. That what the Old Testament related had actually or literally occurred was in principle not doubted, but neither was it doubted that these occurrences had been brought about by God chiefly in order to reveal, as symbols, the infinitely greater truths to come. For the prophets, if properly understood, had clearly foreseen and foretold those truths. This was indeed one of the reasons for stressing the *credo ut intelligam*: by believing what the New Testament revealed one was able to extract from the symbolism of the Old a further and in fact indispensable understanding of the New.

Since this symbolic method, as we have seen, went back at least to Origen, we need only to cite an instance or two more of its results. Honorius of Autun referred to seven passages in the Old Testament which, when understood symbolically, foretold the Virgin birth. The unofficial but widely popular *Physiologus* was designed to show how the animals mentioned in the Old Text each symbolized a dogmatic or moral truth. A man who understood all the symbolic meanings which lay embedded there would hardly have any further need to know the New Testament. A Manichee, therefore, might well have been asked why, if the Old Text was the Devil's work, he had any good reason for believing that the New was nonetheless the work of God.

On the other hand, it was risky to attach a symbolic meaning to the New Testament, if only because its literal meaning was the very Revelation which the Old had been designed to symbolize. Christ's parables were obviously only illustrations to clarify a point, but certain other passages so troubled the theologians that they here, too, resorted to a symbolic meaning. Those, for instance, which described the humiliation and anguish of Christ on the Cross had so offended some that they were sorely tempted to interpret them as mere symbols to

teach men the supreme virtues of obedience and compassion. But Abelard was among the many who denounced this view. The most famous such controversy was of course in regard to the Eucharist. Here the literal meaning had just been rejected by common consent: as we have seen, the *body* of "This is my body" was now to be understood rather as the symbol of the Church.

In some instances, too, both the literal and the symbolic meanings were to be understood: in 1 *Corinthians* vii Paul had said that marriage was preferable to concubinage. This, said Honorius, was to be literally understood by the laity, but by the clergy symbolically as referring to the superiority of the Church over the Synagogue.

iii. *Literal Meanings.* Usually the Old Testament demanded both a symbolic and a literal interpretation and in that case the literal meaning was also historically true: Cain killed Abel, Noah rode the flood in his ark, and Moses really did talk with God. Occasionally, however, the literal meaning had to be frowned on, as, for obvious reasons, in the case of the *Song of Solomon*. There were other cases, as of the Creation in six days; this could be either literally or symbolically true but hardly both. Guillaume de Conches, who, not liking theology anyway, was delighted to feel free to understand the *days* symbolically, also rejected the literal interpretation of the passage "and the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man, made he (into) a woman." He preferred to take it, too, as a symbol of the evolutionary process revealed to him by the pagan Greek texts. (Poole, *Illustrations of . . . Medieval Thought*, 109).

In the New Testament also there were certain passages which were embarrassing to take literally yet did not lend themselves to a symbolic alternative. In *Mark* xvi 16, for instance, Jesus had said "he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved." Faced with the long-established dogma, these words had to be liberally interpreted, as by Hugo (*De Sacramentis*, II, 14, 8), to mean *can* save themselves. The letter, indeed, killeth. But when?

iv. *Divine Deceit.* In one case not only a symbolic but even a liberal interpretation was impractical because Christ

had already made the interpretation himself. According to *Exodus* xxi 24 the law of Moses had exacted "eye for eye, tooth for tooth," but according to *Matthew* v 38-39 Christ had said,

Ye have heard that it hath been said, "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" but I say unto you that ye resist not evil.

It was considered axiomatic that God never deceived men, but it was also recognized that He had often to permit evil in order that out of it good might come. In this case, however, Jehovah had permitted Himself to deceive men. For He thought that only by telling them that 'eye for eye' accorded with justice could he deter them from taking 'life for eye.' He was evidently induced to do so as a matter not of principle but of expediency. This, however, was Jehovah. What of Christ?

We are not told. But we are told by *Luke* (ii 40) that "the child grew and waxed strong in spirit, filled with wisdom," and by Paul (*Hebrews* x 8) that Christ "learned obedience by the things which he suffered." And what did Hugo say to this? First, that "he learned obedience" meant that "from the time he was made man he was made obedient" (*De Sacramentis*, II, 1, 6). Secondly, he said:

What the Evangelist (Luke) says, that Jesus advanced in age, wisdom, and grace, is not accepted as if he had become better in himself, but that the wisdom and grace which he himself had and kept concealed he disclosed to men ever more and more according as the reason of the times demanded. Thus he himself was advancing before men, as men themselves advanced in knowledge of him. (*Ibid.*)

3. GOD'S NATURE

a. *Existence*

With all these refinements of technique what more did men find out about reality or truth?

There was still to be answered the preliminary question of how men knew that God even existed. Everybody was convinced of it, but they continued to give a variety of reasons to supplement their faith. Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter Lom-

bard said that their natural reason told them. Was this because the knowledge came from human nature rather than from divine grace? Others said, more specifically, that men could also learn this much by abstraction from sensuous observation and experience. Thierry said that the multiplicity of this sensuous world could only emanate from unity, and Hugo said that the imperfection of the world presupposed the co-existence of a perfection—both arguments which were based on the famous Greek premise of opposites. Hugo added that the beauty of even so imperfect a world required an architect, and Gilbert and Guillaume felt that, if not its beauty, at least its design led to a like conclusion. Adelard of Bath, on his part—aware, probably through the Arabs, of Aristotle's theory—offered the motion or energy of the world, and especially of the celestial sphere, as proof of a First Mover. Finally Bernard, drawing his inferences from men rather than nature, concluded from man's obvious beginning in time (perhaps on the premise of opposites as well as of cause) that there must also be an Eternity. He added the quite illogical argument that men have to know that God exists in order that they might be held morally accountable for disobeying Him.

b. Attributes

i. Ignorance of. As men turned more and more to the Greeks rather than the Jews for light, the Neoplatonist belief in God's incomprehensibility was more generally asserted. Gilbert and Abelard said that His nature could only be conceived by means of images or metaphors. Hugo called God incomprehensible and Bernard added that, were He not so, men could have no faith in His nature, and could therefore earn no merit for trusting, without proof, Christ's word.

Of course a good deal of this was cant, because they had already inferred God's existence *from* His attributes, that is, from the existence of a One, a Perfection, a Creator, a Mover, and an Eternity.

ii. Knowledge of. To these were added certain further attributes, again at the suggestion of the Greeks. Gilbert and Abelard both said that God possessed a superessence or substance superior to that of His creatures, and Gilbert added

that, like the Architect of Plato, He must be the possessor of Ideas. Nonetheless, because of the specifically Christian elements in the once pagan conception of God's nature, the chief attention was still being focused on His Trinitarian personality as differentiated by His power, wisdom, and virtue.

God's powers were indeed impressive. He could, and did, said Abelard, beget Himself—though he does not say how or when. He could be, and was, said Hugo, omnipresent, He was not bound by any law, physical or moral, and since nothing was beyond His power, nothing which He is reputed to have done should be thought incredible. Gilbert asserted that He could actualize any of His Ideas, and Adelard's conception of Him as First Mover was to the same effect.

To these great powers, however, certain limitations were attached. For instance, God could not not create, yet He could create only imperfection. He could not do anything unwise or evil and therefore could not wish to change His mind.

God's wisdom or knowledge was given a new solidity by the belief that since He was Himself the sole creator as well as possessor of Ideas, He created the truth and must therefore know all that He created. And furthermore, since He was wholly wise, He could know not only the truth which was or is but also that which is to be.

Did this wisdom, however, extend even to a foreknowledge of what could be, but in fact never had or would come to be—that is, of mere past, present, and future unrealized contingencies? Hugo said that it did. Whether others subscribed to so bold and by now unfamiliar a belief is unlikely, because Hugo did not merely so conclude lest God's wisdom should seem in any way circumscribed, but because, as we shall see, it seemed to be the only way of saving God's justice—and therefore virtue—from serious impairment.

No one denied that God was not only virtuous but was virtue, or that He could create only imperfection (that which to men at least seemed evil) in order to foster an approach towards perfection. The Greeks had identified this evil with nature, including human nature, and it was from them that the Christian Pelagians had derived their belief that every man had a fair and equal chance of ultimate salvation by choosing to purge his soul of its defilements.

To the Christians, however, it was not so simple as that. In the first place, it was generally believed, as by Augustine and now by Hugo, that God chose to save only as many souls as were needed in order to fill the depleted, or at any rate uncompleted, ranks of the angels. In the second place, God clearly gave the souls of men born in Christian countries a great advantage over the souls of others.

c. The Trinity

Emboldened by the possibility of harnessing reason to the service of a still baffling theology, and seeking therefore to find out how it could best be harnessed in order to unveil the reality behind the sensible appearance, it was a temptation to begin by seeing in the Greek theory of emanation, from God to Wisdom to Soul, a premonition of the later revealed Christian Trinity. For just as there was a division, if not of labor, at least of function in the Greek, so was there one in the Christian, triad, corresponding to God's three most significant attributes of power, wisdom, and virtue.

Even Hugo, who was prolific in assigning to the Father such distinguishing characteristics as immensity, operation, will, mind, or figure, most often spoke of His power. Likewise the Son, although Hugo often associated him with beauty, disposition, or form, was above all wisdom, which was very like Abelard's identification of Christ—as Logos—with reason or logic. In the same way Hugo showered the Holy Ghost with such attributes as free will, utility, power, joy, or beauty, but most usually with virtue. At some risk Abelard and Guillaume associated him with the Greek world soul, although Abelard, at any rate, was careful to say that the two were rather reconcilable than identical because the world soul was considered to be an emanation in time and not a coeternity.

To the conservatives one of the most objectionable innovations of the new generation was its shameless effort to clarify such mysteries as the Trinity by subjecting them to pagan terminology. It was bad enough when Gilbert applied the word *divinity* to describe the whole Trinity, and the word *God* to specify the Father. But it was worse when he said further that the One was to the Many as the species was to the

individual or as essence was to existence; or when Abelard said that the Father was to the Son as genus was to species, and that, since the Holy Ghost was not engendered but instead 'proceeded,' his substance differed from that of the other two.

So far as we know, Thierry did not get into trouble as did the other two, but his Greek innovations were much like theirs. For, following the Platonists, he declared that the Father, being the original One, could only engender another One, but that these two Ones, by causing the Holy Ghost to proceed from both, brought about multiplicity. Thierry went gaily on to say that whereas the Father was both the efficient and material cause, the Son was the formal cause and the Holy Ghost the final or operative cause.

It was tempting of course to try to distinguish the three from each other, as the pagan Greeks had. But in trying, however conscientiously, to render the mystery less impenetrable, they were led by the Greeks into an ancient and far more serious error: for the Trinity was the supreme reality precisely because it was a One, and to the extent that it was, as the Greeks thought, not a One but a descending Plurality, the only supreme reality was the Father. The innovators were therefore in danger of lapsing into the Christianized but still Greek heresy of Arianism.

4. GOD'S ACTIVITY

a. Creation

True to the premise of opposites, Hugo supposed that because God was Being He was therefore goodness, and contrarily that there had once also been His opposite, which was nothingness and therefore evil. Furthermore, as God was light, so His opposite was darkness. But note that darkness necessarily supposed a pre-existing Space.

There was still doubt as to why He created. Hugo said it was voluntary, a traditional Christian belief. But Peter Lombard said it was necessary, although only because goodness must, by its very definition, desire to propagate itself.

In either case God had created by fiat—that is, by His mere determination to do so. But Thierry and Hugo now said He

did so in three distinct stages. The first brought matter into existence: chaotic, formless, inert, and indestructible. Several thought that it consisted of the atoms as suggested by the Greeks, inert but already containing the germs or seeds of potential things, which they called the seminal reasons. Hugo said that God then also created light.

By the second creation Time came into being, and with it not only change but also the incorporeal essences and the four elements of fire, air, water, and earth, which were ranged into a hierarchy of substantial forms. According to Thierry, God so activated the germs or seeds that they became alive and began to evolve. Thus in the water appeared fishes, some of which later became birds, and from the still moist earth came animal life and finally man himself.

Hugo added that God then also molded the disordered light into a concentrated single light or sun; and it was also Hugo who first attempted to employ science to corroborate rather than to correct the traditional dogmas. No less a mystic than was Bernard, he could yet describe how by this second creation the waters were conducted

in all directions by a wonderful and tireless departure from, and return to, one place in accordance with an eternal law. (*De Sacramentis*, I, 1, 22.)

Up to now the cause of events had generally been attributed either to God's just judgments or to chance. It was now beginning to be realized by certain responsible, as well as irresponsible, theologians that besides God's moral judgments there functioned, instead of lawless chance, a nature so cunningly designed to further His divine ends that it would continue to function satisfactorily, even as the Devil did, without any need of further correction by His will. This was presumably why Hugo was tempted to accept the Greek belief that the events of the sublunar world were determined by those of the superlunar, and thereby encouraged the belief that, apart from miracles, Providence operated by necessity.

The third creation was of human souls, which, like matter, were indestructible and therefore immortal. Adam's soul was a result of the second creation, but all others were subsequently created as their respective bodies each in turn reached

a certain stage of development. This was the creationist theory, adopted also by Guillaume. God was still creating, but only human souls now. Nonetheless this last creation would not stop until the end of the world.

b. The Fall

i. Recapitulation. Anselm had tried to explain the Fall by adopting the traducianist theory that in Adam all human souls had sinned. Odo of Cambrai had preferred to rely on the creationist theory that the child was tainted by the sin of his parents' copulation. Hildebert, in turn, had resorted to the hypothesis that Adam, by his sin, had put mankind in the power of a Devil whom God could not justly restrain. A generation later Abelard and Hugo, both dissatisfied with these solutions, each offered a solution of his own.

ii. Abelard. Abelard, seventeen years older than Hugo, being convinced that the truth was to be found only by men who could combine virtue and intelligence, concluded that such Greeks as Plato and Aristotle must have had both, or at least as much of both as the patriarchs and prophets had had, because these Greeks had divined the Trinity far more clearly than had any Jew. Furthermore, that the natural law as conceived by the Greeks and even by the Brahmins, was superior to that imagined by the Jews. For, whereas the latter supposed virtue to depend on a combination of ritual observance and the good luck of divine grace, the two former thought that it depended wholly on each individual's personal good judgment and intent.

For these and other reasons Abelard concluded that the only punishment of Adam was his expulsion from the Garden of Eden to a world bristling with temptations—cities, money, and women—almost impossible to resist. The expulsion did not decrease man's intelligence or free will, or increase his natural propensity to do evil; it merely exposed him to the tragic consequences of his natural ignorance and weakness. Having been shielded in Eden, he was now left to the mercies of a tough and unfeeling Nature. Under these adverse circumstances mankind had on the whole put up a reasonably creditable fight.

iii. Hugo. Hugo chose to borrow many of Abelard's ideas, but in regard to the Fall he would not follow him. Nor did he follow Anselm. First he raised the theoretical problem of what would have happened had Adam not sinned, but rather one of his descendants. Here Hugo decided that the sinner's descendants, although inheriting his guilt, would have been more lightly punished because of the blameless lives of their earlier ancestors—another case of the vicarious effect of supererogatory virtue.

Proceeding next from the hypothetical to the practical problems of what in fact did happen, Hugo chose the theory not of an inherited guilt but only of an inherited propensity to sin. This was close to Abelard's view; but, whereas Abelard quite consistently denied that infants were born guilty and therefore doomed until they were baptized, Hugo, by remaining loyal to the orthodox dogma of infant damnation, was driven to resort to the old view of Ambrosiaster and Cassian, that infants who died unbaptized were justly damned because God foreknew that, had they lived, they would have sinned. Yet this belief, that God not only foreknew all the future contingencies which were never in fact to occur, but also punished an otherwise innocent person because of his unactualized propensity to sin, seems a radical repudiation of Christian premises. For, were this really so, why did God bother to create this world at all?

In all fairness, however, it must be said that Hugo, who was inferior to Abelard only in self-assurance, qualified his hypothesis by adding that "divine justice is in truth irreprehensible in this, but is (at the same time) not comprehensible." Abelard no doubt knew that he too was guessing, but was usually not modest enough to admit it.

How decisive Greek ideas were at this time in theological matters is not easy to determine; in this case, however, it was the Greek idea rather of justice than of logical reasoning which was troubling Abelard and Hugo. For they were here concerned not to bring the human justice into harmony with the divine, but rather to bring the divine a little nearer to the human.

c. *The Incarnation*

Long ago Porphyry had condemned the Christian God's cruelty for dooming every man to damnation during the thousands of years between the Fall and the Redemption. But Augustine had explained that men had fallen so far that it had taken all that time for them to amend themselves enough to be able to appreciate and heed the message of Christ. For, even when this Revelation came, most men disregarded it.

Abelard here followed Augustine closely. Hugo, however, gave the explanation an opposite twist by saying:

The time of the natural (Old Testament) law was set so that Nature (natural fallen man) might operate by itself, not because it could do anything by itself, but that it might be recognized that it could not. (*De Sacramentis*, II, 2, 1.)

The two prevailing temperaments are here well revealed: to Abelard the intellectual, God is recognized by His likeness to man; to Hugo the mystic, by His unlikeness.

Some, however, like Honorius of Autun, shrank from the suggestion that Christ's first Coming was induced only by the tragedy of Adam's sin. For the truth was Christian truth, and only Christ's Incarnation and Passion could effectively reveal it. If so, however, it would have been timed rather like the expected second Coming or end of the world, to coincide with the salvation of enough souls to complete the desired quantity of angels.

Theoretically born in sin and therefore guilty, the Virgin nevertheless received at birth a grace so superior even to that bestowed on the patriarchs and prophets that she was not only saved but, like her Son, had never been able to sin.

How she conceived of the Holy Ghost was accepted widely as a mystery, but Hugo nonetheless dared to hazard the explanation that her conception of Christ was effected

because, through the love and operation of the Holy Ghost, Nature provided the substance for the divine foetus from the flesh of the Virgin. (*De Sacramentis*, II, 1, 8.)

In this way, assuming the now dominant creationist theory, the incarnated Christ had not been tainted by the sexual in-

dulgence of his parents. Of all men he alone, since Adam, had thereby been born innocent.

We see here how contagious and therefore dangerous even one unorthodox view can be: Abelard, slighting original sin, cast doubt on the need of a virgin birth in order to save the Christ child from being born in sin. Yet, if he had been otherwise conceived, his origin would not have differed from that of many of the sons and daughters of Zeus.

One of the most disputed dogmas concerned the dual nature of the incarnated Christ. For the Latin West, Pope Leo I and the Council of Chalcedon in 451 had settled the controversy by the blunt declaration that Christ had been at the same time both wholly divine and wholly human; and in those days the more irrational a dogma was the less pagan it seemed to be, and the more consonant, therefore, with a divine revelation. But times had now changed: in contrast to the Fathers, the Doctors were now trying to prove that the Christian dogmas were the more credible because they were, at bottom, not contrary to reason; and both Abelard and Hugo were tempted to show how the apparent contradiction could be resolved.

Abelard started with the risky pagan assumption that a God, and therefore Christ, could not physically suffer. But if he only pretended that he so suffered he was guilty of a cruel deceit, and if he so suffered only as a man, he was not, at the moment of the Passion at least, really God. Peter Lombard was accused of accepting these unpalatable alternatives. Fifty years after Abelard, John of Cornwall was to declare that this so-called man, being no specific man, could not be a man at all but was a hoax. Even if the explanation of Abelard was more logical, it was certainly far more unorthodox.

Soon after, Hugo tried his hand. He said first, that the incarnated Christ possessed "full and perfect wisdom and power and virtue and goodness," and secondly, that "he had assumed all that pertained to the truth of human nature." So far so good: here was a Christ who was wholly both God and man. But Hugo was not satisfied to let well enough alone, for he added, that unlike God, Christ had feared to suffer, had suffered, and had died. But it was precisely because he was wholly God that Abelard had denied him these wholly human weak-

nesses, and had denied too, that since he possessed perfect power, wisdom, and virtue, he could be wholly a man.

Thus Hugo, in trying to explain, only made it appear that the incarnated Christ possessed certain qualities which were purely human and certain others which were purely divine—a combination which would apply equally well not only to any pagan demigod but also to any mythical mermaid or centaur.

Why, then, was Abelard declared heretical and Hugo orthodox? Was it not because Abelard wished, pagan-like, to keep God's majesty inviolate, whereas Hugo was holding fast to the Christian faith of a close bond connecting God with man? Yet even this bond between Christ and man was not felt to be enough. Man was now shifting his allegiance from even the man-God to the wholly human Mary.

d. The Redemption

i. Purpose of. Augustine had reduced the purpose of the Redemption to the simple one of firing men with ardor for the love of God. For only in so far as this purpose was achieved would either the Father's wrath or the Devil's power be reduced. In spite of Augustine, however, the belief had persisted that the Redemption aimed to improve man rather indirectly, that is, through its direct effect on the Father or the Devil.

Anselm had taken the first step back to Augustine by eliminating the so-called mousetrap theory, but he still held to the belief that it was only in order to reward His Son that the Father canceled the debt which man had incurred on account of Adam.

The mousetrap theory nevertheless lived on. Not only were Abelard's contemporaries, Philippe de Thaon and Pierre de Celle, still taking it for granted; even after both Abelard and Hugo, Peter Lombard was still saying that although the Devil had never acquired a legal power to tempt men, God had nonetheless felt obliged—perhaps on the theory that the Devil had acquired a prescriptive right through passage of time—to reduce his authority only after inducing him to overstep it.

Here again it was Abelard who first turned back towards Augustine. Denying inherited guilt, he saw no necessity for a

sacrifice which would serve to atone for it. As there had been no vicarious punishment, so there was no need of a vicarious pardon.

According to Abelard, Adam's descendants were born as innocent as he had been, and with no greater propensity to sin. But, since they were exposed to greater temptation, they were treated as if born guilty. Was this because by Adam's sin the power of the Devil had increased, or was it rather that God used that sin as a pretext for exposing men to a less pleasant but far more challenging environment? Adam had been tempted only by a woman; his sons were to be tempted also by cities and money. This was to be a toughening process calculated to prepare men to live righteously in spite of the various ingenious temptations which the Devil was only too eager to provide.

Man was at first ignorant and impotent, but he was neither wholly stupid nor wholly corrupt. With the help of his reasoning powers, still intact, and of his senses—by means of which he could study past history and present nature—he was equipped to learn to live ever more wisely and virtuously, as Greek and Jewish history had already amply demonstrated.

What more did he need then? Much more: to know that God had created him and that Christ so loved him that, if only he would reciprocate so far as he was able, he could live with him happily forever after.

Our Redemption consists in that great love which the Passion of Jesus Christ inspires in us; a love which not only delivers us from the servitude of sin, but also obtains for us the freedom of the children of God. (*Saint Bernard*, Expos. in Ep. ad Romanos, Lib. III, 207.)

Away, then, with all idea of a magical ransom, as if men owed any other debt to God. Might not God as well indeed owe men a debt for having doomed them for so long to damnation? For the Devil was a slave and the Father and Son were One. The only protagonists were God and men, with God devising the Redemption in order to raise men towards Him. Just as the Devil cannot influence men except psychologically, so God should not be supposed to have chosen to do more. He will first only help men by placing them in a world designed to toughen their minds and souls; second, He will help

them by revealing that such is His love for them that He is willing to die in order to win theirs in return; and last, He will help them by an everlasting reward if only they continue to love Him till they die.

If Abelard's theory of the effect of the Fall was close to the Pelagian, his theory of the purpose of the Redemption was equally close to the Augustinian.

But was not the Father's wrath—or at least His anxiety—assuaged? And was not the Devil's effectiveness much reduced? Certainly. And, except for the Son's disguise, the only magic was the response he evoked in men's hearts.

If Hugo's understanding of the purpose of the Redemption was more orthodox, it was also more complex and even confused. He did not want either to limit God's power or to question the wisdom of the Church. He said, for instance, that although the Devil had no rights, the Redemption was designed to ensure that he got fair treatment by playing him a trick to match his in trapping Adam. But his general exposition was elusive. This is how he summed it up:

Christ, then, by his birth paid man's debt to the Father, and by his death atoned for man's guilt. (*De Sacramentis*, I, 8, 4.)

How closely was he following Anselm? The birth, by divinizing men magically or vicariously, paid the debt men owed God on account of their sins; the death released them from their inherited guilt. Apparently this death relieved, not the debt and so the injustice, but rather the divine anguish; yet this relief was achieved, not now magically as the debt was, but as Augustine and Abelard had said, by the psychological effect of the death on men.

By attributing a three- and even four-fold purpose to the Redemption, as against the single purpose conceived by Abelard, Hugo no doubt buttressed the dogma as a mystery, but as a mystery perhaps rather of his own than of God's invention.

ii. Free Will. Hugo appears to have followed the orthodox view that under the Old Law a very few had received a free, irresistible, and therefore saving grace and that it was only by baptism that a man could receive that free, but resistible and therefore merely sufficient, grace of the first Adam—that which permitted him, if he chose, to earn enough merit to

deserve the final grace which saved. Since, however, he could earn that merit only because he had already received the unmerited grace of the free will to do so, it could still be said that God's grace was free because unless man first received the free grace of baptism and so of free will, he was helpless to earn the saving grace conferred on account of subsequent merit.

Here once more Abelard chose to differ, because what other men could explain only by assuming the intervention of magic, he believed he could, at least in most cases, explain by reason.

Why God had ever put the guileless Adam in Eden at all might be puzzling, but it was clear that the Fall did not change human nature but only its environment. Therefore man, having originally had free will, did not lose it. There was doubtless magic in the Incarnation itself, yet this divine stratagem did not improve his nature but only his knowledge and thereby his aspirations. Before the Redemption only a very few had had an inkling of it; through its coming everybody who was lucky enough to have either witnessed or been apprised of it, could now believe in its reality. There was no more free will after it than before, but the lesson, long hidden, was now available to all. Under the natural law, whether of the Greeks or Jews, men had had to grope painfully towards the truth. Only when God had deemed the time ripe did He choose to reward their feeble efforts by revealing the truth which they had for so long instinctively but blunderingly sought: that if only they would love Him as He loved them, they would receive an everlasting reward.

e. Providence

i. Abelard and Adelard of Bath. Exactly why, in temporal matters, the divine justice of Providence in so many cases differed from human justice, does not seem to have roused any more curiosity now than before. Abelard felt that God was doing His best in men's behalf but was in one way or another handicapped by the fact that ephemeral and relative evil was a necessary means to a more perfect good. Adelard felt that God had allowed Nature, like the Devil, so much

latitude because He was confident that these could both be relied on to promote his ultimate purpose.

ii. Bernard. The great abbot Bernard, although disinclined to speculate on the nature and significance of the dogmas, was nonetheless deeply concerned about the ways of Providence. This was because he felt so close to God in spirit that he could almost know, and so tell others, what was going on in the divine mind. But, in trying to identify his own mind with God's, he inadvertently identified God's mind with his. As often as he thought that God had acted as he expected Him to, Providence seemed to him to be no mystery, but on occasions when God did not act the way, if in His place, Bernard would himself have acted, a reappraisal of God's intentions became unavoidable.

In this latter category were those cases where, in spite of Bernard's prayers, friends of his who had been virtuous died—often prematurely. Here he could only suppose that, because of their great merits, God knew that they would serve Him more effectively when, as Jerome had long before said, as saints in heaven they sought to intercede in behalf of their friends and other innocents at the Last Judgment.

Earlier, Pope Gregory VII had taxed Providence with being dilatory. So, on one occasion, Bernard demanded of God "How long shalt Thou delay before showing Thyself?" Thus chided, God quickly executed the miracle asked of Him.

When, as the prelude to the Second Crusade, the Saracens invaded the Holy Land, massacred many Christians and threatened Jerusalem, Bernard, preaching the Crusade, said:

The great eye of Providence contemplates these events in silence: He wants to see if there be any who seek Him, any who have compassion for His anguish and are willing to (try to) restore His heritage. (*Saint Bernard*, Ep. 457.)

God could of course have held back the Saracens in the first place, but He was now perhaps even inciting them to threaten Jerusalem. Surely this could only be because He wanted to see which Christians, if any, were willing to do what they could do themselves and thereby prove their devotion to Him.

Bernard's appeal, as we know, had a phenomenal effect. To his summons not only many of the kings, feudal lords, and

their vassals responded, but also thousands of others, including many criminals, vagabonds, and whores. God, thought Bernard, should have shown His gratitude, but instead, only defeats and failure resulted. Great, then, was Bernard's grief—yet he was not disillusioned. On reconsideration he came to the conclusion, not that he had himself been rash or presumptuous, not that he had in any way been sinful or even stupid, but rather that, because of the enormities which the Crusaders themselves had committed, God had felt obliged to punish these very men who, in contrast to those who preferred to stay at home, had at least made the sacrifice of trying to help Him. That it might have been not God but rather Bernard who had asked for this sacrifice seems never to have crossed his mind. Or that God might not be quite as pleased with him as he was with himself.

iii. Hugo. Hugo, while greatly admiring Bernard, was infinitely more reflective and, perhaps for this very reason, more humble. He was therefore more puzzled by the ways of Providence. On at least one occasion he reasserted the traditional view that:

God is shown manifestly, in order to fulfil His just judgments, to excite the evil wills of men and demons. (*De Sacramentis*, I, 5, 32.)

This means, apparently, that, knowing men's evil propensities, God excites them to actualize these in order to make sure that the damnation they get is fully deserved. This, however, was inconsistent with his belief that, as in the case of infants dying unbaptized, the mere evil propensity suffices to warrant damnation. It was the complete opposite of Boethius' supposition that God tries to save men from damnation in spite of their evil propensities by giving them no occasion which would tempt them to turn that propensity into a concrete intent. All three of these views, however, presupposed God's will to be the immediate, direct, and sole cause of natural events.

At the same time, however, Hugo was not unaware of the now growing belief held by such as Adelard of Bath that Nature, too, played, if only humbly, a role not to be ignored. For he was one of those now alleging that the events of the sublunar world were governed by the superlunar, and it was

probably with this in mind that he ventured to say that, although men's fate in the afterlife depended directly on the will of God, their fate on earth depended (barring miracles, no doubt) immediately and directly on necessity.

Augustine had said that on earth there was justice and injustice in about equal proportions. Hugo followed him here, saying that on earth both evil and good existed simultaneously. Augustine had thought that this, like everything else, was effected in every detail by God's will alone, but it must be presumed that Hugo understood that the direct effects were by God's delegation of power to Nature—a permissive power, such as the Devil enjoyed—with reliance on His foreknowledge of how these agents of His were going to behave. This did not mean that Hugo regarded Nature as a power which God had to put up with, being reconciled to evil only because He foreknew that good would ultimately prevail. It meant rather that, just as men, by a study of the Devil's psychology, could roughly foreknow how he was likely to behave, God could, by His knowledge of Nature, precisely foreknow how *it* was going to behave. That is, just as hot and cold, darkness and light, sickness and health, drought and flood always alternated, so would good and evil.

5. SALVATION

a. Intent

Abelard thought that even after the Fall men remained capable of loving virtue for its own sake. It merely became a rarer achievement than it would otherwise have been. In order so to love virtue the initial requisite was to have a good intent, and this required not merely a clear conscience but also a preliminary examination of conscience. This was in order to make sure that the intent would also seem good to God. What was true of the intent was also true of the effect: it too should seem good to God, and every intellectual effort should therefore be taken to ensure this as well. It was because Abelard made every effort to learn what God, rather than he himself or others, thought virtuous, that he defied priests, theologians, and even the Fathers, by going straight to

Scripture itself. If, even so, his intent and its effects were not good in the eyes of God, at least he need not blame himself for not having tried.

Bernard said that if virtue consisted in carrying out God's will, the Jews had not sinned in crucifying Christ. But Abelard, had he lived to learn of the disaster of the Second Crusade, might properly have rejoined that only if virtue was based exclusively on good intent could Bernard be free from blame for what *he* had done. Bernard was hardly one any longer to be preaching that hell was paved with good intentions, for if others were expected to exercise judgment as well as good will, so, surely, was he.

b. Works

Hugo said that "there is no will if it does not do what it can," but works ranged from the extreme of Mary, through the norm of Martha, to the extreme of going all the way to Asia to kill the Infidel. Mary did what best she could by contemplation at home, the crusader by fighting abroad. But, since God could read men's inmost thoughts, He did not need to know what works they performed in order to weigh their virtue. Works, therefore, must logically be regarded as purely human devices to satisfy in some degree man's curiosity about the state of his own soul. Was he really as good or as bad as he seemed, either to himself or to others? Works, good or bad, would do at least something to enlighten him, and the priest's judgment would tend either to confirm or contradict his own tentative estimate of himself.

It may be hazarded that it was the monastic vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience which first put Abelard in mind of the nature of the Fall, for he said it exposed men to the three great temptations of cities, money, and women. The monastic life was therefore designed to protect men from these temptations, being modeled (but without Eve) after the Garden of Eden. Abelard might not go so far as to suppose, as had the monk Eucherius at Lerins, that monks could thereby enjoy felicities comparable to those of heaven, but he realized that it at least offered the security needed for the cultivation of the wisdom which Adam had lacked.

Bernard, on the other hand, took the asceticism of the monastic life as a self-imposed punishment which, almost of itself, would earn salvation as its reward. He said, for instance, that one of the advantages of the unhealthy site of Clairvaux was its high mortality rate: the monks there suffered more and died sooner than they did elsewhere. That these hardships, added to the required monastic regime, seemed to make it unjust for God to deny the sufferers the salvation they were counting on, led to the belief that all who received burial there were surely saved. This was the *quid pro quo* theory of salvation, and with the emphasis rather on physical than on mental suffering.

c. *Penance*

If the sin confessed was a venial one, no penance was imposed and the absolution was therefore given unconditionally. If, however, the sin confessed was a mortal one, a penance was imposed and the absolution, when given before the penance had been completed, became valid only if and when it had been. Because in the first case the pardon was not earned by works it was a wholly gratuitous one, whereas in the second case it was earned as well.

In either case the pardon rendered the recipient innocent once more and qualified him, provided he remained contrite, to receive the fortifying substance of the Eucharistic sacrament.

On the authority of the apostle Paul (*Hebrews* vi 4-6), who had said that

It is impossible for those who were once enlightened and have tasted the heavenly gift and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance,

the earlier Fathers had forbidden more than a single penance. But later, relying on Christ's answer to Peter's query "How oft shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him—until seven times?" which was "I say not unto thee until seven times, but until seventy times seven," they allowed repeated penances.

The penalty, declared Hugo, should be such that the affliction of the correction is at least equal to the delight derived from the sin—which was a reversion to the Old Testament ‘tooth for tooth.’

Beyond even this strange interpretation of Christ’s answer Hugo argued that subsequent penances should be even more severe than the first, and here, perhaps because he found no pertinent theological authority, he declared that because the civil law punished second offenses more severely, the canon law was justified in doing likewise. This civil law was not an image from natural revelation or a symbolic interpretation of it but, like logic, an authority to be followed when Revelation was silent.

This is a good example of the manipulation of authorities to serve practical ends: from *Matthew* to *Hebrews* to the Fathers to the civil law. By proceeding from authority to logic to law, Hugo worked his way to a justification, however far-fetched, of what was in fact merely the most sensible empirical conclusion.

In order to encourage volunteers to take part in the First Crusade of 1095, Pope Urban II had promised salvation to all who should die in the course of it, and remission of sins for all who, having taken part, lived through it. But now, in order to obtain volunteers for the Second Crusade of 1145, Pope Eugenius III took the further step of promising not only remission of sins but also salvation to all the crusaders whether they died in their attempt or survived. This papal pronouncement, if taken literally, meant that a volunteer who had merely confessed his past sins, could thereafter, whether before embarking, during the undertaking, or, should he survive, during the rest of his life, sin as much and as often as he chose without in any way endangering his salvation.

d. The Afterlife

i. The Last Judgment. Such was the concentration of men on salvation and therefore on the Last Judgment that there was an enormous curiosity about the details of its procedure. This curiosity had to be satisfied, however, with various visions, more or less accredited, such as those of the Ger-

man mystic Hildegard of Bingen. The theologians were more cautious, but even the level-headed Hugo recognized that "dying souls often get a foreknowledge of many things which are to be put on them." He related a story (perhaps the same one already told by Guibert de Nogent) of the experience of a man who, having died and been brought to judgment, was sentenced to return to life (instead of being sent to purgatory) in order to do his penance for sins still unrequited at his death.

According to Honorius, the twelve apostles sat with Christ in judgment, and the intercessors, in behalf of the defendant, were the Virgin and, quite inconsistently, the apostle John.

ii. The Mansions of the Dead. "In my Father's house are many mansions," but so there are also in the Devil's. Hugo said that "the greatest torments have a place in the lowest regions, the greatest joys in the highest." Those who are sentenced to abide in these lowest or highest go there straightway.

Certainly the saints were no longer being imagined as humanly as by the Merovingians. In spite of their differences in rank there was now no envy, no class consciousness; and their supposed knowledge was more restricted. Hugo said,

This one thing is certain, that the souls of the saints . . . know as much of the things that are done outside as is considered to be of benefit either for their joy or for our help. (*De Sacramentis.*)

The saints are so well conditioned that the idle curiosity, so deplored on earth, will no longer be even a temptation. They are furthermore so well toughened that, although they remain fully aware of the sufferings of both men on earth and their souls in hell and, at least for God's sake, remain ready to do the right thing by them, they do not (as the Merovingians had supposed) feel compassion, even for their surviving loved ones. Here again the Virgin was surely the exception which proved the rule.

To purgatory were sentenced only those who had begun, but at death had not completed, their required penance (*ibid.*, II, 14, 3), that is:

Those who have departed this life with certain faults, but who are just and predestined for life. (*Ibid.*, II, 16, 4.)

But this purgatory was not, like life on earth, partly good and partly evil, for while it lasted it was, like hell, wholly evil.

Although Hugo felt obliged to believe that infants who died unbaptized were in hell, he consoled himself by supposing that they there suffered the least punishment of all. Yet even this belief so disquieted him that, in order to square it with his conscience, he was driven to resurrect the long-discredited supposition that the damnation was fair because God foreknew that these infants, had they lived, would have chosen so to sin that they would then have deserved a worse damnation.

To Hugo, as to almost everybody of his day, the hierarchies must have no gaps, and so it must be even of this last hierarchy of the dead: since below heaven was a purgatory or antechamber to it, so above hell there must also be an antechamber—two of them, in fact:

Just as the good with faults are detained in certain habitations that they may not straightway ascend to the joys of Heaven, so too, no less, the evil, when they depart from this world, although to be damned, even when certain lighter punishments have been disposed of according to the mode or measure of their faults, do not straightway descend to the torments of Hell. (*Ibid.*, II, 16, 4.)

Hugo probably here had in mind only the less evil, to balance the less good, for he implies that the good who were without faults went to heaven straightway. But he realized that, even so, the correspondence was imperfect, for he adds:

What (good) does the delay do, where there can be no emendation or purgation? Since this is entirely hidden by no means should we explain it rashly. (*Ibid.*)

Of the intensity of the worst punishment Hugo said:

As it is not unfittingly believed to be greater than all punishments, so too not unreasonably is it thought to consist in that torment which is sharper than all others and more vehemently excruciating. This, therefore, perhaps alone will be, so that it can always be the highest, since whatever would be exchanged for that would be diminished from it. (*Ibid.*, II, 16, 5.)

Still hypnotized by the hoary premise of absolute opposites, Hugo was sure that since there was complete happiness in heaven, logic, and therefore justice, required that there be equally complete unhappiness in hell.

Since, moreover, the hierarchy required the absolute opposites of joy and misery, it must be not only in intensity but

also in duration: since, in order to be complete, the joys of the saints must be eternal, eternal too must be the miseries of the damned. In order to try to explain why this was also just, Hugo again resorted to his hypothesis that God, because of His foreknowledge of unrealized contingencies, punished the mere propensity to sin. Here he quoted Pope Gregory I by name:

The unjust sinned with end only because they lived with end. For surely they would have wished, if they had been able to live without end, to sin without end. For they who never cease to sin while they live show a desire always to live in sin. (*Ibid.*, II, 18, 10.)

Had Hugo been asked what would have been the fate of Magdalen, Paul, or Augustine had they died prematurely, he would presumably have answered that God did not allow them so to die because He foreknew that, although they would sin, they nevertheless retained a propensity to virtue.

Human justice might regard this as 'cruel and unusual punishment,' but Revelation had made it clear that since, according to divine justice, nothing could be too good for the virtuous, it necessarily followed that nothing could be too bad for the sinners. But, we may ask, was the current idea of the good also a divine revelation? Hugo says that:

In greater or lesser degree the unjust will all burn so that the just in the Lord may see the joys they receive and, in those (the unjust), may look upon the punishments they have evaded (*ibid.*, II, 18, 2), so that

while bad angels and men remain in eternal punishment, the saints will then know more fully what a blessing grace has brought them. (*Ibid.*, II, 18, 13.)

No wonder the philosophers were consoling themselves by repeating the Platonic axiom that evil was a nothing, and the theologians likewise consoling themselves by concluding that even God could only bring good out of evil.

6. HERESIES

During this period the great Albigensian heresy in Southern France was only smoking; it had not yet broken into flame. But there were already those spasmodic local bursts of heresy

which were to rouse the apprehensions of Bernard. The Waldensian outbreaks had been in the vicinity of Soissons, in 1108 and again in 1126. They were reported to have preached against the Real Presence and the alleged efficacy of the sacraments, against the worldliness and hierarchical pretensions of the secular clergy, and against the cult of relics and saints. Subjected to the Ordeal of cold water, many had 'proved' their innocence, whereupon the people, thwarted, proceeded to lynch them.

Another sect, the Apostolics, first invited persecution in 1145, in Champagne and Cologne. They opposed what the Waldenses did and, apparently in addition, the belief in purgatory. Like other heretics before and after, they also insisted that every Christian layman and priest, as well as monk, must observe poverty and chastity, and abstain from meat and even milk. This latter prohibition was suspiciously Manichean, but otherwise their views, like those of the Waldenses, were purely anticlerical or, as is sometimes said, purely biblical.

Some of these, too, were lynched by burning, and Bernard cited their extraordinary fortitude as proof of their having compacted with the Devil. As to the burning, which was not yet the legal penalty, Bernard said that,

In doing this the populace of Cologne has gone too far. We approve of its zeal but we do not approve of what it has done. Faith is the work of persuasion: it is not to be imposed. (Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, II (2), 360.)

The truth seems to be that, like Abelard and not wholly unlike Hugo, these heretics were troubled by much of the paraphernalia invented by the people, with at least the acquiescence of their priests, in order to cut the corners of the road to salvation. Abelard, being a master theologian, knew when he had gone too far, and so saved his skin by recanting, but these more uninstructed heretics thought that only by being true to their convictions, and so to their consciences, could they hope for God's mercy.

NOTES ON PERSONS MENTIONED
WHO FLOURISHED 920-1150
(Early Medieval France)

*Approximate
birth & death
dates **

- | | |
|----------------|--|
| fl. 10th cent. | HROTSWITHA. Wrote dramatic pieces and comedies as well as saints' lives. |
| 894?-966 | FLODOARD. Canon of Rheims. Wrote "Annales" covering years 919 to 966. |
| 912-973 | OTHO (OTTO) I, THE GREAT. German Emperor, crowned Emperor of the West in 962 by John XII, who in 963 deposed him. |
| ? -973 | WIDUKIND. Monk of Corvey; Saxon historian. |
| 925-965 | BRUNO THE GREAT. Archbishop of Cologne, Duke of Lorraine. Wrote commentaries on Pentateuch, Evangelists, etc. |
| 940-996 | HUGH CAPET. Became King of France 987. Moderate, politic, founded dynasty that lasted until 1789. |
| ? -999 | GREGORY V (BRUNO). Became Pope 996. First German to be Pope; excommunicated Robert le Devot. |
| ? -1003 | GERBERT (SYLVESTER II). Studied in France and in Spain under Arabs; legendary for wisdom and magical powers. |
| 945?-1004 | ABBON DE FLEURY. French theologian and chronicler. |
| 950(5?)-1023 | BERNWARD. Bishop of Hildesheim. Tutor of Otho III. Painter, sculptor, architect; embellished his cathedral and formed library of profane and sacred works. |
| 952?-1022 | NOTKER LABEO. His Latin-to-German translations helped fix the German language. |

* a, after.

- ? -1029 FULBERT. Bishop of Chartres. "One of the most beautiful characters and brightest lights of his time," stoutly resisted courtly injustice and ecclesiastical intrigue.
- ? -1047 POPPO, ARCHBISHOP OF TRIER.
- ? -1048 WAZO, BISHOP OF LIÉGE. Lenient to Manichees.
- 962-1049 ODILO, SAINT. Abbot of Cluny 993-.
- ? -1050 RAOUL GLABER. "Intractable," pushed piety to limits of belief. Colorful, diffuse writer.
- ? -1030 ADALBERON. Bishop of Laon. Ambitious author of "Poème Satirique" and other works.
- 971-1031 ROBERT II, LE DEVOT. Became King 996. Was excommunicated for marriage to cousin, his second wife, Bertha of Burgundy.
- ? -1032 CONSTANCE OF ARLES. Third wife of Robert the Pious, Queen of France. Introduced national poetry and gaiety which angered Glaber.
- 978-1048 POPPON, SAINT. Flemish Abbot of Stablo.
- 988-1072 PETER DAMIAN. Italian Cardinal; ecclesiastic reformer.
- 990- ? GUIDO D'AREZZO. Italian Benedictine musician.
- 998-1088 BERENGAR OF TOURS. Attacked dogmas of transubstantiation; condemned for heresy.
- fl. early 11th cent. HELGAUD. French historian, dear to King Robert.
- fl. 11th cent. GARIOPONTUS. Italian physician and medical writer.
- ? -1063 HUMBERT. French Cardinal, Papal Legate to Constantinople.
- 1005-1089 LANFRANC. Italian Priest, founded school at Bec and became Archbishop of Canterbury. Reformer.
- 1013-1085 HILDEBRAND, SAINT. Became Pope Gregory VII 1073. Compelled Henry IV to do penance at Canossa.
- 1017-1056 HENRY III, "THE BLACK." Became Holy Roman Emperor 1046.
- ? -1099 URBAN II (OTHO). Became Pope 1088. Opposed Henry IV and Anti-Pope Guibert.
- 1024-1109 HUGUES, ABBOT OF CLUNY. Independent supporter of Papacy.
- 1027-1087 WILLIAM I. Crowned King of England 25 December, 1066.
- 1030-1109 ALFONSO I (THE BRAVE). King of Castile.
- 1033(?) -1109 ANSELM, SAINT. Archbishop of Canterbury; disputed Henry I *re* investitures.

*Approximate
birth & death
dates **

- a1035-1123 MARBODE DE RENNES. Bishop of Rennes. Latin poet, hagiographer.
- 1050-1106 HENRY IV, "THE GREAT." Became Holy Roman Emperor 1084. Present at 66 battles; many times excommunicated.
- ? -1113 ODO, BISHOP OF CAMBRAI. Author.
- ? -1026 BURCHARD. Bishop of Worms. One of wisest of contemporary prelates, most famed for "Magnum Volumen Canonum," for instruction of clergy, and immense charities.
- ? -1117 ANSELM OF LAON. "Scholastic Doctor," restored theological study to France.
- ? -a1122 ROSCELLINUS. Nominalist, condemned for heresy.
- 1053-1124 GUIBERT DE NOGENT. Wrote earliest history of Crusades.
- ? -1131 ALGER DE LIÉGE. Priest, savant.
- a1057-1133 HILDEBERT, ARCHBISHOP OF TOURS. Philosopher and poet.
- a1060-a1120 ALBERT, CANON OF AIX. Wrote history of first Crusade.
- 1067- ? BERNARD OF CHARTRES. Founded school at Chartres; philosopher and theologian.
- ? -1141 HUGO, ABBOT OF SAINT-VICTOR.
- 1076-1154 GILBERT DE LA PORRÉE. Taught at Chartres; a chief of the Realists.
- 1079-1142 ABELARD. French philosopher, theologian, writer.
- ? -1150 GUILLAUME DE SAINT-THIERRY. Belgian theologian and author.
- 1080- ? ADELARD OF BATH. Scholastic philosopher, taught at Laon.
- 1080-a1154 GUILLAUME DE CONCHES. Norman-English philosopher and grammarian; taught at Chartres.
- a1080-1167 BERNARD OF CHARTRES (SYLVESTRIS). Philosopher and theologian.
- 1082-1152 SUGER, ABBOT OF ST. DENIS. First Minister of Louis VI, VII.
- 1090-1153 BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX. Preacher of Crusade.
- ? -1155 THIERRY OF CHARTRES. Younger brother of Bernard of Chartres (q.v.).

- ? -1167 ROBERT DE MELUN. Bishop of Hereford; theologian and philosopher.
- 1098-1180 HILDEGARD, SAINT. Abbess of St. Rupert's Mount, near Bingen. Wrote "Scite Vias" *et al.*
- ADAM DE PETIT PONT. See list, p. 529.
- 1105-1157 ALFONSO II (RAYMUNDO). King of Castile.
- fl. 1120 PHILIPPE DE THAON. Anglo-Norman poet.
- fl. 1120-1130 HONORIUS OF AUTUN. Theologian and writer.

FROM SENTENCES TO SUMMAS

1. THE CLERGY

a. Expenses

IN THE PAST it had been generally understood that the duty of the peasants, slaves, and craftsmen was to support the nobles and clergy by their manual labor. In return, the nobility were expected to further their temporal, the clergy their eternal, welfare. The nobility had to maintain castles, armed men and their equipment; had also to maintain law and order. This cost money. As for the clergy, the monks' duty was to pray to God for mercy, and, since they had taken the vow of poverty, their needs were not great. The secular clergy required more. Their duties to preach and confer the sacraments were inexpensive, but the great Gothic cathedrals which were now rising, especially in the North—even though the work was done chiefly by serfs and volunteers—were certainly expensive. Theoretically, therefore, the nobles needed the most money, the secular clergy less, and the monks least.

b. Fiscal Temptations

It was a temptation for most men, however, then as now, to take all the money or property they could lay their hands on, regardless of theoretical need. As the nobility were no exception, neither were the clergy. But, whereas the nobility were recklessly extravagant, the clergy were avaricious, with the result that they grew ever richer, and the reason for this, as everybody knows, was that given by the anonymous author of the late twelfth-century *Song of Hervis*:

When today an honorable man falls sick and goes to bed with the expectation of dying, he thinks neither of his sons, nephews nor cousins; he summons the black monks of Saint Benedict and bequeaths to them all that he possesses in the way of lands, rents, baking ovens and grinding mills. The laymen are impoverished and the clergy are enriched. (Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III (1), 374-375.)

Since, by canon law at any rate, Church land and other appurtenances could not be alienated, her capital could only tend to increase.

John of Salisbury, himself a secular priest, spoke of the monks more impartially:

The Cistercians are holy men, as are the Cluniacs; holy are monks and the regular canonical priests, and among these from time to time a particular one reflects a peculiar sanctity. (*Policraticus*, VII, 23.)

But, he adds, there are also, as Jerome had said (*Letters*, #52),

those who do not contribute much for the poor in order that they may retain more, and, under pretext of soliciting alms, acquire wealth. This should be called venery rather than almsgiving. It is the way that beasts and birds and even fish are caught. A small bait is put upon the hook that the purses of matrons may be hooked by it. (*Ibid.*)

c. Abuses

Almsgiving was from the first regarded as a good work, and the donor was given to understand that the more spontaneously this was done, the more appreciative the all-seeing God would be. At the beginning, too, the poverty of the clergy was such that the gifts to them were also counted as alms, and they could even claim a just priority, for they were poor not from necessity but from choice. When, as, and if the clergy should acquire any surplus, it was understood that they would distribute it to the more needy.

But since it was a primary function of the clergy to pray, they would hardly have been human if they did not particularly pray for the souls of their benefactors, and since the more this became known the more generous were the donations, the clergy did not long hesitate to intimate that God

would be more moved by their prayers of gratitude than by the donor's mere indiscriminate almsgiving. In a word, they offered themselves as influential intermediaries between the giver and his God. But, as so often happens, what is originally given as a favor ends, if it proves valuable enough, by being sold at a price.

d. Centralization

The reforming popes had sought to check these and other abuses by acquiring a greater control over the body of the clergy, but the results were disappointing: the evil cleric merely shifted his activities to Rome. Since there were bad popes as well as bad bishops and abbots, the abuses simply shifted their ground. It was in the years around 1200 that the papal legates were most outrageous. Armed with plenary powers and operating beyond the pope's range of vision, they imposed a ruthless obedience not only on the laity but also on the good and bad clergy alike. The successful effort of Pope Gregory VII in the late eleventh century had taken many of the episcopal appointments out of the hands of the kings and nobility and restored them to the local dioceses. Now, a hundred years later, Pope Innocent III was trying to get his own hands on these appointments, at least to the extent of vetoing the local nominations or of deposing the present incumbents.

So long as the great nobles were a threat to the best interests of both king and Church, the kings often defended the Church; but as papal control increased, the balance of power shifted in her favor and the nobles had therefore to rely more and more on the king for protection. This was made the easier because the French king from 1180 to 1223 was Philip Augustus, who was concerned to serve the interests rather of his state than of his own soul—that is, to do his duty as a temporal ruler rather than as a suppliant before the pope.

In 1188 a significant if minor issue now arose which illustrates the new tension. In that year the Church was again agitating for a Crusade, and although Philip felt obliged to accede he also felt that the Church, as the chief instigator, should at least bear some share of the prospective expenses.

He therefore laid a tax on her, too, called the *dime Saladine*. The Church, however, resisted, offering the peculiar reason that, since the Crusade was being undertaken at her request and for her benefit, she should not be mulcted; for this was a device whereby what was to be given her with one hand was to be taken away with the other, as if the only excuse for the existence of a state was to serve the interests of the Church. Pierre de Blois offered a further reason. Although critical of the abuses within the Church, he said—and doubtless sincerely—that to rob the very Church on whose behalf the war was to be fought was tantamount to robbing the poor of what they had earned by the sweat of their brows. Evidently the Church could still persuade many to believe that her wealth was being held in trust for the poor, with only a bare minimum deducted to defray her own expenses.

Shortly after this, in 1201, some of the nobles attacked the Church of Rheims, and she appealed to King Philip to send his soldiers to defend her. To which Philip, still nettled by the refusal of the Church to pay the *dime Saladine*, replied that, "You have only helped me by your prayers. I shall only help you in the same fashion." Not a courteous retort, but at least a retort courteous. For if the Church sincerely despised temporal well-being, she should act accordingly. She should practice what she preached or else stop preaching. For a long time the temporal powers had flouted the spiritual irresponsibly, relying on might. Now, and perhaps for the first time, they were challenging the spiritual power by relying on right. Not yet, nor for several centuries to come, on theological, but on moral, right: whoever chooses to play a temporal role must observe the temporal rules.

e. Popular Resistance

Nor was King Philip alone in resenting the new pressures being applied by the Church. Through the ever-increasing resort to indulgences to reward the obedient and to excommunication to punish the disobedient, respect for both of these devices declined. This was true in the eyes not only of the nobility, but also of the middle class, the writers, and even of many of the clergy themselves. Probably the peasants

alone were unaffected: illiterate and concerned, temporally speaking, only with survival, they either blindly followed the lead of their own lords or, if these were oppressive enough, chose whatever course might present itself which promised a possibility of relief.

Most articulate and bitter were naturally the writers, some of whom made effective use of classical Latin models such as Juvenal or Martial. Typical of these were Alain de Lille, Pierre de Blois, Gilles de Corbeil, Walter Map, Geoffroi de Troyes, and Guyot de Provins. This was also the time of the scandalous poetry of the Goliardi and of the bloody *Chansons de Geste*. In many of the latter the accusations against the morals of the clergy were so bitter that the anonymity of the author alone could have saved him from reprisals.

Familiarly enough, the most usual sins alleged were financial or sexual, and the tirades were equally directed against the shameless and the hypocritical. Doubtless the more brutal and repulsive deeds were the work of only a few, but clerical demoralization was certainly widespread. When King Philip determined to resist the Church these literary and other attacks were already current. He knew, therefore, that he could count on allies who were only waiting for him to assume the lead.

2. HERESIES

a. Anticlerical

A power which is abused is first distrusted and finally challenged. God's power was good because He was good; therefore those to whom He chose to delegate any of His powers would presumably be good too. And the Bible confirmed this because not only the patriarchs and prophets were good, but also the apostles. The bad men had been confounded because they had chosen to be, and so to do, evil.

Belief in the efficacy of the monks' prayers was based on their virtue, and it was largely because their virtue was becoming suspect that men were turning to other methods of pleasing God. Why, then, should the sacramental power of a bad priest not be equally contaminated and therefore ineffectual?

There were two outbreaks in the Geneva area about 1150. Pierre de Bruis and Henri de Lausanne both denied the efficacy of prayers for the dead—presumably a denial of purgatory—and also the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Henri also disbelieved in infant baptism, though whether or not for the reasons which Abelard had given, is not clear.

A generation later, this time in nearby Lyons, appeared Pierre de Vaux, founder of the Vaudois, or Waldenses. The occasion of the Church's hostility was his translation of the Bible and his assertion that, since "no one should obey any other man but only God," every man might interpret its meaning as he pleased. He himself, however, was otherwise heretical only in his insistence that a bad priest was as incapable as any good layman was capable of administering the sacraments. The sect was also accused of believing that their holy men earned an irresistible saving grace during life, although this was simply a return to the early Christian belief that he who publicly confessed a faith which by law was punishable with death would surely be saved. Had not Christ himself promised that "he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved"?

b. Dualism of the Cathars

The Cathar heresy first became generally known when a council of these dissidents was held at Toulouse in 1167. Because of its centre at Albi the heretics were also known as Albigensians. It was also prevalent in Spain and Italy, but only in Southern France were the nobles, and indeed a large part of the population, won over. These dissidents denounced prayers for the dead because they did not believe in purgatory; they also denied the efficacy of the sacraments, notably baptism, ordination, and the Eucharist, and, as a corollary, both indulgences and excommunication.

As the sect grew and spread, however, a clergy of sorts became unavoidable. Certain men were chosen—we do not quite know how—to receive the *Consolamentum*, doubtless the equivalent of a sacrament. These men, called the *Perfecti* or *Elect*, thereby became sanctified, and it was said, as it was of the holy Waldenses, that they regarded themselves, and

were regarded by the rest of the sect, as the recipients of an irresistible grace—a scandalous belief, yet hardly more extreme than the indulgences apparently offered by Eugenius III in order to recruit volunteers for the Second Crusade.

After death, however, the Cathar saints, unlike the Catholic, took no further part in mundane or human affairs. For this reason the sect denied the efficacy of prayers for their help or of the images or relics which accompanied such prayers, and, what seemed to the Catholic especially blasphemous, even of prayers to the Virgin herself.

So far it might be argued that they were within the pale, if not of Catholicism at least of Christianity, but this was in fact very far from being the case.

It had seemed to both the Jews and the Moslems that the New Testament had added nothing of much significance to the Old. The Cathars, however, were going to the opposite extreme of regarding the New as a complete repudiation of the Old. Now, since contrasting forces are opposites and good and evil are also opposites, Jehovah as creator of the world was obviously the Devil, and man—that is, his soul—had somehow fallen into that world, been imprisoned in a body and become contaminated by it. Christ, by his apparition, taught men that they had the power, if only they chose to exert it, of resisting the temptations offered by the body and thereby of becoming so pure that at death their souls could rise again to Christ's kingdom in heaven.

The Devil's instrument, and therefore power, lay in matter. For this reason it was inconceivable that Christ should ever have assumed the flesh or that any body and blood, to say nothing of bread and wine, could be his. Man's soul must imitate Christ's. Therefore it must resist matter to the point of avoiding all sexual intercourse even in marriage. Only in this way could the existence, and therefore the contamination, of future souls be avoided.

Furthermore, animals, too, had souls; if those of men could become immortal, so might theirs. Out of respect for the soul as such, the Cathar would not kill or eat an animal; he would not touch eggs or even milk. Like Plotinus, he professed, at least, to be ashamed of being in the body.

There was certainly an oriental flavor to this heresy: their

Bible was based on the Greek version; they repudiated the cult of images; they respected the souls of animals; and Neoplatonic or Manichean beliefs are frequently recognizable in their doctrine. Was their rather sudden recrudescence, then, an indigenous one, springing from the Manichean or Greek residue which had still been smoldering in Merovingian times; was it a recent infiltration from Hungary, where such beliefs were current in about 1230; or did the indigenous rise of anticlericalism lead to this basic repudiation? Was the explosion caused by a spark striking highly combustible material or by actual spontaneous combustion? This matter of disentangling causes is not easily resolved. The consequences, however, are all too clear.

It may be presumed that a doctrine based on the repudiation of life cannot survive in competition with a doctrine based on survival—whether this be Aristotle's or Darwin's, whether it be the Jewish expectancy of the Messiah or its pseudo-Christian variation of the millennium. To be sure, Christ had given the impression that the end of the world was imminent, but neither the Jews nor, in the long run, the Christians had subscribed. Whether, if given time, the Cathars would have found some pretext for perpetuating themselves no one can say, for before they had time to destroy themselves the Catholic Church and Catholic State in the North, both seeking to extend their temporal control, chose to destroy them. Of this bloody persecution we shall later have more to say.

c. Pantheism

In the later ninth century the Neoplatonic explanation of the world by Erigena had been condemned by councils, but with the turn towards philosophy after 1050 Neoplatonism naturally returned, for it was to be found in greater or less degree not only in Erigena but also in Pseudo-Denis, Boethius, and even in Augustine. Anselm used it with discretion; but, as ever more Greek and Arab texts began to circulate, others came who, like Erigena, used it not in order to give greater consistency to existing dogma but in order to correct and even distort doctrine.

The distinct powers allocated to each of the three Persons of the Trinity, the necessity that God not only create but create beings possessed of free wills to choose good or evil, the perceptions which the mystic acquired of God's essence, the virtually irresistible grace—all these and more can probably be traced to Neoplatonic origins through Erigena.

Especially noteworthy was his theory that the Creation had been produced by God out of Himself, thus bringing multiplicity into being. As a result free will, angelic and human, came into existence and thereby both a new good and a new evil. But this multiplicity was only a cyclical phase. In due course the creation would contract just as it had previously expanded until all became unity once more. As this reverse process approached completion the evils attendant on multiplicity would fade. Not only the souls but also the bodies of all living things would gradually lose their identity and, by rejoining God, restore the One.

Erigena had not characterized his own time as one of increasing or decreasing multiplicity, but—perhaps because of a new optimism—certain men of about 1200 began to see Christian history more dynamically. As the Old Testament text became better known, its literal and therefore historical import became clearer, and it was concluded that civilization since those days had come a long way. One did not need to be a Cathar to recognize its innate savagery, and Jehovah was clearly implicated.

One manifestation of this new view was in Southern Italy, where Joachim of Flora, observing that Jehovah had ruled before Christ, concluded that the Holy Ghost, as part and parcel of the Trinity, must logically come to rule after Christ. The other manifestation was in Northern France, where Amaury de Benes (near Chartres), expounded an analogous theory. Joachim had said that the reign of the Holy Ghost was imminent; Amaury went him one better by declaring that it had already begun. In either case, however, the period described in the Old Testament would be that of the maximum multiplicity; and if so, the period of the Holy Ghost, being the last possible for a Trinity, was that which led directly back to unity again.

Therefore, just as the Jewish ritual was a product of the

first phase, so the sacraments and ritual of the Church and the Last Judgment with its heaven and hell were products of the second. But, said Amaury, in this third phase these, too, were obsolete. Indeed, as multiplicity faded so did good and evil, virtue and vice. In this new phase faith and hope, too, have given place to science and conviction! Man has henceforth no need to do other than contemplate these truths, for, in doing so, he is reducing his individuality and thereby expediting his return to the bosom of his Father.

Amaury died in 1207. But his influence spread, especially easterly, into Sens, Troyes, Langres, and, with his disciple David de Dinant, into Belgium. In 1210 Amaury's doctrines were condemned, his body disinterred, his books burned, and ten of his followers also. But his dream long, if fitfully, survived.

3. THEOLOGY

a. Codification

Peter Lombard's *Sentences* were a compendium of those patristic texts which time had shown to represent orthodoxy. It was so plausible and convenient that the patristic contradictions which had so disturbed Abelard became academic. Henceforth the controversies would centre not on what the Fathers thought but on what Scripture, when subjected to logic, actually revealed. Already now appeared the first of the many hundreds of *Commentaries* on the *Sentences*: an early one by Pierre de Poitiers, a later one by Alexander of Hales. Between the two was the decree of the Lateran Council in 1215 that the *Sentences* were to be taken as authoritative. Henceforth theological speculation in the grand manner faded. On the one hand, logic came in to fill the vacuum; on the other, creative theology was left at the mercy of either heresy or popular superstition.

b. God

i. Existence. According to strict theology, the existence of God was a matter of faith—faith in the authenticity of

Scripture's Revelation and of the mystical intuition. But against the rational the irrational is always on the defensive, and the eagerness to prove, as well as trust in, God's existence was now intensified by the challenge of the heretic and infidel. For, after all, even they believed that there were proofs.

There were already, indeed, plenty of traditional proofs which had only to be repeated, the chief ones being based on the old premise of opposites: abstracting from men's sensuous observation of a world which was multiple, in motion, ephemeral, and altogether most unsatisfactory, to infer a dramatically contrary reality.

Guillaume d'Auvergne, a contemporary of Alexander, seems to have been the most fertile in elaborating this method of proof. He added that a being which, like a stone, merely receives, presupposes another being which merely gives, that a purely corporeal being presupposes a purely spiritual one, that a purely accidental being presupposes a purely substantial one, and finally that since many of our ideas are illusory there must also be some which are true. This last proof recalls that of Anselm.

ii. Coeternal Powers. The question which roused more exciting speculation, however, was whether God's will was really omnipotent or whether there were not certain truths coeternal with Him by which His will was bound.

Peter Damian had maintained that such was God's power that He could cause a past event never to have happened. This John of Salisbury questioned, saying,

It is impossible in the nature of things for that which has passed and been completed by the successful working out of divine disposition not to have been; though I dare not make any statement one way or the other which does harm to Him who disposes. Yet the most learned of teachers—I mean Jerome—says, "I shall speak boldly; though God can do all things, He cannot raise up a virgin after her fall. He can, however, crown her, though defiled." (*Politicus*, II, 22.)

Alain de Lille's denial was more categorical, and he coupled it with a denial that God can make a thing be and not be at the same time.

We have seen how Roscellinus had denied that God could be both a One and a Trinity at the same time. He had been squelched, however, and it was generally recognized that this was indeed a special mark of God's divinity, and that it was equally true of His power, as Christ, to be at once wholly God and wholly man. But the further question was now more vigorously raised of whether or not, in creating, God could defy reason. Pierre de Poitiers was willing to grant that God could have turned Socrates into a donkey, but doubted that He could make a donkey and a lion into a One. In God Himself 1 could equal 3, but He could not create a world in which this was true. He was Himself what was called *superrational*, but He could only create the rational. Logic was now to dog God's footsteps at every turn.

Here there was also a borderline case: what He created must be rational, but must His act of creation be rational too? In other words could He create something out of nothing? Even the Son was engendered, and the Holy Ghost proceeded. Was the creation of the world more irrational than these?

Neoplatonism had regarded all three steps as rational creations of God out of Himself, but since Christians denied this in the case of the third step they were faced with but one alternative: if God could not create something out of nothing He must have created it out of some other substance coeternal with Himself.

Bernard Sylvestris, following the pagan tradition of Chares, now explained the Creation as the putting in order of a pre-existing chaotic and formless matter. Pierre Comestor denied this, but Guillaume d'Auxerre followed Bernard. It was then that the issue broke wide open. First the Cathars alleged that the Devil rather than God was the Creator; the heretical sect of Ortlibians declared matter eternal, and in turn this was found true of Aristotle. Guillaume d'Auvergne seems to have hedged, but he did say that the forms which produced order out of chaos were, like Plato's Ideas, coeternal with God, and before 1250 Bartholomew Glanville of England, in his *Encyclopedia*, explained how forms were independent substances, just as matter until joined to forms consisted of vagrant atoms.

Perhaps the best example of the moderate position was Alain de Lille's theory that the forbidding Father created prime matter, the less forbidding Son created form, and the wholly benevolent Holy Ghost, by joining these to one another, created the sensuous world.

Was it possible, too, that even Justice was a coeternal power? Hugo of Saint-Victor, following tradition, had said that the only justice was what God's will determined that it should be. The pagans had thought otherwise. Not only had Zeus been bound to administer justice or run the risk of being dethroned as he had once dethroned Kronos; the Stoic conception of a natural law of justice transcending the will of the gods as well as of men had been at the foundation of the evolution of Roman jurisprudence. It was, as its name indicated, inherent in nature, and the task of the jurist was to try to conform the civil law as nearly as possible to it.

The Christians had the theoretical advantage of a revealed law, but this had the practical disadvantage that their Revelation was of a seemingly impetuous and excitable Father, injudiciously righteous, alternately revengeful and merciful. To a Roman, Christian government would have seemed one rather of men than of laws.

As Roman law became better understood in France as well as Italy, it was not hard to see that the Christian God, far from *being* natural law, was merely trying, and not too successfully, to adapt Himself to it. Rather than being its creator, He was still struggling to master it. As concerned the after-life He was unquestionably now succeeding, but His mastery of the temporal still left much to be desired. Therefore if it be said that His will was justice there could be no injustice on earth and no need of any afterlife, whereas if justice was coeternal He was obliged to provide the afterlife in order to satisfy its requirements.

Just as God could not join form to matter without preserving both of their innate natures, so He could not produce man with a free will without conforming to the laws of justice.

That such radical ideas were rather adumbrated than thought out is perhaps not enough to warrant our mention of them at this early date. We must remember, however, that they were not only an attraction to the speculative mind

now obsessed by the possible uses to be made of reason; they were also to be found in many of the Greek and Arabic translations now in circulation. For these coeternals were nothing more nor less than the Ideas of Plato, the Ideas which Plato's Good had found ready-made and had served as His models for bringing order out of chaos.

c. The Time Lag

In order to answer Porphyry's sarcasm about the time lag between the Fall and the Redemption, Abelard had adopted Augustine's view that God had chosen to wait until fallen men had become civilized enough to recognize the incarnated Christ as God. Hugo had said that God had waited until men came to realize how helpless they were unless God came to their assistance.

Another explanation was based on the time needed by God in order to perfect His mousetrap. Anselm, to be sure, had repudiated the mousetrap theory, but it continued to be held by certain theologians, such as Geoffroi de Vendôme, Pierre de Celle, and Arnaud de Bonneval as late as 1175. As Anselm's own explanation gradually won acceptance, however, it became clear that the responsibility for the delay was wholly God's.

Augustine, Abelard, and Hugo had therefore supposed that God's timing had depended on a psychological change in men. Bernard of Clairvaux, however, perhaps because he was loath to admit that God's will could be influenced by men, preferred to rely rather on the equally traditional theory of Anselm, which was based on God's wrath. This, however, did not really explain the time lag. Bernard had, therefore, to suppose a psychological change in God.

In a sermon based on *Psalm* 85, 10, "Mercy and Truth are met together; Righteousness and Peace have kissed each other," Bernard described in allegory how God's decision to decree the Fall had been instigated by Justice and Truth. But Mercy and Peace had protested, and so persistently that the Father finally agreed to reopen the case by instructing the two factions to debate the issue again, and this time with His Son as judge. Finding no other solution, Christ thereupon

offered himself as a sacrifice in order to appease and pacify Justice and Truth and so his Father; whereupon the contending parties all acquiesced and embraced.

Bernard had a fertile imagination and trusted it implicitly. To him it was the allegory or symbol which was the real truth. His close friend Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny, also told how, at the Council of God, the conflict between Justice and Mercy had been resolved.

Nearly fifty years later Pierre de Poitiers elaborated this theme. He spoke of a King who had four daughters, a Son, and a servant Adam. The King, becoming suspicious of His servant's fidelity, put him to the test and, having found him wanting, imprisoned him. But two of His daughters—this time Mercy and Truth—in due course protested; the Son, as arbitrator, thereupon offered to resolve the issue by his own sacrifice.

Soon after Pope Innocent III, in a sermon, closely followed Bernard's account, and this in turn was repeated in three anonymous texts of about 1217, 1225, and 1275. The striking resemblance of this Council of God to those so long held on Mount Olympus was, however, probably fortuitous. The image of the king, his children, and his servant betrays the inspiration of a more enduring model—familiar alike to Homer and Bernard: the government of God could best be imagined as analogous to that of a State, where the ruler has first to keep the peace within his family in order to be able to keep it among his subjects.

As time went on both the theologians and the philosophers ignored the Daughters. But the people did not forget them. The scene of the Council with the four Portias arguing their respective cases is recognizable in many of the Mystery Plays which were to outlive even the Middle Ages.

d. Providence

i. Effect of the Redemption. That Christ's sacrifice made it possible for fallen men to win an immortality in heaven to compensate for their loss of it on earth, no one doubted. But that he thereby rendered the temporal life itself more bearable, only a confirmed optimist like Salvian could main-

tain. Alexander Neckam was now saying that by the Fall not only did man forfeit his temporal immortality, but all Nature turned hostile. The animals, once tame and friendly, turned wild, and men not only became carnivorous but fought each one against his brother.

All this was due to God's wrath, but since, as a result of the Redemption, this wrath had ceased, why did not the consequences of it cease too? It was generally taught that God deliberately left the temporal life as before because He was now offering a new and better kind of immortality. But why was there not also the possibility that He was sacrificing the temporal to the eternal life because, as a result of His earlier experience as revealed in the Old Testament, He had found that the proper administration of the temporal life was beyond even His capacities? The possibility of this explanation, however, depended on determining what if any causes there might be to account for this divine failure.

ii. Obstacles. That there might well be coeternal powers which would serve to hamper God's administration on the temporal world was one tempting, if dangerous, hypothesis. A less radical one was based on the suspicion just referred to, that God found that He must govern the temporal world, much as kings did, by resorting to constant expedients. The celestial hierarchy now so clearly revealed to men in all its intricacies may well have been designed merely in the hope of facilitating temporal operations, for there were many indications that, like even the best human bureaucracies, it creaked.

To carry the monarchical analogy a step further, God might also be exhibiting one or more of the weaknesses so usual in a king. The Epicureans, in saying that the gods were indifferent to the affairs of men, were blaspheming, but even the now highly revered Seneca had hinted that they might be forgetful. We have already seen how Gregory VII and Bernard of Clairvaux expostulated with God for being dilatory. We now find Innocent III consoling himself for allowing the Emperor Otto IV to deceive him by recalling that God Himself had once been deceived by Saul.

If God, who was the embodiment of all conceivable power,

knowledge, and virtue, was nevertheless unable to achieve the impossible, must it not be suspected that the Devil, ever plotting against God, could occasionally commit outrages before being observed?

Shocked as a good Catholic was by the power which the Cathars attributed to Satan, he would be more than ever inclined to minimize that power, and indeed it is plain that there was now a concerted effort to persuade the more credulous that the Devil could merely persuade, and even then only by resorting to deceit.

These same men, however, were none too sure of this themselves. John of Salisbury said that the Devil could only give men the appearance of animals, but he believed that if, because of sin, the Holy Ghost abandoned a man's body, the Devil could take possession of it. Etienne de Bourbon said that the cannibal was not a man possessed but the Devil himself disguised as one, and Gervase of Tilbury thought that a real metamorphosis of men into animals was possible.

John of Salisbury and Alexander of Hales' *Summa* declared night-flying an illusion, but Gervase of Tilbury and Etienne de Bourbon declared it real. John, Guillaume d'Auvergne, and Alexander's *Summa* denied that the Devil could have sexual intercourse with women, but Gervase believed it and Walter Map said that the sorcerers were the children born of it. Finally it was the *Summa* which now declared that the Devil's power was not supernatural but merely superhuman, and that man, therefore, to the extent that he might become cunning and experienced could parry the Devil's thrusts.

Thus their general conclusion seems to have been that the Devil was pretty much of an impostor—even many of men's illusions, said Guillaume d'Auvergne, were the mere natural products of madness, illness, and even nightmares. The *Summa* added that behind it all there was little malice but great credulity.

To the extent that these sober views could be accepted it was clear that, for the miseries of the temporal life, neither men nor God could shift the responsibility, as the Cathars were doing, on the Devil.

iii. Role of the Saints. The miracles were still so numerous that to estimate their nature would be an almost insuperable task. From a number of random cases, however, it would appear that the vast majority could seem miraculous only to those who knew what prayers or prophecies had preceded them. Even then, the possibility of mere coincidence remained.

More and more of the miracles were being attributed to the Virgin, and among the thousands recorded at least one is so characteristically disarming that it deserves to be quoted. According to Gautier de Coincy's *Miracles de Notre Dame* (as paraphrased by Maurice Vloberg, p. 30):

A squire, deep in debt, abjures his faith in Christ but not in the Virgin. In due course he becomes remorseful and kneeling before an image of Mary, he beseeches her to induce Jesus to forgive him. Thereupon she does intercede, but her plea was coldly received. "This man," the Savior said, "has insulted me too much." And, when she persisted, "Lady," he replied crossly, "say nothing more about that squire and leave me in peace." "Dear son," she answered, "never have I seen you so harsh. Very well then, off my knees you go. I am putting you down." And she forthwith set him down on the altar. The child could not help laughing at such vehemence and says, "Mother, take me back." "Not," she says, "until you have absolved this culprit." "I grant you this boon," Jesus answered. Whereupon Our Lady took him back on her lap. She then summoned a knight who had been a witness to this pretty by-play and commanded him to take this squire as his son-in-law and heir. Thus it was that this denier (of Jesus) is so quickly and completely pardoned that after an act of contrition, which was assuredly very sincere, he made an ideal marriage in which love, riches, and beauty were united.

At the risk of carping, it may be observed that the Virgin is pictured as more peevish than forgiving. For the extravagance of the temporal reward which she bestows on the squire is designed rather to teach her son to respect her whims than to reward the squire's contrition. There was therefore a double moral: not only that it was better to sin and repent than not to have sinned at all, but also that to depend on Christ rather than on the Virgin could lead to unfortunate consequences.

Here again, one cannot help but be reminded of the tem-

poral analogy: of a Queen Mother disciplining her infant king.

iv. Role of Relics. In Lavissee's *Histoire de France* (III (1), 306), Luchaire says:

The truth is that the populace had only one religion: the cult of relics. How many of the men of this time were capable of grasping the metaphysical and moral conceptions of the Christian doctrine? For the masses contact with Divinity was exclusively through the veneration of either the remains of the saints or of the objects which were closely associated with either Jesus Christ or the Virgin.

In 1191, Luchaire continues, the most precious relics were the Crown of Thorns and one of the nails of the Cross. The capture of Constantinople in 1204 resulted in a vast importation of new relics. Some were at least traditionally authentic, others were of very questionable origin. But both found an equally ready market, the different churches vying with one another to obtain the most remarkable. It was perhaps from this new treasure that the church of Saint-Médard in Soissons came into the possession of one of Christ's baby teeth, and a church in Vendôme of a tear which he had shed when in his cradle. These were still actual parts of his body even though left behind at his Resurrection. The Crown and nail were here surpassed because they had never been a part of him as the tooth and tear had been. With the acquisition of these, must not the long advance in the quality of the relic have come to its fulfilment?

v. Doubts. This obsession to acquire relics was bound in time to cause concern among the responsible leaders. In 1162 Manasses de Garlande, bishop of Orléans, had dared to berate his people for fighting over an alleged head of Geneviève, patron saint of Paris, which he felt sure was not genuine. He was soon after deposed, "to end his life as miserably as he had lived it." Fifty years later, however, Innocent III himself became concerned, and, at his suggestion, a canon was inserted in the Lateran Council of 1215 which read:

The prelates should not allow those who visit our churches in order to venerate the relics of the saints to be deceived by relics of doubtful origin or by fraudulent documents. (Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III (1), 307.)

The pope may not have been surprised when this canon proved a dead letter, for its real purpose was to make it more generally known that the Church was not guaranteeing the authenticity of even the most cherished relics.

In spite of the fate of Bishop Manasses, it was safer to cast doubt on the authenticity of a given relic than on the miraculous character of an event, for the former was a matter rather of fact, the latter rather of faith. Although a serious physician must, like Gilles de Corbeil in about 1190, believe that many cures resulted from his own therapy rather than from the intervention of God or one of His saints, he was satisfied to pocket his fee without disparaging the part also played by Providence.

It was safer, however, to speak of miracles in generalities. Writing about 1230, Guillaume d'Auvergne declared that he preferred to attribute unaccountable phenomena to natural rather than supernatural causes, thus putting the burden of proof on the believer rather than on the skeptic. In about 1250 Thomas de Cantimpré (near Brussels) undertook extensive travels in order to investigate alleged miracles and thereby to determine which could be believed and which could not.

When, at the time of Francis of Assisi's death in 1226, his stigmata were being heralded by his followers as proof of his divine mission, certain Dominicans made so bold as to express their doubts. Pope Alexander IV was quick to reprimand them and no doubt properly, because he must have had reason to know that this was rather the result of jealousy than of any objective investigation. But that so sensational and widely accepted a miracle should have been questioned by responsible churchmen was surely another sign that skepticism was now beginning to challenge credulity. That France was not in this regard a pioneer is indicated by the much greater prevalence of doubt, which, spreading north from the court of Frederick II in southern Italy, was by 1250 also displaying itself in Florence.

e. Salvation

In the ninth century the doctrine of Ambrose, Caesarius, and the Council of Orange that baptism conferred the free

will to acquire merit and thereby earn grace had been officially affirmed. But Augustine was never long neglected, and in the pantheistic revival of the early thirteenth century, which was partly a protest against Aristotelian concepts, the Augustinian view was revived. His predestination theory was not explicitly defended, but his conviction that no man could by any merit earn God's grace as of right was now again recognized, for surely He conferred His grace only freely, as He pleased. Yet, if this were true, of what use to man was this gift of a free will to acquire merit?

The *Summa* of Alexander of Hales now offered a new solution. According to the traditional view, baptism merely gave men the power to acquire such merit that God was obliged to confer grace in proportionate amount; and this was a form of theurgy. The *Summa*, however, now declared that by baptism each individual received not only free will but also a grace which was sufficient to enable him to earn his salvation by his own unaided efforts. The only grace, in a word, was bestowed at the moment of baptism, and therefore before anyone had any time in which to exercise his new free will to acquire merit.

This new explanation was, if one likes, a subterfuge; it did not change the net result. But it was so sensible a way of saving God's independence of anything a man could do that nearly 400 years later the Jesuits in repelling the Jansenist attacks adopted it. True, it did not tally with Augustine's belief that man proposes and only God disposes; but neither did any other theory which recognized free will. The accusation could still be made that this smacked of Pelagianism and even of paganism. But surely Catholicism was something more than a denial of whatever pagans or heretics had ever believed.

f. The Last Judgment

Evidences of what went on in the afterlife were now accumulating, and the procedure at the Last Judgment was naturally of particular concern. Although dreams and visions furnished many details, the star witness was the man who had actually appeared before the Court of Last Resort and had

obtained the boon of being returned to life in order to get another chance to complete his required penance. Much of the detail was of popular origin, unauthorized but tolerated by the Church provided it was edifying and not positively unorthodox.

At the other extreme, however, was the account given by Pierre de Blois. Under the glamor of the Roman law, now being imported from Italy, he described the procedure of the Last Judgment as following that prescribed by the Romans—a pretty illustration of how insidiously yet innocently pagan ways were infiltrating the very heart of Christian Revelation.

It was to be a long time, however, before the people, or even perhaps churchmen, were to be much distracted by sophisticated humanism. To them the procedure centred on the role of the Virgin. Although at times delegating the actual defense of her culprit to the good angels, it was always she who dominated the scene. But as Vloberg, in his edition of her *Miracles* (p. 479 above), says, her role

then becomes extremely delicate because it clashes with obstacles both canonical and Scriptural and with the sentences and decrees of the Divine Word. (*Miracles de Notre Dame*, 31.)

Thus, when on one occasion the angels were arguing for a culprit's pardon on the ground that he had at least always remained loyal to the Virgin, the demons cried out:

Astonishing this Lady of yours, and how! Does she wish to kill us if we dare to claim the soul of this villainous flat-ear? She wants to rule as absolute mistress, to replace God and twist the Almighty around her little finger. She wants everything for herself and nothing for either God or Devil! (*Ibid.*, 33.)

4. THE TEMPORAL LIFE

a. De Contemptu Mundi

The monastic spirit of Bernard of Clairvaux lasted for some years after 1150. Bernard de Morlaix wrote his *De Contemptu Mundi*, Adam de Petit Pont attacked Gilbert de la Porrée, Isaac Stella championed Bernard of Clairvaux, and Richard of Saint-Victor elaborated the mystic technique. But, although distrust of matter was still pervasive, it was now to

be seriously challenged by a series of tentative reconciliations with the natural world. The radical repudiation of this world of matter by the heretical Cathars must also have tended to cast suspicion on the monastic ideal.

b. Foreign Influences

The civilization here under consideration may be called French because it was centred in Paris, but it included the British Isles and Flanders as well. On the other hand, Paris was not the centre for Spain, Italy, or even Southern France. She dominated only an essentially Northern or Gothic world which was distinct from that of the Mediterranean.

Nevertheless this North was part of the larger Latin world, and as life was becoming less harsh it was also becoming more cosmopolitan. We have spoken of the rising influence of both contemporary and ancient Rome, and of the Latin translations of Greek and Arabic texts found in Spain, Sicily, and even Africa. The more scientific tradition inaugurated by Chartres was picked up now by Bernard Sylvestris, who taught for a time at Tours, and by John of Salisbury. John was not so much a scientist as a humanist. Devoted to Cicero, he was a master of Latin style and of Roman law. He was also an eager, though baffled, enquirer into the intricacies of both political and philosophical theory, and an enlightened skeptic of any certainty not grounded on faith. His view of the world as an exciting and challenging place, however, now set the tone which was to last until the eclipse of humanism by Aristotle shortly before 1250.

Another influence was that of the Greek East, introduced by the returning Crusaders. After the fall of Constantinople in 1204 the Latin dynasty there was French, and the Frenchmen brought back the picture of what a rather degenerate but relatively sophisticated Christian world could be like.

Until after 1200 the Langue d'Oc, or Provençal language, of Southern France had been a barrier between her and the North. That and her Mediterranean culture both made the North distrustful. But the Crusades especially were now breaking down this barrier, and the Capetian monarchs hastened the process by invading the South and subduing at the

same time both the English invaders and the Cathar heretics. From this contact the South doubtless learned more details about the future life, and the North more about the possibilities offered by the present one.

c. Cities

It is a temptation to attribute change to outside influences because they are so easily identified. Nevertheless, the influences may quite as well be indigenous and spontaneous. For if supply creates demand, so does demand create supply. What then were some of the demands originating from within?

A thorough inquiry would be inappropriate here, but a consideration of the effects of the new urban civilization which so disturbed Abelard may serve as an illustration. This change was naturally gradual. The towns first served to protect the peasants as well as the barons. The artisans, not needing land, formed the first permanent inhabitants, and the city thus became a centre for the exchange of goods, with its weekly markets and annual fairs.

Naturally the barons and bishops ruled in most such centres, but in others the commoners gained control and sought the protection of the king, who was only too glad to get the overlordship for himself. It was in this way that the king, in conflict with both baron and bishop, came to be more and more regarded as the protector of the people.

As the smaller cities were growing, so were the larger, and in these the bishops and barons usually shared the control. Here the great cathedrals were rising; here appeared the schools and universities, of law and medicine as well as of arts and theology. Here the preachers attracted the largest congregations; and here the Mendicants, as after 1220 they spread north from Italy and Spain, chose to settle, because the cities offered not only the possibility of mass conversions, but also the cheapest housing and the most profitable begging.

The bigger the city, moreover, the more formidable a local militia could prove in defending its citizens from the incursions of robber barons and brigands. Civil disorders there would still be in plenty, but even so the lot of the citizen was more enviable than that of the helpless peasant exposed

to the violence of the professional freebooters. Had Abelard not died in 1142, his fear of cities might in time have abated.

d. Literature

Literature, that is, stories whether in prose or verse, had long existed, but written texts in the vernacular only now became common. The *Chansons de Geste*, based on songs glorifying chiefly the exploits of the ninth- and tenth-century barons, picture a civilization now soon to die out. These were epics or war songs, and the victims of the heroes were not only the Saracens or Hungarians but also their own kings, monks, and peasants. Even nuns, mothers, and daughters received scant consideration. The hero was the killer, the villain the traitor; the rest merely furnished the setting.

Love songs and stories contrasted with these blood-and-thunder tales. Some, like *Tristan*, had a Northern origin, but the South, and even the Greek East, made the largest contribution. Feminine influence doubtless inspired the change, and it affected not only courtship but also dress, art, and above all deportment. The woman could henceforth be regarded not only as whore or nun, not only as mother or housewife, but, like a man, as an independent entity. Because among the barons marriages were arranged according to rank and wealth, the romances did not always lead to marriage; the thwarted love came to be pictured as not only an ideal in itself but even an apprenticeship divinely designed as an introduction to the holy love of God.

Chivalry in war had, after a fashion, already been practiced, but this chivalry in peace was a novelty. John of Salisbury said that in peace the barons now spent most of their time hunting, hawking, and gambling. He does not include dalliance with the ladies, but according to the romancers, who especially wished to please that sex, these barons did little else. Their prowess became rather that of the peacock. The fact seems to be that the new chivalry was still largely a fiction or façade; Pierre de Blois of Brittany said these chivalrous knights were nothing but so many plunderers. The seed had indeed been sown, though it was still many centuries to Molière's *honnêtes hommes* and *précieuses*.

These two contrasting types of literature were written chiefly for the nobles and their admirers: the *Gestes* for the satisfaction of the fathers and sons, the *Romances* for that of the mothers and daughters. They picture a reality, but chiefly a reality of the mind. A third literary category was that of the *Fabliaux*, written about, if not also primarily for, the citizen-bourgeois, and picturing a reality not of the mind but of the senses. Here we see city life and, incidentally, human nature as it really was. The authors were the forerunners of Balzac and Dickens—alternately tragic and comic—writing not to idealize but to amuse. Out of these quite as much as out of the religious Mysteries grew the theatre.

Luchoire (in Lavis, *Histoire de France*, II (1), 371, 378, 411), says that these three kinds of literature were all at the peak of their activity about the year 1200. From them, without reading further, we can get a feeling for this period which no modern writer can hope to convey. It is proper, therefore, at least to call attention to them here before returning to our more special inquiry into the sequence of belief.

e. Effect on Belief

The monks and mystics had taught how miserable was the temporal life, but the pagan classics were now also teaching how pleasant it could be. Aristotle was demonstrating that, after all, the temporal world had a reality of its own; that it was not merely a symbol of Revelation or a temptation for the unwary but an intrinsic reality; that men indeed had a purpose, but that everything else, from beast to stone, also had a purpose: a desire to perpetuate and perfect its own species.

It had been said that man's mortal life is like that of a sparrow flying in one window and out the other. This no longer seemed so apt. Ephemeral as man's span still was, it now seemed more protracted. Life offered the fair prospect of a measurable future with time to learn, to plan, to change, to improve. The world was such that it could be utilized and even enjoyed, and matter could be an inspiration as well as a temptation. Even the desire for fame, provided it was sought (as by the old Romans) through heroic public service,

was, although not itself a virtue, at least not incompatible with virtue. Prosper of Aquitaine had long ago said that the ordinary layman, although destined to perdition, was necessary in order to maintain the monkish elect. This notion was now as obsolescent as was the image of the swallow.

5. JUSTICE BETWEEN MEN

a. The Technique of Virtue

The traditional conception of virtue was of a behavior which invited grace as its reward, and so salvation. The right instinct had not been obliterated by the Fall, and this was identified with the individual conscience which, being fallible, had to be buttressed by the decisions of canon law. Just as a judge, however upright, relies on the written law to check his own sense of right and wrong, so does the priest; and the individual thus judged should welcome these checks and therefore acquiesce in their respective decisions. Euthanasia for men and vivisection for animals today offer analogous problems. The feeling of abhorrence in resorting to them can lie heavy on the conscience even though the sanctions of reason and authority are offered as consolations.

This eternal conflict between cold reason and blind instinct was now becoming complicated further by temporal as well as eternal considerations. The earlier monk was as assiduous in nursing the sick as he was fearful of trying to cure them: the one tended to promote the salvation of both, the other tempted God and thereby jeopardized both their chances. But may we not suppose that the conscience of such a monk was not always clear?

The Church, jealous guardian of God's prerogatives, refused to be accessory to any attempts to promote temporal justice. She disapproved of the Ordeal because it was a human invention, but she also was wary of Roman law for the same reason. The papacy even forbade the teaching of that law in Paris lest it corrupt as well as distract the students—and teachers, too—who came there to devote themselves to theology.

It was just at this time, however, that both Roman law and

Aristotle's *Ethics* were beginning to be understood, and the Church, by this prohibition, merely enabled the study of these to proceed with greater impunity. Thus it was that shortly before 1200 Pierre Cantor and Pierre de Poitiers declared the study of ethics to be independent of faith and dogma, and after 1200 Robert de Courçon and Jean de la Rochelle said the same. One reason given was that the Revelation was only of those truths which such men as Aristotle and the Roman jurists could not otherwise learn. Even if it were conceded that the revealed truth gave the monks all that they craved, it left the layman without adequate guidance. In 1250 Robert de Blois was to write the first of many later manuals of lay morals—for those who wanted to get to heaven but did not aspire to highest honors.

b. Shortcomings of Divine Justice

Whatever the reasons might be, Providence did not treat men equally fairly. Original Sin may have been a legitimate punishment before Christ, but the element of luck in being baptized was disturbing, for the whole concept of inherited guilt was not one which Christ would be expected to perpetuate. So Abelard, at least, had concluded; and Michael Scot was not wholly fanciful in imagining the newborn babes as exclaiming, "O Adam, why have you sinned that I, on your account, must suffer eternal misery." Innocent III decreed that no son should be held responsible for his father's crimes. Original Sin may once have been a popular dogma, but it was now also serving to encourage the suspicion that the human concept of justice as embodied in the individual conscience and now found repeated in so many pagan texts should not be too lightly dismissed.

According to human justice a man who, having been imprisoned as guilty, is later found to have been innocent, is paid money as fair redress. This is on the *primaeval* principle of the *quid pro quo*. But it presupposes a miscarriage of justice and, when God obliged one man to suffer and another no less guilty to prosper, this seemed to be a miscarriage too.

But according to divine justice, this first injustice was not corrected but rather compounded by a second one. For

whereas the temporally unlucky man was rewarded by eternal bliss, the temporally lucky one was punished by eternal misery—"they have (already had) their reward."

Some of the traditional excuses for questionable behavior were now beginning to look threadbare. Bernard's claim that a deed done with virtuous intent was meritorious in itself regardless of any unfortunate consequences was no longer dominant; wits were being required as well as heart. For in case God was counting on men's help this must be given with prudence and discretion.

Fatalistic justifications were also being challenged. No one could say now, as Caesarius had, that Joshua could not be blamed for his massacres because he was possessed by the Holy Ghost; nor, said John of Salisbury, could an evildoer plead that the Devil had forced his hand. For, even if this were so, it was only because his evil deeds or disposition had given the Devil the power to take control of him.

The texts on astrology, now very popular, almost all assumed that the events foretold by the heavenly bodies must inevitably come to pass, but, although it was firmly believed that God's will was the cause, it was also emphasized that man's free will was not thereby affected and therefore impaired. For faith in free will was, as we have just seen, at this time rather on the increase.

One excuse, however, was still held valid: the injunction to love one's neighbor as oneself was still being interpreted to mean to love only those whom God loves. To the extent that a neighbor seemed doomed to damnation God must be assumed at least to hate his body, and loyalty to God required that good men should hate it too. This belief was sporadically challenged, as by Francis of Assisi and certain persons inclined to toleration and pacifism; but most men persuaded themselves that if only they loved another man's soul they could destroy his body with impunity.

c. Incipient Remedies

i. Medical. In earlier days the monks had undertaken to tend the sick, but this was confined to preparing their souls for an edifying death, and at Clairvaux Bernard had de-

clared early death a blessing. An early sign of change was the founding of a hospital in Liège by Lambert le Bègue, to be operated by lay women, later to be known as Beguines. This was about 1166. Because he taught that good works were more important for salvation than the ritual he was condemned as a heretic in 1175; but the Beguins, both men and women, became a new force as a lay Order, generally looked at askance by the authorities yet surviving even today. In 1191 the Order of the Holy Ghost was more specifically organized to found hospitals. In neither of these cases was there any pretense of concentrating on physical cures.

The next step was to tend the lepers, isolated, confined, neglected, and doomed to suffer a lingering death. In 1210 Marie d'Oignies, one of Lambert's disciples, founded a cloister at Nivelles in Brabant exclusively for their care. Francis of Assisi was devoting himself to them in Italy at about this same time. Here most loyally did his Order follow his example: the Franciscans were the first monks to study botany, because they wanted to learn to cure the bodies as well as the souls of men.

The lay physician's tradition was of course far ahead of the clerical. The school of Montpellier was now challenging the supremacy of Salerno. By 1244 in Southern Italy only those with a medical degree were allowed to practice, and it was further required of all who did practice that they give medical advice to all comers whether these could afford a fee or not. This was following the grand tradition of Hippocrates, and its spirit was now, through Montpellier, spreading north.

ii. Economic. The traditional belief was that manual and menial labor had been imposed as a punishment for Original Sin. But why should one be born a commoner and another a noble? The reason given had been that a community could endure only by a division of labor whereby the clergy protected man's eternal welfare, the nobles his temporal security, while the labor of the commoner in return supported them both.

In time of crisis this arrangement worked well enough; but of late years a crisis was rather the exception than the rule, and in its absence the nobles either fought each other, turned

to marauding, or, if they avoided bloodshed, spent their time carousing or idling. Even when not pests they were parasites. Therefore there were mutterings that the nobles be obliged to help share the economic burdens, either financially—for they paid few or no taxes—or by doing a bit of work which, if not manual, was at least productive. In crises, as at the battle of Bouvines in 1214, the commoner had to help, and often in the front ranks. Yet in peacetime did the noble ever deign to reciprocate? And, it was said, it would even do the monks no harm to pray a little less and work a little more.

The motive behind both of these complaints was probably less to lighten the workers' own burdens, than to keep their betters out of mischief. These were enjoying too much leisure and showed no intention of making any constructive or even harmless use of it. One trouble was that the more virtuous nobles became monks. Some even formed an Order of their own, calling themselves the Humiliati. But they, no more than the contemporaneous peasant organization called the Capuchonnés, could really do anything to break the lay noble of his bad habits. They both demanded that the nobles renounce war, but this was as chimerical as to demand that the priests renounce their sacramental powers. The Capuchonnés were soon exterminated; the Humiliati seem to have sought refuge among the Waldenses.

This was all before 1200. A generation later arose the new Mendicant Orders to try to reform the life of the monk. Would this effort be any more successful than the others?

iii. Legal. The Christian idea of natural law, derived from the Stoics, included a justice which, whether coeternal with God or created by Him, was unchangeable. But nothing is more changeable than men's concepts of what is unchangeable. Some said that natural law was that which prevailed in the Garden of Eden; others, that it was the law of the jungle; and between these extremes were the various other suppositions.

It was agreed that men ought to conform to it, but should this be as the Epicureans conceived it, or as did the Stoics, or Adam or Christ, or the monks, or the pope? The Church and now, more specifically, the papacy was claiming the right to

impose her own understanding of it, but the kings claimed that they, as temporal sovereigns, had the right to embody it as they chose in their civil law.

John of Salisbury said that the natural law was that which men could grasp by reason, and that the Revelation was only that portion of law which was supernatural and so beyond reason. To him a king was the guardian of natural law as the Church was of the divine, but both were merely interpreters of a changeless law which they could only administer. But what if either of them erred? If the Church erred, only the heretics offered any solution. If a king erred, John was embarrassed to say whether he thereby forfeited his divine authority or was nevertheless still to be obeyed because he was a 'scourge of God.' Since John was closely associated with Bishop Thomas à Becket he probably felt that a bishop, at least, could regard the throne as forfeited. How a layman should decide, however, was not so easily determined.

No one was more insistent than John that the law, whether natural or supernatural, must be obeyed by both king and Church. He even argued that the real Fall occurred only when the Old Testament judges were supplanted by kings. Taking advantage, however, of the theory that some of God's laws—like that of tooth for tooth—were designed to be operative only temporarily or locally, and following the precedent of Roman civil law, he said that changes, provided they were enacted by duly authorized persons or bodies, were legitimate and must be obeyed. Inspired, perhaps, by the initial successes of Louis VII in taming the feudal barons of France, he was looking beyond the reactionary Magna Carta to the later legislation of the English kings. Natural law was still the ideal sought, but it was not to be interpreted by the arbitrary will of even a benevolent despot but rather, as the pagan natural law itself provided, by legal, or what we may call constitutional, methods.

The Church, especially in Italy, had always been critical of the Ordeal. Biblical precedent for it was feeble and even unfavorable, and it was furthermore recognized as a barbaric innovation of the Germans. On the other hand, it was a way of deferring to God's superior wisdom, which required neither time, thought, nor any training in the law.

Forbidden where the accused was one of the clergy, the Ordeal was still usual if he were a serf or slave. Where a free-man was accused, either compurgation or, if that was unacceptable, the duel was resorted to, but, as civil cases came to be distinguished from criminal, Roman law procedure was more and more recognized and adopted.

It was the canon law, governing the behavior of the clergy, which had kept the Roman law procedure alive; this included the calling of witnesses to the fact and the admission of documentary evidence, both of which made it more practicable to relieve God of a responsibility which was now embarrassing to all concerned. Unfortunately torture was in this way also introduced with the usual dire consequences. A very good result on the other hand was that, in Southern France at least, it was required of judges, as of physicians, that only those with degrees from duly accredited schools could qualify. Nor was this all. They must sit as full-time professionals and, again like the physicians, they must, regardless of ability to pay, serve rich and poor alike.

That these obligations, imposed on physician and judge as well as priest, were as much honored in the breach as in the observance is likely. But the novelty was that concerted efforts were now being made to set standards which a conscientious layman could follow. He no longer felt that he had to become a monk in order to keep a clear conscience and so be saved. Instead of having to serve other men indirectly through prayer, he could serve them directly and still, if only indirectly, serve God too.

6. THE PURPOSE OF NATURE

a. Traditional Roles

The traditional belief was that Nature provided fallen man with only such temporal aids as were indispensable for his survival: food, clothing, and shelter. Otherwise it was designed wholly to supply symbolic reminders, sensuous temptations, or periodic chastisements, by means of which men were obliged to reveal whether or not they deserved to be saved.

Discouraging as this temporal design might appear, men continued to cling to the hope that they were not wholly powerless to mitigate its harshness. By contrition and therefore virtue some of the rewards held out for their eternity might perhaps be prematurely extracted. And this might come as a result of vicarious virtue or by means of prayers and ritual. As in theurgy, the will of God might be bent—at least to the extent of inducing Him to reveal the impending future by means of portents, so that men, by a prompt repentance, might forestall God's projected punishment.

A saint might of course serve as intermediary or proximate cause, but little or nothing could be expected of Nature.

b. Newly Conceived Roles

We have seen how aware men were becoming of the difficulties which must be confronting God in His efforts to control all the details of temporal events. He could not create perfection; He had conferred discretionary authority on saints and even on demons, and this might be because He could not properly attend to all the details Himself. God had decided, perhaps not wholly voluntarily, to accord free will to all rational creatures; it might therefore also be that, even if He had created Nature out of nothing, He was obliged so to create it that His control over it must be imperfect. If justice as an uncreated concept was coeternal with Him, so too perhaps was matter.

Was it not likely then that if, as Boethius had supposed, the sensuous world and therefore the temporal life was not wholly pleasing to Him, God would have devised a variety of ways and means for improving it? And, since He was using the saints and demons for this purpose, why should He not have intended to delegate analogous, if feebler, powers to men, and in order not only the sooner to reward the virtuous themselves, but also to render the temporal life more bearable for almost everybody?

Although the idea that God and men were engaged in a corporate or joint undertaking was an old one, the common end had been thought of as wholly an eternal one. Why,

then, might not this idea be extended to include a temporal end as well?

Men had been endowed with reason; but if this reason was to be exercised only, as the monks and Abelard had supposed, in order to resist the temptations of money, women, and cities, to what end was all the rest created: the heavenly bodies, the mountains and oceans, the infinite number and variety of animals, vegetables, and minerals? If man's reason was unable to explain the purpose of all these by identifying them as either symbols, temptations, or chastisements, might not this reason of his have been given in order that he might learn to utilize the whole of Nature, and not merely that small part of it which was needed in order to insure his bare survival?

But how was he ever to utilize it all merely in order to increase his or anybody else's chances of salvation? Only if both his reason and the vast ramifications of Nature were designed as much for man's temporal as for his eternal advantage.

The Greeks and Romans had exploited Nature and enjoyed life without undermining their virtue. Augustine himself had believed that the Redemption had been purposely retarded until civilization, enlightenment, and thereby virtue, had so increased that many men became capable of comprehending, as the Jews had not, its true import.

Their virtue had not been Christian and was therefore insufficient for salvation. But their greater mastery over nature had enabled them to mitigate many of the evils attendant upon the temporal life. There seemed to be no good reason, then, why Christians, provided they remained respectful, should tempt God by following the best pagan examples.

Man's God-given reason had largely failed to grasp the truth about the supersensuous which was superior to him. Faith was here triumphing over logic. But an understanding of the sensuous which was inferior to him should prove easier. Even pagan reason had largely succeeded here, and the *credo ut intelligam*, if diverted from the investigation of God to that of Nature, should produce far greater results.

c. Natural Science

i. Independence of Faith and Dogma. Just as it was now being alleged that the study of ethics should be undertaken independently of the Incarnation, so it was being alleged in regard to the study of natural science. Adelard, indeed, had already declared that in science reason was to be preferred to Revelation.

Fifty years later Alain de Lille said that each discipline called for the use of a different kind of reasoning. It was in 1180 that the medical school of Montpellier formally declared its intellectual freedom. Next, Raoul Ardens insisted that a clear distinction must be made between the natural science of the sensuous and the theological inquiry into the supersensuous; and Alfred of Sareshel affirmed that, although God had created Nature, this Nature had become as independent of Him as does a child of its mother.

Alexander Neckam and Guillaume d'Auvergne, moreover, were specific. The former said that in matters of natural science Revelation was not to be trusted, as where it alleges that the moon is second in size only to the sun. Guillaume, writing a hundred years after Adelard, fifty after Alain, and twenty after Neckam, said that, while it was true according to natural science that the heavenly bodies do not receive addition or improvement because Nature cannot add anything to their natural perfection,

Yet you ought to know that learned Christian doctors teach . . . and the prophets seem to say expressly, that they will undergo improvement. (Thorndike, *History of Magic*, II, 242.)

ii. Sources. The enormous influx of Latin translations of Greek and Arabic texts on science has often been said to be the cause of this new approach to Nature; but it could equally well be that, as in the case of the traveler Adelard of Bath, it was rather the new approach which prompted the translations. Here, as so often, cause and effect, demand and supply, are not to be too cavalierly disentangled. Does man meet book, or book meet man?

It used often to be said, too, and condescendingly, that especially in science, the medieval man discovered or invented nothing; that he was a mere plagiarist. But surely

everybody has to learn an art before he can properly practice it, for the advantage of educated man is that his early learning is from books or other men rather than from first-hand experiment by trial and error.

True it is that the new translations included a vast amount of false information; but for persons with a real thirst for knowledge, not only is a poor teacher better than none, he can often stimulate curiosity as well as can a good one.

iii. Traditional. Science had previously been confined to that knowledge which was required in order to achieve salvation. To the extent that men could know God they could prophesy what would happen, and the faith that He never changed His mind made such prophecy the easier. Like a good judge God could deal harshly or leniently, but His concept of justice did not change. The theologians studied God's past judgments in order the better to prophesy what His future ones would be.

iv. Transitional. Next came a transitional view in which eternal rather than temporal welfare was still the only professed end of science. The new variation was, however, that the science of the laws of Nature was now recognized as supplementary to, or at least indicative of, the judgments of God's will. Abelard had merely sought science behind the Fathers and the canons in the text of the Bible itself. But John of Salisbury was now seeking it in all literature, pagan and heretical as well as Christian. Books no less than everything else were put at men's disposal by God in order that they might the better learn how to cultivate virtue. For what other purpose were pagan books produced, than to teach men about Nature as well as about God? Revelation was only of those truths which books and Nature did not and could not reveal. And this was now a recurring view, echoed, indeed, even in Vincent of Beauvais' popular *Encyclopedia* of shortly before 1250.

This view appeared to be a conservative compromise, but it was to prove radical because it authorized a new investigation, which was no longer psychological or ethical but physical. As Alain de Lille said, each discipline called for the exercise of a different kind of reasoning.

v. Readjustments. By now many theologians were declaring that only by abstraction from sensuous experience could man come to know anything, even about God. Technically this could be regarded as an empirical method because it proceeded from the particular to the general. Actually, however, the inference drawn from the observation of an imperfect world that there must therefore also be a perfect one was a purely gratuitous assumption not even based on reason, for it would be quite as sound to conclude from an imperfect effect that its cause was likely to be imperfect too. That the Platonists had been the first to adopt this theory of opposites did not make it any less a premise rather than a conclusion.

But, inasmuch as it was not Nature but only God which had been revealed, it was not enough merely to determine that, unlike God, she was imperfect. If men were ever to learn how she rather than God was to behave in the future, the details of her imperfections must be probed. For in spite of them it was nevertheless clear that she functioned according to laws of her own. No less than God, she produced recurrent effects, as where a stone thrown into the air invariably falls. This called for a new kind of abstraction.

As the conception of abstraction changed, so did that of universals. Boethius had bequeathed the problem of whether the universal Man was more real than the particular Socrates. By this time it was generally agreed that both were equally real because Man was a real concept of a thing and Socrates the physical realization of that concept.

Now, however, science was to give the Universal a new twist: it was the hypothesis suggested by and inferred from variegated and detailed sensuous evidence which must then be exposed to further tests before concluding anything as to its reliability and accuracy. No doubt Man was a universal; but if this was to be more than a name, the concept must be particularized. God knows what Man is but until the whole earth has been scoured, the definition of him as a rational and immortal animal must remain a mere hypothesis. The same was true of every created thing, whether animal, vegetable, or mineral.

The study of causes and effects is complicated because of

their hierarchical character. An effect may not only have original and proximate causes and have more than one proximate cause, it may also be itself a cause of further effects.

As a result of the theological approach, however, the cause had always been sought as the sole key to the effect, so that unless one knew why a stone falls one could not have any confidence that it would fall again in the future.

John of Salisbury, for instance, said that unless the cause of a disease was known its cure remained unpredictable; and Roger Bacon was much later to praise his master Adam Marsh because, more than anyone of his day, "he grasped the cause of things."

The artisan, on the other hand, was an empiricist. If a certain procedure or technique 'worked,' he was not concerned to pursue the chain of its causes. This was equally true of the unlettered physician then contemptuously spoken of as an 'empiricist': if a certain regime or therapy seemed in certain cases to produce a salutary effect, he simply repeated the process.

It was therefore the educated man who was unwilling to rely on any recurrence unless he could discover or convince himself of its cause. The narrowing of this gulf will be a symptom of the progress of science in the centuries to come.

vi. Specific Sciences. The two chief mathematicians of this time were the Italian Leonardo Fibonacci and the German Jordanus Nemorarius, but the Englishman Robert Grosseteste was perhaps more important because he took pains to argue that mathematics was the key to Nature and utilized it to explain physical phenomena such as the rainbow and the burning glass.

There was not even as much original work done on astronomy, because the effort here was still to comprehend and evaluate what the Greek and Arabic texts contained. They had, for instance, to weigh the difference between the two theories, both geocentric, of Aristotle and Ptolemy before they could subscribe to either, to say nothing of questioning the correctness of both. And Robert Grosseteste, at any rate, was mastering the causes of the precession of the equinox. If the progress here was not conspicuous, however, this was

partly due to the hypnotic power now being exercised by astrology.

The celestial bodies had always been regarded as the noblest creations of the natural Revelation because, although visible and therefore sensuous, they were nearest to God. What, then, was their significance? Here, as so often, symbolism did not work. The Fathers had said that God created precisely seven planets in order to remind men that their ages and virtues were of that number. But such an explanation was no longer satisfactory.

During the intervening centuries the problem seems to have aroused little or no interest; and although the astrological explanation evolved by the Arabs was accessible at least by 1100, it did not receive much attention until some of these Arabic texts appeared and were being ascribed, though quite wrongly, to Aristotle. Thus astrology came to the West on Aristotle's coat tails, and it was accepted all the more readily because it harmonized so well with his idea of the First Mover.

By far the most important of the celestial bodies was the sun. Although Pope Leo had not been willing to admit it, this sun obviously served not only as man's clock, but furnished the light and heat to the whole earth and was the clock not only of the seasons but also, as the Greeks had long before conjectured, of astronomical (and we now conjecture, of geological) time. It therefore caused the weather normally to be expected.

The fixed stars did not of themselves seem to be important, but the regularity of their motion was a convenience in calculating the complex irregularities of the planets' motions.

These planetary irregularities were, however, only such in contrast to the stars. It was therefore natural to attribute to them the irregularly recurrent weather or other phenomena: storms, droughts, earthquakes, eruptions, or plagues.

Most irregular and so unpredictable, were the comets. Here there was admittedly no proximate or natural cause, but a pure miracle.

It was all very fine to say that the heavenly bodies were the cause of all terrestrial events, but there was the further question of why, unlike the beings above them, they were made

visible to men, and it was precisely this which the Arabic and pseudo-Aristotelian texts professed to explain. God made them visible in order that men equipped with their God-given reason could, by studying the other planetary motions as they had already studied that of the sun, foretell what events they were about to bring to pass.

Almost all the irregular recurrences brought disaster of some sort; they therefore seemed designed to chastise or punish, and this could only be on account of men's sins. Surely, therefore, they were made visible in order that men, by recognizing the imminence of disaster, might have time to repent and pray for mercy. For although God so designed the cosmos that it could operate automatically, He also so designed it that He could interrupt its operation at will, as when He had stayed the course of the sun for Joshua and had obscured it during the hours of the Crucifixion. Irregular as the motions of the planets were, moreover, their dire effects must presumably be wholesale and therefore indiscriminating. Perhaps, then—especially if the astrologers or their clients were contrite enough—they could avoid being caught, as by getting ashore before an impending storm or by leaving a city before the coming of a plague. If the disaster thus foretold did not materialize, the astrologer needed only to allege that the timely contritions and prayers had sufficed to avert it.

There seems to have been a confusion at this time between predestination and determinism. Some persons were accused of supposing, as had Augustine, that God's decrees were so despotic that they precluded any free-will power to earn salvation. But this was now beside the point. The real issue raised by astrology was not of man's free will to be saved but of his free will to affect his temporal destiny. The planets were believed to influence, not men's good or bad intentions, but only physical events. Probably a fair number, obsessed by the new implications, feared that Nature was so independent that God could not, unless perhaps by an especially miraculous exception, bend her destined course. God was still in control of man's fate in the afterlife but not in the temporal realm. The heavenly bodies were therefore made visible in the hope that men might elude a temporal disaster of which

God could give warning but which He could only rarely forestall.

In spite of the rage for astrology there were still many skeptics. As moderate examples we may mention John of Salisbury soon after 1150, and Michael Scot about 1230. Both said that although the heavenly bodies did not cause future events, they did foretell them. Like the comets, their motions were portents which were wholly miraculous because they had no proximate causes. This time it was the skeptics rather than the credulous who were fighting the rear-guard action in defense of God.

Magic had a bad name. Christians associated it with paganism and therefore with the machinations of the Devil. So Hugo had supposed. There were, however, so many phenomena whose causes were mysterious and yet so frequent and harmless that neither God nor the Devil could plausibly be regarded as the proximate cause. These, therefore, not seeming attributable to either, were called neither white (miraculous) nor black, but rather natural, magic—a matter for scientific rather than theological investigation. Alexander Neckam, although he clung to the old belief that the ocean level was higher than that of the land because God wished to keep men in mind of His power, nevertheless declared that there was also a purely natural magic. Michael Scot and Alexander of Hales' *Summa* among others, purported to classify the varieties according to categories.

That the four elements possessed, if not life and therefore souls, at least certain propensities or virtues, certain sympathies or antipathies, had long been recognized. The new texts now drew further attention to this problem. Why should a stone fall just because it was heavy? Why should it resist, like a live thing, the effort to break it into pieces? Aristotle was now known to have supposed that even stones had desires to rise, but being the feeblest of all desires, were forced to fall. Yet, even so, they retained a desire to perpetuate themselves and thereby their species. However plausible this latter explanation was, no Christian dared accept it. Since man was the sole reason for the Creation, God must have so created Nature that she only promoted man's welfare, be it eternal or temporal; and in either case, therefore, it was not only

man's privilege but his duty to discover, and thereby take advantage of, all the peculiarities of Nature. Since the stone did not exist for its own but only for man's sake, could man safely afford to risk offending God by ignoring it?

Man's natural instinct to improve his temporal lot and his hardly less natural instinct to indulge his curiosity were probably still the chief impulses. But the new suspicion that God designed the world with this intention in mind may well have been the decisive factor in bringing the sciences—not only of astrology but also of zoology, botany, chemistry, and physics—to life again. Here new economic, psychological, and theological factors were simultaneously at work. But who shall presume to distinguish in their actions and reactions which were causes and which were effects?

The symbolic interpretation of Nature had been most successful in zoology, and the *Bestiaries* were to retain their popularity for centuries more. By 1200, however, Pliny's uncritical reports about animals were being challenged by the sober and often accurate descriptions of Aristotle, all of which led to a flood of new texts, full of excited confusion. Such an animal as the beaver could even be regarded as at once a symbol, an image, a help—whether alive or dead—to man's temporal welfare and, if Aristotle were to be believed, an independent entity with a final cause of its own. Casuistry here complicated matters: was it right that men, instead of being satisfied to kill sheep for their fleeces, should also kill beavers in order to wear fur? There was a growing demand for fur: was this desire to be regarded as sinful?

Birds provided food but also served as weather prophets. Did God, in creating them, have the latter also in mind, or rather did Nature provide them with this power merely in order to promote their own survival? One of the surest things was that animal parts were indispensable in concocting therapeutic drugs. Whatever other reasons these parts might have for existing, it was difficult to deny that this therapeutic use of them had been preordained by God in order that men might thereby be enabled to ease their temporal lot.

The change was less in the case of botany because, unlike the *Bestiaries*, the pious had left the *Herbals* to the care of the physicians and these had always regarded vegetable life

as designed by God for use rather than edification. It was perhaps because, in comparison, the vegetables lent themselves both less well to symbolism and better to therapeutic needs, that the new interest in botany, although also notable, was not so feverish.

What was God's purpose, however, in sprinkling the earth with poisonous plants? This was not so easy to explain, but John of Salisbury was doubtless comforted by the tradition that under certain conditions poisons could be used to cure rather than kill.

When, in spite of Honorius III's prohibition, the Franciscans began to tend the bodies as well as the souls of the sick, they at once set to work to study botany after the manner of the physicians, and this entry of the theologian into the field of natural science was another, if ancillary, reason why the onslaught of Aristotle was now fast becoming irresistible.

The *Lapidaries* dealt primarily with precious stones, whose beauty and especially rarity led men to endow them with correspondingly superior powers. What, however, were the baser common metals for? The pagans had long ago surmised that in their present state they were imperfect but were capable of being perfected, and that man therefore could, if only he knew the recipe, transmute them into gold and even into the legendary Philosopher's Stone.

The first pagan texts on alchemy were being translated from about 1150 on, and after 1200 there was more and more talk about its practicability. Thus even the baser lifeless things were being recognized as having been fashioned by God expressly in order to embellish man's temporal life.

Far ahead of anyone else in the scientific rather than merely magical study of minerals was the German, Theophilus, of the middle twelfth century. It was almost a century later before Thomas de Cantimpré, in his *Encyclopedia*, gave his very extensive account of the peculiar properties of copper, lead, iron, and even of steel.

Physics was concerned then as now with the universal laws of energy and motion. The will of God was the original cause, supplemented now by the proximate causes He set in motion as First Mover. To this were added the occult or innate powers of otherwise motionless objects, best exemplified by

the magnet. For one reason or another, however, the phenomena of physics did not lend themselves particularly well to magical explanations and this may have been because here the Greeks had set the precedent of seeking as often as was possible for material explanations.

As we have said, Thierry of Chartres had taken the early step of saying that velocity and weight were complementary, thereby envisaging the law of momentum. But this idea doubtless came from a Greek text rather than his own head; in any case it does not appear to have taken hold. Robert Grosseteste, therefore, was more likely the first to make an original physical discovery when, by experimenting with prisms and lenses, he worked out the laws of refraction. Even this did not lead to further such discoveries, but the reason may have been that Aristotle's false ideas about physical causes were, like so many of his other ideas, now being accepted as authoritative.

Furthermore, such investigations did not seem to suggest any significant applications; they were therefore easily to be dismissed as the products of an idle and even misguided curiosity. For God, whether He had designed the world in order to offer spiritual symbols or temporal advantages, surely had not designed it just to beguile the aimless inquirer. The chief obstacle was, however, that it would be another hundred years before the spell cast by Aristotle faded enough to enable curiosity to scramble to its own feet again.

The Lateran Council of 1215 had formally frozen theology by declaring that Peter Lombard's *Sentences* were to be regarded as authoritative. Just as, in the fourth century, the ossification of Roman law turned men to theology, so now this step towards the ossification of theology drove men to law, natural science, and even into heresy.

By 1250 *Encyclopedias* were being published almost annually and they dealt chiefly with natural wonders, many of them far greater wonders to us, but still quite credible to their readers. Accuracy was of incidental importance because the chief purpose was to accumulate all that men had ever told about this sensuous world whose new significance was only now becoming apparent: it was designed to teach men not only how to die but how to live.

The year 1250 was also that in which the humanistic Trivium suffered a total eclipse at the hands of the scientific Quadrivium.

d. Economics

The growth of this new science was the easier because the rigors of the temporal life were now moderating of their own accord. As if by a pact, men and Nature together were bringing this to pass without asking anybody's leave, so that the problem was not how much they could, but rather how much they ought to try to, achieve.

For paralleling this new conception was a notable increase in law and order and therefore in the standard of living. Which were the causes and which rather the effects cannot be safely determined because each presumably acted and reacted on the other. In the twelfth century the old belief predominated that man should not try to do more than keep himself alive, and that only manual labor, self-defense, or conversion by the sword, therefore, were approved by God. Meanwhile, however, many, including some Cistercian monks, were engaging in trade. The Crusades were giving it an added impetus, small industries were sprouting here and there, and, as a result, money and banking, with interest occasionally running as high as 65 per cent, were emerging to meet the new needs.

Up to now the Jews had been the main bankers or money-lenders, but this business was becoming so lucrative that by 1200 many Templars, back from the East and without an occupation, entered into competition with them. The king, Philip Augustus, recognized the power of money (some said he had been taught it by the monks), and this recognition proved contagious. In business techniques Italy was well ahead of France, but her example was so soon followed that we learn of the issue of a bill of exchange at Marseilles in the year 1200.

Church disapproval was inevitable. The hostility of Abelard was inherited by Pierre Comestor, who called those responsible for cities and industry the descendants of Cain; and, another generation after Pierre, the popular preacher

Jacques de Vitry was still inveighing against lawyers, physicians, women, and especially businessmen.

The heretics, meanwhile, were as hostile to businessmen as they were to priests: in their view only manual labor was consistent with a godly life, and Francis of Assisi founded his Order on the like principle that even a layman should produce only enough to keep himself and the monks alive.

Pope Gregory IX, however, adopted what may have seemed to him a more liberal attitude. Enlisting the services of a distinguished canon lawyer of Barcelona, Raimon de Pennafort—at this time also General of the new Dominican Order—the pope had a penitential code drawn up which, among much else, expressly permitted a Christian to engage in trade; yet at the same time subject to such limitations that profitable exchange was impossible. For the trader could only sell at a price which included the cost to him of the raw material plus the value of the time he had spent in processing it. He could not therefore add anything to the price to cover the cost of transportation, the risk of loss, the time lag before selling; nor could he take advantage of a seller's market. These restrictions made not only usury by any moneylender a sin, but also any profit in trade. They still forbade any other than manual labor as effectively as when trade was condemned in so many words. Putting it this way, however, presented an opening wedge: although it made trade legitimate only if profitless, a man who engaged in it could no longer for that reason alone be called to account, and *how* he traded was not an easy matter to determine.

It was all very well to go on preaching that riches corrupted, but the fact was every day now becoming plainer that riches were also creating a prosperity which was relieving many—although in very unequal degree—of cruel privations. For why did the cities grow except by the immigration of farmers who found a better living there? More students could now afford to attend the schools, and even the Mendicant Orders chose to settle in the cities, chiefly because the prospective converts were concentrated there, but also because those from whom they must beg alms had more alms to give.

Some thought that the new industry of mining was even more dangerous than banking, though for a somewhat dif-

ferent reason. The usurer was selling his own, but no one else's, soul to the Devil; the miners, however—owners and workers alike—were also inviting the wrath of God and so the wholesale punishment which Providence visited on all those also who countenanced this blatant sacrilege.

This taboo was ancient. Pliny the Elder had said that the exploitation of the subsoil was a dangerous sacrilege against the gods, and Pierre Comestor must have had this tradition in mind when, about 1170, he especially reviled those responsible for the mechanical world of metals as being in collusion with the Devil. The issue was doubtless heatedly debated until the defiant innovators finally gained the upper hand, for Vincent of Beauvais in his *Encyclopaedia* written about 1250 felt safe in saying that, in the evolution of man through the Church towards God, the mechanical arts, although liable to abuse, were conferred by God for man's express benefit.

7. PHILOSOPHY

a. Defined

So long as the Christians had faith in the irrationality of their Revelation Greek reason could be dismissed as a mere pagan survival. But reason was now being taken seriously, and the jibes of Jews, Moslems, and heretics were hurting all the more because even those who remained orthodox were also coming under reason's spell. The dogmas had first been proclaimed irrational, then superrational and now, with the *credo ut intelligam*, rational—or at least more rationally probable than any alternative belief.

An effort was made to separate Revelation from reason by saying that Revelation concerned itself only with truths which affected moral behavior and therefore salvation, and that all the rest of truth lay within the domain of reason. But the fact was that the Revelation as codified into dogma covered much more ground, and also that Greek reason, in its turn, impinged on moral behavior. If, as was now being said, the studies of science and ethics ought to be carried on without interference by theology, so, said Alain de Lille, should philosophy. For each of these disciplines, he declared, re-

quired a different kind of reason. This could at least be interpreted to mean that theological authority ought to be kept in a strait jacket.

The line between science and philosophy was even harder to draw. Theoretically it was that separating the understanding of the sensuous world of appearance from the supersensuous reality. The one was acquired by the direct experience of the five senses, including of course practical experiment; the other was acquired by rational inferences from these experiences. Only as observation became more concentrated and as the laws of Nature came to be more, and the will of God less, relied on, did the distinction sharpen. Today science deals with phenomena so obviously recurrent and therefore predictable that differences of opinion are the exception, but in 1200 the conclusions reached by reason as well as by theology were still more readily agreed to than those reached by science. In about that year Gerard de Cambrai was complaining that the passion for logic was checking the infant growth of the natural sciences.

The far more general complaint, however, was that logic was trying to dominate and even supplant theology.

b. The Clash with Dogma

In the years before about 1185 many still condemned the use of reason in the interpretation of dogma as dangerous and therefore to be forbidden. Pope Alexander III was one of these, and to him Abelard had been the chief culprit.

Others, however, while agreeing that the results so far had been either deplorable or ludicrous, believed that reason when sobered and refined could prove fruitful, even in theology. John of Salisbury was the most discursive of these, and Alain de Lille, more forcibly, said that:

Since authority has a wax nose, that is, can be bent in opposite directions, it must be stiffened by reason. (Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement Théologique*, 317 n. 2.)

At least, he said, it could distinguish between probabilities and absurdities.

Among other things the conclusions reached by Greek

philosophy could, they thought, when they coincided with dogma, be used to stiffen it. The conclusion, for instance, that the human soul was immortal was a valuable one because a rational corroboration of Revelation. This was sensible enough except that it was hardly consistent with the principle that Revelation was not concerned with truths which were attainable by reason.

Finally, there were a few to whom reason had become an obsession. Pierre de Poitiers used it, independently even of any Greek corroboration, to prove not only the omnipotence of God but also, regardless of any of the patristic texts, the two great mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation. Nicolas d'Amiens proceeded, without bothering to refer even to the Bible, to prove the truth of every one of the Catholic dogmas. His conclusions were as orthodox as his method was revolutionary, yet in about 1210 two Italians prominent at the University of Paris, Prevostino da Cremona and Pietro da Capova, as well as Martin de Fugeriis, appear to have followed this lead.

There were two ways of checking this madness and both were now tried. Simon de Tournai ridiculed it by showing how, by such use of logic, the Trinitarian dogma could equally easily be proved false. Pope Gregory IX formally forbade the use of any pagan texts in writing commentaries on the Bible, and this because such methods seemed better calculated to repel believers than to attract unbelievers.

c. Sources of Knowledge

In order to find out more precisely what man knew, it was natural to consider how this knowledge came to him. The Christian tradition then was that before the Fall Adam possessed all the truths he needed, but that because he wanted more he was only allowed to see these truths 'as through a glass darkly' or as by 'a dim glimmering of light unput-out.' According to Robert Grosseteste, Guillaume d'Auvergne, and Jean de la Rochelle, this residue of knowledge was still so passive and sluggish that it could be roused to activity only by the impressions produced by sensuous observation.

Guillaume believed that consciousness, conscience (as of

right and wrong), mathematics, and even logic or reason did not need the help of the senses except to be awakened, but Robert felt that, if deprived of the use of his five senses, not even Adam could—unless by a miracle—have come to an awareness of any of these realities.

The general conclusion was that, like the positive and negative electric poles, only by the combined efforts of virtue to grasp the supersensuous and of reason to grasp the sensuous, could the contact be made which would prove fruitful. To this arch Revelation could then be fitted as its keystone.

d. The Existence of God

John of Salisbury had insisted that apart from what Revelation had told men, all knowledge was mere opinion, some sensible and therefore probable, but none of it sure. Alain de Lille added that there was at least a rational presumption that God was good. At the same time the old proofs were still being offered, and Guillaume d'Auvergne, at least, added some fresher ones, although still based on the old Greek premise of opposites. He says first, for instance, that because some ideas are false and some are doubtful others must be true, and that surely if any idea is true it must be that of God's existence. He says secondly that since certain things are purely corporeal and others (man) mixed, something must be purely spiritual; thirdly that since some things only receive and others both give and receive (angels), there must be something which only gives; and fourthly that since most things have an essence which is distinguishable from their existence, there must be something whose essence and existence are indistinguishable.

e. Being

i. Essence vs. Existence. The distinction between eternal and unchangeable Being and ephemeral and changeable beings, derived from Plato's Ideas and their tangible realization, was a welcome substantiation of Revelation. The Ideas needed only to be identified, as by the Neoplatonists, with God in order to distinguish essence, which was Being *per se*,

from beings which were created and therefore derivative and dependent.

A text, recently identified as that of Philippe de Grèves, who died in 1236, was one of the first to analyze "the transcendental qualities of Being" (Gilson, *Philosophie du Moyen Age*, 414). Shortly afterwards Guillaume d'Auvergne, Jean de la Rochelle, and the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales were making the distinction between the *quo est* or source, origin, cause, or essence of beings, and the *quod est* or product, consequence, or effect, which was their existence.

To which category did the disembodied human soul belong? Aristotle had allowed it no essence because it survived its body only as a part of God. But to the Catholic this soul continued to exist as an individual eternally. This time it was the angels who offered a solution. For these, whether the good or bad, because unindividualized, were each a separate species, and therefore in one sense all essence, but in another all existence, for only God was both at once. It would then surely be in this third intermediate category that the human souls of both the saved and the damned belonged.

ii. Realism vs. Nominalism. The distinction between essence and existence was also helping to allay the controversy as to whether the Idea or cause, or the Realization or effect, was the prime reality. Some had said it was the Idea, because it was at once the more enduring, noble, and spiritual. Others said it was the Realization because it was the fulfilment or end, and therefore the purpose of the Idea. Yet was not the Realization itself only a means of enabling fallen man, by abstracting from sensuous appearances, to learn why he and they ever came into existence at all?

This latter view was that of Isaac Stella. But John of Salisbury said that to the extent that one must be more real than the other the question was insoluble. Fifty years later, however, came an important forward step: Alfred of Sareshel cut the Gordian knot by saying that whereas the existence was the reality in physics the essence was the reality in theology.

The more literal-minded had balked at the assertion that the essence Man could have any reality unless there were also real men in existence. Aristotle had avoided this difficulty by

maintaining that the species Man, being an Idea or essence, had always existed and always would. But the Christians, since they accepted Genesis, were obliged to argue that the essence Man was real before and independently of the creation of any individual man, and consequently would continue to be real even if every individual of that species ceased to exist.

iii. The One vs. the Many. It was the mathematically minded Greeks who had raised the problem of how the original Unity could produce Multiplicity. In order to explain it the Neoplatonists had invented their Trinity of successive emanations which, because each emanation was necessarily less perfect than its predecessor, gradually degenerated from the perfection of Unity to the imperfection of Multiplicity. Thus the angels were many but were all of one species whereas men were each individuals as well, and matter was without any Oneness at all.

The Christians were to be only momentarily disconcerted, however. At least Jean de la Rochelle and the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales made it clear that since God was omnipotent He could and did produce Multiplicity by His mere fiat.

Another problem, however, was not so easy for the Catholics to solve because they must believe that all men were created free and equal. How was it, then, that some earned salvation and others did not? Perhaps the Greeks could help.

To them individuals differed first because they were born so. Since all men were imperfect, it was natural that they should vary. Secondly they differed because they had been exposed to different environments. It was the task of each man to improve himself as best he could and whereas the more fortunate found this easy, the less fortunate found it hard.

The Catholics were attracted by both of these Greek explanations. Jean de la Rochelle and the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales both accepted the Greek theory that God created a multiplicity of individual forms which had only to unite with matter in order to produce individual men. Gerard de Cambrai, Gervase of Tilbury, and Bartholomew Glanville,

on the other hand, in order to acquit God of this responsibility, preferred to blame either man's environment or else the matter in him. If, however, the form as cause was inconsistent with God's justice, so the matter as cause was equally inconsistent with His omnipotence. Besides, even if these suggestions could be thought compatible with God's majesty, neither of them really helped to explain how men's wills could be free. Possibly it was for this reason that many clung to the solution that free will was dependent on reason rather than virtue. But this merely led to the no less difficult question of how the differences in reasoning power arose.

This problem of how Multiplicity evolved out of Unity had been faced successively by the Greeks, by Augustine, and now by the Scholastics, yet always without success. Was it a mystery? Or was it soluble, but only if Multiplicity had no more evolved out of Unity than Evil out of Good, or Matter out of Spirit, or Being out of non-Being?

Philosophy had so far been the humble handmaid of theology, but it was now about to ask some thoroughly impertinent questions.

f. The Soul

i. The Premise of Faith. During this period even the steadily mounting concern with ethics and natural science was less than that with study of the nature of the soul. On the surface the issue might appear to be an academic one between the Platonists and the Aristotelians, but actually it was very practical because it had to be shown, as against the Pantheists, how man's soul, although immortal, differed from God, and also how, in contrast to the Cathars, it differed from the purely mortal animal soul.

ii. Composition of the Soul. In the traditional hierarchy the soul came after God and before matter. Since these extremes had little or no extension, this intermediary had to bridge almost the whole of the gulf between angels and those vegetative souls which conferred only life. Furthermore, since it could not be pure spirit or pure matter, the only solution—short of declaring it a separate or third substance—was to suppose that it was composed of both matter and spirit, the

one predominating in the lower forms, the other in the higher. Furthermore, since the orthodox hierarchy was not one of degree but of kind, instead of supposing varying proportions or percentages, each mixture was considered to be a different substance. Thus, just as it was prime matter which united with form, so these two, when united, produced a new substance called corporeal or mundane matter; the bodies of angels were said to consist of celestial matter. As with matter so it was with soul. There was first the vegetative, which had mere life, and then the sensitive which also had desires. The animal soul, possessed of both, was therefore said to be composed rather of incorporeal matter. Finally the human soul, possessing the further attribute of reason—and so of an awareness of the difference between right and wrong—was said to be composed of spiritual matter. Only God's soul had no matter in it at all.

Plato had thought that man's soul had the capacity to exist independently of any body. His image was that of the helmsman and his ship. The Catholics had accepted this, although only with the quite inconsistent reservation that the ship as applied to the human body would also be resurrected. Serious complications, however, now arose with the new reliance on Aristotle. For it was on his authority that the Catholics now chose to divide the human soul into its vegetative, sensitive, and rational subdivisions, and it was also on his authority that the soul came to be regarded as a mere higher kind of form which therefore could have no independent existence apart from its matter. Luckily, however, Aristotle had divided the rational or intellectual element in the human soul into two parts, the one active, the other passive. For it was by this means that he chose to mark the dividing line between God and Nature. The passive, being merely the highest of all the forms, was ephemeral; the active, being pure spirit, was a particle of God, temporarily present in the living body of man but destined at its death to rise and merge again with God in heaven.

Thus the human soul, which had seemed to be the indispensable link which held God and matter together, was being envisaged by the new Aristotelians as a purely temporal substance, for at the death of man's body, the active element of

his rational soul became God again and all the rest of it returned to matter. But to Aristotle the individual was merely a component of its species which was eternal. Therefore the various *kinds* of soul were as real and eternal as the individual souls were ephemeral.

Hypnotized by Aristotle, who was now challenging Plato as the model of what was reasonable, the Catholics felt obliged to try to reconcile their beliefs with his, even at the risk of belittling Plato. Among such efforts was that of Alfred of Sareshel, who not only cut one Gordian knot by distinguishing physical from theological reality, but cut another by saying that whereas man's soul was physically corporeal it was at the same time metaphysically incorporeal. And, as we have seen, Guillaume d'Auvergne was very aware of the temptation to resort to such solutions.

Guillaume, followed by Jean de la Rochelle, was able to offer the happy suggestion that Aristotle's active intellect was the result of his rational effort to account for the then still unrevealed action of divine grace. To be sure, there was little or no grace being bestowed in Aristotle's day, but perhaps, like his contemporaries the prophets, he had been given a premonition of it.

However that may be, at a time when right reason was thought to be indispensable to the attainment of sanctity, this identification could seem to be a promising step forward.

iii. Powers of the Soul. Traditionally the soul possessed five distinctive powers. According to Isaac Stella about 1155, the first was to become aware, through the senses, of bodies; the second was its imagination, or capacity to recall their images by memory; the third was to be able, by reason, to see how their incorporeal forms or essences could be inferred by abstraction; the fourth was the intellectual power which enabled it to perceive these forms or essences as true substances divested of their accidental appearances in time and space; and the fifth was its intelligence whereby it could, through these forms or essences, perceive God Himself. His analogy here was the eye, whereby, sensuously, we can through light perceive the sun.

Alain de Lille recognized these same five powers but he

added that they were purely passive or receptive—powers of assimilation only—so that the soul, although versatile, was nonetheless simple.

Guillaume d'Auvergne agreed with both except that he reduced the powers to the last three, thereby keeping the soul, after the death of its body, intact. At the same time he insisted that, being simple, the soul's substance, essence, and even faculties constituted a One. Jean de la Rochelle, although he spoke of five separate faculties, was probably only trying to refine the terminology.

These two men were among the first to grapple with Aristotle's doctrine of the two intellects and in identifying the active as grace they were hoping to prevent its being identified with the fifth and highest power or faculty of the soul, because this would endanger not only the soul's simplicity and therefore likeness to God, but also its immortality which, if it was to retain its individuality, must remain both undivided in itself and unabsorbed into God.

A further distinction made by Guillaume d'Auvergne was that the soul was receptive of sense impressions only after they had first been so processed by common sense, imagination, and discrimination that they had become dematerialized. This saved the soul's spirituality from any sensuous taints, but only by attributing to the brain, and therefore virtually to the body, functions which had previously been ascribed to the two lower powers of the soul. In this way, just as the active intellect was superimposed on the soul, so the image as well as the actual perception of the sensuous object was separated from it. Thus was the hierarchy of human knowledge being shaped into its full scholastic complexity.

iv. Proofs of Existence of the Soul. The pains which Anselm had taken to prove the existence of God indicated that men were feeling an increasing need to bolster the mere faith in it by resorting to reason as corroboration. For Anselm had sought to reinforce belief not only in the Catholic dogma but also in a God whose concern was with men.

In his day, however, the belief in the existence of soul or spirit, in distinction from matter, was evidently so universal that to prove it would have seemed a waste of time. It was

otherwise, however, with Guillaume d'Auvergne. For he was at pains to explain how men, although deprived of their five senses and therefore unaware of having a body, would still be conscious enough to think, and so to be aware of their own existence and, he added rather incautiously, be able to grasp the truths of logic, mathematics, and even of right and wrong.

Why did Guillaume take this trouble, thereby anticipating Descartes by a full 400 years? He tells us himself. This, he says,

is a proper question because many men not only appear to be oblivious of their souls but even deny that there are any. (*De Anima*, III, 13.)

g. The Creation

Attracted by the vital role assigned to light by the Neoplatonists and their Moslem followers, the Englishman Robert Grosseteste conceived of a radical variation of their general theory. Originating with Plotinus, this theory was that light was spirit and therefore the opposite of darkness or matter and that the Creation occurred by the entry of light from a periphery into a sphere containing mere matter. As the light penetrated, it dissipated this matter, but, because the light grew feeble as it receded from its peripheral origin, the matter more and more resisted it until, driven to the centre, it formed the opaque and solid earth.

But Grosseteste's optical experiments had taught him that light rays did not lose their powers because of distance, but only by diffusion, and conversely gained power by concentration. He therefore said that God, out of nothing, created a single point of light, which was composed of a prime matter and form far more subtle and spiritual than any corporeal matter. This light, or *lux*, was endowed with such a nature that it expanded, instantaneously, perpetually, and in every spherical direction. In doing so it did become feebler, but only because of the space it was filling and not because of the distance its rays traveled. The periphery of Creation was therefore set, not by the points where the rays lost their energy, but where, by spreading, they reached the highest degree of rarefaction (or division) which their nature permitted.

As it expanded, this light created space possibly by leaving its matter behind—for a vacuum was inconceivable—thereby perhaps losing its expansive energy. What then happened? Grosseteste, as we have said, was a keen student of optics, of mirrors and lenses and so of reflection and refraction. He imagined, therefore, that the periphery was that hollow sphere where the now infinitesimal rays, unable further to penetrate the still resisting darkness, were thrown or rather reflected back towards their centre. At this point they were still only spiritual forms, or *lux*, but as they retraced their footsteps, they became material and visible—the *lumen* which men's eyes perceive.

It was here that he picked up the Neoplatonic theory. This *lumen*, returning now towards its point of origin, encountered the prime matter or space which it had produced by expanding, but, being now itself material, it materialized the matter, and as a separate substance, thereby producing one by one the successive spheres with their celestial bodies. Since, as this *lumen* was ever increasing in power as it approached its centre of origin, it was finally able to actualize a matter completely dense and opaque, which was our earth.

Thus he imagined the rays as reflected at the periphery, and at the same time—because this mirror is a lens—refracted so that they were all directed to concentrate at their original point of departure.

For all the apparent shortcomings of this theory it is significant as perhaps the earliest effort by a medieval Northerner to base a cosmological problem on mathematics and physics instead of on reason only. Furthermore it makes it practicable to raise the query of how far the theory was theological, philosophical, or scientific. It was theological to the extent that it took the Revelation of *Genesis* as its premise. But to the extent that this was also accepted as Revelation by Jews, Moslems, and also by most of the Greeks, as a rational premise, it was not primarily an inference derived from faith.

It was based, too, on optics and so on science. But the hypothesis that these sufficed to explain Creation was so impossible of verification by observation or experiment that it must long remain a pure matter of speculation.

We had best classify it, therefore, as philosophy—as belonging to that realm of belief which, in its fickleness, sides at one time with theology and at another with science without ever really committing itself to either.

8. THEOCRACY

a. The Mendicants

Apart from the excitement of the learned as Aristotle's philosophy became fully revealed, the second quarter of the thirteenth century was marked by the appearance of the new Orders of the Dominicans and Franciscans, called the Mendicants because in reacting against the opulence of the older Orders they laid down the principle that in order to be true monks they must rely on God for their daily bread, and this in practice meant reliance on alms.

For it was now as clear to the prospective monks as to most others that the old Orders had grown hopelessly corrupt. Too much of what they professed to do for God in heaven they were in fact doing for themselves on earth. Even when they did practice the ascetic life they tended to neglect the spiritual virtues, as of humility and charity. Willem Cornelis of Antwerp was declared a heretic because he insisted that a poor whore had a better chance of salvation than had a rich virgin, and the early Mendicants were in the same rebellious mood.

Dominic, founder of the famous Order which still bears his name, was born in Spain in 1170. He was an extreme ascetic, devoted to self-denial and poverty not only for himself but for his Order. At the height of the passion for building the great Gothic cathedrals he insisted, as had Bernard of Clairvaux, that the churches of his Order be unornamented. Dominic was not only an ascetic but also a learned preacher and a reformer by deeds.

In his day Spain too was being threatened by enemies of the Church, Cathars in the North, Moslems in the South; and the Moslems were introducing not only Aristotle but also his Arabic commentator Averroes, who had interpreted Aristotle to suit the Moslem theology just as the Catholics were undertaking to do the same to suit their own. Dominic therefore

founded his Order for the purpose of providing the Catholic world with really learned preaching, in order to counter both the Moslem and the Cathar sophistries with a learning and eloquence which they would be unable to match.

Dominic took the further step of trying to enlist the co-operation of the temporal powers in executing the sentences pronounced by the ecclesiastical courts against heretics, but he died in 1221, before the special courts of Inquisition were set up.

Francis of Assisi, most beloved of all the Catholic saints, was born in 1182 and died young, in 1226. He founded his equally famous Order with the unambitious purpose of enabling all who longed to imitate Christ to be free to do so. Nearer to Christ than to the Church, he was sympathetic to many of the Waldensian ideas: of cultivating the simple virtues of utter selflessness, truthfulness, generosity, humility, and love—love not only of God and neighbor, but also of all God's created things, animals, flowers, sun, stars, fire, snow, and even death. Contrariwise he was hostile to everything which we call civilization, against even clothing and cleanliness. If he could not live by begging he was ready to die, for this would then be by God's will. Our meagre and even conflicting information about him makes it hard to tell what he believed about the Virgin with her saints and the Devil with his fellow fiends. Opulence, he said, betrayed the hand of the Devil, but this was perhaps meant, as Augustine would have meant it, rather symbolically than literally. This emphatic return to Christ has often been regarded as a premonition of the later returns to Christ by the Protestants, Jesuits, and Oratorians.

b. The Church Militant

When the papacy undertook to rouse men to join the first Crusades, she had no organization with which to conduct the propaganda. The monks were cloistered and charged only to pray; the bishops, even if not cool, had all they could do to hold onto their offices. But now, with dangerous heresies spreading in their midst, Dominic and Francis, in order to retain their independence of the various abbots, bishops, and

kings, asked to serve the pope only, and the pope could not have received a more timely request. With these two spiritual armies, growing in power almost overnight, this other kind of Crusade, against the enemy within, now first became a practicable undertaking.

The struggle of the papacy to win an effective mastery over the Church had of course been going on for nearly 200 years. Now she would be able to reap her full reward. Instead of a dozen or more papal legates, chiefly Italians or at any rate men personally known to the pope, there were now thousands ready to obey papal orders, and these recruited from the very communities where their services were most needed. No longer now was the pope merely the overlord of a feudal Church, he was in a position to become the despot of half a continent. He could rule not only over the infidel and the heretic, not only over abbots and bishops, but also over the lay world including its kings.

c. Censorship

The heretics were persons who had either been baptized themselves or were the children of those who had been. They were therefore apostates. A first task of the pope was to prevent further such apostasies by imposing a rigid censorship. About 1160 John of Salisbury had run no risks in saying that:

The safe and cautious thing to do is to read only Catholic books. It is somewhat dangerous to expose the unsophisticated to pagan literature but a training in both is very useful to those safe in the faith for accurate reading on a wide range of subjects makes the scholar, careful selection of the better makes the saint. (*Policraticus*, VII, 10.)

Fifty years later, however, the trend was otherwise. Jacques de Vitry denounced all reading done out of mere curiosity, and Francis of Assisi seems to have been doubtful about the value of any sort of learning. A council held in Paris in 1210 declared that anyone who was found in possession of the *Credo* or Paternoster in French was to be presumed a heretic. This was aimed chiefly at the Waldenses, but it was also at this time that the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard were declared the sole criterion of dogma. Not only were the Scriptures

thereby officially superseded—shades of Abelard!—but also the patristic texts. Raimon de Pennafort's canon law codification was at the same time declared to have superseded the canons of all previous councils. Ignorance of the law was no longer to be an excuse.

As reading was being restricted, so inevitably was teaching. The pope had at the same time taken control of the University of Paris; for this, having become the centre of theological learning, had at all costs to be made subject to papal authority. The immediate danger here was the vogue of Aristotle as interpreted by the Moslem Averroes. First it was decreed that any teacher of the Seven Liberal Arts College—the preparatory school for that of theology—who dared to discuss any theological matter was guilty of heresy. Secondly that any member of the Faculty of Theology was equally guilty if he taught any theory derived from Aristotle, including his logic, although this was virtually the only logic then known. Already the basic fear was probably of his alleged conclusion that the universe had not been created but was coeternal with God. Although this theory was being generally refuted, it was being equally generally aired.

In contrast to the humanism of the previous years, which included a good deal of freedom in the interpretation of Catholic as well as pagan texts, there was now an effort to restrict even the Catholic tradition. Heresy, by its abuse of that freedom, had made it expedient and perhaps even necessary to forbid any freedom at all. This, had it been wholly successful—which it was not—might well have driven all speculative activity underground.

d. The Inquisition

i. Jurisdiction. If not the largest, certainly the most obstinate, segment of non-Catholics in France was the Jewish. Yet, with a curious delicacy, canon law had declared that since, like the Moslems, neither the Jews nor their ancestors had ever been baptized, they could not be regarded as heretics and treated accordingly. As the Church militant now sought to apply her full strength, however, Jew-baiting started up again in earnest.

Under the pontificate of Innocent III the Lateran Council of 1215 required all Jews to wear yellow arm bands, and Innocent's successors Gregory IX and Innocent IV were equally hostile. Of like humor were the theologians Philippe de Grèves and Guillaume d'Auvergne. Probably because of the Cathar danger, Jews were especially persecuted in Southern France. There they were monopolizing the budding medical profession. It was therefore decreed that no Jew could attend the medical school of Montpellier and that no one without a degree from it could practice. A generation later it was proclaimed a sin for anyone to patronize the sect. Only Blanche of Castile, widow of Louis VIII and Regent from 1226 to 1236 for her son Louis IX, resisted this persecution, but she was unable to persuade even her own son to share her view.

Armed as the popes now were with the growing multitude of loyal and eager Mendicants, the Inquisition came into being. Up to now the canon law had been administered by the episcopate as courts of first instance, subject to appeals to the papal court of last resort in Rome. This was proving to be rather a hit-or-miss arrangement: some of these courts were strict, others lenient, some impartial, others not, and appeals were expensive. These courts were allowed to continue to judge cases of alleged magic because it was orthodox to believe that any sinner might be so 'possessed' by the Devil that he must serve his evil designs. Indeed, as the persecutions of the Pantheists show us, it was becoming heresy to deny that the Devil had this psychological power.

Cases of alleged heresy, therefore, were now transferred to new courts expressly created for that purpose, and the judges together with the whole procedure were set up by the popes and their Mendicants with heresy exclusively in mind. Because it was assumed that the Devil was the cause of heresy as well as of magic, it was supposedly he who, in contrast to his role at the Last Judgment, pressed for a verdict not of guilt but of innocence. The judges, however, would rarely have been in a mood to consider his arguments even had he appeared before them in person.

ii. What Heresy Was. Where the accused confessed their beliefs openly and voluntarily there was no difficulty; even

Waldenses, Cathars, and Pantheists could have been effectively dealt with by the episcopal courts. So might those who should allege the eternity of the world or who, like certain Germans in about 1220, insisted that the damned and even the Devil himself would eventually be saved. But where, as was more frequently the case as the persecution grew more severe, the accused denied the charge, the proof became one of secret belief, and it was in order properly to judge these cases that the Inquisitorial courts were instituted.

What the papacy and the Mendicants were intent upon, moreover, was something more than orthodox belief: they also wanted to impose the monastic vow of obedience on everyone. It was therefore decreed that disobedience to papal commands itself constituted heresy.

It is significant that, almost coincidentally with the inauguration of the Inquisitorial courts, Pope Gregory IX in 1230 declared officially that the sacramental power of the priest was in no way invalidated by the fact that he was himself in a state of mortal sin. Therefore he was still acting as an authorized agent of Church and pope. This meant that he could not only administer the sacraments, he could also withhold even a conditional absolution until the penance he prescribed—and this might be for life—had been completed. Nor was this all. It was further decreed that any person whom any priest had chosen to excommunicate, even if only for disobedience, should he not thereafter obtain absolution within a year might properly be charged with heresy. There is no evidence that this decree was much enforced, but it doubtless served its purpose of discouraging anyone from openly appealing from a priest's decision.

Nevertheless the Church did not intend to be unfair. If she was hard on the disobedient she tried to be lenient towards the faithful: indulgences were bestowed far more readily than excommunications were imposed. To the customary indulgences Dominic added one of his own to any wife who either persuaded or allowed her husband to abandon her in order to join his new Order.

iii. Procedure. Procedure in the courts of Inquisition had certain new features. In the first place the trials were

secret. In the second place anybody could act as informer and if his accusation and testimony resulted in a conviction he was rewarded by a share of the confiscated property of the victim.

The first step was to try to persuade the accused to confess his guilt; here was a chance for the Dominicans to practice their learned preaching. If this failed, torture was used which proved doubly effective because it induced the accused not only to admit his own guilt but also to turn informer by inculcating his friends. This turning of what we call state's evidence offered the accused a possible double advantage. If he could in this way qualify himself as an informer he might get a share of the property of whoever might be convicted as a result of his information, and, at the worst, he could revenge himself on his informer by putting him in the same fix that his informer had put him.

If there was any widespread protest against this procedure, it must have been as secret as was the procedure itself. In France there was at least one, however: a poet, Guillaume de Normandie, protested that the Cathar suspects were not getting a fair trial.

iv. The Sentence. What proportion of those tried by these courts was acquitted, we cannot even guess. Of those condemned as guilty by the episcopal courts many had, before being sentenced, confessed their guilt and then contritely retracted, if only in order to mitigate the penalties of confiscation and imprisonment. Even then, however, they ran the risk of being boycotted and even lynched by the local populace.

In the courts of Inquisition the penalties were gradually made more severe. In 1224 the death penalty could be imposed at the discretion of the court and as the Inquisition came into full force the death penalty for the guilty who refused to repent or retract was gradually made mandatory: in Italy in 1232, in the empire in 1238, in Spain in 1255, in France only in 1270.

During the trials of the Cathars around 1242 the condemned *Perfecti* or priests were all burned at the stake; the Hearers or laity got only life imprisonment. Many of course confessed and retracted when *in extremis*, and these got

lighter sentences. Dominic had been solicitous even of those who remained obdurate, trying to make their years in dur-
ance bearable and thereby to invite such changes of heart
that even if no temporal pardon was forthcoming, eternal
pardon would result. But Dominic died before the Inquisi-
tion had begun to function, and we do not know how many of
his followers imitated his solicitous example.

v. Execution of the Sentence. Where the sentence was
death and therefore to be burned alive, the Church, because
she did not believe in shedding blood, turned the condemned
man over to the civil authorities with instructions to execute
her sentence, and these were expected to comply. What if
they refused? In that case those responsible were liable to
excommunication. But partly because this threat was often
scoffed at, it was mutually agreed that, out of the victim's
confiscated property, besides the share reserved for the in-
formers and the Church herself, the state should also get its
share. In parts of Germany the bishops were denied any share,
with the result that they organized a resistance which for
many years held the Inquisition at bay. But on the whole the
system worked effectively, for it was to the financial advantage
of all the powers concerned to obtain convictions; and, it
was said, to the advantage of God also because only by making
fearful examples could repentances be extracted on any sub-
stantial scale.

NOTES ON PERSONS MENTIONED
WHO FLOURISHED 1151-1250
(From *Sentences to Summas*)

*Approximate
birth & death
dates **

- 1100-1160 PETER LOMBARD. His *Sentences* on theology long as authoritative as the works of Gratian (1090-) on canon law and of Accursius (1182-) on Roman law.
- 1101-1153 EUGENIUS III (Bernardo Paganelli) of Pisa. Cistercian abbot, pupil of Bernard (1191-). Pope 1145-.
- 1101- ARNAUD DE BONNEVAL.
- 1105- THEOPHILUS (probably a German). Chemist: oil colors.
- 1105- BERNARD DE MORLAIX. Monk of Cluny.
- 1105-a1148 HENRI DE LAUSANNE. Heretic, abjured and joined Cistercians, relapsed and finally was condemned.
- 1108-1169 ISAAC STELLA. English. Pioneer on epistemology of Aristotle.
- 1108- ADAM DE PETIT PONT of Wales. Taught at School of Notre Dame in Paris. Bishop.
- 1110-a1153 BERNARD SYLVESTRIS (of Tours). In the tradition of Chartres: cosmology influenced by Plato's *Ti-maeus*.
- 1112- MANASSES DE GARLANDE.
- 1113-1173 RICHARD OF SAINT-VICTOR (of Scotland?). Pioneer on epistemology of Aristotle. Used logic to design a ladder of Knowledge which led to proof of mystical dogma.
- 1115-1181 ALEXANDER III (Orlando Bandinelli) of Siena. Canon lawyer. Pope 1159-.

* *a*, after; *b*, before.

*Approximate
birth & death
dates **

- 1115-1180 JOHN OF SALISBURY. In the tradition of Chartres. Had wide knowledge. A master of Ciceronian style and content. Familiar with the new logic. Skeptical of sorcery.
- 1118-1170 THOMAS À BECKET (of London). Archbishop of Canterbury. Killed by vassals of Henry II.
- 1119-1178 PIERRE COMESTOR (Le Mangeur) of Troyes. Wrote one of the earliest commentaries on Peter Lombard's (1100-) *Sentences*. Wrote a popular biblical history.
- 1120-1180 LOUIS VII (le Jeune). King of France 1137-.
- 1120-1203 ALAIN DE LILLE. Wrote a philosophical-allegorical poem.
- 1127-1180 LAMBERT DE BÈGUE (a Walloon).
- 1127-*b*1218 PETER WALDO (PIERRE DE VAUX), of Lyons. Waldensian heresiarch.
- 1127- PIERRE DE CELLE.
- 1128-1198 AVERROES OF CORDOVA. Arabic, Aristotelian philosopher.
- 1133-1197 PIERRE CANTOR OF RHEIMS. Taught in Paris. Last exegesis of Bible without reliance on (Aristotelian) logic.
- 1135-1208 PIERRE DE BLOIS of Brittany. Had wide knowledge of law and Latin classics. Much in England.
- 1137-1205 PIERRE DE POITIERS. Taught at School of Notre Dame in Paris. Wrote *Commentary* on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. Church Fathers eclipsed. Concentrated on ethics, and on the new logic and categories of Aristotle.
- 1139-*a*1187 NICOLAS D'AMIENS. His *Ars Catholicae fidei* was designed to convert the infidel by reason alone.
- 1140- RAOUL ARDENS of Picardy. Preacher. Concentrated, as did Pierre de Poitiers (1137-), on ethics and terminology.
- 1140- WALTER MAP of Wales. Studied in Paris in about 1154-1160. Itinerant justice. Served under Henry II of England and Becket (1118-). Wrote an entertaining *Courtier's Triflings*. Believed in incubi.
- 1140-1224 GILLES DE CORBEIL (near Paris). Physician, satirist.
- 1145-1202 JOACHIM OF FLORA of Calabria. His heretical views inspired by Greek East and the Arabs.

- 1145-1200 GEOFFROI DE TROYES.
- 1146- GERARD DE CAMBRAI.
- 1147-*a*1209 GERVASE OF TILBURY. Believed in incubi and night-flying.
- 1150-1207 AMAURY DE BENES (near Chartres). Taught in Paris. He virtually ignored the Bible, following Erigena (812-) instead.
- 1151- GUYOT DE PROVINS (Champagne).
- 1157-*a*1212 DAVID DE DINANT. Influenced by Arabs.
- 1157-1217 ALEXANDER NECKAM (England). Studied in Paris 1175-1190. Wide knowledge, including Latin classics, ethics, and physics. Augustinian canon.
- 1157- MARTIN DE FUGERIIS (Magister Martinus). Taught theology in Paris, especially ethics and logic.
- 1160-1218 ROBERT DE COURÇON. Wrote one of the first *Summas*, including especially ethics and canon law. Papal legate.
- 1161-1216 INNOCENT III (Lotario de' Conti di Segni) of Anagni. Pope 1198-. Extended judicial power of the papacy over temporal affairs. Was against the Ordeal because it involved the shedding of blood.
- 1161-*a*1231 PREVOSTINO DA CREMONA. Chancellor of the University of Paris 1206-1209. A master of the new logic and of the new scholastic technique of argument. Defended the superiority of reason over will. Saw no clash with dogma.
- 1161-*a*1219 PIETRO DA CAPOVA. Taught in Paris in 1218, especially on ethics. Saw reason as of great help to dogma.
- 1165-1223 PHILIP II (Augustus). King of France 1180-.
- 1165-1240 JACQUES DE VITRY (Artois). Studied at University of Paris. Popular preacher. Traveled in the East. Against learning except to promote salvation. Nature served only to provide symbols. Admired Marie d'Oignies (1177-) and Francis of Assisi (1182-).
- 1165-*a*1215 ALFRED OF SARESHEL (England). Philosopher. Relied on Aristotle according to the Neoplatonic Arabic texts of the *Liber de Causis* and Avicenna, and on Plato's *Timaeus*. Concerned with the soul.
- 1166-*a*1219 SIMON DE TOURNAI. Theologian. Said no rational proof from effect to cause. Faith is above reason. Said that Aristotle undermines the *credo ut intelligam*. Precursor of Thomas Aquinas (1224-) on the soul.

*Approximate
birth & death
dates **

- 1167-1227 HONORIUS III (Cenci Savelli) of Rome. Forbade monks to study medicine. Authorized founding of Dominican Order in 1216. Pope 1215-.
- 1168-1236 PHILIPPE DE GRÈVES (of Paris). Chancellor of theological faculty of University of Paris. Preacher. Separated the natural from the supernatural. Grasped real meaning of Aristotle. Stressed ethics. Denounced morals of the Roman clergy. Distrusted the Dominicans.
- 1170-1241 GREGORY IX (Ugolino de' Conti di Segni) of Anagni. Wrote on canon law, but with no new ideas as had Gratian (1090-). Forbade use of pagan texts in interpreting Bible. Against natural science and allowed use of only expurgated texts of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Physics*. Pope 1227-.
- 1170-1221 DOMINIC OF CALARGA in León. Studied at University of Palencia. Ascetic. Hoped for martyrdom with torture. Preached to Cathars. Against using physical violence. Founded an asylum for heretics who had abjured. Founded the Dominican Order (Order of Preachers), dedicated to learning and preaching. Chose the more elastic Rule of Augustine. Vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience.
- 1170-1225 LEONARDO FIBONACCI of Pisa. Mathematician. Early travels in Mediterranean. Learned from Greeks, Arabs, and even Indians, but made many discoveries of his own. In touch with court of Frederick II (1194-).
- 1175-1240 RAIMON DE PENNAFORT of Barcelona. General of the Dominican Order 1238-1240. Encouraged Gregory IX (1170-) to inaugurate the Inquisition. Codified canon law. For obligatory periodical confessions. Condemned Ordeals.
- 1175-1253 ROBERT GROSSETESTE of Suffolk. Had wide knowledge. Called the last medieval humanist. Substituted science for logic as aid to theology. Master of young Mendicants at Oxford, and of Roger Bacon (1214-). Influenced Wyclif (1324-). Mathematical physicist.
- 1177-1236 GAUTIER DE COINCY. Benedictine monk at Soissons. Wrote pious stories and the first musical sequences.
- 1177-1213 MARIE D'OIGNIES. Early Beguine. Reputed to have been divinely inspired.

- 1177- GUILLAUME DE NORMANDIE.
- 1180- WILLEM CORNELIS of Antwerp.
- 1180-1249 GUILLAUME D'AUVERGNE (Aurillac). Taught at University of Paris. Backs Dominicans there. Uses Aristotle to refute Arabs. Precursor of Thomas Aquinas: God merely the efficient and formal cause. Devil's power purely psychological. Said images and incantations ineffective. Against astrology and sorcery.
- 1180-1245 ALEXANDER OF HALES (Gloucestershire). Joined Franciscans in 1222. First monk to teach theology at University of Paris. Like Guillaume (above) he saw how Aristotle could be used to strengthen theology. Stressed ethics. Was a link between Abelard's *Sic et Non* (1079-) and Bonaventura (1221-). His *Summa* completed after his death by other Franciscans. It was declared faultless by Alexander IV (1200-).
- 1181-1236 MICHAEL SCOT (Fife). At Oxford, Paris, Bologna, Toledo, and Palermo (at court of Frederick II, 1194-). Diffused Arabic belief in astrology, magic, and necromancy: auguries, divination, and dreams. All for purposes of prophecy, but based on experiment rather than on tradition or logic. Doubtful of alchemy.
- 1182-1226 FRANCIS OF ASSISI. Founder of the Franciscan Order. He believed that the Revelation was of love, but that it was attainable only through poverty and the humility which it engendered. A man must serve others rather than himself, and these others included the beasts and even the stones, as fellow creatures of God. He feared learning—the Devil was learned—and therefore the learning of Alexander of Hales (1180-). These would receive special torments in hell. He belittled the powers of the Devil and even of the Virgin, who stopped at the foot of the Cross, whereas (Lady) Poverty mounted it.
- 1182-1218 OTTO IV. Emperor 1209-. Defeated by Philip II (Augustus) (1165-) at Bouvines in 1214.
- 1187-1226 LOUIS VIII (le Lion). King of France 1223-.
- 1187-1252 BLANCHE OF CASTILE. Daughter of King Alfonso IX. Wife of Louis VIII (above). Mother of Louis IX (1212-). Regent of France 1226-1234.
- 1190-1237 JORDANUS NEMORARIUS of Warburg (near Paderborn). Bachelor of Arts at University of Paris in 1219. General of the Dominican Order after death

*Approximate
birth & death
dates **

- of Dominic (1170-) in 1221. Won many recruits for the Order among the art students. In mathematics, inferior to Leonardo Fibonacci (1170-) in algebra but superior to him in geometry. Physicist (leverage and weights). Hostile to use of Aristotle in theology.
- 1190-1261 ETIENNE DE BOURBON of Lyons. Studied at University of Paris. Dominican preacher. Inquisitor in Southern France in 1235. Tried Cathars, Waldenses, and (perhaps) those accused of attending the Sabbat.
- 1190-a1240 BARTHOLOMEW GLANVILLE OF ENGLAND. Franciscan. Disciple of Robert Grosseteste (1175-). Taught theology at Franciscan school in Paris 1225-1231. Wrote a concise and very popular *Encyclopedia*, chiefly on natural history and medicine based largely on Aristotle. Showed how all nature had been designed to serve man.
- 1192-1245 JEAN DE LA ROCHELLE. A doctor of theology at University of Paris in 1236. Succeeded Alexander of Hales (1180-) in the Franciscan chair there in 1238. Championed learning and science but he was chiefly concerned about the nature of the soul and how we come to knowledge of the spiritual world, whether by inward contemplation, illumination, grace, or logic. For Plato rather than Aristotle. A precursor of Bonaventura (1221-).
- 1194-1250 FREDERICK II. Holy Roman Emperor. Lived chiefly in Southern Italy and Sicily. His court a centre of learning, especially of Arabic science and Aristotelian natural science. Of a skeptical inclination, he encouraged free experiment and defied the papacy.
- 1194-1254 INNOCENT IV (Sinibaldo di Fieschi or Fiesco) of Genoa. Author of bull *Ad Extirpanda* of 1252. Ardent backer of Inquisition, authorizing use of starvation and torture in order to extract confessions of heresy. Pope 1243-.
- 1196-1258 ADAM MARSH of Bath. Franciscan in 1226. Pupil of Robert Grosseteste (1175-). First Franciscan to teach theology at Oxford. Renowned as a biblical scholar and mathematician but only his correspondence has survived. Admired by Roger Bacon (1214-).

- 1200— ROBERT DE BLOIS.
- 1200-1261 ALEXANDER IV (Rinaldo, Count of Segni, near Velletri). Favored the Mendicants against the Seculars at University of Paris. Easygoing, ascetic and pious. Set up the Inquisition in France, but forbade it to try cases of magic unless heresy was also involved. Pope 1254-.
- 1200†-1265 VINCENT OF BEAUVAIS (of Burgundy). Dominican. Wrote a voluminous but unoriginal *Encyclopedia* chiefly on natural science. Relied on Aristotle, Pliny, and Galen, and probably also a good deal on his contemporaries, Bartholomew (1190-) and Thomas de Cantimpré (1200-). Less discriminating than was Albertus (see list, p. 620).
- 1200†-1270 THOMAS DE CANTIMPRÉ (near Brussels). Dominican 1232-. A doctor of theology at University of Paris. Wrote a popular *Encyclopedia*, *De Natura rerum*, about 1240. Credulous of wonders but distinguishes them from miracles. Described the life of the bees as the model for the monks to imitate. Albertus seems to have borrowed a good deal from him.

† The birth dates here are confusing: Vincent's is merely calculated as at the end of the twelfth century; Thomas' as between 1186 and 1210; and Albertus' as between 1193 and 1206. We have considered Albertus in the later period for purely arbitrary reasons.

B O O K V I

Apogee of Medieval France

ALBERTUS AND AQUINAS

1. THE REVELATIONS

a. Foreword

TO THE APOSTLES, Christ's personal Revelation fulfilled and included the Old Testament. Later this body of texts was extended to include the versions of that Revelation as recorded by the authors of the Gospels, the Acts, Epistles, and Apocalypse. Next, in due course, came the early Christian texts as tradition, and from these the *Commentaries* or expositions of the Fathers culminating in Augustine, whose views, to the Latins at least, became virtually authoritative.

To Augustine, however, there seemed to be other Revelations, and not only those offered by the present world as perceived by his own senses, but also those offered by the philosophical expositions of men who had written about the world before Christ, and therefore by the light of reason alone. For why did God cause these pagan texts to be written unless in order to clarify the Revelation of Nature by drawing correct inferences from it? Just as the Old Testament text was designed to instruct Jews and Moslems as well as Christians about God Himself, so the Greek texts, and especially Plato's, were designed to instruct men regarding the world which God created.

Men were now turning their attention from theology to philosophy, not, however, as skeptics but rather because theology had reached the point of diminishing returns. The only alternatives now were to rehash the old problems or to dig up new ones which, because relatively insignificant, had so far been neglected.

b. The Bible

i. The Redemption. Of the old problems, one of the most puzzling and persistent was why God had devised the Redemption quite as He did. As illustrations we may take the views of Thomas Aquinas and Egidio Romano. Aquinas supposed that only by means of the Incarnation was God able to confer His grace on men. Was this because it would trap the Devil into a breach of contract or rather because, by Christ's assumption of a dual nature, man in a sense acquired one too? The Passion, he said, was added purely for its psychological effect: in order to rouse men to a love of God and a detestation of sin. It was to crown His creation.

Egidio was merely more explicit: he said that the Passion was added merely as the *best* way of enabling God to confer His grace, because the more virtuous it made men the less grace He had to add.

ii. Grace. The *Summa* of Alexander of Hales had supposed that by the Redemption God was able to, and did, confer a sufficient grace on all men, and that thereafter they must rely wholly on their own efforts. Bonaventura, however, thought that this grace came rather as a constant aid throughout men's lives. Aquinas was inclined rather to the theory of the *Summa*, for he said that, as a result of the Redemption, all Christians, at least, received a nature which enabled them to save themselves by their own efforts. Egidio differed only in distinguishing the respective roles of Incarnation and Passion, but Arnald de Villanova, in declaring that the Incarnation itself divinized men, left the problems of the Passion, breach of contract, and grace seemingly unresolved, reverting perhaps to the unanalytical explanation of the third century.

Following Aristotle, Aquinas supposed that knowledge or reason, leading to wisdom in contrast to ignorance or stupidity, was an indispensable ingredient in virtue and therefore in merit. But he admitted that it did not seem fair that a man be damned for being born with deficiencies which he could not overcome. For this reason Siger de Brabant, following Aristotle, doubted that there were future rewards and punishments, and Raimon Lull doubted Aristotle and the Arab Averroes for this same reason.

Aquinas had supposed that the will was ultimately governed by reason—that is, by the evidence at its disposal. But the opposite view was thereafter adopted by many on the ground that it was the will which determined what sort of evidence it chose to acquire; that is, chose the hypotheses, used reason to present the pros and cons, and then passed judgment. Thus the desire to acquire wisdom was based on will, and there was therefore equal opportunity for all men to acquire the requisite merit. Egidio Romano said explicitly that evil was caused by will alone.

iii. The Beatific Vision. Augustine, who was skeptical of the saints' powers to intervene in human affairs, had been consistent in asserting that they did not obtain the full vision of God until the resurrection of their bodies at the Last Day. Bonaventura was more sanguine, William de la Mare held to Augustine, and John XXII at first did likewise. But the tendency, beginning with Dietrich von Vriburg's tract on the subject, was now to swing decisively to the belief in the immediate enjoyment of this Beatific Vision. Evidently the expectation of an imminent end of the world was now confined to apocalyptically-minded sects of which the Church disapproved. Therefore no limitations ought to be set on the role of the saints as intermediaries—like the priests—between man and God.

c. *The Old Testament*

i. Theism Defined. The Oxford Dictionary defines *theism*, as distinguished from *deism*, or a bare rational belief in a God, as a belief in one God as Creator and supreme Ruler of the universe, without denial of Revelation. We therefore use the term *theist* in default of a better one, to describe all men, be they Jews or Moslems as well as Christians, who recognized the divine nature of the Old Testament. And this common belief distinguished them from the *deists* like Plato, who recognized no God as Creator, or like Aristotle, who regarded God not as the supreme Ruler but only as the supreme Mover of the universe.

This distinction was of importance because, although the Manichees denied the divinity of Jehovah and so of the Old

Testament, the other beliefs now most threatening to the Church—those of the Jews and Moslems—did accept it and the arguments to be used against them could safely proceed from this common premise.

ii. The Creation. Because God's virtue was perfect He was bound to wish to create. But He was able to do so only in such a way that the resulting creation did not diminish His own perfection by sharing it with anything else. He had therefore to be content to create relative imperfection, such as the angels, some of whom were to turn against him. Man was therefore also created imperfect, and with the same capacity to make himself more or less perfect as he freely chose. Such was the first Adam.

We have already spoken of the different theories of how man ought best to take advantage of nature to that end. Abelard had said by resisting the temptations it offered. Bonaventura laid stress on the proper reading of the symbols, especially of the Trinity, which to him nature so clearly and abundantly revealed. Thomas Aquinas, however, seems to have been satisfied to observe that it was so variegated and vast that its only possible purpose was to keep men in mind of God's perfect virtue, knowledge, and just power.

The curiosity of the more scientifically minded, however, was not so easily satisfied. Pierre Peregrin de Maricourt thought nature could reveal philosophic as well as theological truths, and the popular *Encyclopedias* sought to explain specific phenomena, such as why there were mountains and seas, and why these seas were salty. It was chiefly Bacon and Lull, however, who openly discarded the symbolic and didactic explanations in favor of the utilitarian. Bacon indeed devoted his whole life and was willing to suffer a long imprisonment in order to persuade men that God had so designed nature that they could exploit it to their advantage.

But was this for their temporal as well as eternal advantage? Bacon had wholeheartedly embraced Augustine's belief that God had endowed the ancient Greeks no less than the ancient Jews with the responsibility of raising fallen men to a degree of understanding and virtue which would enable them to grasp the full meaning of Christ's Revelation, and that the

Fathers, especially Augustine, had been the beneficiaries. But since then, he said, civilization had fallen into evil ways. Men had not only neglected the pagan Latin texts on science and civility, they had forgotten the Hebrew and Greek languages in which the original texts had been written. Some were even being driven into reading the Bible in French. Men were therefore still relying on the authority of Revelations made in languages they could not read, and were therefore basing their knowledge, in canon law as well as in science, on perhaps very inaccurate translations.

Now the Jews knew Hebrew and the Moslems Greek as well as Arabic. Therefore the first thing Christians should do was to overcome this disadvantage, and the next stop should be so to outstrip them in understanding and virtue that they would look to Christians for enlightenment as Christians were now obliged to look to them. Civilization meant power, and only by acquiring it, both materially and spiritually, could the Catholic belief triumph—by virtue first, but also by prestige and, if necessary, by force of arms.

So far Bacon, being a devout Franciscan, still had men's eternal advantage in mind. But he was no less aware of the benefits which enlightenment could bestow on the temporal life. In this connection he had in mind the potentialities of mathematics and thereby of astrology, physics, and alchemy: useful for peace as well as for war, in order "that men may live in peace and justice in this life." For this purpose too the knowledge of languages was advantageous: for medicine, commerce, finance, law; and diplomacy. It was to serve these purposes, too, that God had, as Aquinas was saying, made the universe so various and vast.

It was now becoming known that Averroes had understood Aristotle to have said that the world was as eternal as God. Since this belief was inconsistent with *Genesis* it had to be rejected; but in order to do this effectively, it had to be explained why God delayed the Creation. Aquinas said that God had also created time and therefore that there had been none until then. But to Bonaventura the word *eternity* meant either eternal timelessness or else infinite and therefore uncreated time.

As Aquinas was making a concession to Averroes in regard

to the timing of the creation, so he made a concession to the Neoplatonists in regard to its mechanics. He said that God used light as His creative agency of secondary causes, which were the stars and planets. For it was a Neoplatonic distinction that God only creates, that the stars and planets are created but also cause, whereas man and the world are merely created. God therefore was, and still is, dealing with the world only indirectly, through the agency of intermediaries.

iii. The Fall. Since God had been able to create an earthly paradise for Adam and Eve and then to render it as imperfect as they then proved themselves to be, He could restore that paradise whenever He chose to. Yet in spite of the Redemption He had not so far done so. Abelard had insisted, however, that by the Fall God had not changed nature, and, although Alexander Neckam had supposed that He had, Bacon agreed with Abelard. There was now this difference, however. Abelard thought that nature had been created from the beginning in order to tempt men either to resist or to succumb to evil, whereas Bacon thought that God had created nature as the best of all possible worlds, and at the same time had endowed men with the free will and capacity to make it serve their temporal as well as their eternal aspirations. Both the Joachites and the Jews were waiting passively for a second Coming of the Holy Ghost and the Messiah, respectively. In contrast, Bacon was calling on men to bring a better world to pass by their own efforts, to arm their hopes and good intentions with deeds. Quoting Seneca's belief that God could not be counted on to ameliorate men's temporal lot, Bacon said in effect that, just as God so designed the world that the stars and planets could serve as His primary intermediaries to direct nature, so he designed men that they would serve as His secondary intermediaries to utilize it.

iv. Providence. Such contemporaries of Bacon as Albertus, Aquinas, and Etienne Tempier generally recognized that although God did cause miracles purely for man's edification, He was not the direct cause of every temporal event. This did not bother Him because He was concerned only with eternal results. Therefore the *quid pro quo* theory of Providence remained substantially intact. Bacon did no more

than allege a potential future amelioration. But before the end of the century laymen were beginning, for their own purposes, to put his theory into practice. Thus the tale of *Jehan et Blonde* by Philippe de Beaumanoir accords with Bacon's idea of men's recovery of the lost art of civility. As Langlois (*Lavisse*, III (2), 366) said:

The moral of this tale is that one must cultivate honor. But how? It is not by practising usury and deceit; rather it is by being gentle, courteous, debonair, loyal, by knowing how to please everybody, when to speak and when to be silent. One's first duty is to accumulate but one's second is to spend.

This was a far cry from Abelard and the monks, and it was not exactly what Bacon had in mind in recommending the study of nature as well as of virtue. But it was the lay equivalent of Bacon because both envisaged the possibility and even the duty of finding ways and means of ameliorating the temporal life. Beaumanoir's hero Jehan, indeed, is a recognizable precursor of Meré's *honnête homme*, and even of Nicole's Jansenist whose happiness depended on how much not only God, but also men, loved him.

2. REASON

a. Challenge to Revelation

i. Albertus Magnus. To Albertus, who flourished from 1230 to 1280, the problem was no longer how far reason, that is Aristotle, could be used to corroborate faith but rather how far it could go without the help of faith. In order to find out he deliberately eschewed the biblical premises, not only of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Resurrection, but also the merciless but solicitous Jehovah of the Fall and of Providence.

In many cases he so paraphrased Aristotle's texts that they appeared to harmonize with faith, but by ignoring the Fall he was driven to show that evil was due to a defect in God's power rather than in man's virtue. Since He had to employ evil means in order to achieve a good end, ours was merely the best of all possible worlds. And so it was with Providence. God was not concerned with particulars and therefore with temporal justice. Albertus did not suggest that these rational conclusions undermined faith; he wanted only to find out

where reason really did lead in order to see how far it was to be relied on.

In his day many theologians were still twisting logical techniques in order to show how reasonable the faith was. Albertus thought that in going so far they were doing a disservice to both.

ii. Averroes. It was during Albertus' long career that the *Commentary* of the twelfth-century Moslem, Averroes, on Aristotle came to be generally read. It was only then that the Paris theologians became aware of how far they had been interpreting Aristotle through biblical eyes. For Averroes had argued with dangerous plausibility that Aristotle thought that the world was coeternal with God, and that God was therefore rather its activator than creator, its efficient rather than its original or final cause. God might foreknow what its end might be, but He had not willed it. He was merely moving it along its predetermined course. Furthermore, according to Averroes, Aristotle believed that the active intellect or rational soul was in essence a One so that, although separate while in man's living body, at death it would become part of a One again by merging into the divine One. This was of course a flat denial of individual immortality.

That the pagan Aristotle had believed these things was bad enough, but the worst of it was that Averroes—clearly the most competent of all Aristotle's interpreters—held further that since God was truth and truth reasonable, He was what our natural reason indicated that He must be, and that not only the Christian but also the Moslem revelation of Jehovah and Mohammed should, where necessary, be reinterpreted accordingly. For, were this true, Revelation was itself supplementary to, and therefore a mere commentary on, what man's natural reason led him necessarily to conclude. To Augustine the inadequacy of even Porphyry's reason was confounded by the New Revelation. To Averroes the inadequacy even of the Old Revelation was to be judged by the reason of Aristotle.

iii. Thomas Aquinas. Following Albertus came his pupil Aquinas, and by this time orthodoxy had become aroused to the danger. Aquinas took no other position than that of Albertus, but whereas Albertus was by then an old and vener-

ated figure and his texts confused, Aquinas was young and his ideas, if not convincing, were at least more lucid and consistent. Many of his conclusions therefore were condemned in 1270 and 1277, but rather because they betrayed the influence of Averroes than because they seriously discredited the faith.

His real achievement was to show that he knew his Aristotle as well as had Averroes, and that it was just as, if not more, reasonable to adapt Aristotle's texts to the Faith as to adapt the Faith to suit Aristotle.

iv. Siger de Brabant. Finally there was Siger de Brabant, a master of the Faculty of Arts, but only a clerk or canon and not a priest. Siger's task was more dangerous than difficult. Virtually all he did was to repeat the conclusions of Averroes, to declare that this was the real Aristotle and therefore the real reason, and then to add, quite blandly, that where reason conflicted with faith it was as wrong as it was irrefutable.

How sincere was Siger on this crucial point? Did the incentive of prudence or of conviction dominate? Or were his texts merely a manifestation of irresponsible showmanship? Shortly before his death soon after 1280 he was condemned in Rome as a heretic and sentenced to life imprisonment. But Aquinas, had he lived after 1274, might well have suffered a similar fate. The objection to both was that they seemed to be using reason to probe the weaknesses of papal dogma rather than using that dogma in order to expose the weaknesses of reason. We think again of Abelard: to him the *Credo* was rather what Christ revealed than what the pope decreed, and, if so, was not reason, as it was now being understood, more to be trusted than the too often impulsive and even opportunist motives governing the papal or even conciliar pronouncements?

v. The Franciscans. As is often the case, extremes here meet. Many of the Franciscans took Aristotle as seriously as did most of the Dominicans, but some of them, being respectful of Francis' distrust of learning, turned rather to the Waldenses and the Bible than to Aristotle. These were the Spiritual branch of the Order. Clinging to the so-called exemplarism of Augustine, they argued that man had the innate power to recognize first principles, and that this power, which was pos-

essed by the first Adam and restored by the Redemption as a grace, was superior to reason.

Observing that Aristotle was being used in order to reveal the limitations and even inaccuracies of current dogma, these Spirituals welcomed the new Aristotle which Averroes had laid bare. And it was all the better if Averroes, by revealing Aristotle as the complete pagan he was, in discrediting him, discredited reason as well. While the Scholastics were using reason in order to discredit Averroes, the Spirituals, such as Raimon Lull and Pierre Jean Olivi, overriding the moderation of Bonaventura, were using Averroes in order to discredit reason and therefore also Aristotle. In discrediting Aristotle they were casting suspicion on scholasticism as well and therefore on all the dogmas which appeared to be based on scholasticism.

b. Sources of Knowledge

i. Bonaventura. Leader of the Franciscan school, Bonaventura believed that man, being created in God's image, possessed not only reason, but innate, if potential, knowledge which, if cultivated by virtuous meditation, revealed first principles. It was a kind of grace.

The angels, the bad as well as the good, had been created with actual knowledge; Adam too, perhaps, had at first had it, but the punishment of the Fall had deprived him of it. His reason he had retained, but the knowledge could be recaptured only partially and as a reward of personal merit. This had been the belief of Augustine and, although for a different reason, of the Platonists. To Bonaventura sensuous knowledge could do no more than furnish certain corroborative symbols like those in the Old Testament: just as the latter prefigured the coming of the Virgin and Christ, so the sensuous world had prefigured that of the Trinity, and this because it presented at least twenty kinds of phenomena which naturally divided themselves into groups of three. Most of these triads, such as power, knowledge, and fulfilment (which was ecstasy or peace), or such as past, present, and future, were abstractions, but a few such as weight, number, and size, or artist, idea, and statue, were concrete and sensuous. These

were all rather reassurances than indispensable clues to, or corroborations of, what a true contemplative had already inwardly perceived.

ii. Aquinas. But under the now engulfing influence of Aristotle, Aquinas sought to eliminate the need for such innate and intuitive powers and to mark more sharply the difference between the angelic and the human ways of either corroborating the Bible or demonstrating further truths. Fallen man had been deprived of all knowledge, but he had been left with a rational mind which, by God's mere light, enabled him to perceive and demonstrate many truths by applying his reason to the natural, sensuous revelation. He must first abstract and infer, observe, and generalize and, only then, perhaps hope for the intuition which Bonaventura had boldly hoped to acquire by mere inner contemplation.

Aquinas was confident of man's capacity to do this because he had grasped what use not only the Platonists but also Aristotle had made of their reason. To him Aristotle had not only refined the Platonic premises, he had made far more ingenious and detailed use of them. Like Albertus, Aquinas recognized that there were certain truths such as the Trinity, Fall, Incarnation, and Resurrection which Aristotle had wholly failed even to suspect, and that in regard to other truths such as the Creation and individual immortality his reasoning had been faulty. Nevertheless, to Aquinas, Aristotle appeared to have demonstrated so many truths which either corroborated or even supplemented Revelation, that with discretion, it seemed worthwhile to try to separate the wheat from the chaff.

c. Mechanics of Knowledge

i. Light vs. Ideas. Before being in a position to conclude what was truth and what was not, it was necessary to explain in detail the mechanics by which this knowledge came into man's possession.

God was spirit, man's soul was also spirit. Therefore the Platonists, Augustinians, and now Bonaventura saw no difficulty in supposing that God was able to transmit His Ideas to the spiritual souls of men. Even the Platonists, to be sure, recognized that the objects perceived by the senses were needed

in order to receive these Ideas, but the Aristotelians were now reversing the respective roles attributed to these two sources by saying that it was not the senses which furnished the light and God the Ideas, but rather God who furnished the light and the senses the Ideas.

But how could these inferior material substances not only perceive but actually constitute the superior spiritual substances? How could knowledge of God come to man rather from matter than from God Himself? It might be only because Aristotle had undeniably so concluded that such an apparently sacrilegious hypothesis could be even thought of. Yet, on the other hand, why were man's senses and reason given him if they could only serve to reassure him of what in fact he already knew? For if this were the case, the *intelligam* would really be adding nothing to the *credo*, and this was what was distressing the intellectually minded Aristotelians. They believed that the faith was so reasonable that Christians, by using their senses and reason, were expected to learn how to prove to others that none of the dogmas were unreasonable and many of them logically demonstrable. But how could matter serve as the source of a spirit's knowledge of Spirit? It was Aristotle who seemed to have shown how this could be.

ii. The Senses. For to him knowledge begins with sensuous experience, that is, by the transmission, by means of the partly dematerialized sensuous species, or the image of the object present to the senses. These images were necessary only for the sight and hearing, since odor, taste, and feeling produced their sensations by direct contact. To these five outer senses the Aristotelians added, as a sixth, common sense, whereby, for example, the sight, sound, odor, and feeling of steam all together revealed when water was boiling.

In addition to these six outer senses there were also inner senses, of which the chief was imagination, as where we continue to see the sun after closing our eyes.

iii. The Heart. Next in ascending order was the heart. This served a triple purpose: first to furnish the body's heat and energy and therefore to activate the senses; secondly to cause the body to distinguish between pleasure and pain; and thirdly to activate the will. Although it might not seem very

Christian to distinguish so slightly between life and will, it was clear that life, unless it was capable of choosing pleasure rather than pain, could not long survive. Even the vegetative soul, therefore, had some sort of a will.

iv. The Brain. In the animal soul, however, there is also a brain. But since the beast is irrational and so not immortal, this brain cannot think and therefore cannot choose to forego ephemeral, for the sake of enduring, pleasure. Yet it differs from the vegetative soul because it serves as an indispensable intermediary between the senses and the intellect. Thus, according to Albertus at least, this brain seizes the phantasms it finds in the imagination, shoots them along a corridor which it possesses, and in this way makes them enduring as memory, where they remain indefinitely at the disposal of the intellect as often as this intellect has reason to wish to refer to them. This is the way in which the sensuous experience is transformed from an ephemeral, particularized, material thing into a relatively enduring spiritualized thing which the spiritual intellect is able to deal with.

v. The Intellect. That within the rational soul or intellect there was both a passive and an active element was now generally recognized, but there was not much agreement as to details. Aristotle had made the distinction the dividing line between the mortal body and the immortal particles of God, but this required radical revision by the Scholastics.

Bonaventura compared their relationship to that of matter and form. The passive element was the intermediary between the active element and the senses, neither being able to function independently of the other. This was hardly more than a formal concession to the Aristotelians.

But Albertus and Aquinas thought Aristotle's distinction enlightening if only because it added another step in the difficult problem of transmuting matter into spirit. Although to them the passive element was equally spiritual, rational, and immortal, it had the special capacity of being sensitive to the sensuous impressions as transformed by the brain into memory. Thus the soul, entering the body as the form of a purely generalized rational being, by means of its passive intellect was affected by the memories which the brain put at its dis-

posal; and it was in this way that the whole intellective soul became individualized and remained so when later separated from its body.

The active intellect is that part which lights up the knowledge which the passive receives and thereby renders it intelligible to the whole intellect. But this light is actually more than light because it already possesses (because created in the image of God and so participating in Him) a potential knowledge of First Principles. By the junction effected in the passive intellect these contrasting principles and knowledge were seen to fit together and thereby to reveal the various intelligible species or forms, which were God's Ideas, purposes, and causes.

On the whole these slightly varying scholastic efforts to fit Aristotle's two intellects into a Christian pattern were not impressive. Reacting after 1290 to Siger de Brabant's stress on the active intellect as the sole possessor of reason, Godefroid de Fontaines, Thomas of Sutton, and Egidio Romano declared that there was no need to suppose any active intellect because the passive, once supplied with the brain's memories, could automatically produce the intelligible species from them. Pierre de Trabes said this bisecting of the intellect or rational soul was unnecessary and objectionable.

A particular embarrassment to the Platonists and Augustinians was to explain how, since no inferior thing can influence any superior, the senses could in any way influence the intellect. But where there was a will there was a way: Pierre Jean Olivi said that since the soul was composed of the vegetative, sensitive, and rational elements, and yet was a One, its faculties or powers, being also a One, could so interchange their inferior and superior qualities that the inferior could acquire control. This was typical of how unconvincing mere ingenuity can so often be.

d. Greek Premises

From the reliability of reason, to the sources from which it derives, to the mechanics whereby these sources are transmitted to the human consciousness, we come next to certain premises from which the conclusions were primarily derived. The Christians had theirs in Revelation, but the pagans too, we must not forget, also had theirs.

The allegedly rational premises of the Greek philosophers were based, as we have said, on the observation that man and the sensible world seemed to be composed of opposites, such as light and darkness, heat and cold, big and little, good and evil, wisdom and folly, power and impotence, spirit (or form) and matter, motion and rest.

From these sensuous observations they readily inferred that the sensuous world itself must also have its opposite in the form of a supersensuous world. Since the sensuous world had certain characteristics, such as mutability, multiplicity, and disorder, which were clearly imperfect, the supersensible world must by contrast be perfect.

The third and perhaps the most decisive step in the creation of this premise was their assumption that, since there were everywhere relative opposites, there must, philosophically speaking, also be absolute opposites. For instance, there must not only be an absolute heat or cold, an absolute big and little, but also an absolute power and impotence, wisdom and ignorance, virtue and vice, immutability and mutability, eternity and ephemerality, Being and non-Being.

This general premise of a static world was at least consistent, but dynamics had also to be considered. Here, facing Aristotle's premise of change as an evolution or growth from potency to act—where perfection evolved out of imperfection—was his further premise that only a more perfect power can produce a less perfect one, which meant that only good can produce evil. Thus, while the more perfect was busy producing something which was less perfect than itself, these less perfect things were equally busy making themselves less imperfect.

The paradox may be illustrated by their allegation that a tiny flame, because only potentially a conflagration, was imperfect because this potentiality had not become actualized. Yet, by successfully actualizing and thereby perfecting itself, it reduced many other things to a new imperfection.

e. Scholastic Conclusions

i. Existence of God. Having accepted these Greek premises as tantamount to those to which reason must inevitably lead, it was a relatively easy matter to infer from them the ex-

istence of God. That such a proof was convincing nobody now denied; but the mystical school, led by Bonaventura, thought this exposition unnecessary and even sacrilegious, for it implied a double Revelation of God's existence, with the outer merely a corroboration of the inner.

The difficulty of this view, however, was that, even if the few skeptics like Frederick II or Averroes could be ignored, future ones could not be. Since according to Plato himself this assumption of innate knowledge was based on the empirical evidence of universal consent rather than on rational proofs, as a premise it risked being only ephemerally effectual.

Had rational proofs seemed elusive, as in the case of the Trinity, Bonaventura's view might have prevailed; but these seemed so plentiful that to most men it must have been thought disloyal to God to refuse to recognize them. Probably the most complete and authoritative were those selected by Aquinas, all of them based on the premise of absolute opposites.

These were that (1) since the opposite of motion was rest, there must also be immutability; (2) nothing can cause itself, so motion must be caused by rest; (3) changeful motion can only be ephemeral, therefore there must be something which is eternal; (4) the sensible world is imperfect in goodness, therefore there must be something perfect to make men recognize this imperfection; (5) even inanimate things betray some order and purpose, therefore they are being guided by some complete order and purpose.

This theory of absolute opposites could certainly lead to striking results: here Aquinas purports to prove that neither existence nor cause can be infinite in order to prove further that there must therefore be an existence or cause which is infinite! Egidio Romano said that, although these proofs were rational, this very rationality is a gift of grace. But only a few Franciscans such as Lull and Arnald de Villanova fancied that pure reason could also prove the existence of the Trinity.

ii. Attributes of God. Again assuming the undisputed premise of opposites and the hierarchy of perfections, it was a sound inference that God must be the embodiment of that perfection in contrast to the relative imperfection of man and

nature. The most essential characteristics of perfection lay in a Being of perfect or absolute power, wisdom, virtue, and will. Aquinas, moreover, claimed that this inference was corroborated by the fact that these were the very attributes which men naturally longed to possess and without which they must remain restless and dissatisfied. These must therefore be the very attributes—except absolute power, surely—which the saints did, or ultimately would, possess.

Although it was therefore thought to be axiomatic that God was omnipotent, even Bonaventura admitted that God cannot be at one and the same time both Himself and the opposite of Himself, or indeed anything other than Himself. Bonaventura also said that God could not create any other infinity because there cannot be two simultaneous infinities; nor could He cause any past event not to have occurred. For even God was unable to do anything which is logically impossible.

On the other hand, said Bonaventura, the logic of God's omnipotence sufficed to prove that God could do everything which cannot be proved to be illogical. Thus He can be spatially everywhere present because logic cannot prove that two substances cannot be present in the same place at the same time, or that one substance cannot be in two places at the same time. Similarly it cannot prove that a large being cannot occupy—as in the Real Presence—a small space or that an infinite being cannot be infinite in extension and yet have no centre.

Aquinas added more radical limitations. He not only agreed that God had no power to do what was logically impossible, he refined the pagan premise that God could not create perfection by explaining (according to Gilson, *Philosophie du Moyen Age*, 536) that “the assimilation of the world to God is inevitably deficient,” and this because “the order according to which this descent is effectuated is that very law which regulates the inner constitution of the universe.”

Was this use of the word *law* meant as a mere synonym of logic, or as a conscious acceptance of Aristotle's coeternal law of Nature?

Under the influence of Aristotle's rationalism and naturalism, Aquinas had hobbled the power of God. He had follow-

ers, but there was now also a return to, and even an exaggeration of, Bonaventura's beliefs. Henri de Gand, a theologian, and William de la Mare, a Franciscan, both ten years younger than Aquinas, declared that, since logic proved God's omnipotence, it necessarily also proved that God had the power to will, and therefore to do, what was logically impossible. As such they were among the first precursors of Duns Scotus.

The awkward corollary, however, was that, if so, God could have willed to create perfection, that is, a world without evil. Since He did not do so, it must be suspected that He was unable to, because it was equally logical that, without the existence of evil as its opposite, there could be no good. God Himself could be wholly good, but not His creatures. For this old Greek premise was not to be so easily dismissed.

Since God's perfection must also include perfect wisdom, this too He possessed. Although some supposed that, as Providence, He was indifferent to particular events, He nevertheless possessed a full foreknowledge of their occurrence. Bonaventura had alleged that God even foreknew all events which might, but in fact did not, occur; but Aquinas said that He could foreknow such contingencies only indeterminately—as whether an infant would have saved his soul if he had grown up. The Averroist Siger, on the other hand, denied God all foreknowledge.

God also had, or rather was, perfect virtue. But this had to be understood as perfect intent—at least by those who thought He had merely created the best of all possible worlds—and that He was able to bring about a general ultimate good only out of particular ephemeral evil. It was here that the question arose of whether justice or natural law was really created by Him or was coeternal. Egidio Romano said that although God cannot do anything positively evil, He can choose between degrees of goodness.

As perhaps in all human endeavor there was here, if not hypocrisy, at least a fair measure of cant. Even with faith unfettered by reason, a decent consistency of dogma was difficult enough to achieve. Reason, especially when saddled with the Greek conception of it, made consistency without intellectual chicanery a virtual impossibility. Jehovah and Christ were

persons, wielding a harsh and even merciless justice which was the more credible because the common experience of men on earth seemed to corroborate both Revelations. But the God of Plato and the God of Aristotle were merely forces, indispensable to Nature and perfect in themselves, yet endowed with only limited dominion over the worlds which had emanated, involuntarily, from them.

The effort to reconcile these two general conceptions could result only in a rickety structure as ingenious as it was fragile. It was held together at all only by being constantly shored up by a resourceful central authority which, among many other expedients, conferred on the purely merciful Virgin the title, but not the authority, of Queen of Heaven.

iii. Terminology. For some time now Aristotle's terminology had been hypnotizing virtually all the Scholastics, but as the skill with which it could be manipulated increased, so did the conclusions drawn from it become more elusive. The earlier problems had been merely which was the more real, the universal or the particular, ideas or substances, essence or existence; but the problem was now rather to determine first what each really was and exactly what were the differences between them.

Aquinas was perhaps the first to raise, if indirectly, this question by demonstrating that both ideas and substances could be understood in at least four different ways. He was a good prophet in remarking that the search for a proper definition of *essence* would probably never end. For he, like so many wise men, was as humble about the intellectual capacities of other men as he was about his own.

Many of those who followed after him, such as the Franciscans Raimon Lull and Pierre Jean Olivi, held to the sharp distinction between ideas and substances or essence and existence, but others such as Henri de Gand and Richard of Middleton declared that the two were identical.

At this same time Godefroid de Fontaines dared to suggest that, in contrast to ideas, substance, essence, existence, and entity were all merely different words meaning the same thing. Agostino Trionfo in his turn declared that ideas were mere man-made generalizations; Egidio Romano echoed this decla-

ration in arguing, if rather too artificially, that, since God's creation was of Being out of non-Being, His alleged precreation ideas could only have been non-Being.

Finally Pierre de Trabes, near Bordeaux, perhaps because he viewed Paris only from afar, observed that, before arguing whether Aristotle's active as distinct from passive intellect was possessed by men in common or individually, it should first be determined with more certainty whether the human intellect really was so subdivided. Until then, he said, to argue about such hypothetical subtleties was probably a waste of time.

iv. Immortality. Christianity had long ago adopted the Platonic conception of each individual man's soul as a separate substance created by God and joined by Him to matter in order that it might perfect itself. The pilot of a ship existed before boarding the ship, while in the act of navigating it, and still, and with added experience, after leaving it. The ship itself had a form of its own, but, with the pilot in control, the two together produced a further form. In the same way the living body possessed a plurality of substantial forms ranging from its shape to its rational soul, and at death the body lost only this last one, and the detached soul subsisted as a more perfect, substantial form now than when it had been first created. The theory therefore seemed to be not only compatible with the Christian faith in individual immortality, but to furnish an admirably convincing explanation of it.

To Aristotle, however, the soul, like any other form, was a mere potentiality until actualized by being united with an equally potential matter. It was only by their union that a substantial form came into being. Furthermore, on the theory that the hierarchy descended from the universal to the particular, the potential souls or forms were mere species and only lowliest matter was the cause of individuality.

So long as the soul remained in the body it was the only form of that body, and the previous forms became simply parts of the living body's matter. But at death the corpse became a new and lower form, and the soul, being separated from its body, ceased to be a form of any matter and therefore to be even a substance. What then, if anything, did it become?

Losing even its originally created potentiality to unite with matter, it could only subsist by reuniting with God.

There was therefore no individual immortality and consequently no rewards or punishments in any afterlife. Instead there was only a temporal immortality of the species. For only by propagation could mankind survive.

Here was one of the basic problems. Whereas Plato thought that matter merely served to actualize the soul's potential individuality, Aristotle thought that matter was not merely the occasion of individuality but its sole origin and source. The Dominicans Albertus and Aquinas chose to prefer the Aristotelian to the Platonic solution as the more in harmony with Christian belief. God had created matter because He wished each man to acquire individuality.

Aristotle, however, had declared further that, since those souls acquired individuality only because united to matter, they lost it when separated from the body by death. Men's end being to them the purely temporal one of perpetuating—and so perhaps of perfecting—their temporal lot, their souls, once separated from their respective bodies, having no further purpose or function, could only merge again with the One whence they had originated.

But this Albertus and Aquinas were unwilling to concede. Instead, they offered the very plausible argument that the soul had been individualized not merely long enough to be able to perpetuate its temporal species but chiefly in order, by means of heredity and environment on the one hand and of trials and tribulations on the other, to have the time needed to prepare itself for a fuller eternal life. To Aristotle as to Plato, the soul was not permanently changed by its sojourn in the body, whereas to Albertus and Aquinas the real purpose of its sojourn was to change it, so that at death each had become a complex individual instead of a mere sample of a species.

Some of the theologians, shocked by the decisive role thereby assigned to matter, argued that individuality was the joint creation of both soul and body. But this was mere evasion. To the pagans matter just *was*—it had no beginning and so no supernatural purpose; but to Christians it had been voluntarily created to serve man, and if the soul had already been

individualized, the body and the world could appear to be of use only as a laboratory demonstration of what God, from His foreknowledge of each soul's proclivities, was already fully informed.

Further to complicate the scholastic problem of individual immortality was the dogma of the ultimate resurrection of the body. Whether the soul after death retained its individuality because it had received it when still a form or only by its contact with matter, in neither case was it clear why it should have any further need for its body. Aquinas said that between its separation from the body at death and its reunion with it on the Last Day, the soul was in a state which, although not violent, was nevertheless not in accordance with its nature. Only by the recovery of its body would it achieve the plenitude of its natural perfection.

Whether or not the soul alone obtains the full beatific vision of God, it is still human enough to long for its body as well. Therefore this soul becomes completely happy only when its former body, although now necessarily spiritualized, rises to reunite with it. Only then is the immortality of each individual man completed. Thus, in contrast to Plato, it is not only the individual soul which is immortal, it is also, as an extension of Aristotle, the indivisible entity, man, which will subsist intact not only during his temporal life, but also, barring the awkward temporary separation, for all eternity.

3. SCIENCE

a. Justification

i. Aristotle and Albertus. Aristotle had said that the species Man was so constituted that sensuous truth was much more accessible to him than the supersensuous. Hitherto Aristotle had been known and admired chiefly as a logician, but the realization that he had regarded observation as more fruitful than ratiocination was presumably what now inspired Albertus' bold assertion that his study of the natural sciences was to satisfy curiosity rather than the needs of either medicine or agriculture. He was not to be shackled by utilitarian considerations, or even by the demands of the philosophers:

For it is not enough to know about universals; we must seek to know what is the special characteristic of each particular nature, because this is the best and perfect kind of knowing. (Thorndike, *History of Magic*, II, 535, n. 2.)

ii. Roger Bacon. Although Bacon, as we shall see, was influenced rather by utilitarian considerations, he also recognized Aristotle as a master rather of science than of logic. In contrast to Porphyry, Boethius, and Abelard, Bacon, following rather John of Salisbury, recognized that Aristotle's stress on the categories, as of time, matter, essence, similitudes, etc., was in order to create a firm foundation, not for supersensuous but for sensuous knowledge. That, he thought, was why the mere logicians had so far found almost nothing on which they could agree. In addition to the single step from logic to God, there was also the step from science to God. The symbolists like Bonaventura were on the right track but theirs was only a beginning.

Bacon began his exposition with the premise that the Fall was natural in the sense that whereas mankind fell into sin and from sin into ignorance, Nature on the other hand, although created for the temporal benefit of the deathless first Adam, did not change. It was the wisdom of Solomon, he said, which, recognizing God's true purpose to be to promote man's virtue and happiness, first revived a second Golden Age, and Thales was the first Greek to follow his example. A second decline was next reversed by the prophets and Aristotle which led to the third Golden Age of the Roman Empire, culminating in Christ's Revelation and lasting until the invasions and the Third Fall. The sin of ignorance was here again the cause and the Scholastics constituted, or ought to constitute, the next revival. For just as knowledge alone was incapable of effecting a revival, so was virtue. But if medieval virtue had been adequate, its knowledge had remained deplorable. It was essential, therefore, to redress the balance.

To this end two disciplines should be revived: the study of the Hebrew and Greek languages in order to find out what the Bible really said, and the study of mathematics in order to find out how the world was designed. Christ had been concerned only to reveal those ultimate truths which such men as Aristotle, and later Seneca, had been unable to discern.

Therefore only when the two Revelations had both been independently and meticulously analyzed would it be possible to recognize by comparing them, what the over-all Revelation was.

What was this Golden Age towards which Bacon aspired? His collaboration of virtue and knowledge, perhaps analogous to the scholastic form and matter, gives the answer. God wished all men well, but He left it largely up to them to realize His purpose. This ultimate purpose was salvation for all. Therefore the immediate task was to convert the infidel—by persuasion if possible; if not, by force or the threat of it. To this end to set a mere good example was not enough; tangible temporal superiority in knowledge and physical power was equally necessary. This involved a higher standard of living, superior justice, physical health (including greater longevity), and peace (domestic as well as foreign). Like God, man must seek that power, wisdom, and virtue which would make both God and man happy. It will perhaps even serve, by astrology, to foretell—and perhaps forestall—the coming of Antichrist. The temporal immortality which it had been in Adam's power to enjoy could presumably never be regained, but, since many of the patriarchs had lived for hundreds of years, this much was still a possibility.

iii. Robert Kilwardby. Of Bacon's immediate successors very few seem to have thought this problem through. Aquinas said that God had created the world primarily in order the better to reveal His own perfections; Raimon Lull simply said that science was indispensable to the acquisition of a knowledge of God. Robert Kilwardby, however, was close to Bacon when he explained how the study of science must have arisen naturally out of practical needs rather than theoretical curiosity, and his example was how the need of a resurvey of the Nile valley after its annual flood led to geometrical discoveries which Pythagoras then developed into mathematical laws. He did not specifically infer that this flooding was God's way of attracting men to scientific inquiries, but he could hardly have supposed that Pythagoras, in doing as he did, had been tempted by the Devil, and there is no suggestion that God might not have approved.

b. Method

i. The Three Experiences. Fifty years before, Alain de Lille had said that each discipline required a different kind of reason; and by reason he probably had in mind method rather than logic. At the two extremes were the inner experiences: the one of God, the other of mathematics. In between were the outer or sensuous experiences, based primarily on observation but with experiment often superimposed.

ii. Albertus. Albertus, no less than his contemporary Frederick II, was the great observer because his chief study, apart from philosophy, was natural science. His books on geology, climatology, zoology, botany, and mineralogy were not mere restatements of classical or Arabic texts but critical appreciations, with his own corrections and additions. His account of the life sequence of the butterfly probably surpassed any analogous earlier work in its sustained and meticulous observation, and often when observation did not satisfy him he experimented, dissecting the crickets, removing the antennae of the ant, decapitating the cicada, feeding salt water to a turtle and iron to an ostrich. In some cases he could rely only on negative evidence: he had never seen the salamander, beaver, or barnacle goose in any way confirm the legends about them; and having never seen a phoenix at all, he could not be categorical; but he did say that these latter were, appropriately, the objects rather of mystical than of scientific, investigation.

iii. Roger Bacon. Unlike Albertus, Bacon did not disassociate science from faith. He was therefore more credulous of what people or books told him. His faith seems to have been based on such hearsay rather than on that inner experience which he said led only to mysticism; and he thought that the Apocrypha must be authoritative because Ambrose had so regarded them. Hearsay too was the basis of his philosophy of history, and it led him to argue that spontaneous generation and the Virgin birth together proved the truth of both.

iv. Albertus and Bacon. All the investigators were still looking for causes, but Albertus, being a naturalist, believed that it was first necessary to determine what it was that was

being caused. Bacon, being a physicist, found less difficulty in determining the *what* and was therefore impelled also to seek the *how*. Thus in concrete terms Albertus had first to observe the growth of the butterfly before he could worry about the cause; Bacon could not help but observe the rainbow and could therefore at once begin to worry about the cause. This was why Albertus was as unconcerned as Bacon was concerned with mathematics.

Both believed that experiment was the decisive determination of the truth and therefore engaged in it as often as it promised to be fruitful; both speculated regarding the *how* when balked or when their curiosity remained unsatisfied. But on the whole each concentrated on a specific discipline and tried first to bolster it at its weakest point: in the one case chiefly by observation, in the other chiefly by mathematics.

v. Pierre Peregrin de Maricourt. Pierre de Maricourt has been described as Bacon's master; but since his only known work did not appear until 1269, when Bacon was already about fifty-seven, it is safer rather to regard them as contemporaries. Maricourt is chiefly famous for his experiments with magnetism, but it should also be remembered that he was the first on record to declare that every experimenter must, like the surgeon, acquire manual as well as intellectual skills. He declared further that experimenters, if they worked in collaboration, could greatly accelerate the rate at which discoveries could be made. Bacon's extravagant praise of him suggests that they collaborated, and it may well be that much of Bacon's great achievement was in fact a joint one.

c. Aristotle's Physics

i. Changes in Form. According to Aristotle, both form and matter were mere potentialities, becoming actualized as substances only when united. The same form can then change its matter, as when the rational soul's body grows from infancy to maturity. The same matter can then likewise change its form, as when by death the body assumes the form of a soulless corpse. The corpse, indeed, in the course of putrefaction, in turn loses its form as corpse, assuming a multitude of lower forms such as bones and even worms.

These changes occur by degrees until they are such as to cause a change in the body's primary qualities. A body consists first of the four elements—fire, air, water, and earth; secondly, of four qualities—hot and dry, hot and wet, cold and wet, cold and dry; and finally, if a living body, of Galen's four humors—blood, yellow bile, phlegm, and black bile. Only when these distinctive but interrelated compounds of matter change their primary qualities is there a change in its so-called substantial form. Thus a drop of wine in the ocean loses its form, but the ocean's form subsists. In contrast to the Arabic preference for a flux or gradual change from one form into another, Albertus held to Aristotle's conception of the fluidity of a single form, evolving from potency to act. Artificial as this concept of form now seems, the Scholastics for a long time did not discard it.

Aristotle's explanation of how a substance changed its form by being subdivided was also generally accepted. The problem was based on the paradox that the inner as well as the outer of two concentric circles must consist of an infinite number of points; yet, if only points, they occupied no space, and if more than points they could not be infinite.

For to him space was not infinitely large, but matter could nevertheless be infinitely divided within that space. It was clearly as hard to imagine infinite space as it was easy to imagine infinite divisions within it. The question therefore arose of how far a substance could be divided without losing its substantial form. Bacon said that so long as the separated parts were otherwise like the whole they retained their form, but if small enough they lost their operative force. On the other hand, the Averroist Siger claimed that a separate part of any whole, by being of a new size assumed a new form. Egidio, however, said that any substance, provided that it was lifeless, could be infinitely divided and yet not change its form.

At the precise instant of a change of form Aristotle had said that it was the new rather than the old form which existed. But Petrus Hispanus said rather that neither existed because there was a gap between life and death, visibility and invisibility, motion and rest.

The identification of different minerals had long been begun by the empirical artisans. More and more of the different

species were now being identified by Thomas de Cantimpré and Albertus. But a fruitful approach was hampered by notions of occult virtues and now, more seriously, by Aristotle's forms and above all by the almost universal belief that matter was constituted of the four elements. Being heavy, metals must be composed chiefly of earth and were, therefore, to be differentiated only by what proportions of water, air, or fire they might also contain. Furthermore Bacon, led on by Aristotle's doctrine of the desire of all substances to perfect themselves, came to believe that man, by ingenious experiment, could accelerate this change—as from iron into gold.

Albertus was not to be so easily led astray. He showed his independence of both tradition and Aristotle by supposing that the fundamental elements were rather arsenic, sulphur, and water. A generation later others reduced these to mercury and sulphur.

Although the ideas of the infinite divisibility of matter and of indivisible atoms were now in the air, neither appears to have so far exercised any particular influence on chemical development.

ii. Expansion and Contraction. Aristotle had said that the substances of the sublunar world each had a density corresponding to the proportions of the elements in them. For the density of earth was ten times that of water, water ten times that of air, and air ten times that of fire. Therefore also the weight of any material body depended on the proportions of each of these constituent elements. This could serve to explain why the weight could remain constant but not why the density could vary. For a substance of unvarying weight was, by expanding or contracting, constantly changing its volume and thereby its density.

Temperature changes were the apparent cause, but how could these change the proportions of the four constituent elements? Did this mean that more fire entered the body? Richard of Middleton apparently supposed so, but Godefroid de Fontaines and Thomas of Sutton thought it more likely that the four elements themselves, instead of being of a fixed density in proportion to the others, each possessed indeterminate dimensions. Egidio Romano stated more explicitly,

although he later contradicted himself, that each element possessed a natural power to vary its volume apart from any change in its weight. Since the particles were infinitely divisible, there must be degrees of infinite divisibility.

Aquinas had realized that the Eucharist, although changed from a material to a spiritual substance, continued to be susceptible to expansion and contraction. Since it was then generally supposed that, as in alchemy, a material substance could be identified by its appearance, it seemed to Aquinas, not that the expansion and contraction raised any doubt about the truth of the transubstantiation but were rather a valid corroboration of the faith that this change was miraculous.

iii. Vacuum. Aristotle's further assumption that nature, as it was said, abhorred a vacuum, raised another problem. Egidio Romano did not say that God could not have created a vacuum but only that, had He tried to, there would still have been no distance between the different substances. For God could create space only *by* creating substances. His Creation was of something out of nothing and this something was a substance which, possessing extension or volume, itself created the space which it required. Empty space was nothing, and, like the Neoplatonic evil, since God created only something, neither was created and therefore could not exist.

If, therefore, substances can expand or contract must not space do likewise?

iv. Energy and Motion. That all energy and therefore motion and change were transmitted from God to earth by the celestial bodies was now more than ever undisputed. Only the miracle was directly transmitted and even the soul was merely an impotent potentiality until vitalized by union with a body.

The celestial bodies were eternal; and, because they had to move eternally, this motion could only be in a perfect circle. It was in order to reconcile this circular motion with their observed motions that the complicated concentric planetary spheres of Aristotle and the Ptolemaic epicycles had both been devised. The Aristotelian explanation was the more logical because according to it the earth was at the centre of all the circular orbits; but the Ptolemaic was usually preferred—

as by Bernard de Verdun, Bernard de La Treille, Egidio Romano, and Guillaume de Saint-Cloud—because reliance on it increased the accuracy of the prophecies of the future celestial motions and therefore of the coming seasons.

In about 1290 the University of Paris officially declared the Ptolemaic hypothesis the orthodox one and Oxford followed suit. Italy, however, for a time continued to prefer Aristotle.

Again according to Aristotle, the terrestrial, in contrast to the celestial, substances had natural motions only in a straight line and only vertically up or down—as fire towards the top, earth towards the bottom. They did not always lie motionless at their respective levels only because the motion, especially of the sun, kept disturbing them. This was true of living as well as of lifeless substances: all energy derived from the sun, even man's; and many Scholastics admitted that only men's power to choose between alternative ways of expending their energy saved their acts and even thoughts from being predetermined. Orthodoxy, however, dared not go so far. The astronomer Robert of England, working at Montpellier, was condemned by the University of Paris in 1277 for alleging that, although the motion of the heavens cannot stop, if it did, every motion below them, and so presumably that of man, would also stop. Roger Bacon, who was perhaps Robert's master, was condemned at the same time for more serious indiscretions, for he had said, among other things, that the stars were the cause of the multiplicity of religious sects and that, obedient of course to God's will, even the incarnated Christ had been under their influence. That God had merely made use of the stars in order to bring these things to pass was evidently not thought to be sufficiently reassuring.

Since there was no vacuum, every substance was in physical contact with some other, and when (cf. Descartes' Vortices) any one of them changed its location another had instantaneously to take its place. As this was true of the natural vertical motions of the four elements, so it was of violent motions, as when a projectile, for example, was hurled horizontally by a projector. Aristotle had said that it continued to move after breaking contact with the projector because the intervening air was in its turn still being hurled by the projector; but it

was now being objected that this horizontal motion continued after the projector itself had ceased to move.

Siger de Brabant therefore supposed that it was the air which the projectile was displacing which rushed in to fill the space being vacated. This already—provided he assumed that the projector had ceased to move—presupposed a certain impetus subsisting in the projectile; but this idea was obscured by bringing in the influence of the air. For surely the rush of the air to fill in the space being vacated by the projectile was only possible because the projectile itself was now moving of its own accord.

Bacon, and after him Olivi, recognized that neither explanation really tallied with common sense, and they were therefore driven to conclude that the projectile had a motion generated from within. This was because it also possessed a natural but passive or potential capacity or desire to move horizontally which was activated by the pressure exerted by the projector, so that it then freely sought its end, at least momentarily, by describing a curve. Lame as this hypothesis must seem to us, it was a body blow to the hitherto unchallenged one of Aristotle.

Robert Kilwardby got no further. He explained how the celestial substances were endowed by God with the capacity as well as the desire to move eternally in their circular orbits, in contrast to the constantly thwarted desires of the terrestrial substances. But this is in no sense an indication that he preferred the Baconian to the Aristotelian suggestion of why the terrestrial projectile could continue to move horizontally. Possibly Maricourt and others, in trying to invent a perpetual motion machine, were further along on the long trail which was to lead to the law of inertia. But this could be only if by chance the celestial substances moved passively rather than because of any active desire, and also only if by chance terrestrial bodies were governed by the same laws as the celestial.

d. Measure and Precision

i. Mathematics. At Paris Aristotle was in the ascendant, and his technique for the study of nature was based on logic and quality. But at Oxford Plato was holding his own and

this was partly because his quantitative and mathematical approach seemed to lead to results which were no less logical and much more demonstrable and precise.

Amplifying our records of the surviving texts, we also have Bacon's own list of the best mathematicians of his day. Starting with Grosseteste and Adam Marsh before 1250, the full list would be Nicolas de Paris, Maricourt, Bacon himself, Thomas of Bungay, John Peckham, John of London, and Roger of Marston. Of these nine, seven were English, two from Northern France, and, of these two, Maricourt was presumably called *Peregrinus* or stranger because he was teaching abroad, which we may suspect was at Oxford.

Pure mathematics was probably not the prime attraction. To be sure, by reading the Greek texts—and not always in translation either—they became aware of such phenomena as the 'pure' numbers from 6 and 28 upwards, the sum of whose factors was equal to them. It seems safe to say, however, that, like Bacon himself, they were chiefly concerned to apply their mathematics to the study of the natural sciences.

ii. Time. It would now appear that, instead of imagining as Aristotle had that time was an effect or product of the process of becoming, that is, from potency to act, the Oxonians were rather seeing becoming as the product of time.

Aristotle had alleged that a heavy substance's desire was to fall instantaneously. But, due to the resistance of lighter substances, it fell gradually, its velocity increasing however—provided the resistance was constant—as it approached its natural location. But Richard of Middleton was now asserting that the acceleration in velocity corresponded not to the distance from its end, but rather to the distance from its point of departure.

iii. Space. Similarly Aristotle had alleged that space was the result or effect of the existence of substances, whereas it was now being alleged that substances had extension only because there was space.

When Maricourt was insisting that a scientist must acquire manual skills he must have had in mind the mariner's use of the astrolabe for vertical, and the azimuth for horizontal, measurements, as well as the instruments used by the survey-

ors. For in these ways charts and general maps of space could be made far more reliable.

Guillaume de Saint-Cloud, a follower of Roger Bacon and possibly an Englishman himself, founder of the school of astronomy in Paris about 1286, must have followed Maricourt's advice. For he invented an instrument, of which we now have no description, but with which he made not only a remarkably accurate calculation of the obliquity of the ecliptic in 1290, but also a calculation of the latitude of Paris as $68^{\circ} 50'$ which stands to this day.

iv. Refraction. To these instances of precision is to be added the work on refraction, inaugurated fifty years earlier by Robert Grosseteste and now being more extensively applied to the rainbow, the magnifying glass (including spectacles), and the burning glass.

v. Weight and Pressure. Methods of measuring the weight of a substance had of course been employed for centuries, but mathematics was now permitting a new precision. We can see from such architectural records as those of Villard de Honnecourt shortly before 1250 that the thrusts and other pressures in the cathedrals were resourcefully dealt with, but how much this achievement was purely the result of trial and error is not clear. More precise results were probably also being obtained in the use of balances or scales to obtain both comparative and absolute weights.

Latin texts purporting to be translations from the eighth-century Arabic texts of a certain Geber recorded the experimental discovery that lead gained a definite weight when calcinized, from which it was now being inferred that the cause was the entry of spirit into body. It may be noted that it was at this same time that Egidio Romano was trying to find out at what precise moment the rational human soul entered its body.

vi. Proportion. As with weight so with proportion: in preparing food or medical prescriptions trial and error had led to successive improvements. Since music had long been recognized as dependent on mathematics, harmonies and rhythms were now profiting by the advances.

In chemistry assaying for the purifying of metals and the mixing, as in coinage, of appropriate alloys, could now also be made more precise, although the secret of the mathematical basis of compounds was long to remain undiscovered.

vii. The Theoretical and Practical Approaches. Whether the theoretical or the practical approaches were the more responsible for this advance is, as is usual in such cases, hard to determine because only the combined pressure of both was doubtless indispensable. But the now increasing recognition that, if progress in the understanding of nature was to continue, practical, empirical discoveries must be given as much consideration as those of logic, marked the dawn of a new scientific era, which was still, however, to remain substantially scholastic.

e. Medicine

Close to the Mediterranean and on the land route from Italy to Spain, Montpellier was the site of the first university of medicine in France, having become such before 1220. For a time it had been under the influence of Salerno and therefore chiefly of Hippocrates, but, by 1250, the Jews and Arabs of Spain had introduced Galen, who, following the lead of Aristotle, had turned medicine from reliance on the empirical methods emphasizing diet and regime towards that speculative learning which was unfortunately based on balancing the supposed proportions in the body of the four elements, four qualities, four humors and four complexions. Only the importance of man's bodily health now kept the medical art from turning wholly to magic.

The authorities at Montpellier were for a time chiefly the Spaniards Petrus Hispanus, Raimon Lull, and Arnald de Villanova. In northern France, at any rate, the first physician of note was Jean de Saint-Amand, a Galenist from Brabant. Bacon to be sure, like the Spaniards, urged the need of combining reason and experience, but one of his few sensible medical suggestions was that, since animals had not suffered the penalties of the Fall, man should, by observing how they cured themselves, learn how likewise to cure himself.

A generation after Saint-Amand appeared the first French

surgeon, Jean Pitard of Normandy, who in this capacity served three French kings. When a famous Milanese surgeon Lanfranchi was driven from Italy in 1290, Pitard welcomed him in Paris, and together they founded the serious study there of both medicine and surgery. Pitard is the reputed founder there of the surgical school of Saint-Côme.

As a physician Lanfranchi was a theorist—a Scholastic and Galenist—but he was also a surgeon. He therefore taught that in order to be a good doctor a man must become equally skillful in both of these arts, and he particularly berated the physicians because they left bloodletting to a barber-surgeon on the pretext either that manual skill was beneath them or that they had compunctions against shedding blood. The fact was, Lanfranchi said, that they dared not betray their ignorance of the surgical art. As teacher he employed clinical methods and performed public operations to illustrate his instruction.

Such men no doubt helped to raise surgery from the level of the barber to that of a more reputable art, but Lanfranchi, at any rate, only helped to sink therapeutics deeper into its learned rut, while Arnald de Villanova admitted giving prescriptions more for their psychological than for their physiological effects.

f. For the Layman

i. The French Vernacular. Most of the texts so far expounded were written in Latin by scholars for other scholars. But since most laymen, although their interest in science was growing, could not read or understand Latin, there was a rising demand for such information in the French vernacular.

In Charles Langlois' *La Connaissance de la Nature* (1927) four of the most popular such texts appearing at this time are thoroughly analyzed and paraphrased. These are Gossuin de Metz's *L'Image du Monde*, Brunetto Latini's *Livre du Trésor* (written in French when he was living in France), and two anonymous works called respectively *Le Roman de Sidrach* and *Placidus et Timeo*. Their respective dates of publication were, roughly, 1252, 1275, 1287, and 1295.

ii. Astronomy. On astronomy these books dealt only with a few matters of special interest: in spite of the rising belief

that God created the celestial substances in order to enable men to foretell coming events, Gossuin had merely supposed that just as a king needs the help of ministers, so God needed these substances in order to cause the natural terrestrial events. Why God took pains to make them visible to men, however, Gossuin did not explain.

Like almost everybody else, Gossuin stressed the gigantic size of the created universe. But, whereas he said that God made it spherical simply in order to save space and make it easier to move, the author of the *Placidus* added that this motion was essential in order to create the heat by means of which all things on earth could be brought to birth.

iii. Physics. Physics was also only incidentally dealt with. In the *Sidrach* it was said that the magnet pointed north because iron had an affinity for, and therefore strove to join, the pole star. In *Placidus* it was alleged that fire was luminous because it had the capacity to store up the light it received from the sun.

iv. The Earth. Both Brunetto and the *Sidrach* declared that the earth was round. Doubtless all four agreed that the earth as well as the universe was spherical. Gossuin, at least, added that the earth was not in any way supported or suspended.

Brunetto, apparently in order to account for springs, believed that the ocean surface was higher than that of the land, whereas the *Sidrach* more sensibly held the contrary.

Both Brunetto and the *Sidrach* believed that the antipodes were inhabited by men; but Brunetto was confused in explaining that when there is day here there is night there, and in adding that daylight predominates at the equator and night at the two poles. The *Sidrach*, on the other hand, seemed to recognize that the antipodes were rather south of the equator than exactly opposite to Europe.

v. Man and Beast. Gossuin spoke of the importance of travel if one wished to know more about men, and he told about cannibals, giants, pigmies, and men who had tails. Like so many others, he had been to the East and on his return he had climbed Mount Etna, but he was on that account no less

credulous of the tales others told of lands where he had not been.

The *Sidrach* was evidently influenced by Aristotle's tendency to divide everything into fours. For paralleling Aristotle's proportional volumes of fire, air, water, and earth, it tells us that for every man there are a hundred beasts, for every beast a hundred birds, and for every bird a hundred fish. This, it says, must be so because man is composed chiefly of earth, fish of water, birds of air, and beasts of fire! The inconsistencies in the two sequences well indicate how many independent sources had been drawn upon without any effort to co-ordinate them. The assumption that in all such groups there must be a division into four seemed to blind the compiler to their artificialities.

The *Sidrach* also stated that, although men would gradually shrink in bodily stature, they would also become ever more numerous. Finally, in case a man might be ruminating about his good or bad luck in being born at all, the *Sidrach* assured him that, had his parents not produced him, he would merely have been born of some other parents—which meant, presumably, that his soul had first been created and when the time for its incarnation came would enter the body of the first infant which became available.

Medically the *Sidrach* prescribed eating once a day, copulating once a week, a bleeding once a month, and a purge once a year. The *Placidus* warned against copulation too early or often and advised bathing at least twice a month. It was certainly one advantage of the Hippocratic regime that, except for bleeding, the physician and his fee were not often necessary.

4. MAGIC

a. Sources

The sources of magic are as obscure as were once those of the Nile. In France alone they were Celtic, Roman, Christian, and Germanic, and, until about 1200, they had been kept somewhat under control by being either assimilated, tolerated as innocuous, or repudiated as dangerous, superstitions.

But in the course of the thirteenth century there was an influx of new magical beliefs from the East and, via Italy and Spain, from Jewish sources such as the Cabbala and from Moslem sources such as the Koran. It was difficult to determine which were true or desirable and which were not.

b. Distinguished from Science

The distinction between magic and science must be personal and arbitrary because it is only one of degree. Being largely a matter of the relation of cause to effect, the problem was to ascertain, first precisely what each of these were, and secondly the relationship between them.

When one ball collided with another the relationship was clear: the two balls were visible as cause and effect and the consequence was invariably recurrent.

When, however, a certain drug usually had a beneficial effect, and another usually poisoned, the causes were identifiable enough, but the action was not visible nor the effect invariable.

c. The Magnet

In a third class of cases the reverse was true: the magnet, although like the ball visible, was like Aristotle's First Mover inert, yet unlike the drug, its effect was invariable. Its power as a cause was therefore a scientific although an occult fact. The proof of this was that it enabled Maricourt to discover the further fact of the positive and negative poles, and that it helped to assure Bacon that bodies of the same nature had an affinity for one another, tending rather to union than to dispersal. Although neither he nor anyone else for many centuries thought of applying this principle to explain the circular motions of the planets around the sun, or of the moon around the earth, his was an early step towards the conception of the law of gravity because he substituted occult physical powers for Aristotle's psychological desires. Where other phenomena were being explained as due to this innate desire, he preferred to allege that the cause was merely occult, that is, the as yet mysterious behavior of natural forces such as air, sound, or even odor.

d. Astrology

i. Celestial Powers. Although, as we have said, it was now agreed that the celestial bodies were the cause of earthly events, there was still doubt as to whether men could ever read their secrets. About 1250 Albertus as well as Gossuin was skeptical. Shortly after, however, Bacon declared that, although no one had yet succeeded, this was possible, and he also believed that the celestial influences were so all-embracing that they were the cause not only of material but also of spiritual effects, such as the rise and fall of heresies, and even of the Incarnation. This was beyond anything that even the Manichees had alleged, and Aquinas and Lull were inclined to agree with him, although with the express reservation that the original cause of these effects was neither Nature nor the Devil but only God. All agreed, however, that the only way to find out the extent of these celestial influences was minutely to study their behavior by comparing their conjunctions with the events which followed them.

ii. Conjunctions. The Greek calculation of the regular precession of the equinoxes which would repeat itself at the end of the Great Year was now known. Theoretically, therefore, if men could determine what had happened at any given moment of the previous Great Year they could prophesy when and what would recur in this one. Since, however, it was obvious that there could not even be a pretense of knowing what had happened so long before, the astrologers had to fall back on the recurring conjunctions of only a few of the celestial bodies. Even then, the past effects were so many and so vaguely identifiable that they had to resort further to tradition, myth, and even arbitrary invention, in order to draw any conclusions at all.

At this time the most generally accepted kind of conclusion was that certain periods, such as the solar seasons or the waxing or waning of the moon, were propitious or unpropitious, and Roman or Arabic or some other accessible lore elaborated their significances. Bacon, who relied heavily on biblical authority, said that:

The saints, like Moses and others, performed their [miraculous?] works under chosen constellations. (*Opus Maius*, III, 14.)

But, if there was a favorable moment, how could it be equally so for both of two antagonists? We have mentioned that William the Conqueror had scored such beliefs. To be sure, he was not versed in the European tradition, but it may also be that he could not see why any conjunction should be favorable only to him.

This brings up the theory of nativities according to which every man's future destiny on earth was determined by the position of the celestial bodies at the moment of his birth. This belief was elaborated only much later, but if men did not yet think that such a destiny could be ascertained, they could already suspect that their temporal destinies, at least, had been predetermined.

iii. Late Views. As the century drew to a close, belief in astrology was spreading fast. The worldly Jean de Meung expressed his skepticism, but many of the learned could not resist the temptation to it. At the end of the century Henri Bate de Malines, although an able astronomer, was reputed to be an even abler astrologer.

e. Alchemy

As astrology was the bastard daughter of astronomy, so was alchemy of chemistry. For both were inspired by the will to believe that there were shortcuts to the alleviation of temporal shortcomings: the one for evading calamities, the other for procuring further advantages. For the alchemists hoped to produce either the Elixir of Life or Philosopher's Stone which would confer if not a renewal of youth at least greater health and longevity; or else alternatively, gold, and thereby wealth. The process by which the Elixir might be extracted was, as Bacon said, the nobler of the two: it did not need to be kept a secret because its discovery would benefit everybody equally. But the process of producing gold had to be kept secret because it was doubtless realized that if everybody could have all the gold he wanted to no one would be any better off.

There were plenty of ancient texts, such as those of Hermes and Alexander of Aphrodisias, already available, but it was the Arabic texts, based on the ancient ones and further elab-

orated, which were now leading almost everybody to believe that such a transmutation of metals was possible, and many were being led to believe that it had already been accomplished.

Three writers were especially responsible for the new vogue of magic in France: Bartholomew Glanville of England, whose unoriginal but compact encyclopedia of science was to be widely read until after 1500; Vincent of Beauvais, a Burgundian, whose equally unoriginal but enormously bulky compilation was hardly less influential; and Albertus, who, though discriminating and cautious, suffered in reputation because of the quantity of very inferior alchemical texts which won recognition by means of the fraudulent use of his name. Albertus had been a victim of this, as had Augustine and many others before and after him, because his pre-eminence was so generally recognized. For Albertus knew more about metals than anyone else of his time or indeed until much later: he recommended the creation of laboratories for further experiments and was constantly studying what the miners and artisans knew. Although he would not pronounce transmutation to be impossible, he said it was a matter not of natural science but of magic, for he doubted that metals, being in fact composites of different metals, were interchangeable, and doubted above all that transmutation had so far ever been achieved.

Bacon, as we have said, was naïvely hopeful that he or another would some day produce the Elixir, perhaps more than one. Aquinas rather shared Albertus' doubt because, he said, real transmutation required the utilization of the occult forces of the celestial virtues. Jean de Meung allowed, perhaps rather condescendingly, that alchemy should at least prove more fruitful than astrology. In the South, Lull seems to have denied even the possibility of transmutations, but Arnald de Villanova followed Bacon in pursuing the elusive Elixir.

The truth was that men were at this time only beginning to distinguish one kind of metal from another, with no idea of what they called the substance or primal matter in them. They were just breaking out of the egg of symbolism and be-

coming conscious that God intended men not only to heed what Nature openly revealed to them pertaining to their salvation, but also to find out what Nature, if patiently and minutely observed, could teach them in matters pertaining to their ephemeral welfare while in the flesh.

f. Coincidences

i. Natural. In astrology the identification of the sun or moon as causes of specific effects gave men a reasonable confidence that all the planets were the causes of all other effects. The only problem was to determine which of their motions caused which effects. Similarly the alchemists, being certain that fire transmuted wood into ashes, could have a reasonable confidence that fire would cause changes in the nature of many other material substances.

But in many other cases the expected effects were so often not realized that it remained a fair question whether the supposed cause had any identifiable effect, or whether the apparent relation between them was not rather merely coincidental. Thus when after an herb, ointment, or animal part had been administered one patient recovered but another died, although the prescription may have caused both results, or one or the other, it may just as well have caused neither. Talismans and effigies faced the same difficulty, as did also the dream.

The belief in such magic was chiefly due to trust in hearsay, much of it based on a respect for whatever had been reported from a distance either in space or in time. Not otherwise, surely, could so careful an observer as Albertus have stated, as Thorndike (*History of Magic*, II, 560-561) paraphrased it, that,

a diet of lion's flesh benefits paralytics. Garments wrapped in its skin are secure from moths, and hair falls out of a wolf's skin which is left near a lion's skin. If the tooth of a lion, which is called caninus, is suspended about a boy's neck before he loses his first teeth, he will be free from toothache when his second teeth come in. Lion's fat mixed with other unguents removes blotches, and rubbing cancer with its blood cures that disease. Drinking a little of its gall cures jaundice; its liver in wine checks pain in the liver.

Its brain, if eaten causes madness; but it cures deafness if inserted in the ear with some strong oil.

Even though Albertus relied too much on hearsay, the probability is that he did so largely because he believed that everything terrestrial as well as celestial had been created by God in order to promote man's temporal as well as eternal welfare. Just as the teleological premise allowed no waste of either time or space, so it allowed no waste of substances, even of any of the parts of a lion's corpse. Yet that Albertus was in this respect rather at the vanguard than at the rear guard of science, is indicated by the fact that such a teleological notion began to be seriously challenged by the physicians only after 1650.

Those who, like Albertus, Bacon, or Raimon Lull, were primarily theologians, metaphysicians, or physicists, could afford to concern themselves with magic or not as they pleased; but the physician had no alternative. He was paid by the sick to cure them, and magic seemed to offer the best chance of success. One of the best known was Petrus Hispanus, renowned also as a master of logic, who became pope, as John XXI, in 1276. His works were full of magical prescriptions based on occult virtues. Sometimes he employed sympathetic magic analogous to effigies because both were like the magnet operative at a distance; but more often he relied on physical contact as by 'suspension' of an object around the neck, or by ligature, as of a healthy right foot being bound to another's ailing right foot. An equally famous physician of a later generation, Arnald de Villanova, although reputedly an expert on poison, often preferred, as we have said, to rely on psychological rather than physiological therapy. Nevertheless, if we may judge from the bulk of his writings, he, no less than Petrus Hispanus, was fascinated by the supposed powers of magic, whether in astrology, alchemy, demonology, incantations, or in the use of gems or seals.

Unlike his predecessor Petrus, Arnald did not crown his career by becoming pope but he did become adviser to several kings and, although at times under suspicion, won the confidence of Pope Clement V. Already, therefore, along the coast of the Mediterranean, the road to fame, and perhaps also to wealth, was by the occult arts of the magician.

ii. Supernatural. The Church, although suspicious of some kinds of natural magic, must share responsibility for the reliance on it. For if faith, which was itself based on hearsay in terms of time and space, was to be trusted, why should not similar hearsay also be accepted on faith? If it was laudable that Abbot Guillaume de Ryckel, for instance, should collect the relics of 132 saints in the expectation that they would serve the temporal welfare, why should not other objects reputed to be efficacious also be collected and employed for a like purpose? To be sure, these, unlike relics, could be employed to do harm instead of good, but by taking the precaution of having them blessed they could do only good. If this blessing could work in the case of water or oil, or of a ship or a sword, why should it not also work in the case of objects reputed to have special occult virtues? If prayers were fortified by the presence of sanctified water or oil, why should not incantations benefit by that of precious stones?

Still, such theurgy was double-edged because it was now widely believed that many men were successfully employing objects possessing occult virtues or powers in order to do harm. And since God had to be invoked to a good end, so surely the Devil must be to a bad one.

In the ninth century, at a time when pagan beliefs were still active, the papal *Kanon Episcopi* had declared belief in the reality of sorcery to be a heresy. But the belief subsisted, and, perhaps in order to refute the Manichees who were alleging that the Devil could hurt only men's souls and not their bodies, it was now being said, as by the Germans Caesarius of Heisterbach and Albertus, that sorcery was real and that the Manichees were sorcerers as well.

On their heels, in 1252, came the papal bull *Ad Extirpanda*, which declared that all heretics were to be presumed to be sorcerers, thereby in effect repealing the earlier *Kanon Episcopi*; and by 1265 the French inquisitors were already complying with it. To be sure, this bull also declared that magic as such did not constitute heresy, but by recognizing that it could be sorcery everybody dabbling in magic became suspect and the peasants began lynching the magicians whom they did not trust because of the fear that although not

heretics they might be sorcerers. Indeed, there now doubtless were magicians who were either trying to enlist the Devil's services or at least professing that they had succeeded.

Around 1270 belief in the reality of sorcery was alleged by the leading Franciscan, Bonaventura, and the leading Dominican, Aquinas. The latter, by declaring that sorcery was not only a reality but ought to be punishable by death, was particularly instrumental in persuading the pope to decree in 1274 that anyone who had engaged in black magic—that is, with an evil purpose—was to be presumed to be a sorcerer and therefore a heretic.

But how did one go about it to become a sorcerer? Long ago it had been alleged that the only sorcerers were the involuntary progeny of an evil woman and a demon; but Bacon doubted not only such a consequence but also the possibility of the alleged cause itself.

Nevertheless the belief was now gaining ground that it was possible voluntarily to become a sorcerer: by night-flying to the Sabbat, by sexual intercourse with a demon, and by entering freely, as Faust was to do, into a pact or contract whereby if a man offered his soul, the Devil, in exchange, was able and willing to give him certain of his superhuman powers.

Bonaventura and Aquinas both believed only in the reality of the sexual intercourse. The pact, however, was clearly described in a play by Rutebeuf in about 1275. At about this time the Inquisition obtained, presumably by torture, a woman's confession of having flown to attend the Sabbat. Among the few skeptics was the anticlerical Jean de Meung, who said that night-flying was a delusion and that the Church's declaration that it could be real had been largely responsible for reviving the belief that it was.

In any case, whatever the cause or causes, fear that there might be persons abroad who were armed with some of the superhuman powers of the Devil now grew apace. John XXII, who became pope in 1316 when already seventy-one years old, was in such mortal terror of becoming a victim of the black arts that he clutched at all suggested magical ways of counteracting the dreaded effects. His contemporary, the astute, though perhaps not really insincere, Arnald de Villa-

nova, an apt pupil of Petrus Hispanus, was an expert on such protective devices. Evidently the precautions traditionally recommended by the Church in order to counteract the Devil's black magic were not deemed sufficient protection against that of his human agents all too present in the flesh.

g. Numbers

i. Numbers 7 and 3. The fascination of numbers was very old. The Pythagoreans based their philosophy on it, and the Christians followed the Jews in assuming that any number mentioned in the Old Testament must have a specific significance. The number 7 was doubtless inspired by the planets; we still speak of being, or hoping to be, in the seventh heaven. The Romans regarded their seven liberal arts as the foundation of human knowledge. The Christians followed the Jewish predilection for seven: they estimated that the virtues of the Holy Ghost were seven and that there were seven deadly sins.

The Christians, however, naturally regarded the Trinitarian number as of supreme significance and we have seen that, even in this later age, Bonaventura still saw nature as a series of trinitarian symbols.

ii. The Greek Number 4. The Greeks, however, and especially Aristotle and Galen, were most partial to the number 4. In many respects this was natural enough: north and south were obvious, east and west hardly less so. So too the four seasons and the four winds. Only less obvious was their supposition that the sensible world consisted of fire, air, water, and earth, from which elements they derived the four qualities of hot, cold, dry, and wet, and from these in turn the four complexions in the human body of hot and dry, hot and wet, cold and dry, and cold and wet.

Following Hippocrates, Galen, now the dominant medical authority, stressed the four humors of the body: the choleric, phlegmatic, sanguine, and melancholic or, otherwise stated, the blood, yellow bile, phlegm, and black bile.

All this and much more, whether derived from the old texts or newly conceived, was now being elaborated. The

four cardinal virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice which Cluny had appropriated from the Romans had now long been taken too much for granted: but the new quartet of senses, memory, reason, and intuition was now enjoying an ever-increasing popularity.

iii. Number 4 from 1251 to 1300. There were, for example, the four animals: man, beast, fish, and bird; the four ages of man: infancy, youth, maturity, and old age; the four parts of the body: head, chest, stomach, and feet; the four virtues of the body: appetitive, retentive, digestive, and excretive; the four hygies: to eat once a day, to copulate once a week, to be bled once a month, and to be purged once a year.

In the realm of matter may be added the four trinities of the zodiac; the four colors of the rainbow: red, green, yellow, and *ynde* (dark blue? Langlois, *La Connaissance de la Nature*, 293); and finally now, for alchemy, the fourfold process of dissolution, distillation, calcination, and solidification.

What made these various fours more self-deceptively plausible was that they seemed to combine with each other. For not only was fire hot and dry, air hot and wet, water cold and wet, and earth cold and dry, but also, in the same order were blood, yellow bile, phlegm, and black bile—which, when not kept in relative balance, caused illness. Similarly there had to be a constant preponderance of fire in the head, air in the chest, water in the stomach, and earth in the feet.

iv. As Magic. That number too often went to men's heads is indicated by the assertion in the *Sidrach* that man was akin to earth, fish to water, birds to air, and beasts to fire. The fish and birds fitted nicely; but man as akin to earth was dubious, and beasts as akin to fire pure nonsense.

Perhaps this obsession with numbers was not, strictly speaking, a magical one. But it was certainly based neither on revelation, reason, mathematics, observation, nor experiment.

5. ANTAGONISMS

a. Within the Church

i. Secular Clergy vs. Mendicants. There had always been antagonisms, but those existing among Catholic clergy were now becoming more acute. The first clash after 1250 was between the seculars and the Mendicants.

Already before 1250 the growing interference of the pope through his papal legates and Inquisitors had roused resentments, and the extraordinary growth of the Mendicant Orders—also responsible only to the pope—was bound to aggravate the bitterness. For one thing their popularity among the laity led to the diversion of gifts not only from the already established monastic Orders, but also from the episcopate. This change indeed led to the steady decline in the building of cathedrals. For another thing, the Mendicants soon began to be ordained priests, wielding sacramental powers which if abused could be corrected only by appeal to the papacy.

In addition, the pope, in order to strengthen his control over the University of Paris, backed the effort of the Mendicants to share in the teaching there, thus breaking the monopoly of the local episcopate. Roger Bacon said that the intensity of the passion for learning had increased phenomenally from 1231 on, and this was presumably because it was then that the philosophy of Aristotle was becoming known and the young often chose to become Mendicants in order to be free to devote themselves to it. Since, however, Aristotle then meant Aristotle as interpreted by the Moslems and especially by Averroes, the resistance of the elders was doubly intense, to infidel as well as to papal dictation.

The opposition of the episcopate was led by Guillaume de Saint-Amour, Etienne Tempier, Henri de Gand, and by the Cistercian Humbert de Prulli, and it is said that their suspicions that the Mendicants were secret heretics was not allayed until 1300. But their efforts, against the combined pressures of Aristotle, the Mendicants, the papacy, and even Louis IX, were foredoomed to defeat.

ii. Benedictines vs. Mendicants. In this struggle the older monastic Orders do not appear to have played much part.

The intense popularity of the Mendicants is a further indication that the Benedictine Orders were, if not corrupted, at least enervated, by their wealth. But the friars and the pope were challenging the power not so much of the old monks as of the old episcopate.

iii. Dominicans vs. Franciscans. One would expect some degree of rivalry between the two Mendicant Orders. At first, of course, they had to support each other, but their natural rivalry soon became evident. The satirical poet Rutebeuf, about 1275, referred, though casually, to their jealousy, and the pope had to be careful to appoint an equal number of cardinals from both Orders, but they rarely carried their jealousy to scandalous extremes. The serious split was rather within the Franciscan Order.

iv. Conventual vs. Spiritual Franciscans. Francis himself was the immediate cause, but behind him were the old twelfth-century heresies of the Waldenses and Joachites, both anticlerical because the vernacular Bibles now becoming accessible revealed the discrepancies between Christ's promise and papal performance.

Francis was accepted by the papacy because he seemed to offer the needed compromise which would serve to reconcile these heresies, then especially rife in Italy, with orthodoxy. Instead, as might have been foreseen, his new Order was split in two.

The Waldenses asked only to be let alone. But the Joachites were aggressive. In 1254 a certain Gherardo di Borgo San Donnino published an *Introduction to the Everlasting Gospel* of Joachim of Flora which, relying on the *Apocalypse*, prophesied that by 1260 a new age would begin, heralded by a simoniacal pope and leading to the obsolescence of the sacraments and so of the priesthood. When this failed to materialize some, like the Italian Salimbene, returned to the fold, but in the meantime the Spiritual wing of the Franciscans had become a power, doubting the prophecy but holding, as Francis had, to the ideals of poverty, nonresistance, and holy ignorance of the world which Christ had allegedly both preached and practiced. Not only was Aristotle ignored; the Virgin was somewhat eclipsed, by Francis' Lady Poverty

and by Christ himself in the Eucharist. The anonymous *Meditations on the Life of Christ* (perhaps by Giovanni de Caulibus who flourished in 1281) was the forerunner of many productions of the kind. Some of the generals of the Order, Giovanni da Parma (1247–1257) and Raimondo Gaufredi (1289–1295) favored the Spirituals; but between them were the more influential moderates Bonaventura (1257–1273) and Acquasparta (1287–1289). The popes turned more and more towards the Conventuals, till the Spirituals were finally condemned outright by John XXII in 1317. He declared categorically that Christ did not teach utter poverty, but only belittled wealth.

The Spirituals were far less numerous, or at least far less extreme, in the North. Thus Gerard d'Abbeville called the seculars "the adversaries of Christian perfection" but he defended the legitimacy of owning property. John Peckham attacked all pagan philosophy but did not commit himself on the issue of poverty. William de la Mare spent forty years correcting, as Bacon had recommended, the old Vulgate text, but he too did not argue about poverty. Those Franciscans who were now beginning to emphasize the power of God freely to will what was irrational—the precursors of Duns Scotus—were concerned only to break away from Aristotle, the Arabs, and the Dominicans, by again presenting God as above reason, logic, science, and Nature. These Northerners were against pagan reason but not against property.

v. Secular Clergy vs. Pope. A further antagonism was between secular clergy and pope. As the Curia needed more and more money it naturally turned to episcopal support, taxing more of it as the need increased. To this end the Curia was now claiming appellate jurisdiction over all cases which came before the ecclesiastical courts. The employment of the Mendicants as papal agents only added to the episcopal resentment.

It is not therefore surprising to observe new challenges to papal supremacy. Among the English, William of Shyreswood argued prophetically for the establishment of a national Church. Bacon declared that although the canon law was binding it must be based not only on the original Hebrew

and Greek rather than on the Vulgate text, but also on rational interpretations of that original. In other words, if the laity are to obey this law, the clergy must, in consideration of such obedience, do their utmost to detect and correct its defects. Soon after, Bacon was imprisoned for heresy. Evidently he thought that if the clergy misinterpreted, or failed to correct, the canon law as he, Bacon, understood it, the fault was rather theirs than his.

In Italy the Augustinian monk Agostino Trionfo claimed that a General Council had the authority to proclaim that a Pope was a heretic and his office therefore forfeited. Such claims were probably based rather on Aristotle's than the Church's authority and were among the first open defiances of growing papal arrogance. Certain dates are here instructive: Pope Boniface VIII was born about 1222, Agostino about 1245; both Philip IV of France and his notorious crew of jurists, although already active soon after 1285, were born only between 1260 and 1270. Some say that it was here that the curtain fell on the true medieval scene, to rise again only with its aftermath.

b. Within the State

i. Centralization. Under feudalism the fiction had been developed that every freeman was really free because his obligations to his superiors had been voluntarily assumed in return for protection against violence. But as adequate protection came to be required on a wider scale the idea of the nation as the true unit was conceived, and here both Aristotle and Roman law appeared most opportunely to lend authority to it. For to Aristotle the teleological end was mankind, and to Roman law it was the Roman State. The Church had had ample time to establish the precedent that the good end was unattainable without resort to questionable means. Therefore, not only the contractual feudal rights but the rights of families and individuals could plausibly be ignored in so far as they interfered with the promotion of the general welfare of the State.

The last serious revolt of the barons against their common overlord the king was in 1242-53. It was the final defeat of

the South by the North. King Louis IX employed lawyers instead of barons as his ministers, and these set to work to apply the legal concepts of pagan antiquity to the creation of a new temporal government.

Up to this time legislation had been conceived as mere administrative clarifications of unrepealable principles; now it was beginning to be based on the classical principle of complete state sovereignty. More and more, therefore, the kings subordinated the judicial powers of the barons to that of the central *Parlement de Paris*, and its procedure was becoming more Roman and less Germanic or feudal.

Against the barons it was also provided that any freeman, regardless of intervening lords and overlords, could, if he chose, take a further oath of fidelity to the king himself and thereby to the State. At the same time private wars, duels, and tournaments were forbidden.

These various changes, however, cost money and the king was not only able but obliged to procure it. By feudal law the barons owed a limited military service, but as time went on they were allowed instead to give money with which others could be paid to do the king's fighting. From this precedent grew the right to tax outright and there were always plenty of emergencies which could be used as pretexts for increasing the amount. Needless to say, the barons were highly resentful of such proceedings and doubly so because the agents available to the kings for the enforcement of this legislation were no longer the barons or prelates themselves but upstart jurists. The barons were now, however, fast becoming impotent and they knew it.

Much of this new legislation affected the bourgeois even more, especially the sale of licenses to do business, taxes on commercial transactions, and expropriations such as were arbitrarily imposed on Jews, and even on Lombards on the pretext that they were aliens! Shortly before 1300 a flat tax was being levied on property and even a graduated one on income.

These measures were being resorted to one after another as the needs of the central government for money steadily increased. Enforcement must have been very incomplete if only because of the resistance encountered. In many cases exemp-

tions or subsidies had to be offered to soothe the recalcitrant.

The most significant concession was the emergence of the recognizable forerunner of the Estates-General. The idea of a constitutional monarchy had never quite died out. It was now realized that Aristotle had preferred it. Louis IX had been favorably inclined; Aquinas had supported Aristotle's recommendation; and at the turn of the century Philippe de Beaumanoir made a full legal exposition of its underlying principles. The real innovation was the addition of representatives of the Third (or bourgeois) Estate, and this addition was realized at least as early as 1294. Rarely did this body do more than ratify what the king proposed. But each of the Estates could now air its opinions and complaints in public. The accepted reason for this check on the king was that he could legislate only for the general welfare of the state, and that he could not judge what this was unless fully apprized of what the people wanted. That the leading bourgeois properly represented the people was of course a legal fiction, for the voice of the people could not be made truly articulate till many centuries later. Had the people been asked who represented their interests they would have said that it was not the bourgeois but the king himself.

ii. Exploitation. Bacon blamed men's temporal plight more on their own stupidity than on Adam's fall from grace. Albertus and Aquinas, however, still supposed that such embarrassing institutions as slavery and private property were, if not imposed, at least approved, by God as merciful mitigations of the punishment which Adam, and thereby all his descendants, must justly be made to suffer. Jean de Meung agreed with them, but said more specifically that these institutions were designed in order to mitigate the evil consequences of unrestrained avarice—to moderate the law of the jungle. He added that it was the corruption of the judges of the law which led Jupiter (rather than Jehovah!) to subject the judges to the supreme authority of a king. The anonymous *Placidus et Timeo* was even more specific: the first villain was Nimrod, who, as a highwayman, persecutor, and homicide, built fortified castles not only to prevent his victims from retaliating but also to extract a ransom from them

by imposing an annual tribute and levying import taxes with which the 'petit peuple' had ever since been burdened. Jean de Meung went so far as to say that no one had any right to property which he had not earned by his own industry.

This was a direct attack on chivalry. The baron had been tolerated and even admired so long as he gave local protection, and later because he had led the great Crusades; but it was the king who was now giving the protection, and, the crusading fervor having abated, the baron was again behaving like Nimrod, or at best enjoying a parasitic life of ease. According to Rutebeuf, he had abandoned real fighting against the infidel in order to engage in the cowardly mock fighting of the tournament.

iii. Bourgeois Contrast. In so far as private property was allowed only as a mitigation of the punishment of the Fall, to abuse the privilege was clearly to tempt God. There was grave question, therefore, of how far such property could be transferred, by gift or legacy, by buying or selling, by borrowing or lending.

Business, especially as a result of the various Crusades, was already bringing heavy pressure to bear on the restrictions imposed by Gregory IX and Raimon de Pennafort. Roman law was now seen to have disregarded almost every one of them. Further support of the business man was now also coming from Bacon, who wrote:

The legislator teaches men to frame laws relating to patrimonies, inheritances, and wills, because Avicenna says that the substance necessary for life is partly branch, partly root. But the root is patrimony and anything bequeathed and given by will, of which three roots patrimony is the most secure. But the branch of substance comes from gains derived from the various kinds of business. Then laws should be published regarding contracts in all kinds of business, buying, selling, giving out and taking contracts, borrowing, lending, expending, saving, and the like, so that in contracts whatever can do harm may, as Avicenna says, be excluded. (*Opus Maius*, VII, II, I.)

Aquinas merely repeated the usual noncommittal declaration that any price above the just price was unjust. But Henri de Gand, born and bred in one of the great trading centres of the West and Doctor of Theology at the University of

Paris, declared that a merchant could properly take advantage of a high price caused by demand exceeding supply. By this time it was becoming safe to say, as did Raimon Lull and Jean de Meung, that wealth, although liable to abuse, was in itself a blessing. Roman law, which had never died in Italy, was now so far penetrating France that Guillaume Durand de Mende's encyclopedic legal work included an exposition of the Roman law of contracts.

The prejudice against usury was not so quickly overcome. The Dominicans Albertus and Aquinas inclined to the Roman law acceptance of it, but Henri de Gand held to Aristotle's condemnation. It was the canon and not the civil courts which here had jurisdiction and Henri complained that they allowed many loopholes. It was indeed shortly after this time that Boniface VIII was openly authorizing certain of the clergy, including monks, to borrow at interest from Florentine bankers. One rate will always be just, the others not; but no judge or theologian has ever in any concrete case been able to define which is which.

While the male population of the northern cities was becoming more and more involved in business, many of the pious reacted against this addiction to money. The men who reacted could join the secular clergy or the monks, but the women could not become priests, and the nunneries were relatively few and therefore economically exclusive—most women could not pay the required entrance fee.

Out of this dilemma arose the Beguines, who most resembled the Waldenses and the Spiritual Franciscans yet differed from either. Never recognized as an Order, they constituted an association open to spinsters and widows—usually only if over forty—who wished to live an otherworldly life, but not, so far as they could avoid it, as parasites: they were to support themselves by manual labor as long as they were capable of it, and also to care for the old, sick, and helpless. Unlike the Mendicants, they were forbidden to beg, but since they were always in need to support their hospitals and extend their poor relief, the community was authorized to accept outside help. Thus Louis IX gave liberally to the Parisian foundations and the Countesses of Flanders and Hainault to the

Belgian. There were at this time many other important clerical as well as lay benefactors.

Several of the popes, too, were favorably inclined to these Beguines and probably to most of the Mendicants; but their loose and independently minded organization was not too much trusted—they could not be quite disassociated from the Waldenses and Spirituals. Bonaventura, for instance, as General of the Franciscan Order, dealt with them only at arm's length. The Beguine Christine von Stommeln near Cologne, although a renowned mystic who was widely reported to have won the stigmata, was never canonized.

In the thriving business centres of Flanders there was bad feeling between the rich and poor. Here the Beguines must have had a mollifying effect. Dedicated to poverty and devoted to the poor, their humble labor could not seriously interfere with the big business in which their neighbors and many men of their own families were engaged. There was no doubt on which side their sympathies lay, but they must have realized that their best profit was in prudent humility.

Their rules were local, rarely strict. No admission fee or dowry was required. Their vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience were valid only so long as they chose to remain and to conform to the restrictions imposed. Upon leaving they were free even to marry, but this eventuality caused little embarrassment because membership was usually restricted to the middle-aged. As Beguines they must live frugally and if possible give generously; but their property, as of land, houses, or other capital goods, could be retained, to sell or enjoy, and to bequeath in whatever ways they chose.

Manual labor, either at home or in their common 'béguinages,' was required of all according to their capacities. It was doubtless because trade was forbidden them that very few males were tempted to join the corresponding Beghards. Since it was relatively easy and cheap for any male so inclined to become either a priest or a monk, only those who, although devout, preferred to be free to quit if they later changed their minds would be tempted to join.

That so loosely organized a body should invite many cases of evil behavior and heretical belief was inevitable; but the hard core was never seriously shaken or modified, and it sur-

vives in Belgium to this day. Generally obedient to the canon law, faithful to the sacraments and the priests (who were usually Dominicans in the North and Franciscans in the South), the Beguines craved confession rather than absolution and they sought to earn, rather than merely to beg, for God's mercy. Whether or not this was a mere unconscious reaction from the mercy of the Virgin towards the justice of Christ, it was Christ whom they particularly adored. This was as the incarnated God—the child, the man, the martyr whose presence was in the Eucharist. It was the Beguine Juliane de Cornillon who just before 1250 inaugurated the feast of Corpus Christi; the Beguines were among the first to return to the New Testament as the foundation of Catholicism. Often at their peril, they chose to read it in the vernacular versions which they could understand. If unofficially, their patron saint was Catherine of Alexandria, renowned for her biblical erudition, who was martyred in the year 310. Such independence might, as it often did, encourage thoughtless heresy, but it seemed to them a greater danger to remain ignorant of what Christ had come to reveal to all.

c. Clergy vs. Laity

i. Lay Grievances. Already in 1251 the Church was complaining that the barons were constantly forming leagues to oppose her rights, and it was in this year that the anticlerical revolt of the Capuchonnés in northern France occurred, to be cruelly suppressed only when the barons turned against the dangerous excesses committed by their peasants. The clergy, at least, believed that all levels of the laity had been against them, for the Council of Ruffec in 1258 declared that the guilty included soldiers, barons, peasants, and bourgeois.

Since the chief grievance of nearly all the heretical sects was the abuse of sacramental powers, it was naturally also a milder grievance of the orthodox laity. Too many of the priests, if not of notoriously evil repute, were either venal or biased. That so many guilty received, and so many innocent were denied, absolution was rendered only more intolerable by the Church's adoption of the hitherto unacceptable claim (see Lagarde, I, 68) that no harm could come of it because the priest did not himself pass judgment but merely pro-

claimed a judgment secretly communicated to him by God.

Since the Church did not have the physical power to impose penalties on the laity by force, the State had undertaken to do so. This separation of judicial and executive power functioned well enough provided that the State approved the sentence imposed, but not otherwise.

Where the sentence was one of excommunication or interdict it was understood that the State was not expected to prevent priests by force from granting absolution, nor to oblige the clergy to pay the tithe imposed on them by the Church. But when the excommunicated had failed within a year to obtain absolution, the Church declared them to be guilty of heresy, which rendered their property liable to confiscation. This gave the State an opportunity to seize the property at discretion and thus to aggravate or mitigate the Church's sentence as seemed most desirable. The Regent Blanche had, under protest, abused this prerogative, and her son Louis IX and his successors had followed suit. Thus to the State no less than to the individual layman, the sacramental power could be as galling as it was indispensable.

Two further grievances were now being aired by the laity against the cleric: hypocrisy and avarice. Two concrete evidences of hypocrisy were based on legal fictions. The first was that the priests declared that they were not themselves judging the sins of men, but were merely proclaiming a judgment rendered by God. This, if true, exculpated the priest of any malfeasance but put the blame on Christ instead, yet it was not easy to persuade men that Christ was using a helpless priest as a front in order to hide his own delinquencies. Even the pope insisted that, as vicar of Christ, he was only Christ's mouthpiece—which was perhaps why, at the Council of Lyons in 1274, he was able to have himself declared infallible. This, as we shall see, was too much for the laity to take lying down.

The other concrete evidence of hypocrisy was the pope's further legal fiction, perhaps inaugurated by Nicholas IV in 1279, that since the pope possessed legal title to all monastic property whereas the monks themselves enjoyed only the beneficial use, their oath of poverty was not thereby violated. This was designed to kill two birds with one stone: for it not only answered the criticisms by the Spiritual, of

the Conventual, Franciscans, it also enabled the pope to claim the right not only to tax the monastic revenues but to expropriate their property as often as he thought that the welfare of the Church required it. The layman's gift to a specific monastery was thereby interpreted as a virtual gift to the pope.

But the most exasperating hypocrisy was that now being practiced by the Conventual Franciscans. According to their Rule the Franciscans must support themselves as far as possible by their own manual labor. Only when this did not suffice were they permitted to beg, and then only for such immediate necessities as food, lodging, or clothing, and never for money. They were, however, evading these restrictions by accepting donations to the Order, and were presumably soliciting them. The proceeds went partly to the support of their hospitals and asylums, but gifts of land and buildings with their revenues also enabled them to accumulate money enough to buy more such assets. One of the scandals was their purchase of a great palace in Reggio in Southern Italy. No doubt there was need to house their charities, but it did not seem consistent with their professed devotion to Lady Poverty.

It has been estimated that in the thirteenth century the Church owned one half of all the arable land in France, and therefore one half of the taxable wealth. Yet it was immune from taxation by the State. Any surplus of revenue not needed by the Church was to be given to the poor, but the Church was sole judge of these conflicting needs.

This revenue was being constantly augmented by surreptitious sales of the sacraments, especially of the Eucharist and Extreme Unction. But the most profitable method was the sale of indulgences or absolutions in lieu of penances. At first they were chiefly granted to those who went on the Crusade; now they were being given to any who paid for the privilege of not participating.

The Church claimed to have at her disposal the treasure of merit accumulated by Christ and his saints which, when dispensed, conferred forgiveness, and the priests were as eager to sell this merit as the faithful were to buy it.

So long as the fervor for the Crusades lasted the papacy had received huge gifts to finance them. But since, after 1250, the

projected Crusades rarely materialized, the papacy spent the money so procured in fighting to extend her temporal domains in central Italy at the expense of the local barons. Prudently the Church never chose to regard her embezzlements among even the venial sins.

In earlier days the Church was the beneficiary of a flood of legacies bequeathed by the dying in return for promises that prayers and masses would be said for the souls of the donors in purgatory. But it was already a sign of slackening spontaneity that in 1170 Pope Alexander III had decreed that no will was to be recognized as valid unless it had been signed in the presence of a priest. Whether this was a mere precaution against forgeries or betrayed a more sinister design we cannot say, but a hundred years later Rutebeuf accused the Dominicans of preaching that whoever died without leaving their Order a satisfactory legacy was doomed to damnation. Did they ingenuously regard this as a mere proclamation, or was there here possibly a threat of human retaliation? The testator must usually have played it safe, but the technique employed was not calculated to endear the Order either to his prospective lay legatees or to other prospective testators.

ii. Lay Resistance. The power of investiture or of the appointment of bishops was now gradually passing from the king or local church to the pope, and the office itself, therefore, from the haughty French baronial families to agents chosen because of their loyalty to the pope. In addition to monastic control through the Mendicants, Rome was now tightening her control over the episcopate.

Traditionally the French kings had leaned heavily on the bishops as well as the barons in carrying on the government of the realm. The bishops were often the younger brothers of the barons, and they served not only as advisers and administrators but also as judges. But this was no longer to be. Already just before 1250 the barons were protesting "that the sons of serfs are judging according to their law the children and sons of freemen." To be sure, these sons of serfs were not all papal appointees, for Louis IX was already beginning to replace the barons who knew only their customary law with bourgeois jurists who were familiar with the

Roman *corpus*. But it was primarily the new bishops who were resented. Thus Philip IV did no more than distrust baronial ignorance, whereas he so distrusted the loyalty of the bishops that although he could not exclude them from representing the First Estate in the Estates-General he took care to appoint none of them to the bench.

The actual steps taken by the laity to satisfy their grievances were still rather symptomatic than systematic. Not until under Philip IV in 1287 were disabilities imposed on the clergy, and then only as judges. Open defiance came only after the year 1300. It was otherwise, however, in many of the communes. Here the secular clergy had of course been long installed; they had caused plenty of friction, but, since they were more often worldly than fanatical, a *modus vivendi* had usually been achieved.

Fortunately the Benedictine monasteries had been founded in remote rural areas; their monks had sought seclusion in order to pray and contemplate in peace. But the Mendicants were now on the warpath. They particularly chose to settle in the urban areas because they wanted to reform the inhabitants; they wanted to direct and even dominate the laity there for its own good.

Writing about 1255, the Italian jurist Odofredo described how in many of the Italian cities the laity resisted. In some they not only barred clerics from holding any municipal offices, but forbade their taking title to any additional land or buildings within the city walls or accepting any further donations or legacies, even from a monk's own family. Furthermore the ecclesiastical properties were often taxed.

It was no doubt partly because the Beguines put themselves in the hands of the Mendicants that they were so often disapproved of, and this tension is further indicated by the frequent requirement that the Beghards or Mendicant Tertiaries, who were the male equivalent of the Beguines, must serve, like the rest of the laity, in the city militia.

The detailed record of Odofredo applied only to the Italian communes shortly after 1250, but according to Georges de Lagarde (I, 218), the same thing was going on in the communes of northern France—if not in 1250, at least before 1300.

iii. Papal Claims. The power of the priest to excommunicate any baptized person had long been recognized, although where the status of a ruler or other notable was in question the pope had to ratify the judgment. When the ruler was excommunicated in this way, the Church had claimed either implicitly or explicitly that the ruler was therefore deprived of his office until the pope saw fit to absolve him. During this period the ruler's subjects were regarded as absolved from their oath of allegiance to him, so that their loyalty, if to anybody, devolved to the pope. The most famous precedents were the submissions of Emperor Theodosius I to Ambrose and Emperor Henry IV to Pope Gregory VII.

The bishop or pope had also long exercised the powers of mass excommunication. This was the interdict. Within the territory involved, no one except the clergy themselves could receive any but the Last Sacrament.

These powers were easily, and of late years not infrequently, abused and consequently made light of, for the clergy were deprived of their usual emoluments and the laity were tempted into defiance. The more abusive the deed, the less the doer of it will be respected. For when a man is innocent he knows it, and will therefore tend to denounce the authority which condemns him.

The papacy was therefore tempted to advance new claims as well. Relying on her earlier claims and practices as precedents, the Italian canonist Hostiensis about 1260 presented the thesis that the pope was bound by no precedent or power, or even by natural law. The end not only justified but required resort to any and every means whatsoever. Pope Boniface VIII declared among much else that rulers held office only by papal consecration just as priests did by ordination, and that the so-called two powers meant these two, both equally subordinate to the pope. He and Pope John XXII also claimed the right, against king as well as episcopate, not only to depose evil men but also to appoint successors. To make these claims the more impressive they declared that to disobey their bulls or other decrees was itself evidence of heresy. This was made more specific by the further declaration of the younger Italian canonist Bartolommeo da Lucca

that any state official from the king down, whose failure to execute the sentences imposed by the ecclesiastical courts was proved, was thereby also proved *ipso facto* to be a heretic. To these claims are to be added the assertion of Egidio Romano that a pope can absolve anyone at pleasure, however notorious his offense may have been.

In a less self-confident age the popes, as we have seen, had been only too glad to rely on the *Donation of Constantine*, an eighth-century papal forgery purporting to be a transfer to the papacy of the temporal power over all Italy and the West. This had hitherto been understood as a gift, but it was now being argued that it was void because no ruler had the right to alienate state property. Therefore Agostino Trionfo now declared that the *Donation* was not such in fact, but rather a restoration of property which the previous pagan emperors had illegally retained. For as vicar of Christ the pope had automatically acquired ownership of all the territory of the whole world.

Egidio Romano, in writing his brief for the claim of Boniface, did not go so far: but he was more specific. He said first that the pope possessed a clear legal title to all ecclesiastical property, and therefore had the right to tax and even to take possession of it at discretion. Secondly, that the pope had the right to the revenue of all the property of all baptized laymen including the king, and could therefore tax it at will. Thirdly, that he had the right to the confiscated property of all who had been excommunicated and had not thereafter procured absolution within a year, because they could then be treated as heretics. There was indeed a special excuse for this because the State, in executing the sentence of heresy proclaimed by the ecclesiastical courts, had hitherto been allowed to keep the property thus confiscated for its own use. And fourthly, said Egidio, the unbaptized had no right to own any property at all. Only he did not specify whether it was the king or the pope who did rightfully own it.

iv. Lay Counterclaims. Egidio was a man of the world. It has even been thought that, as theologian at the University of Paris and bishop of Bourges, he also wrote a brief for his other patron, Philip IV of France, in which he argued that

the king has the same right over lay property that the pope has over ecclesiastical. If so, he was relying on the view of Aquinas, and so of Aristotle, that the temporal life was also an end in itself.

This constituted a defense of the traditional conception of the two powers, which had been taken for granted—as by Vincent of Beauvais, Pope Urban IV, and the English Bracton—until after 1270, and in 1300 was still the prevailing view. In 1297 the famous Italian canonist Andrea d’Isernia also held to the traditional view, and at the very end of the century the famous French jurist, Philippe de Beaumanoir, declared that the temporal power co-operated with the spiritual not as a matter of law or duty but only as a matter of grace.

d. Taxation

The discord between clergy and laity must not, however, be exaggerated. They had been of one mind in launching and supporting the Crusades against the infidel; they were, as we shall see further, at one in striving to wipe out heresy. The antagonisms of which we have spoken were based on means rather than ends. Which party, the Guelphs or the Ghibelines as they were called in Italy, should determine what means were to be chosen, that is, which one should govern, was the real issue and both sides were realizing that money was, more than ever, to be the determining factor.

Instead of the Joachite vision of a new Golden Age was the reality of a coming Age of Gold. Formerly the State had relied on feudal, the Church on spiritual, loyalty, but, as the temporal life became more real, so did temporal wants, and loyalty was more often offered only at a price. Not only the soldiers but also the clergy had to be paid, and since the money with which to pay them was no longer given voluntarily, it had to be extracted by coercion. And this meant taxation.

At first the laity had reason only to complain that the king taxed them, and the clergy only that the pope taxed them. Now the laity complained that the pope, too, was trying to tax them, and the clergy that the king was doing the same.

This was because the king and the pope were each trying to divert the revenue previously claimed only by the other. Because the king had physical force at his disposal whereas the pope did not, the pope was struggling to become the temporal lord at least of central Italy, and had in the meanwhile to depend on threats of damnation in case of disobedience. A hundred years earlier the pope might by his threats alone have secured his triumph, but in 1300 his efforts could lead only to the Babylonian captivity of the papacy at Avignon.

6. LAW

a. The Three Laws

The Church never repudiated Roman law, but as the old empire faded the canon law tended to supplant it even in those lands which held out against Germanic domination. At first the canon law maintained a personal or racial jurisdiction over the Roman inhabitants only, but as time went on the distinction of persons became rather between clergy and laity, that is, between Christian sins and Germanic crimes, with the old Roman law virtually abandoned. The Church, although always with misgivings, even adopted the Germanic procedures of the Ordeal, and particularly of compurgation, for her own clergy, as well as recognizing much of the new feudal law.

Then, in the thirteenth century, came a recognition of the superiority of Roman law as revealed in the famous gloss of Accursius, and from 1230 to the end of the century a dozen and more Italian jurists were writing further glosses refining, elaborating, or merely repeating what Accursius had begun. As a result the canon law began more and more to rely on it, thereby acquiring a dignity and prestige which gradually brought the Germanic and customary or feudal law into disrepute.

The distinction between canon and civil law was nonetheless still sharply drawn. Whereas the canon law court claimed no jurisdiction over the unbaptized, it claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the clergy. If a cleric was accused of murder, the civil court had no jurisdiction over him unless

and until found guilty and sentenced not only to a penance but to lose his clerical status. Only then could the civil court deal with him.

Civil cases between two clerical litigants could be tried only by the Church, usually in her episcopal courts. If one litigant was a cleric, the other a layman, there was a conflict. But in certain cases, as of marriage or usury, the Church was granted exclusive jurisdiction, and also, though here her claim was often disputed, over all litigation involving heredity and wills. There was always plenty of friction between the episcopal and lay court but there were also some cases of concurrent jurisdiction, where either court could institute a criminal action and a civil suit be entered in either court.

b. Criminal Offenses

Certain criminal offenses are punished because of actual injury to an individual only. The robber or murderer, for instance, is a threat to the public but he does not directly harm it. Other criminal offenses, on the other hand, such as treason or conspiracy, are directly harmful to the general welfare. In such cases the crime is always taken more seriously and punished more severely. By civil law this was now designated as *lèse majesté* or injury to the monarchy and was mercilessly dealt with.

It was at this time that the Church began to argue that, since an injury even to the king as temporal sovereign was less serious than one to God and therefore to the pope, any such crime against these should be even more mercilessly dealt with.

Such offenses could be of various kinds: open physical defiance, secret deeds, plots or conspiracies, injudicious words, or mere divergent beliefs.

Before 1250 both Church and State were chiefly concerned with the spread of two heresies. One was that of the Waldenses who, becoming familiar with the Bible text, denied the validity of sacraments conferred by a sinful priest. The other, far more serious, was that of the Cathars.

At first the Cathar heretics of Southern France had been openly rebellious. Because of their added wish to retain polit-

ical independence, the nobles made common cause with the people and their military power was broken only around 1250. Until then these heretics could easily be convicted by the evidence of their deeds, but, thereafter, the survivors who refused to submit naturally resorted to secret methods which often included conspiracies.

So long as the Ordeal was in favor it was as easy to convict the suspect of a forbidden belief as of a forbidden act, for in both cases the judgment was left to God. Trust in this method, however, was now fading. Compurgation was still to be relied on so long as the community recognized the evil nature of the crime alleged; but it was useless where, as in the case of the Cathars, the compurgators were likely to be either Cathars themselves or at least hostile to the persecution.

It might be supposed that the superior nature of the Roman law, which was just now beginning to be adopted, would facilitate the work of the courts in distinguishing between the innocent and the guilty. This Roman law, however, was designed to punish only evil deeds and therefore treated an evil belief as merely so much evidence of an evil deed and not as in itself a crime. No doubt there were exceptions, such as a conspiracy against the State or sovereign. Also, prophecy was regarded as a deed. But in general no man was to be convicted of sorcery, magic, or heresy as such, but only of the evil deed which these beliefs had tempted him to commit.

Perhaps such a distinction is oversharpe; but the fact remains that the episcopal and civil courts, both now in many respects following Roman law, were failing to secure the convictions deemed necessary in order to eradicate the heresies. As this failure became clearer the orthodox members of the community resorted more and more to lynching, because the courts either had not obtained a conviction or were not thought likely to be able to obtain one.

c. Courts of Inquisition

i. Justification for. The king had long been recognized as having the power of life and death over his subjects. He was so indispensable to the stability of government that he must be able to kill anybody whom he suspected of plotting

to kill him. For it was of little use that a court should execute an assassin only after the deed was done. Everyone, including the legally minded Aquinas, recognized that the king was above the law.

The pope, claiming that he too was above the law, claimed further that he had the right, by *divine* law, to depose the king without trial because God, having already judged and condemned the king, was merely authorizing the pope to make this known. Both king and pope were probably encouraged to defend such tyrannical positions because, until the concept of legislative power became more clearly defined, they assumed that their prerogative to interpret the law included the further prerogative to improve it.

Theoretical justice requires that an accused may not be presumed to be either innocent or guilty. Roman law required that he be presumed innocent until proved guilty. But the more dangerous the crime alleged the less the individual, and the greater the general, welfare will be considered. Prisoners of war are familiar victims of this tendency; the burden of proof shifts to them because it is safer to kill the innocent than to save the guilty.

Such was the attitude at this time of both Church and State, of both pope and king. But because the defiance was so widespread and wholesale slaughter repugnant—not only to them but probably also to public opinion elsewhere—a compromise was made by setting up special courts of Inquisition to be under the direct control of the pope and so to judge according to new procedures which would assure the number of convictions deemed necessary to effect their purpose. If the procedures adopted fell short of expectations, others, more effective, could then be easily substituted.

ii. The Mendicants as Judges. It was at this opportune moment that not only one but two new monastic Orders came into being, both of them offering their services to the pope for any work to which he chose to assign them. These would be his Inquisitors. Young, untrammelled by tradition, disapproved of by the episcopate, they were ideally equipped to head and direct the new judiciary which was to terrorize the heretics into either submission or extinction. In France

the Dominicans were dominant, so they were appointed to head all the new courts west and north of the Rhone; to the Franciscans were given only the courts of the east and south. These were the new Crusaders.

iii. Jurisdiction. These new courts were given jurisdiction to try all cases of heresy, but the immediate need was to ferret out the secret heresies, and these, being widespread, required an enormous force of agents as well as judges, highly specialized and with no other duties to distract them. Sophisticated heresies such as those of the theologians of the University of Paris, on the other hand, were not only written down but usually given wide publicity. Such were those for which Bacon and Aquinas were condemned. Their guilt was, except in such cases as that of the wily Siger, a matter of interpretation—of law rather than of fact. These the episcopal courts were quite capable of handling, and since they retained a concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of Inquisition each court usually tried the cases best suited to it.

The great mass heresy of the day was the Cathar. It was not only widespread but also cut deep into Christianity itself by declaring that the only true Providence was the Devil. Who, believing this, would not be irresistibly tempted to invoke his temporal help as the orthodox were invoking that of God? It was certain, moreover, that God conferred miraculous powers on certain men who had most assiduously sought to deserve them. Why then might not the Devil wish, and in fact be able, to do likewise? It would be theurgy in reverse except that instead of any promised reward there could be only damnation. To save these erring souls from so monstrous a fate was therefore so pious an end that no means should be spared to effect it.

As we have seen, in the ninth century a *Kanon Episcopi* had declared that belief in sorcery was a pagan superstition and therefore heretical, and this dogma held fast until the famous papal bull *Ad Extirpanda* of 1252 declared that all heretics were sorcerers. This about-face was presumably occasioned by the growing belief that the Cathars were not merely deluded by the Devil but had deliberately chosen to become his accomplices.

But what was the definition of sorcery? It was always recognized that the Devil had the psychological power to tempt and delude men, but the Cathars believed that, being Providence as well, he possessed physical power. The sorcery which the *Kanon Episcopi* had condemned as a pagan superstition was presumably not the belief that the Devil was Providence, but only that what powers he did possess could be delegated to human agents.

What, then, did the *Ad Extirpanda* mean in saying that all heretics were sorcerers? Not that they all believed (however pessimistically) that the Devil was Providence, for the virtuously ascetic, like Abelard, readily suspected this. By sorcery, therefore, the bull presumably meant the willing acceptance of some of the Devil's physical if not also psychological powers. If this be true, the bull of 1252 was declaring to be a reality what the *Kanon* had declared to be a heretical superstition.

Aquinas is usually given the doubtful honor of having been the first to declare that a sorcerer was a criminal who ought to be punished by death. He refrained, however, from saying that he was also a heretic. To be sure, the practitioner, like the murderer, sinned by choosing to act in the Devil's behalf, but he did not sin because of his belief. The crime, again like murder, was therefore within the jurisdiction only of the episcopal or civil courts, and not of the Inquisition.

The episcopal courts were trying cases of sorcery as early as 1264 in Languedoc, but since they did not resort to torture, they failed to get convictions. Perhaps cases brought, as Aquinas was recommending, before the civil courts, were failing for the same reason. Clearly, therefore, something more effective was needed. Between 1274 and 1287 the Inquisition declared that not only was every heretic a sorcerer, but every sorcerer a heretic, which justified them in taking jurisdiction over all sorcery cases as well.

It was an anomaly, although not an uncommon one in history, that it was the very ferocity with which both State and Church sought to eradicate the exaggerated Cathar belief in the Devil's unchallenged power over Nature, which led to a recrudescence not only of the Christian doubt of how completely the Redemption had tamed the Devil's power over

Nature, but also of the pagan belief in his power to delegate some of these powers to men. It was to be nearly 400 years before this latter belief (in sorcery) became generally suspect, even among the laity.

The term *magic* was applied to those phenomena of nature which were not comprehensible enough to be taken for granted, yet not incomprehensible enough to be thought miraculous. Sometimes a spring or mountain was itself thought magical, but usually it required a man to produce the effect and the man who could do so was called a magician.

To the pagans the magician often knew too how to enlist the co-operation of supernatural forces such as fairies or deities good or bad. But their courts were not concerned about what ritual devices were employed or were believed possible to employ, because they considered belief or intent only as so much evidence of the prohibited deed.

The Christians, however, having introduced religious intolerance, belief and intent themselves became crimes, and the deed only so much evidence of them. The only good magic was that which was intended to be good, and since, except for the priest, only good men could perform this so-called good magic, its accomplishment was declared to be not magical but miraculous.

Was all other magic then bad? Yes, but bad only in belief or intent, because only the Devil, with God's connivance, could actually cause the evil magical deed.

It was only with Albertus that the notion of a natural magic became generally recognized. It marked the inauguration of natural science. For if it did no harm, why was it bad simply because it could not plausibly be classified as a miracle?

As natural magic came to be recognized, evil or black magic was not only reduced in scope, it also tended to be further differentiated because, with sorcery now a reality, much was attributed to the sorcerer rather than to the Devil alone. Unlike the sorcerer, however, a man could be a magician without committing himself to the Devil by any pact. In order to be accused of wrong-doing he must now further have done a maliciously evil deed, and this was, like murder, what the older courts were thought entirely competent to deal with. It

was therefore declared by the Parlement de Paris in 1282 that, although the Inquisition could try anyone for sorcery and so for heresy, if it could not convict, the accused must be turned over to the civil courts for possible trial as a mere magician.

Besides the pact, there were certain specific evidences of sorcery such as assuming the appearance of a wolf. But other evidences, as of evil prophecy, the use of effigies or other forms of sympathetic magic, pointed merely to malicious rather than diabolical magic. Yet, even so, the distinction was so uncertain that only the Inquisition seemed competent to draw the line.

This last problem was finally resolved only by Pope John XXII. He was himself so mortally afraid of what injury even the mere magician could do, that he declared that, although magic did not, like sorcery, necessarily constitute heresy, its capacity to do harm was so great and the evidence of it so difficult to procure that those suspected of it must be tried according to the same rules and procedures as were sorcerers and other heretics, which meant by the Inquisition.

Let us see now what these newly forged rules and procedures were.

iv. Procedure. Virtually every safeguard which past jurists had devised to insure accused persons a fair trial was in these new courts either reversed or disregarded, and this at the very moment when those of Roman law were being more and more introduced in the proceedings of both the civil and episcopal courts. Thus we may say, as the Inquisitors would readily have admitted, that the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was now on the accused instead of on the accuser.

For one thing, he could be tried and condemned even if for any reason he was not present in person or by anyone authorized to represent him. Furthermore, if he were present he could not be represented or assisted by counsel, though this was perhaps no great handicap because the judges were really not bound by any law.

The accused was not to be informed of the nature of the charge against him, or of the identity of any of his accusers.

He was bound to testify and to answer any questions even if he thereby incriminated others, or revealed what he had himself said to his wife or she to him, or what he had said to his confessor or the confessor to him. For no privileged communications were recognized.

Yet even this was not the worst. In spite of the Church's past refusal to adopt the Roman law's resort to torture—because it solved nothing, said Augustine (*De Civitate Dei*, XIX, 6)—the testimony of the accused under torture could now not only be used as a clue to the discovery of further evidence but also be admitted as itself a presumption and even proof of guilt.

Often the arrest was made on pure rumor or suspicion. In such cases the accused was imprisoned while the further evidence needed for conviction was being collected, which might take years. And if the prisoner died before trial, he could still be convicted.

The necessary evidence was usually procured by the Inquisitors themselves or their agents, and, if they relied on informers or others, these were subpoenaed—by bribes or threats if necessary—to repeat their testimony on the stand. Sometimes the witness was an informer in the sense of having volunteered his information. This was often done out of fear that if he did not inform first, he ran the risk of being informed against.

These witnesses, too, were liable to torture, even if only to incriminate others besides the accused himself. Nor was there any real check on the competence or credibility of the witnesses: they could be children or they could be of evil repute. The only exception was if the accused could in any way satisfy the court that the witness was his personal enemy.

The most plausible justification for this novel procedure was that heresy was a mortal danger to both State and Church; and the kings, from Louis IX on, here fully shared this fear with the clergy, nobles, and people.

Less plausible to us was their argument that by these methods so many who would otherwise be damned were induced to repent and abjure; for this was surely not a promising way of procuring the contrition which was necessary in order to validate the absolution.

The final and decisive justification was either the least or the most plausible. This was that, since the pope was the infallible mouthpiece of God, he was able to delegate this power to the Inquisitors as he had to the priests. Their wisdom and power too, therefore, was from God; they merely proclaimed the judgment He had already rendered.

v. Guilt and Punishment. Witnesses were of course not being charged with heresy. But they were under oath and were liable to torture. They were guilty, however, of what we should call contempt of court if they refused to reveal the identity of any others whom they or the court might have reason to suspect. Further, if their testimony was proved false, they could be found guilty of perjury. Penalties here were fines or penances. Nor did this prevent the court from trying them for heresy in their turn if, as witnesses, they appeared to have been trapped into betraying themselves.

Those who, before arrest, presented themselves before the court to confess and then abjure would, if they were believed, be granted absolution subject to a prescribed penance. But if they, like the rest, later relapsed, they got no second penance but only the stake.

If the court was satisfied that the accused was guilty of heresy only because he had associated with heretics—as if a member of the same family—the penance, because the presumption of guilt was feeble, could also be light.

Probably this was true also when a man who had been excommunicated failed to obtain absolution within a year, although technically he thereby became a heretic. For, granted that by his willingness to remain in a state of perhaps mortal sin he ran a constant risk of damnation, it could also be that for one good reason or another it was beyond his power to comply.

Finally mere disobedience, as where an agent of the State failed to execute a sentence of the court, was also declared to amount to heresy. This sin of omission could be regarded more severely because the accused might have refrained on account of the excessive severity of the sentence imposed. And to believe in fair play, although not real heresy, was quite as subversive.

In these last two cases the plea of mere negligence could be easily, but also plausibly, made. Here the judges, both the humane and the cruel, must be perceptive and judicious, each according to his disposition. The penalty could then be properly either light or heavy.

If a man only after being arrested confessed that he had formerly been a heretic but had since abjured or was now abjuring, his property was nevertheless confiscated and a heavier penalty imposed: from the lighter ones such as wearing a cross, submitting at intervals to the lash, making arduous pilgrimages—all of which were usually only imposed for a term of years—to life imprisonment under relatively tolerable conditions.

If, however, a man confessed and abjured only reluctantly, as under stress of torture, he was likely to be sentenced to life imprisonment, in solitary confinement, chained, and fed only on bread and water.

If to the bitter end a man refused to confess or abjure, and the evidence against him seemed convincing, he was sentenced to the stake and declared irretrievably damned. If, having confessed and abjured, he later relapsed or even willfully neglected to complete his penance, he was also sentenced to the stake, for no second penance was allowed. But if, before death at the stake, he again confessed and abjured he could receive the Last Sacrament, which was said to allow God, if He saw fit, to save him from damnation.

vi. Confiscations. Theoretically the seizure of the property of everyone arrested on the charge of heresy was merely as security to cover costs, the rest to be restored in case of acquittal. Practically, however, this was confiscation because there is no record, at least, of any outright acquittals.

Since the State had long been recognized as the executive agent of all ecclesiastical sentences which required the use of physical force, the confiscated property came into her possession, the Church receiving only as much of it as was necessary to cover her actual costs.

With the rise of the Inquisition these costs now became considerable. Thousands of its own agents were now employed, especially in hunting up suspects and maintaining

the detailed dossiers of all who had been, or might some day be, accused. Another large expense was for the building of hundreds of new prisons and for the maintenance in them of thousands of new prisoners. Hitherto the guilty clergy were either imprisoned in monasteries or else defrocked and burned; the guilty laity, if not burned, were fined or mutilated. In place of new cathedrals now arose new prisons.

Exactly how the spoils of the confiscations were divided is not clear. Usually State and Church come to an understanding satisfactory to both. Louis IX was overgenerous to the Church, and his successors had so much to gain that they too were reasonably accommodating. There were occasions, however, when the Church had to resort to threats.

The value of the confiscations was greatest around 1250, when the Cathars were first being disposed of, and this was because the rich, too, had been implicated. Gradually this source was drained dry, and, consequently, the Inquisition lost a good deal of its drive, but it came quickly to life again at the prospect of more large confiscations, as of the Templars.

The more meagre the confiscations became, the more rigorously they were imposed. Not only were the prospective heirs completely wiped out, the creditors remained unpaid and the debtors forced to repay in full. It was then that the Inquisition resorted to trials of the dead. If they were condemned, their property was subject to confiscation even to the second and third generation. This included property which, since the death of the victim, had been bought by a *bona fide* purchaser or otherwise acquired in good faith.

d. The Laws Governing Salvation

i. Early Beliefs. According to the Gospel, Christ empowered the priests to bind the obdurate but to loose—that is, to absolve—the contrite an indefinite number of times. This was at first understood, as by Paul, to mean that the apostate or relapsed had committed a mortal or unforgivable sin from which no priest could absolve and so save him. Among these sins murder was also generally included and sometimes adultery as well.

Later the idea of an unforgivable sin seems to have been

abandoned, and absolution, conditional on a severe penance, permitted. Ambrose and Pope Leo I, however, had declared that for a repetition of so serious a sin, no second absolution was possible. Caesarius had not been so strict, but it would appear that the earlier view was thereafter generally followed.

ii. Augustine. Having always uppermost in mind the omniscience and even foreknowledge of God, Augustine had not regarded the priests' powers to bind and loose as decisive because, being fallible men, they must often misjudge the degree of a penitent's contrition. Only because they were more likely to be right than wrong, at the Last Judgment Christ usually upheld their judgment, but he would certainly feel no obligation to rely on it, even as presumptive evidence. Thus the priests' power to bind or loose had no other effect than, by predicting what Christ's judgment would be, to warn the obdurate and to reassure the contrite.

iii. Gregory I. According to Gregory I, the clearly virtuous souls such as those of the martyrs, and the clearly sinful souls such as those of the unbelievers or relapsed, were not tried at the Last Judgment because God was already quite aware of their deserts. At death, they went respectively straight to heaven and to hell.

But was Christ equally sure of the deserts of the other souls? Since Gregory was the first fully to conceive of a purgatory, it seems probable that his idea of it was inspired by the need to explain the reason for a Last Judgment. Christ, to be sure, being omniscient, already knew the thoughts and deeds of every dying man. He did not need to try them in order to find out which were innocent and which were guilty. But he was not so sure of what precisely just penalty should be imposed. Here purgatory offered a solution. By a meticulous re-examination of the circumstances under which sin had been committed, he was able to vary the severity and duration of the purgatorial sentence with full precision.

To Gregory, however, God was no longer the despot that Augustine had supposed. The Last Judgment, therefore, must have a resemblance to human judgments, and this suggested a court of appeal where the decisions of the priests in the lower courts, and also the arguments not only of the Devil's

Advocate but especially of the saints were at Christ's disposal. It was the presence of these saints which was now decisive because their merits were such that their pleas for mercy could not justly be denied. This involved a sentence of mercy which the accused had only vicariously deserved. Christ, however, being by nature merciful, was happy to avail himself of a pretext which enabled him to follow the equity, rather than the letter, of the law.

It is true that a baptized sinner could still be damned, especially if he had not taken the precaution of cultivating the favor of an influential saint; but in this way a majority obtained sentences to purgatory and so salvation—even if they got no final reprieve until the very end of the world.

iv. Hugo of Saint-Victor. It was only much later that Hugo of Saint-Victor, mindful again of Augustine, felt it imperative to disentangle Christ from the triple thralldom of Devil, saints, and priests.

Of the saints he said that a man does not have to pray to the saints in order, through them, to get God's attention. God Himself does not even need to hear his prayer, for He already knows its spirit and content.

In regard to the priests Hugo said that whoever received the substance, as distinguished from the form, of a sacrament—that is, he who, by grace or otherwise, acquired contrition—was absolved even if he did not also receive its outward form. As Augustine had said, this was, conversely, particularly true of the Last Sacrament. For how could priests judge of the contrition of a dying man? Even if he were not already unconscious, there must usually be no certainty that he was in his right mind; and, even if he were, he had nothing to lose by alleging contrition because he ran small risk of having to serve the penance otherwise required in order to render his absolution valid.

This was a bold contradiction of the traditional view as stated by Gregory I. It went back even beyond Augustine to the Greek belief that the soul rose to heaven wholly because of the natural inclination or energy of its own virtue. At the Last Judgment Christ would then merely be giving the fact of this individual achievement his seal of approval.

v. The Dilemma. The awkwardness of this view was, however, that Christ had given the priests the power to bind and loose and, if he were in fact reserving this power to himself at the Last Judgment, he was not being quite frank. That God could not always afford—as in the case of predestination—to be quite frank, was the rueful conclusion of Augustine. What Hugo concluded we cannot say. In any case it is certain that most of the clergy continued to believe—and for a very plausible reason—that when Christ said that he was giving them the power to bind and loose he intended it to be literally understood, even though it followed that his Last Judgment would in most cases be a mere formality.

vi. Distrust of the Sacramental Power. This problem had, of course, always existed; but so long as the clergy's use of the sacramental power retained the public respect there was a general willingness to accept their claim even though it seemed to involve a derogation of Christ's freedom of action at the Last Judgment.

But as the thirteenth century wore on, the clergy and especially the popes began, as we have shown, seriously to abuse their alleged authority. Penances which had been designed to chasten the souls of sinners were becoming indulgences which were absolutions put up for sale. As a corollary, absolutions were withheld from those who refused to pay the price—all of which was thinly disguised blackmail. Doubtless such measures were not usually employed, but they were frequent enough to become notorious and the Church, including the popes, tamely acquiesced.

vii. Proclamation. While the public dissatisfaction was still mounting the Church had had ample time to admit the abuses and to make a serious effort to correct them. But instead, the papacy chose to aggravate the hostility by declaring that the sacramental power was not to be understood as a pious and informed responsibility to pass judgment on a sinner, but was to proclaim a judgment already rendered by Christ. The priests' power was merely to receive information of that judgment and their sole responsibility was to make it known. They did not have to judge of the degree of the sin or contrition because Christ, being omniscient, had already

done so. The validity of every absolution and of the penance attached, or of every refusal to absolve with its consequent excommunication, was therefore decisive, and disobedience as well as disbelief was tantamount to heresy.

What more, then, was there left for Christ to do at the Last Judgment? A man who, having been absolved, sinned again, and had then died before being absolved of this new guilt could only be judged by Christ *post mortem*. But if he could obtain the Last Sacrament, this must now be of certain rather than merely of doubtful efficacy because it was given by Christ himself.

The Inquisitors supposed another use for the Last Judgment. Where an accused had abjured, relapsed, and again abjured, he could receive (but only conditionally) the Last Sacrament before being burned—which accordingly left the determination of his ultimate fate to Christ at the Last Judgment. This was clearly derived from the traditional principle that for a mortal sin no second penance was permissible. The only difference was, apparently, that the Inquisitors now allowed this second, although only conditional, absolution.

In these two rather exceptional cases, therefore, it could have been argued that Christ had not at the time yet fully made up his mind or else had for some reason been unwilling to inform the priests of his decision. In any case, it left the Last Judgment to serve as a mere catchall for the consideration of cases which, at the death of the sinner, the priests had been unable satisfactorily to resolve.

viii. The Lay Reaction. There was nothing intrinsically new about this theory of proclamation, for it was no more than a literal interpretation of the authority to bind and loose. It might equally well have been said in the more traditional language that the priests, acting in their sacramental capacity, were, as was said of Joshua, possessed by the Holy Ghost.

But the timing was unfortunate. The popes were clearly under pressure to do something to recapture their prestige. So long as the priests seemed to be doing their best to honor their calling, the Church could claim that Christ approved and would therefore give them his support. But to take this

moment to try to put the blame on Christ for all the abuses practiced by the priests, could only be interpreted as a transparent device for seizing despotic power, over not only the spiritual but also the temporal fate of men. The laity, therefore, instead of being cowed, were thereby roused to an open defiance.

NOTES ON PERSONS MENTIONED
WHO FLOURISHED 1251-1300
(Albertus and Aquinas)

*Approximate
birth & death
dates*

- 1193- or
1200-1280 ALBERTUS MAGNUS of Cologne. Dominican. Taught theology at University of Paris.
- 1201-1264 URBAN IV (Jacques Pantaleon) of Troyes. Pope 1261-.
- 1202- GOSSUIN (or Gautier) DE METZ. Popular encyclopedist.
- 1205-1265 ODOFREDO OF BOLOGNA. Jurist, glossator. Taught in Southern France.
- 1205-1267 WILLIAM OF SHYRESWOOD. Political theory.
- 1207-1268 HENRY BRACTON of Devonshire. Jurist. Roman law.
- 1208-1268 CLEMENT IV of Saint-Gilles (Gui Foulquois le Gros). Pope 1265-. Favored Roger Bacon (1214-).
- 1208-1276 GREGORY X (Tebaldo Visconti) of Piacenza. Pope 1271-.
- 1208-1263 NICOLAS DE PARIS. Logician, mathematician.
- 1209-1289 GIOVANNI DA PARMA. Spiritual Franciscan. Taught at University of Paris.
- 1210-1285 MARTIN IV (Simon de Brion) of Touraine. Pope 1281-.
- 1211-1271 HOSTIENSIS (Enrico) DA SUSÀ. Canonist.
- 1211-1261 JEAN DE SAINT-AMAND (near Tournai). Physician.
- 1212-1275 GHERARDO DI BORGO SAN DONNINO (near Parma). Born in Sicily. Joachite. Taught at University of Paris.
- 1212-1272 GUILLAUME DE SAINT-AMOUR of Franche-Comte. Secular. Defended University of Paris against Mendicant encroachments.

- 1212-1272 GUILLAUME DE RYCKEL. Benedictine abbot of Saint Trond, 1249-.
- 1213-1269 PIERRE (Peregrin) DE MARICOURT (Picardy). Mathematician, physicist.
- 1214-1270 LOUIS IX. King of France 1226-1270.
- 1214-1294 ROGER BACON of Ilchester. Franciscan. Theologian, scientist.
- 1215-1277 PETRUS HISPANUS (of Lisbon or Compostela). Physician, logician, theologian. Long at University of Paris. Pope as John XXI 1276-1277.
- 1215-1275 THOMAS OF BUNGAY (Suffolk). Franciscan. Mathematician.
- 1216-1265 GERARD D'ABBEVILLE. Defended Mendicants.
- 1220-1280 NICHOLAS III (Giovanni Gaetano Orsini) of Rome. Pope 1277-.
- 1221-1274 BONAVENTURA (Giovanni da Fidenza) of Bagnoria (Tuscany). Theologian. General of the Franciscan Order. Taught at University of Paris.
- 1221-1290 SALIMBENE (Ognibene) of Parma. Franciscan. In Lyons and Paris. Wrote an autobiographical *Chronicle*.
- 1221-1278 ROBERT KILWARDBY. English Dominican. Studied and taught at University of Paris.
- 1217- or
- 1235-1303 BONIFACE VIII (Benedetto Gaetano) of Anagni. Pope 1294-.
- 1223-1271 ROBERT OF ENGLAND. Astronomer. At Montpellier.
- 1223-1274 THOMAS AQUINAS of Aquino near Naples. Dominican. Theologian. Long at University of Paris.
- 1225-1294 BRUNETTO LATINI. Master of Dante. Much in France and wrote his *Trésor* in Langue d'Oïl.
- 1225-1284 ETIENNE TEMPIER. Secular theologian at University of Paris. Against Mendicants.
- 1225-1285 RUTEBEUF OF PARIS. Satirical poet.
- 1228-1292 JOHN PECKHAM of Sussex. Franciscan. In Paris about 1250.
- 1231-1281 GIOVANNI DE CAULIBUS. Franciscan.
- 1232-1292 NICHOLAS IV (Girolamo Masci of Ascoli). Franciscan. Pope 1288-.
- 1233-1293 HENRI DE GAND (Ghent). Archdeacon of Tournai. Theologian.
- 1233-1314 JEAN PITARD of Carentan (Manche). Physician and surgeon.

*Approximate
birth & death
dates*

- 1234-1284 WILLIAM DE LA MARE. English Franciscan. Follower of Aquinas.
- 1235-1315 RAIMON LULL of Palma (Majorca). Franciscan (tertiary). Taught at Toulouse and University of Paris.
- 1235-1281 SIGER DE BRABANT. Secular. Arts Faculty at University of Paris. Inclined to Averroism.
- 1235-1305 JEAN DE MEUNG. Satirical poet (chief author of the *Roman de la Rose*).
- 1235-1295 RAIMONDO GAUFREDI, Italy. Spiritual Franciscan. General of Franciscans 1289-.
- 1236-1325 BARTOLOMMEO DA LUCCA. Dominican. Political theory.
- 1236- BERNARD DE VERDUN. Astronomer.
- 1237-1289 MATTEO D'ACQUASPARTA (Todi). General of the Franciscan Order.
- 1237-1296 GUILLAUME DURAND DE MENDE (Southern France). Jurist.
- 1237-1287 Anonymous author of the *Roman de Sidrach*.
- 1238-1298 HUMBERT DE PRULLI of Burgundy (near Dôle and Besançon). Cistercian. Opposed Mendicants in University of Paris. Abbot 1296-1298.
- 1240-1292 BERNARD DE LA TREILLE of Nîmes. Dominican. Follower of Aquinas.
- 1240-1307 RICHARD OF MIDDLETON. Franciscan. Physicist.
- 1248-1304 BENEDICT XI (Nicolò Boccasini) of Trevisa. Pope 1303-. Familiar with Roman classics. General of Dominican Order.
- 1242-1312 CHRISTINE VON STOMMELN (Cologne). Mystic.
- 1242-1303 GODEFROID DE FONTAINES (Belgium). Secular theologian at University of Paris. Precursor of Duns Scotus.
- 1243-1328 AGOSTINO TRIONFO of Ancona. Augustinian Hermit Order. Taught at University of Paris. Political theory.
- 1245-1316 EGIDIO ROMANO (Gilles de Rome). Theologian. Taught at University of Paris; Bishop of Bourges. Political theory.
- 1245-1315 LANFRANCHI OF MILAN. Physician and surgeon. Promoted school of surgery in Paris.
- 1245-1285 PHILIP III. King of France 1270-.

- 1245-1334 JOHN XXII (Jacques Duèse) of Cahors (Southern France). Pope 1316-. Transferred papacy to Avignon in 1316. Against Spirituals.
- 1245-1311 THOMAS OF SUTTON. Dominican. Mathematician, physicist. Follower of Aquinas.
- 1245-1295 Anonymous author of the *Placidus*.
- 1246-1296 PHILIPPE DE REMI, Sire de Beaumanoir (near Beauvais). Jurist, customary law. Political theory. Author of *Jehan et Blonde*.
- 1246-1317 HENRI BATE DE MALINES. Free-lance theologian, philosopher, astronomer, humanist. Inclined to Augustine.
- 1246-1267 JOHN OF LONDON. Mathematician, physicist. Disciple of Roger Bacon. (Not to be confused with John of London, 1181-1252.)
- 1247-1316 ANDREA D'ISERNIA (Southern Abruzzi). Jurist. For Roman as against feudal law. For power of alienation and free trade. Favored pope.
- 1248-1312 ARNALD DE VILLANOVA (Spanish Pyrenees). Physician. Taught at Montpellier. Mild Joachite. Obsessed by Antichrist and magic.
- 1248-1296 GUILLAUME DE SAINT-CLOUD (perhaps English). Astronomer.
- 1248-1298 ROGER OF MARSTON. Franciscan. Mathematician. Precursor of Duns Scotus.
- 1249-1297 PIERRE JEAN OLIVI (Olieu) (Languedoc). Alumnus of University of Paris. At first a Joachite, later a Spiritual Franciscan.
- 1250-1315 DIETRICH VON VRIBURG (Theodoricus Teutonicus). Mathematician, physicist.
- 1250- PIERRE DE TRABES (Southwest France). Franciscan.

SCOTUS AND OCKHAM

1. THEOCRACY THWARTED

a. Financial Straits

IN EARLIER TIMES the Church grew rich because of the constant gifts of property by the laity in the expectation that the giver's chances of salvation were in this way enhanced. The natural heirs were thereby being steadily deprived of their prospective inheritance. Money was then scarce, but the Church did not badly need it because the produce of her lands was ample. Neither did the king, because under the feudal system, not only the lay barons but also the secular clergy—and often even the monks—owed their services to the king in return for protection.

But as this rural economy evolved into a monetary one, money became indispensable: the pope did not want the produce of the Church lands but the cash price for which it could be sold; and the king also wanted money rather than services. Furthermore, the tendency was towards centralization, and this involved greater expenses for both of these central bodies. This meant higher taxation; and just as the pope wanted to encroach on sources of lay wealth, so did the king on the sources of the Church wealth. The fight, therefore, now began as to which should get the lion's share.

Since, however, neither was able to get enough in this way to satisfy his needs, the king had also to resort to inflation and thereby to a depreciation of the currency; and the pope had further to popularize the sale of his indulgences. In addition both strove to extend their jurisdiction: the royal at the expense of the baronial courts, the papal at the expense of the

episcopal courts; and each of these in turn at the expense of the other. Both used their courts not only in order to extract the maximum court fees, but also in order to render judgments and sentences which were either too lenient or too severe.

b. Antagonism in 1300

An anonymous text, *Disputatio* or dialogue between a knight and a clerk, which appeared about 1300 well reveals the grounds of the antagonism. Here the clerk complains that:

In my own day I have seen the Church held in great honor by the king, princes, and all the nobles; I see her now in affliction. For all of you now the Church is but a prey; much is demanded of us, nothing is given to us; we are despoiled, our rights are flouted, our liberties are despised. (Quoted by Lagarde, I, 260.)

To which the knight replies,

Be careful what you say, Master Clerk. You are rousing the sleeping dog, and are driving me to go further than I had had a mind to. (*Ibid.*)

The fact was that the Church, although still rich, was no longer getting any richer, while the king was becoming aware that being free of taxes, it was not fair that she continue to enjoy even the riches she already possessed. It was no longer enough that she served men's spiritual needs, she must also serve their temporal. In the old days the clergy also fought; today, now that the king needed money rather than men, the Church, whining at the scarcity of lay donors, was unwilling to pay, as the laity now must, anything even for her own protection.

c. The Traditional Two Powers

For over a thousand years the doctrine of the two powers was based on the text, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's." The first decisive interpretation of this was that of Pope Gelasius I in the late fifth century when he declared that an emperor who would not accept Pope Leo's doctrine of the double nature of the incarnated Christ was a heretic and even an Antichrist, who thereby automatically forfeited his office. Caesar was

therefore Caesar only if, and so long as, he believed what the pope told him to.

In the eighth century a document, presumably forged by the papacy, purported to be a donation by the Emperor Constantine to the papacy of all the western half of the empire. In due course this was accepted as genuine and justified the papacy's later claim that Charlemagne had received his imperial office only by being crowned by the pope, and her further claim to a reversionary right to a clear temporal title to her newly acquired territories in the Romagna. In order to conquer and defend these lands from their lay claimants the popes even utilized the money they had raised in order to defray the expenses of a succession of projected Crusades, none of which ever materialized.

The more conservative interpretation of the two-powers theory was that although they were separate and independent—as the king for war and the pope for salvation—if there were a conflict the pope alone was qualified to determine where the line was to be drawn. This was because, according even to the Greeks, the perfect is superior to the imperfect, and because mankind has not two ends, but only one, which is perfection. To this certain doctors added the superiority of the soul and eternal life over the body and temporal life, thus clinging to the Fathers' position that the invisible world was superior to the visible.

It would appear, then, that, according to such thinkers as Aquinas, Giacomo Capoccio da Viterbo, Engelbert von Admont, Dante, Duns Scotus, and most others of this time, whereas the pope's power was limited to spiritual and not to temporal matters, he did, as a court of last resort, have power to declare to which of these categories a matter properly belonged. Among those categories which had been most commonly challenged by the Ghibellines in Italy and Germany and the Gallicans in France, were his power over marriages, dowries, wills, and inheritance.

d. New Papal Claims

Boniface VIII, already an old man when he became pope in 1296, was irritated by the claim of the young King Philip IV

of France that he had a right to tax the possessions of the French clergy without first obtaining the pope's consent. He therefore denied the king's claim on the ground that the Catholic Church, although it had two swords, had only one head, and in his famous bull *Unam Sanctam* of 1302 were these words:

We say and declare that to be subject to the Roman pontiff is for every human creature a prerequisite of salvation. (Quoted by Lavisse, *Histoire de France*, III (2), 154.)

This was not in itself a new doctrine because it had long been recognized that the spiritual sword had jurisdiction over matters of sin. But for a king to tax the property of his subjects was hardly a sin within the traditional meaning of the word. Boniface's position was here equivocal: for if a king had any theoretical power at all, the pope could not have the right to restrict it at his pleasure. It was true that the pope could excommunicate a king and thereby damn him, but could he do more? In earlier times the spiritual power of an excommunication had sufficed to obtain even a Roman emperor's submission. But Philip IV was not to be intimidated because he had confidence that his Catholic clergy as well as laity would back him in his resistance. It was therefore rather the pope who might be suspected of jeopardizing his salvation.

Furthermore, he said, even if the king were to be justly excommunicated, he was not the first king who had lived and died in sin. The difference was that the pope was now claiming that an excommunicate, if he did not obtain absolution within a reasonable time, became automatically a heretic and thus under sentence of death. However, even if the pope were so to sentence him, who—unless the king was incautious enough to be arrested in the papal states—could have any authority to execute the sentence except the king's own men?

Among those who, although younger than Boniface, still belonged to the thirteenth century, Acquasparta, Agostino Trionfo, Pope John XXII, and Egidio Romano were already claiming wider powers for the papacy. But the extreme claim seems to have been made by two later Italians, Arrigo da Cremona and Giacomo Capoccio da Viterbo, only after the humiliation and death of Boniface in 1303. For whereas Boni-

face had only claimed the right of the pope to decide whether in any given case the pope or king had jurisdiction, these two men argued that the king had no powers other than those delegated to him by the pope. For to them, indeed, the king became such only by being crowned by the pope and therefore remained king only so long as the pope approved of his behavior. Like any other agent, the pope approved a man as king only because he had promised to serve him faithfully and could therefore depose him if he proved faithless.

Boniface believed that he could depose a king who acted beyond his legal authority; Arrigo and Giacomo argued that no king had any authority which the pope was legally or otherwise bound to respect. This was a claim to infallibility not only as to faith and morals but over the whole temporal life as well. Thus the two powers, they said, were not to be understood as those of Church and State, but as those conferred on the bishops by the rite of consecration on the one hand and as those conferred on the king by the rite of coronation on the other. This was a scaffolding designed for the construction of a theocracy—an exclusively Italian idea—and was bound only to widen the papal breach not only with all rulers but also with all laymen.

e. Resistance to Papal Claims

i. Temporal and Eternal Justice. The *Disputatio* was designed to present the layman's idea of where the line should be drawn between the powers of the Church and the State: the Church was to administer justice between men and God, the State between one man and another. Sin and crime were not to be confused, nor eternal with temporal welfare. God as Providence divided His delegated powers equally between the two.

ii. Pierre Dubois. Pierre Dubois, a Norman jurist, wrote a series of tracts between 1300 and 1308, chiefly to Philip IV, to complain of the evil times and to suggest remedies. In his text of 1300 he said that,

The vice of disdain for the safety and good of the Commonwealth has hitherto increased more in the kingdom of France than in other parts of the world. (Brandt trans., 193, n. 77.)

Whether more or not, the shocking culmination of antagonism in 1303 was to be a fair corroboration. To this complaint he offered as a remedy a scheme which would bring about a restoration of peace and unity, first in the Latin world and ultimately among all men. The methods would be rude, but the times demanded nothing less.

Dubois did not deal with corruption among laymen. Doubtless he knew them to be no better than they should be, but he also knew that the king knew it too. He believed, however, that the clergy, because they set themselves higher standards, were worse than they should be and that it was important that this should be more generally known. He therefore gave a few flagrant instances as illustrations.

After observing that the clergy fight too much and even study civil rather than canon law in order the better to win profitable judgments in the civil courts, he declared that out of every hundred bishops there was hardly one who lived virtuously. As for the monks, he added, many were in the habit of buying from their abbots exemptions even from their prayers.

Of the pope, he said that, in addition to his generally aggressive arrogance, he not only sold his benefices but, through his bankers, then lent the proceeds of his sales to the impoverished buyer at usurious interest. Surely this constituted, if anything did, *lèse majesté* against God.

He justifies his proposed remedies first by arguing that according not only to Roman law and Averroes but also according to Christ's revisions of the Old Testament, the law, being designed to vary in respect to time, place, and persons, should be suitably changed. Moses recognized that this was his prerogative when, without first obtaining the consent of the high priest Aaron, he put to death 22,000 persons for worshipping the golden calf. That God so intended this is further indicated by the fact that:

None except old or even decrepit men are, or have been in the past, chosen to be Roman pontiffs, and frequently they are not of noble birth or trained and experienced in arms. (Brandt trans., 100, n. 84.)

In view of this fact, and also that their spiritual duties surely leave no time for any further responsibilities:

The fruits, revenues and income which remain after the expenses and customary fees have been deducted and which ordinarily reach him and remain in his hands, should be turned over to some great king or prince as a perpetual leasehold. The most elaborate precautions that can be thought of should be taken to guarantee to future Popes an annual pension in perpetuity and without diminution. (*Ibid.*, 100.)

The property and revenues of the bishop and other secular clergy should be similarly expropriated. And that of the monks, too. The former should receive pensions which are suitable, as in the case of the pope, to their secular office, but the monks should get back only so much as suffices for their food, raiment, and other necessities of life. The whole residue, Dubois argued, belongs to the poor and they should get it. But did he really expect any king or prince willingly to do what the Church would not?

As to the military Orders, Dubois recommended that they be consolidated, that their property at home be confiscated outright, and that if they refuse they should be imprisoned in Cistercian monasteries to do penance for breach of their vows.

Dubois was probably seriously concerned to make possible a recovery of the Holy Land, which had only been lost in 1291. Various recent popes had raised money ostensibly for that purpose and then spent it quite otherwise. The king, Dubois hoped, would use this vast new revenue to make another Crusade a triumphant and even permanent reality. The trouble was, however, that the pope and his clergy resisted, chiefly for selfish reasons no doubt, but probably also, if incidentally, because they knew that a king was quite as likely as the Church to spend it dishonestly as well as foolishly.

iii. Jean Quidort de Paris. Dubois was a jurist. Fifteen years later, resistance, although of another kind, came from a Dominican, Jean Quidort de Paris. Whereas Dubois was an authoritarian who viewed the conflict as solely between king and pope, Quidort seems to have been the first to base his arguments on the ultimate source of authority in the popular will.

As regards the State he was certainly influenced by Aristotle's *Politics*, Cicero, and Roman law. Following Henri de Gand, it was from Cicero that he got his idea of the social

contract, first among individuals to form a body politic, second as between this body and one of their number chosen to be their ruler. Should this ruler break the contract they had the right to depose him and choose another.

This ruler was empowered to legislate, but only with the consent of the people as represented in the Estates-General. Neither he, nor perhaps even they, had the authority to alienate State property, because future generations were also interested parties to the contracts. Therefore, contrary to Dubois' opinion, not only was the *Donation of Constantine* illegal, it could not, as Pierre de Cuignières was also to say, be validated by prescription. The clergy could own property, however, on the same basis as could any individual.

This principle of popular sovereignty Quidort also applied to the Church. Christ died for all Christians, and it was these, therefore, who were sovereign. Christ had also revealed the truth to them all; and just as the king had to act as the faithful servant of the people, so must the priests, including the bishops and the pope. Therefore, the General Council, representing the people just as did the Estates-General, had the power to condemn a pope no less than a bishop—and not only for heresy but also for any other serious divergence from the law laid down in the New Testament. Here Quidort had the support, although for another reason, of the French secular clergy who were still resentful of the papal bulls which were authorizing the Mendicants to act concurrently with, and yet independently of, the secular hierarchy.

Quidort recognized the two powers of Church and State as not only separate but equal. Such arguments as that the soul was superior to the body he regarded as nonsense. He placed the common sovereignty in the people: these had the right to require either their temporal or their spiritual representatives to try, and if necessary depose, either of their rulers. For in both cases the authority of these was not absolute but only delegated, as a practical necessity of government. In contrasting analogy to the claim that the pope could judge not only between himself and the Church but also between the Church and the State, Quidort declared that the people could judge not only between each other but also between themselves and either of their appointed agents.

Going a step further, Quidort said that the king can exercise spiritual powers but only as the agent of the pope; and that the pope can exercise temporal powers but only as the agent of the king. Neither can himself depose the other, but both may urge the people to do so through their respective Councils or States.

iv. Guillaume de Nogaret. For his attack on Boniface, Philip IV employed Guillaume de Nogaret, his chancellor. If Boniface was outrageous both in his behavior and his claims, Nogaret was far more so, calling the pope every opprobrious name that came into his head. In contrast to Quidort, he was too impatient to consider the legal aspects of the case. In gaining the king's consent to his physical assault on the old pope at Anagni, he said to Philip:

Sir, you are bound to this (procedure) for several reasons: for the defence of the faith; because of your royal dignity which imposes on you the duty to exterminate the pestilential; because of your coronation oath for you have sworn to defend the churches of this kingdom which a devouring wolf is laying waste; and out of respect for your ancestors who would not have suffered that the Roman Church should be dishonored by so shameful a concubinage. (Quoted by Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III (2), 157-158.)

There was not much law and less belief in this rhetoric, but it did sharply bring out one conception which was soon to be further developed: namely, that the king was as divinely authorized to defend the Church as was the pope and not simply, as the pope was, by the spiritual but by the temporal sword. To Dubois the popes were usually too old and weak to wield any temporal powers. Nogaret was now adding that they could also be too arrogant and corrupt.

2. THE NATURALISTS

a. *Early Views of Nature*

In the early Middle Ages men's attention was attracted to natural phenomena either by theologians who saw them as Christian symbols or by artisans who looked only to their utility. But in the course of the thirteenth century at least two other approaches were evident: Albertus said he was attracted

to them by pure curiosity; Bacon saw in them the means of promoting wisdom and thereby not only salvation but temporal progress.

In this predominantly Aristotelian century the possibilities of acquiring so much new knowledge had given an added stimulus to a tendency already evident but not yet pronounced.

Men came into contact with nature from still other angles. First and foremost were the doctors. At first, care of the sick was left to the monks who tended them in the hope of saving their souls, or who, like the Mendicants, sought also, as deeds of mercy, to alleviate their suffering by the sympathetic tending of their bodies.

In another group were those who hoped, chiefly by a study of the celestial bodies as causes of future events, to prophesy the effects and perhaps thereby to counteract them. A third group were the so-called magicians who sought, by studying the occult virtues or powers of both spirit and matter, to harness them to either beneficent or malevolent ends. Among these were what we may distinguish as a fourth group, the alchemists, who hoped by chemical techniques so to purify baser metals that they either became gold or could be used to prolong life.

b. Medicine

i. Physicians: Pietro d'Abano. In the years around 1300 Pietro d'Abano of Padua was perhaps more famous than any theologian, pope, or king. Born in 1250, he was familiar with both Greek and Arabic lore and, by his years in Paris, with the Scholastics there. Philosophically he aimed to effect a new reconciliation, based on Aristotle, between paganism and Christianity, but he succeeded only in producing confusion rather than clarification. This was probably because his real addiction, which was the chief cause of his fame, was to astrological medicine.

He did, however, know his medical lore. His psychology emphasized the power of one will over another's—including hypnotism—and he even extended it to power over lifeless matter as well. Demons, he said, possessed this power but probably no more. He was an expert on poisons and their

antidotes. His pathology was sound for its day. In distinguishing arterial from venous blood he was approaching the much later discovery of its circulation. He recognized the deleterious effect of bad air, which was a likely carrier of plagues. He distinguished inherited instinct from acquired habit. He envisaged the function of the nervous system and concluded that the spirit of life, as distinguished from the soul, was rather imponderable than purely supernatural.

It would be burdensome as well as tedious to determine which of these notions were original with him. He was doubtless rather omnivorous than inventive, but the important thing is that he gave all this a currency which, for better or worse, kept his fame alive for the next 300 and more years.

ii. Surgeons: Henri de Mondeville. Surgery came to France from the great Italians Hugo and Teodorico Borgognoni of Lucca. An early pupil was Jean Pitard, but we know little about him. A generation later came Henri de Mondeville, who wrote a good deal, not only about himself but also—and not flatteringly either—about his colleagues. These, he said, were mostly

illiterate such as barbers, such as drew lots, flatterers, deceivers, fakers, alchemists, whores, procuresses, midwives, hags, converted Jews, and Saracens. (*Nicaise trans.*, 97.)

To which may be added

soothsayers, clerks such as monks, hermits and even recluses in whom the populace has the most confidence [because it believes that] such men know surgery without art because they had been infused with that science by the pure grace of the Creator. And, if one does not wholly believe this, one is reputed heretical, and incredulous or infamous. (*Ibid.*, 99.)

Henri illustrated this difficulty with an anecdote:

Such grace a surgeon whom I knew lacked, nor did he pretend to have it. As he was one day braying some remedies necessary to cure a fistula which the vulgar call the disease of Saint Elias, he by chance broke the mortar. In consequence a rumor started among the people: it was thought that this breaking was a divine miracle, a vengeance, because forsooth he had dared to wish to cure a disease of the Saints, the treating of which was reserved exclusively to divine surgeons. (*Ibid.*, 102.)

Because the surgeon, not being a priest, was deemed to be incapable of making effective use of prayers, holy water and other approved methods, he was accused of intruding on the jurisdiction of the priests and thereby of tempting God.

The passion for money at the time is shown by Henri's accounts of how doctor and patient were constantly trying to cheat each other, the doctor to augment his fee, the other to avoid paying any of it. Henri believed that he was justified in mulcting his rich patients in order to compensate him for giving his free services to the poor. Therefore the rich patient felt doubly tempted to retaliate by paying as little as he could.

Following Galen's method, the current practice was to treat a wound by probing and widening it in order to soak it with suppurative drugs. But in France, Jean Pitard and now Henri, following the example of the two earlier Italian surgeons, Hugo and Teodorico Borgognoni, had great success by substituting the so-called dry treatment which was merely to bandage the wound to keep out the air and to soak it, as an antiseptic, with warm wine. At the same time Henri was careful to see that the needles he used were always clean. He also used drugs as local anesthetics, although how effective these were we cannot know.

iii. Autopsies. The dissection of animals, usually pigs, was allowed; but that of human corpses was first permitted in Italy in 1316, which was the very year in which Pietro d'Abano died. It was legalized in Montpellier only in 1363 and in Paris only in 1478. Here the surgeons had a double advantage over the physicians, for by their operations on the living they could learn a good deal about physiology as well as about anatomy.

In medicine as in so many other respects, however, France not only stopped advancing after 1350, but reverted to many of her earlier mistakes.

c. Astrology

i. God as Wilful Cause. That the celestial bodies were the immediate or proximate cause of earthly events was now rarely doubted; but, so long as these bodies were thought to be under the direct and uninterrupted control of God's will,

predictions based on their motions must always be unreliable. For not only was the miracle always to be expected; God was also believed to employ their motions as warnings to men of punishments to come unless they quickly amended their evil ways.

ii. God as Blind Cause. Then, with Aristotle, came the hypothesis of God as rather a blind force than a wilful Person, a necessary First Unmoved Mover, and therefore the mere source of energy and motion operating as an inexorable machine.

Accepting therefore this pagan premise, men were confronted with two new problems: first, whether they could, even by hindsight after the event, be able to relate any observed celestial change to any observed event; and second, if they ever should be able to do so, whether they could rely on these observed relations with enough regularity to be able to learn what causes might be expected to produce what effects. For only if this too was possible could men acquire foresight as well as hindsight and thereby predict what events were in store for them.

These problems resembled the traditional one of how to recognize God's will, but the method was no longer the same. In the earlier case man believed that God allowed men time to repent. If, therefore, they availed themselves of His warning promptly enough, God might stay His threat by nullifying the otherwise automatic effect. If they did not so repent, the threat was allowed to take its natural course.

Both faith and intuition, however, assured man that the celestial bodies could not overpower his free will. Furthermore, must there not indeed be general effects to come which men, by astrological foreknowledge, could so far evade as to suffer the least unwelcome consequences—as by hiding one's treasure or by avoiding an epidemic or a hazardous voyage? For, if not, man's earthly fate was inescapable and therefore predetermined.

This resembled the problem raised by the activity of God in His role as Providence, but there still remained that which was raised by His role as Last Judge. To what extent did the celestial bodies control man's beliefs and moral behavior, and

therefore his eternal fate? This problem was one not of mere determinism but of predestination. In the early years of the fourteenth century the famous Franciscan, Duns Scotus, said that, although the stars influenced man to follow his sense appetite rather than his reason, they merely bent rather than constrained or coerced his will. For, were this not so, everything would happen necessarily and nothing contingently.

iii. Necessity and Chance. In any case the issue was becoming so vital and the resistance so aroused that by 1341 Johann Danko von Sachsen could record eleven different reasons which were being alleged to prove that astrology was mere superstition. Some were arguing that events were governed rather by chance, and these were unwittingly siding with the fatalists in that the contingencies due to the free wills of God, the Devil, and even of men, were being more and more ignored by both schools.

iv. Recurrences. The utility of astrology was that it could make human prophecy possible. This hope was based on the double premise that God created the celestial bodies in order to transmit His energy to the earth, and that He created them luminous in order that man might be forewarned of what effects this energy was about to produce. Actually the second premise seemed the more undeniable of the two, because the position and motion of the sun invariably warned men of the coming seasons, and it was a fair inference from this fact that the phases of the moon, the eclipses, the comets, and even the conjunctions of the planets and constellations, had been designed for a similar purpose.

As created, men as well as angels had been endowed with this knowledge intuitively, but men, like the fallen angels, had lost it, and could recover it only by their own efforts. The fallen angels, however, said Pierre Dubois, having

studied the stars since the world began, can judge and foresee future events by calling to mind those consequences which on some previous occasion resulted from like causes. (Brandt trans., 72, 109.)

Because human experience, however, was relatively short, and past astrological observations, even if made, had almost never

been recorded, man has had to start his study virtually from scratch.

Prophecies, chiefly of weather, had long been based on the behavior of animals and even on the clarity of the sound of bells. The Englishman William Merle had kept weather records for the years 1337-1344, and had based his predictions by consulting not books but the opinions of sailors, shepherds, and farmers. These methods, however, even if reliable, were applicable only to local weather whereas the presumed influence of the conjunctions had been designed to give warning of events both wide in scope and vital in import.

Yet if both stars and men had been created in order to make human prophecy possible, and since the Devil had learned the art by his own prolonged efforts, was it not only man's right but his duty, however tedious, to follow suit?

v. The Practitioners. Pietro d'Abano was an astrologer only to the extent that he believed in the dominant influence of the celestial bodies; for he said he doubted whether men could ever be able to prophesy at all accurately by means of them. In practice, however, he believed that they revealed propitious times when invocations or incantations, whether to gods or demons, could be rendered effective.

From his knowledge of precession, whereby the fixed stars of the eighth sphere returned to their previous positions every 26,000 years, he presumed that earthly events followed suit. He did not allege a complete repetition, but he did suppose that within each cycle there would be a Golden Age of virtue and well-being, and, as marked by the solar eclipse, a contrasting age of sin and degeneration. Even religions were so determined, although he seems to have believed that the progress of scientific knowledge would gradually bring men nearer to the real truth.

His most cherished beliefs were: first, that the strange behavior of material objects was rather natural than supernatural, and second, that it was due not to the innate qualities of the objects themselves but to the influence on them of the celestial bodies. He thought it might be that these, like the angels, were alive—in any case, that they controlled every individual entity:

Precious stones and medicines have marvelous and occult virtues which cannot come from the qualities and natures of the elements (which constitute them). (Quoted by Thorndike, *History of Magic*, II, 893.)

They can, therefore, only be accounted for as products of the influence of the stars. Indeed, each grain of sand of the sea is influenced by some particular star.

The most extravagant of his beliefs was that images made by human art with due regard to the constellations could capture and store up the celestial influences in such a way that men could thereafter use them to influence future events to suit themselves. To him, however, this was a natural, not a magical, process; for real magic was not merely the so far unexplained natural law but the out-and-out miracle.

North of the Alps plausible prophecy based on conjunctions does not appear till after 1330. Belief in the celestial influences was already general but it was still doubtful whether prophecies were yet, or ever would be, reliable. Such efforts were now being made, however, and it happened that soon after 1330 these included several which, based on an apparently unusual conjunction, warned of a terrible disaster to come. Pietro d'Abano had declared that among the many difficulties was the likelihood that the effects might ensue only some time after their causes could be observed, and, if this possibility were accepted, it was plausible to argue, after the event, that this conjunction had caused and so foretold the Black Plague of 1348. Among these prophecies were those of Geoffroi de Meaux, Jean de Murs of Normandy, and later those of Simon de Corvino of Liège, and the Englishman John of Eschenden.

It was at this time that the texts of the Arabic astrologers were being carefully analyzed. It is to be observed that Johann Danko von Sachsen, who as a pupil of the French astronomer Jean de Linières was chiefly active in Paris, spoke of the astrological work of the Arab Alcabitius as that which was then being "favored by moderns" (Thorndike, III, 262).

On the problem of whether, as Pietro d'Abano had alleged, changes in religious beliefs were effected by the astronomical motions, Johann was more prudent than Pietro had been forty years earlier. Was this because he was writing in Paris or

because the authorities in general were now more aware of the danger? He said for instance that:

It is not expedient to speak much of this matter for it is a thing which does not agree with our faith. But if anyone delights in these things, and wishes to reduce the changes that take place in religions to the motions of the superior bodies, let him read the work of Albumazar on great conjunctions. (Quoted by Thorndike, III, 265.)

Shortly before Johann, another astrologer, Robert of York, had said that men could learn nothing from the ancient books and that he resented that anyone should cite any of them in order to refute him. Evidently these moderns were not of the same kind as Petrarch (1304-1374) or the jurists Bartolo (1314-1357) and Baldo (1327-1400) were soon to declare themselves to be. Petrarch was about to inaugurate the cult of classical civilization; the jurists were to adjust Roman law to fit the realities of everyday needs, while the astrologers were reviving the possibilities of a discredited pagan science. In seeking to extricate themselves from the thralldom of Aristotle, these moderns, according to the Scholastics, were charting divergent courses, each based on his individual proclivities.

d. Alchemy

The wish to retain perpetual youth or at least greater longevity must have gone back to the Fall. The desire for riches was probably equally old, but this must have been primarily for goods, whereas now it was becoming more and more for currency and this meant chiefly gold.

The alchemists had to get off on the wrong foot because counterfeiters were becoming plentiful and those adjudged to be such were burned alive. Dante (*Inferno*, XXX, 75) mentioned such a case in Florence in 1281, and the famous jurist Andrea d'Isernia declared it punishable to offer for sale as real gold what had merely been given that appearance. John XXII later issued a bull against counterfeiters that was so drawn as to include the honest as well as the dishonest alchemists.

The fourteenth-century sources go back to antiquity, but

Western Europe derived them chiefly as elaborated by the Arabs in Spain. The texts attributed to a mysterious Pseudo-Gerber were the most advanced; in them were many sound premonitions of real chemistry. These, with other Arabic texts, had by 1300 become generally available in the North and their vogue was being accelerated by the activities of Arnald de Villanova, who had become famous throughout Southern Europe. At a time when most men were still believing that, although transmutations were perhaps theoretically possible, man, unless with the Devil's help, was incapable of effecting them in fact, Arnald professed to have obtained personal successes; and many, including several of the popes, believed him.

Arnald de Villanova said that he relied chiefly on the four elements and on quicksilver, sulphur, and silver as heated by fire. He described the stages of change as those of dissolution, distillation, contrition, and fixation. To this Walter Odington added as ingredients blood, chalk, and vinegar. John Dastin distinguished different stages of perfection in the same metal so that sulphur, for instance, could be changed from vulgar to white and then to red. Robert of York said that the mixing powers were the planets. He also added new qualities to the four elements. Thus air was not only hot and wet but also tenuous, expansive, and flexible. Curiously enough, all three of these men after Arnald were English.

The justification of alchemy was based by Bacon on its obvious utility. But such was the opposition that first Arnald and later John Dastin were constrained to argue that the Atonement, with its scourging and Crucifixion, were to be understood as symbols designed to prefigure, and therefore to sanction, the practice of this art.

The making of alcohol seemed to John XXII so innocuous that he asked a bishop of Cavaillon, Gaufré Isnard, to send him an alembic for that purpose. The Dominican General, Hervé de Nédellec, however, forbade the practice, at least to his own monks; and Benedict XII forbade it to all monks. Perhaps they thought that the monks were already obtaining as much as was good for them.

The later pontificate of Clement VI may have marked a real change. At any rate he was readier than his predecessors

had been to distinguish natural or occult from diabolical magic, and thereby honest from fraudulent experimentation.

e. Magic and Sorcery

Only a few years before 1300 Agostino Trionfo was still insisting that there was no such thing as natural magic because all phenomena were caused by either God or the Devil. He would not deny, however, that prayer could, if only through the saints, sway God's will, any more than the naturalists would deny that the Devil was only too ready to be similarly invoked. In each case, of course, in order to obtain results, the intent and purpose had to be appropriate.

Belief in astrology could hardly be classed as magic, however, because no one could be expected to believe that God would alter the behavior of the celestial bodies just to please a mortal. The real objection to the art was rather that it assumed that God would be so reluctant to alter the celestial behavior that man's reliance on prayer for the sake of temporal effects must be largely abandoned. It would not have been illogical had there been a few protests that to try to find out beforehand what God had in store for men, was to tempt Him; but if there were any such they attracted no attention, and the issue which astrology now raised concerned rather the influence of God over the stars than of men over God.

Nor was alchemy directly associated with magic. Although looked at askance, it was, as we have said, forbidden to monks primarily because it was a temptation to either fraud or some other unholy distraction. The reason for so few accusations against alchemists as sorcerers may have been that, judging by results, the Devil, whether invoked or not, had so far shown no disposition to help.

The priests regarded the doctor, especially the physician, with suspicion because he represented a challenge to their prerogatives, and the people had been indoctrinated accordingly. When it was intimated that he was tempting God the real grievance often was that he was getting between the priest and the patient.

If recovery ensued, the physician's good intent could hardly be called into question, but if death followed, as it eventually

must, it was plausible to blame it on the physician's evil intent, and not only because of criminal negligence but often, too, because of murder by poison for a fee.

To this was now added the belief that murder could also be effected by stabbing a wax image of the intended victim to the accompaniment of a ritual which included incantations of unsavory origin. Such a criminal, while not easy to identify, was clearly a magician, and it could virtually be assumed here that the Devil was his indispensable accomplice.

Of these latter practices the clergy were often, however unfairly, accused, but more usually they were simply involved in supplying, for a price, certain safeguards or antidotes to reassure the apprehensive or to counteract the suffering of the already afflicted. This art was called countermagic—that is, magic with good intent but short of the miraculous.

It was a moot question whether in general or in any specific case a miracle should be attributed to a saint or to God. So, it was not yet certain when, or even whether, the Devil could give the asked-for help, or even, by a pact, actually delegate and confer some of his superhuman powers—whether of knowledge or skill—to a human being. Manuals on sorcery were to be the product only of a slowly accumulated experience.

Just as it was uncertain whether a man could voluntarily influence the will of the Devil, so it was uncertain whether not only the stars but also the Devil could overpower a man's will involuntarily. The general conclusion in this latter case, too, was that man's free will remained. As Dubois said,

The wicked angels, by persuasion, temptation, and especially by evil counsel, can check the efforts of even prudent men to the same degree as they can be of use to others versed in the forbidden arts who consult them whenever they please . . . but luckily these forces do not and cannot constrain man's free-will or the judgment of a rational mind. (Brandt trans., 73.)

f. Personnel

The men who might be classed as naturalists included only a few of the many who might be classed as anticlericals. The heretics, for instance, were deeply religious; the humanists were primarily devoted to classical literature; the jurists were

concerned with law and so with justice as between either individuals or categories of men; the exact scientists, as we shall see, concerned themselves chiefly with the measurable or ponderable. The naturalists, on the other hand, devoted themselves chiefly to what seemed to them the occult forces of nature—one might almost say to those phenomena which were neither clearly demonstrable nor clearly miraculous and therefore, mechanically at least, defying reason.

The physicians undoubtedly here led the way: Aristotle, Averroes, and many other Arabs; and now, at the turn of the century, Arnald de Villanova and Pietro d'Abano. Besides the schools of law, the only schools offering any higher education which was not theological were the schools of medicine. The various faculties of arts had long been doing what they could but theirs was not only elementary teaching; it could lead to no other than a clerical career.

Now, however, more and more, these purely lay vocations were developing into lucrative as well as exciting, though still risky, careers.

3. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS

a. The Need for Co-operation

Following the assault on Pope Boniface VIII, it became clear that Church and State had to co-operate in order to restore and maintain law and order. Because the prestige of the temporal State was now greater than that of the demoralized spiritual papacy, it was the latter which was bound to give in. Therefore in 1305 a French pope, Clement V from Gascony, was elected. He appointed enough French cardinals to form a majority, and thereupon abandoned Rome to reside in France. His successors in due course settled in Avignon. This was what became known as the Babylonian Captivity. Thereafter the popes, necessarily subservient to the king, worked with rather than against him, and in such a way that both were able to gain at least a temporary advantage.

For one thing, this relationship made possible a workable co-ordination between their law courts, royal, episcopal, and inquisitional. Conflicts of jurisdiction over alleged crimes, whether of belief or behavior, could be more amicably appor-

tioned, as could also the execution of their sentences, whether involving financial or physical penalties.

b. Dogmatic Deviations

The most serious heresy had been that of the Cathars in Southern France because many of the barons had also been attracted to it as a means of resisting the political domination of the North. By 1300 their physical resistance had been thoroughly broken, but the momentum of the bitterness persisted, and the last Cathar of note, Pierre Autier, was as much a political as a religious leader. Around 1310 Bernard Delicieux, a bishop, was alleging that the Inquisition, in default of real Cathars, was condemning rich Catholics as such, in order to add to their now dwindling confiscations. Other beliefs were being declared heretical, which was also making up for some of the loss.

As old as the Cathar was the Waldensian heresy. Being chiefly anticlerical, it was less radically subversive; but, since the clergy had made no effective effort to reform itself, this heresy persisted and was perhaps even spreading.

In the later thirteenth century the Spiritual Franciscans (to whom the Beguines had attached themselves as a third or lay Order) had arisen to give the Waldenses moral support, and already by 1300 splinter sects, all stressing poverty and charity, were forming and adding to the confusion.

To be distinguished from them were the Pantheist or Apocalyptic sects, stemming from Joachim of Flora and Gherardo (1212-75) and leading soon to Eckhart and the German mystical school. Imagining that they could, through efforts of prayer, privation, and meditation, become possessed and thereby directly inspired by God, they dismissed the services of any priests, with their sacraments and ritual, now rendered obsolete by the dawning of a new age of the world. In many instances it would seem as if the rigors of asceticism, having served to attract or actualize God in them, led to the violent reaction of believing that, being henceforth predestined to salvation, they could safely behave as they pleased. From self-flagellation they were often alleged, at any rate, to have turned to sexual promiscuity.

The centre of these ascetic extravagances was Northern Italy and probably all but the leaders were poor as well as ignorant. They cannot be wholly blamed for believing that, against the clergy, the pope, and even the Mendicants and other monks, not only Francis of Assisi but also Christ and therefore God the Father, were on their side.

In the thirteenth century such extravagant views held their own, but as the Franciscan Order grew to cosmopolitan maturity these ceased to be practical or respectable, and in 1317 John XXII pronounced the whole Spiritual conception to be heretical. Only the more extreme beliefs, probably, were condemned by the Inquisition, but extreme asceticism was widely discredited. Among those canonized in the fourteenth century very few of that time were French, and it may be hazarded that this was because many of the most spiritual were disqualified as having been at least sympathetic towards this Spiritual sect. Only a few got into serious trouble, but there must have been many more who prudently kept their beliefs to themselves.

c. Sorcery and Magic

Albertus Magnus had prepared the way for a recognition of natural magic as good or evil only according to why or how it was resorted to. But with the recognition, as by Aquinas, that man could learn how to exercise certain of the superhuman powers of the Devil, this natural magic remained in general disrepute.

If a man believed he was exercising only those demoniacal powers which the Church was now declaring that he could exercise, in doing so he was surely guilty only of sin and not of any heretical belief. For only if he believed he could exercise further powers which the Church declared that he in fact could not, was he a heretic. It is not clear, however, that the Inquisitors or even the Church herself had formed any judgment of how far the Devil's power extended, or even of whether the Devil might not be able occasionally to act beyond the authority delegated to him by God. The Church believed only that the Devil had far less temporal power than the Cathars attributed to him.

The embarrassment was soon partly relieved, however, by Pope John XXII. For he was so fearful of the harm which the black arts could do that he authorized the Inquisitors to try and to condemn all magicians, if not for the same reasons, at least with the same procedures and penalties that they were already employing in cases of alleged heresy.

d. Judaism

In theory the Jews could not be tried as heretics unless they had relapsed after having been baptized. But now that the Inquisition was empowered to try cases of alleged sorcery they could be condemned for it. This device was the more effective because the Christian populace was already suspecting them of being responsible for every otherwise inexplicable crime. Of the 600 persons condemned to the stake by the Inquisition at Toulouse between 1320 and 1350 as magicians, we may fairly suspect that a disproportionate percentage were Jews. If there was no inexplicable crime of which they could be plausibly accused, they could also be properly condemned on the ground that they had tried to wean Christians from their faith. It was probably a waste of their time to try to convert born Christians, but the many born Jews who had accepted baptism under duress could often be persuaded to return, as it was said, to their vomit. Only by a legal quibble could such a return constitute heresy or sorcery or magic, but civilization had now reached the point where judicial murder seemed more humane than, as Louis IX had recommended fifty years earlier, indiscriminate murder by the sword.

e. Degrees of Disbelief

Naturally there were degrees of disbelief, and certainly the belief now most widely challenged was the pope's declaration that his power was simply that of being authorized to proclaim God's will, and, as a corollary, to delegate this power to his monks, priests, judges, and other agents. The Waldenses and other ascetics could not easily be persuaded that it was mortal sin to deny this novel claim.

More heretical were those who regarded the Bible as the source of truth, and the authority of the present Church as valid only in so far as she followed the traditional interpretation of the Bible as recorded in the works of the Fathers and in the old canon law.

Next would be those who, like the Joachites and Pantheists, believed that each individual could find out the truth by studying the Bible for himself.

It was said that some Waldenses regarded only the New Testament as trustworthy. In any case the Cathars clearly believed this, and supposed further that the Devil not only wrote the Old Testament but was still, as Prince of this World, the temporal Providence and master of man. Evil men were both his victims and his agents. But whereas the Cathars believed that the Devil's power over matter, nature, and the temporal world was unlimited, their successors erred merely in attributing more power to him than the Church believed that he possessed. He could make men his agents, but armed only with superhuman rather than supernatural powers.

Whereas the Cathar repudiated the divine nature of the Old Testament, the Jew repudiated that of the New. Here Christianity was not only mutilated but wholly discarded: Jehovah was salvaged and Christ spurned.

Finally there were the Averroists. Averroes was nominally a Moslem, but he was primarily devoted to an Aristotle who had surely never heard of Jehovah. The Templars were to be condemned as heretics chiefly because it seemed proved that they blasphemed by caricaturing the mysteries and rituals revealed in the New Testament, though it is not clear whether they were thought to have done so because seduced by their long contact with the Moslems in the East or because they had fallen further into Averroist skepticism.

f. Trial of the Templars

i. Preliminary Events. The Templars constituted one of the largest of the military Orders founded in the twelfth century for the conquest and occupation of the Holy Land. They were not priests but they took the vows of monks, and during the earlier days of crusading fervor they received large gifts,

chiefly of land, from the revenues of which they were able to carry on their distant wars, and they normally served as the *corps d'élite* among the vast hordes of the Crusaders proper.

In the course of the thirteenth century, however, as the popular ardor cooled, so did that of the military Orders. When not actually fighting they fell into the more luxurious and not always edifying ways of the Orientals. Still later they even made treaties with the Moslems, especially when thoroughly outnumbered; and the end virtually came when their great fortress of Acre was captured by Baibars in 1291. Some of these soldier-monks preferred to remain in the East, but most of them returned, to occupy—notably in France—their vast landed properties. It was not wholly their fault, but the fact was that they thereby became parasites. They had no responsibilities beyond the minimum demands of hospitality and almsgiving, and, if they had no special privileges, they possessed many strong fortresses, a multitude of retainers, great wealth, and a military cadre—there were at least 5,000 of them in France, forming the best equipped and most experienced body of knights in the kingdom.

They were, therefore, no less the objects of fear than of envy. Their Grand Master since 1298, Jacques de Molay, certainly had his own Order in mind when, in 1306, he said:

It is well known that all the nations formerly had a great devotion to the monks whereas the opposite appears to be true today, because more persons are inclined to take from rather than to give to the monks . . . ; great injuries are being done them, and continuously, by prelates as well as other persons of power or otherwise and whether clerics or laymen. (Lizerand, *Le Dossier*, 13.)

It is clear by this official admission that the Templars, although apparently unashamed, were unpopular. In this same year we note that Pierre Dubois was urging that they should all either return to the Holy Land or else be condemned to do penance in a Cistercian monastery.

ii. Arrest and Sequestration. Their self-confidence enabled Philip IV the next year to effect the sudden arrest of virtually every member, and to take possession of all their properties in France. His pretext, sincere or not, was that he had accumulated such convincing evidence of their enormi-

ties (secret idolatry, sodomy, and an obscene ritual of initiation) that they constituted an immediate danger to both the State and the Church. Confessions of guilt, obtained to be sure by torture, had, he said, specifically corroborated the truth of the charges, and he thereupon so informed Pope Clement V—who was now a relatively helpless exile in France—demanding that he forthwith declare the Order abolished. The pope, having then made an independent investigation of the charges and being unconvinced by them, demurred; whereupon the king let loose a flood of propaganda calculated to inflame public opinion, and at the same time threatened to expose the pope's nepotism, financial irregularities, and the ineptitude of his ecclesiastical appointments if he made any show of resistance. This king had already virtually deposed one pope, and he made it clear that he was now in a mood as well as in a position to depose another. For if a pope could oust an erring and heretical king, so could a king oust an erring and heretical pope.

iii. The Courts. A compromise was then effected whereby commissions of inquiry were appointed in each diocese, composed of the bishop, two canons, two Dominicans, and two Franciscans. Since under the circumstances neither pope nor bishop cared to resist the king, he was free to choose as the lesser commissioners those who would be even more subservient to him than to them.

To be sure, neither king nor pope could, even had he wished, prevent his respective court from retaining a concurrent jurisdiction. But this conflict of powers was unlikely to prove a serious obstacle because the king held the prisoners, their properties, and the physical force with which he could dispose of both as and when he chose. All he needed was a credible pretense of legal processes. The result was therefore only what might be expected: the Papal Council held at Vienne in 1311 decreed the abolition of the Order and in 1314 the pope's own Commission of Cardinals condemned the dignitaries of the Order to a life penance in prison. Whereupon the king, in whose prisons almost all, dignitaries or others, were being held, paying no heed to the cardinals, condemned these dignitaries to the stake and no one dared openly protest.

iv. The Confiscations. The king also held the Templar properties but he did not dare to expropriate them all to himself. He and the pope agreed that they must be re-employed for the benefit of the Christian cause in the Holy Land and should therefore be turned over to the companion Crusader Order of the Hospitalers. But here the king insisted that, as trustee or at least as responsible custodian of these properties, he would hand over nothing until the Hospitalers had effected a reform from top to bottom. Meanwhile, until threatened by an adjudication, he dealt with the enormous revenue as if it were his own and was probably not too meticulous about preserving even the principal intact.

That other parties who had helped the king to consummate this result were also rewarded, we may be sure: the Inquisitors and the judges and possibly, in one way or another, the pope. It is certain that Egidio Romano, then bishop of Poitiers, was well rewarded for his part in furthering the condemnations.

By 1317 Philip IV, his evil genius Nogaret, and his feeble accomplice Clement V were all dead, and there was both a new king, Philip V, and a new pope, the aged John XXII. Whether or not under pressure of John, Philip V at last chose to hand over the Templar properties to the Hospitalers, not, however, restoring the income which had accrued since the confiscation of 1307. To what extent and in what ways, if at all, the Hospitalers had in the meanwhile cleaned house is not clear, or how much of the income, if any, remained unspent. In any case the Holy Land does not seem to have thereby acquired any perceptible benefit.

v. The Procedure. In estimating how fair the procedure was we must consider that the Roman law which the royal judges, like the Inquisitors, were now trying to follow was still so unfamiliar that it could be misapplied and distorted, if only by misunderstanding. The use of presumptions of innocence or guilt had of course long been familiar to them, but in France at least, where Roman law was still an exciting novelty, presumptions, when applied to depositions, the testimony of witnesses, accusers or accused, or to the exclusion of evidence as hearsay or irrelevant, became more complicated

to handle. The revived use of evidence extracted by torture only added to the confusion.

It was officially required that no torture was to be so severe that the victim lost his free will to deny the charges if he wished. But this limitation was difficult to enforce and in many cases was disregarded. Some men, indeed, died from the effects, and the other accused soon became apprised of such cases.

Furthermore, this torture was applied in order to extort not only clues which might lead to independent verifications, but also self-incriminations from which a presumption of guilt might be assumed apart from any verifications.

Finally, the accused were usually denied the right to counsel on the pretext that the proceedings were a mere inquiry in order to enable the court to decide whether the Order should be abolished as no longer serving any useful purpose. Witnesses, however, no less than the accused, might also be tortured, and their confessions also treated as presumptions of their individual guilt. This presumption was deemed so conclusive that the witnesses henceforth forfeited their rights to due process, that is, to the safeguards which the law normally provided for the accused in criminal cases, such as to be informed of the charge against them and to be able to cross-examine their accusers, personally or by counsel.

But suppose that, in spite of torture, the accused persisted in denying his guilt? He was apparently also presumed guilty, and of perjury into the bargain. He was no better off than if he had confessed only later to retract.

The notion of wholesale justice, the modern equivalent of which is guilt by association, dies hard. If the Order were to be abolished, the innocent as well as the guilty were to be deprived of their share of the common property. But that was not all. The more heinous the crime alleged, the more important it seemed to be to convict the guilty rather than to acquit the innocent. An innocent majority should not save the guilty few, but a guilty majority may condemn the innocent few.

So notorious had the alleged criminality of the Order become that, in order, as the Church said, to avoid scandal either the innocence of all must be declared—and this the king would never have tolerated—or else all must be condemned: for just

as Caesar's wife must be above suspicion, so must the pope's monks be. As there was a *raison d'état*, so there must be an even higher *raison d'église*.

vi. The Evidence: Credibility. As evidence of guilt the testimony of the informers was credible in varying degrees. Although no present member volunteered any guilt before his arrest and therefore before any torture or threat of it, some of the informers were former members who had either deserted or been expelled from the Order. This evidence was at least not mere hearsay, but we do not know how thoroughly, if at all, they had been cross-examined, or how far they initiated the charges rather than merely corroborated those already made by others.

It was said that the charges came from so many and such various sources that the likelihood of conspiracy was inconceivable, yet that these charges—of repudiating Christ, of sodomy, and of obscene kisses imposed as a part of the initiation—were so nearly identical that they could not have been independently concocted.

If, however, there was a frame-up, it could very well be that the charges were inspired by a central unit, which bribed or threatened the various informers to make these, and only these; and that other informers, either because already aggrieved or in hope of sharing in the bribes, eagerly followed suit as soon as the arrests showed how the wind was blowing. Also, if a frame-up, it would be natural to warn prospective informers of the danger of deviations, and, if there should be deviations, to try to hush them up.

From another angle it could seem unlikely that, whereas these charges were every day accumulating, none were being made against the Hospitalers or any other similar Order—unless, while the Templars were deep in sin and corruption, these others had remained simon-pure. Which, then, was the more likely explanation, the frame-up or the contrast between the Templars and their brother Orders? When the Templar Order was finally abolished, the king had promised to hand over its confiscated properties to the Hospitalers only when that Order had been reformed from top to bottom; and this would lead us to suspect that there was a fair degree, at least,

of corruption in both of these Orders, and that the king was taking advantage of their vulnerability to discredit first the Templars and later, if also feasible, the Hospitalers. He had already blackmailed Pope Boniface and was threatening to do likewise to Clement V. Why, then, should he be inclined to deal any more honorably with the already unpopular and yet enormously wealthy knights?

The charges of the informers were therefore regarded as sufficient to create a presumption of guilt, but as not sufficient to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor were even the confessions as such so regarded, for it was common knowledge that they had been obtained with the help of both torture and promises of thereby escaping death.

The case for the prosecutor had therefore to be further bolstered by the argument that, inasmuch as the prisoners had no opportunity to communicate with one another, they could not have agreed that all should confess the same falsehoods. Their confessions could therefore concur only if each was revealing the truth. This argument, however, was transparently specious because the torture continued until they confessed precisely what, by leading questions, they were told that they must confess. And these were the very crimes with which the informer, and now the courts, were charging them.

By confessing, a man received a guarantee against torture or death. He could receive absolution, though subject to a life penance or imprisonment, and could receive the Last Sacrament and thereby presumably be saved. If, however, he denied, either consistently or else by later repudiating his earlier confession, he knew that, unless his denial were to be believed, he must die. Yet a few did deny, at least when in the presence of the reputedly more humane judges serving directly under papal authority.

One of the most dramatic records of such a case was that of a certain Ponsard de Gizy, who declared to the papal commissioners that his earlier confession was false, having been extorted from him before the episcopal court held under the auspices of the bishop of Paris as a result of the prolonged ministrations of that court's 'torturer priest.' When, according to that court's record, he was:

Asked whether he was ever tortured, he replied that three months before the confession which he had made in the presence of the lord Bishop of Paris he was placed in a ditch, his hands tied so tightly behind his back that the blood flowed even to his nails and that he remained there in a space of only a tether, protesting and declaring that if he were tortured again he would deny everything that he had previously said and would say everything that they wanted him to. Ready as he was to suffer if only it be made short—decapitation, fire or boiling—he was incapable of enduring the prolonged torments which he had already suffered during an imprisonment of more than two years. (Lizerand, *Le Dossier*, 156-159.)

How did the judges interpret such a denial? That this man showed courage they could not deny. To them the only plausible explanation could be that he was being true to his oath not to reveal any of his Order's secrets, and this they must regard as mere misguided obstinacy because the pope had already absolved him from that oath on the ground that it conflicted with his loyalty to the Church and was therefore void as contrary to public policy.

The alternative interpretation—which surely occurred to many others besides the Templars themselves—that the denier denied because he was even more loyal to the truth than to the Church, was not given much publicity. But there did exist the testimony of a learned Dominican and Thomist, Pierre de la Palud, which was thus paraphrased by the court:

that he had assisted in the examination of many Templars of whom some confessed to a large number of the errors contained in the said articles while certain others denied them entirely and that for many reasons it seemed to him that one should rather believe those who denied than those who confessed. However, he had heard a great number of the inquisitors who had examined these Templars tell many details which had been confessed in their presence: from these recitals and other circumstances he concluded that the crimes contained in the above articles, or at any rate the greater part of them, had been committed either at the moment of, or immediately following, the initiation of certain brothers, and that they were not committed at all in the case of others. (Lizerand, *Le Dossier*, 192-195.)

This guarded statement, in which he carefully distinguished his own personal impressions from those of the many others to whom he owed a proper deference, has a ring of sin-

cerity which inspires confidence. Even he may not have been right, but we of today cannot do better than accept the general tenor of his judgment: there was rot in the Temple, just as there usually is in any pampered Order, but it had not gotten to the core.

4. PHILOSOPHY

a. Averroism

i. The Naturalists. The physicians and Masters of Arts who turned their attention to Nature were doubtless inclined to resent the restraints which were being imposed on them by the scholastic theologians. But they were nonetheless equally attracted by Aristotle's and Averroes' philosophy. If it could be maintained that philosophy could make important contributions to man's knowledge of the supernatural, why should it not do as much for the natural? For philosophy is reason and the natural is reasonable in a sense in which the supernatural is not.

On the other hand, theology had appropriated philosophy to itself. What then could justify a mere Master of Arts, and much less a physician, in poaching on the theologian's private preserve? Such was the view in Paris. But in Italy and especially in Padua the universities were less under theological domination, and the fact that Guglielmo da Cremona, born in 1275, was one of the first Italian theologians of repute who did not attend the University of Paris, was a sign that the intellectual prestige of the Italian universities was now challenging that of Paris. For, to Thomas of Wilton, the Averroists, whether one approved of them or not, were now the 'theologi moderni.'

ii. Diffusion. Following the condemnation of Averroism in Paris in 1277, which had incriminated even the judicious Aquinas, this repaganized interpretation of Aristotle could survive only in Italy, where papal control was feeble. There it was at least tempting Pietro d'Abano, Dante, Taddèo da Parma, Angelo d'Arezzo, Marsiglio of Padua, and Francesco di Marchia—who said that individual immortality was, at least rationally, unlikely. The only prominent Averroist in

France was Jean de Jandun, a teacher of the Arts in Paris and later in Padua, where he was able to speak more freely.

iii. The Rift. So long as the Aristotelian texts were held barely less infallible than Scripture, Averroes could hold his own even against Augustine, and it was inevitable that intellectual honesty must soon have to choose between the two.

iv. Eternity. Averroes had found nothing in Aristotle to suggest any creation *a nihilo*. Therefore the world, no less than God, must have existed from eternity. Thus Walter Burley declared that time existed independently of any motion or even existence, and Jean de Bassoles said that space—and therefore matter, because there could be no vacuum—must also, in some form or another, be eternal too.

The Averroists themselves said further that, since the created world was composed of both spirit and matter, and since mankind alone possessed both, mankind must be co-eternal with the eternal creation, although only as a species, for the individuals were of course most undeniably ephemeral.

v. Necessity. The Averroist God, like Aristotle's, was the First Mover or source of energy, of life and motion—a powerhouse but not a Person. His activity was not under His control; what He did He could not help doing. And since He was mere power there was no reason to suppose that He possessed either wisdom or virtue. It was perhaps with this in mind that Thomas of Wilton, flirting with Averroism, said that God, like the deities imagined by the Epicureans, perhaps had no knowledge but of Himself.

As First Mover, God first moved the celestial spheres and the bodies imbedded in them, and His power was in this way transmitted to the earth and so to man. But this was the extent of God's physical control over men. It was rather Nature than God who was responsible for earthly and human events and behavior; man's virtue was governed not by any free will but only by his inherited traits and his environment. Jean de Jandun, a true Averroist, said that it was impossible to disprove every alleged miracle and therefore the possibility of grace, but that the presumption must nevertheless be that Nature was wholly free to follow her own devices.

If God could do no more than keep the celestial bodies in motion, so He could do no more than enable them to keep the earth and its inhabitants in motion. Once He had started the machine He could not thereafter tamper with it. Furthermore, having no awareness of good or evil, He could have no thwarted desire to do so. Man, therefore, was at the mercy of necessity, and, since this necessity had no real purpose, it could equally well be called either Chance or Fortune.

vi. Nature and Man. There was, however, the machine called Nature. Since a machine does something, it must have, if not a purpose, at least an end. To Aristotle, and therefore to Averroes, this end was the sum of a plurality of ends; and since the world was eternal, these ends were eternally sought for and yet, as with Achilles and the tortoise, were never attained. These ends were the survival of each of the several species so that for each individual there was only a relative end: to prosper while alive and to further the survival of its species. Thus only Nature was immortal, and God, as the mere Unmoved Mover, was only a part, although an indispensable part, of this Nature.

The orthodox had maintained that bodies possessed a plurality of substantial forms, the higher being superimposed on the lower. The higher ones were, like Plato's pilot, independent and so detachable. But many now, like Aquinas, had denied any such plurality, preferring the simpler Averroist idea that in any single body there could be only one such form which, in a man, could only be his rational soul. Averroes, however, had maintained that this soul, once detached, could only continue to exist in the sense that it became absorbed into, and therefore a mere part of, the universal One. A dying man did not divest himself in turn of his rational, sensitive, and vegetative souls but rather of all of these simultaneously. His sensitive and vegetative souls having already ceased to exist, his body reverted to mere matter. His rational soul and his body had together made him a man so that once separated he ceased, as a man, to exist at all. As parts both survived eternally, but it was only his species which was eternal.

Why should it be otherwise? For since man was the slave of necessity there was no reason why there should be a God who

was concerned to promote his welfare either in this life or thereafter. Without any moral behavior there could be no rewards or punishments. In order to justify individual immortality, it was suggested that it could nevertheless serve as a *quid pro quo*; that is, to compensate for the unequal fates to which men were exposed while on earth. This ingenious but lame effort to save the doctrine, however, could only prove offensive to both of the contending schools because it restored man's individual immortality without restoring his free will. It was more just than the doctrine of predestination, but was suitable rather to animals as then conceived than to man.

vii. The Double Truth. Averroes had asserted that although theologies can lead us to certain truths, reason, when properly used, can lead to ever deeper ones. It was the *credo ut intelligam* but in a new and startling sense.

Siger de Brabant had insisted, however disingenuously, that in seeking truth, reason must give way if it conflicts with faith. Nearly fifty years after Siger, Jean de Jandun put it rather differently. He said that since Christ had come to reveal only those truths which must defy human reason, it would be presumptuous, if not actually tempting God, to try to reduce His Revelation to reason. He would rather say, then, *credo ne intelligam*, meaning that "I believe in order that I may be under no illusion that I can possibly understand."

b. Duns Scotus

i. Life. Duns Scotus was born on the Scottish border and belongs to Oxford; he also studied, and later taught on two occasions, at the University of Paris, where he received the degree of Doctor of Theology. Born in 1266, he became a Franciscan in 1281. As such he took the part of Pope Boniface, was banished from France for a time, and died, prematurely, in 1308. Although he wrote prolifically, it is thought that, had he lived longer, he would have given his reasons for the many opinions which his texts hardly more than assert. He often said of some of Aquinas' allegations that he could not understand their meaning, but many, even of his devoted Franciscans, later said the same about his own. In any case, however,

he blew a blast of fresh air into a scholasticism which was now coming to be thought stuffy and therefore suspect.

ii. Mechanics of Knowledge. Aquinas had argued that God as Cause could be directly inferred from concrete effects. Scotus, however, said that, since these were largely contingent by nature, it was essential in order to infer a necessary cause, first to extract from these concrete effects those which were necessary, and these were merely the concepts they revealed, such as Being, Imperfection, Contingency, or Cause.

iii. Reason. According to Scotus, therefore, man's reason can tell him that a certain kind of Being exists which is finite, and therefore imperfect, because it must have been caused. And, since its immediate cause has to be more perfect than its effect, there must ultimately be an uncaused and therefore First Cause. It did not follow that, since there was imperfection, finity, and contingency, the *existence* of their opposites can be inferred; but these *may* be, provided this First Cause may be, because it cannot *not* have these characteristics.

Perhaps because Scotus was not too sure of the Greek premise that an effect was always less perfect than its cause, he admitted that this merely proved that the existence of such a First Cause was a logical possibility. It must further be proved, therefore, that it was a reality as well. According to Etienne Gilson, the substance of Scotus' further proof, therefore, was that:

provided that it is impossible to conceive of any cause which could make it possible that it should *not* exist, one must conclude that it is impossible that it should not exist. (*Philosophie du Moyen Age*, 596.)

Since elsewhere Scotus says that this is no more than a relative demonstration, he evidently thought that, however unconvincing his perfectionist argument for such an existence might be, there was no argument at all for its nonexistence.

Scotus has long been distinguished from other Scholastics by the appellation of the Subtle Doctor, and this was perhaps because he had so mastered logic that he perceived even the flaws in his own. In this case, at any rate, he was ready to bolster it by offering two corroborations of quite a different kind.

The first was the age-old argument of universal consent; the second was that the Christian Revelation was in no way inconsistent with his purely rational hypothesis.

iv. Revelation. Scotus said that Christ had revealed only truths which were unattainable by reason and yet indispensable to salvation. By exposing the helplessness of reason he was inviting the return, even of the philosophers, to the premises of faith—a return from the *intelligo ut credam* of the Thomists to the *credo ut intelligam* of Anselm.

Aquinas had tended to shackle God to law and reason as conceived by Aristotle. Following Henri de Gand a generation earlier, however, Scotus sought to unshackle Him by showing that God's will was not governed by His knowledge, but operated independently of it.

But Scotus was not sure how free God really could be. For one thing, He was free not to do all that He had the power to do: that is, He could have chosen not to create; He could choose not to act as a Providence; He could have made right and wrong quite other than He in fact did; He did not need, as He had, to create contingencies—like human free will—as well as necessities.

On the other hand, even His free-will power had limitations. For one thing, having determined what actions He would perform, He could not thereafter change His mind. He could no doubt have originally determined to change His policy at certain future times, but even so, having created, He was bound at least by the first two Commandments: "I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain" (*Deuteronomy* v, 6, 11; see Gilson, *Philosophie du Moyen Age*, 613–614).

Here Scotus may have intended to discredit theurgy, for prayer cannot influence a mind which cannot change. But he may also merely have meant that because of God's foreknowledge of contingencies He had made up His mind from the beginning which prayers He would heed and which He would not.

On the other hand, Scotus, like his legal predecessor Pierre Dubois, still clung to the thirteenth-century scholastic belief that God had no power to will, cause, or create anything

which was illogical and therefore impossible, although this still surprises because Revelation and specifically the Incarnation taught that this was just what He could do. For faith surely required belief, not only in the many miracles which contradicted the laws of physical nature, but also in certain mysteries which contradicted even the laws of mathematical logic. Evidently Scotus was quite ready to humble reason by showing it to be virtually helpless without the support of Revelation, but he did not go so far as to admit that faith and reason were, at least according to his own allegations, flatly incompatible.

v. Man. As regards man there was not the same difficulty. By reason man could not know that he had free will, that he could receive grace, that any Providence guided human events, that his soul was immortal and was to be either saved or damned. Reason, although it could not prove these truths, also could not disprove them. Therefore God and not man was Scotus' chief concern; He also, it would seem, remained his chief embarrassment.

vi. Ratiocination. Perhaps because Scotus found that he had to restrain his natural impulses in order to give his reason its full scope, once he had curbed it by Revelation he felt safe to allow these pent-up impulses every speculative extravagance and complication. In trying to follow him, the reader is soon entangled and engulfed. In order to hold things together, Scotus was at pains to stress the unity of Being, but in doing so he imagined six different degrees of unity and twenty-five different *modes* of Being.

The resemblance of Scotus' doctrine to the flamboyance of late Gothic architecture has long been suggested. It is probably true of the later Scotists, who for the next hundred and more years continued to overornament their constructions; but most of the philosophers soon after reacted towards simpler, if not necessarily purer, designs.

c. *From Scotus to Ockham*

i. Terminology. The thirteenth-century Scholastics had gradually evolved a considerable and baffling terminology

which often confused even Scotus himself. This had been largely borrowed from Aristotle but had naturally been employed to expound many new concepts. Scotus, however, had not been impatient of the strange uses to which this vocabulary had been put; his objection was not to its complexity but only to its misuse. For his own use of it appears, to us at any rate, far more uncontrolled and puzzling than that of any of his predecessors. It was not so much that he invented new terms like *haecceitas* to distinguish the form of an individual from that of its species, but rather that he manipulated them in order further to multiply the already enormous number of distinctions.

He defined his newly invented undetermined natures as realities but not as things, as entities but not as beings. The terms *being*, *idea*, *essence*, and *existence* often seem to run into each other. So also do *actuality*, *substance*, and *form*. Things were often this or that, not absolutely but only formally, logically, relatively, or virtually. These various kinds of things possessed, in addition to themselves, formalities, faculties, aptitudes, and modes. At times, in spite of this complexity, his demonstrations seem comprehensible, but at other times only the most experienced technicians can pretend to follow him.

ii. Later Scotists, 1317-1337. Because Scotus was the earliest conspicuous theologian to break from both the Greek and Arabic dominations, he founded a new school. In the generation following him arose disciples of less importance. Some of them, however, diverged, either, like François de Meyronnes, by further emphasizing the reality of the universal, or, like Jean de Bassoles, by further emphasizing God's free-will omnipotence.

Their chief differences concerned the reality of universals. Duns Scotus had said that the species formed a real, objective reality. So did Walter Burley and Meyronnes. But Henry of Harclay and Jean de Bassoles said that they existed only in the mind, because when the mind received an image of the distant figure of Socrates, this image was only of one of the species Man. The image was generalized only because it was so imprecise; for Socrates did not on this account become

any more of a species. Harclay concluded, therefore, that there was no universal, such as species, apart from concrete individualization, for it was these concrete things which together created the species. God, of course, had the Idea of the species before any exemplar of it was created, but the very fact that it *was* created indicated that it was, until then, a part of God and not an entity. Harclay, nevertheless, still believed that, short of full Being, it could already exist as potential, relative, logical Being.

iii. Intermediaries. The reaction to this intricately elaborated philosophy was not slow in coming, and it was first aimed at the psychological devices allegedly connecting the physical object revealed by the senses to the highest spiritual concepts of the rational intellect or soul. Of two men who were virtual contemporaries of Scotus one, Jacques de Metz, while recognizing the sensible species, denied the existence of any intelligible species; and the other, Vital du Four, insisted on the direct contact naturally existing between sensation and knowledge.

About fifteen years later Durand de Saint-Pourçain further denied not only that there were any species, intelligible or sensible, but also that the intellect was divisible into any active and passive elements. He also refused to accept the whole theory of Aristotelian forms. Finally he objected to intellection as an indispensable addition to the intellect, as if light were not complete without an object for it to illuminate.

At the same moment Pierre Auriol, also doubting, gave his reasons for doing so. Although experience, he recognized, certainly indicates that there is a difference between man's soul and his body, the very fact that in the hierarchy of Being he is midway between the angels and the beasts made it no less obvious that he was made a compound of soul and body in order to effect a contact between the two. It was true that no experience enabled man to determine precisely how this contact was effected, but this was no reason for imagining various intermediate and shadowy Beings as necessary connecting links. There was indeed no good reason for multiplying these without a real necessity, and even Aristotle had

declared that Nature adds nothing in vain. The Fathers, moreover, were able to clarify many great truths without relying on, or even conceiving of, links which always narrowed, without ever closing, the gaps.

It was therefore only left to Ockham to deliver the *coup de grâce*. Following Durand and Auriol he denied all such species and any separation of the soul into active and passive. His ruthless logic, however, was to carry him further: reason cannot identify causes by abstraction from observed effects; it cannot therefore infer that it is a soul which acquires and utilizes the information furnished by sense impressions. Furthermore, granted that there is such a soul, there is still no rational evidence that it is not, like Aristotle's passive intellect, material and corruptible.

iv. Universals and Particulars. It is surprising that the relative reality of particulars and of such universals as God's Ideas—resulting in such categories as genera and species—should now, after so many years, still remain a subject of acute controversy. Apart from its intrinsic merit as a subject for scholastic debate, one explanation may be that whereas the earlier controversy was launched by Boethius' presentation of the issue as he had retrieved it from the earlier commentators on Aristotle, a revival came from the study of the Aristotelian texts themselves, which were now becoming generally available in good Latin translations directly from the Greek.

Why the particular or individual should have been taken as the prime reality is easy for us today to understand; but why the reality of the universal seemed to challenge and even contradict it, requires a backward glance. Aristotle had supposed that the end or final cause of a man was the species: Man was the survival, not of mortal individuals, but only of immortal mankind. Christian Revelation also explained that God created the universe not so much for the individual as for the human species. In both cases the significance of the individual was subordinated to that of the human race.

Aristotle, perhaps because he did not think the issue too important, had not clearly committed himself; and Aquinas, as so often, had sought to reconcile the reality as conceived by

God with the reality as it appeared to unimaginative men. The issue now flared up, however, when the Averroists declared human souls to be immortal only because, after death, they were all indiscriminately absorbed into the divine One. At the same time Scotus, by making all created reality a wholly dependent part of the univocal Being, gave new vitality to the centripetal concept.

The early fourteenth-century Thomists, such as Jacques de Metz, Jean Quidort de Paris, Hervé de Nédellec, Nicholas Trevet, and Pierre de la Palud, seem to have been satisfied with the explanation of their master. But, of the followers of Scotus, some appear to have exaggerated his stress on unity while others tended rather to tone it down.

One argument for the universals was that they were form, and form was naturally superior to matter. On the other hand, if form could not exist except as united to matter, both in a man could be individual, and, if the immortality of the individual was to be defended against the Averroists, the prime significance of the particular must be stressed. Durand de Saint-Pourçain attacked the whole Aristotelian notion of forms, and Pierre Auriol followed by arguing that, since this form had no separate existence as a substance apart from its matter, it could be regarded as a real universal only so long as its matter was equally real. This at least meant that no universal form, as of Man or stone, could exist either before there were men or stones or after there ceased to be any. Auriol recognized that the mind's vague image of a man or stone constituted a knowledge or concept of a universal, but he claimed that this image was wholly dependent on an individual, so that if the individual ceased to be, this universal, from being a true, became a false, concept.

Then came Ockham. He might perhaps be called literal-minded; but it would be more precise to say mathematically minded. Possibly he was irked by the scholastic allegations that the Trinity and Incarnation, although mysteries, were at least not unreasonable. For this seemed to him to pervert reason, whose foundations were that unity was numerical and that nothing could be both true and not true at the same time. Therefore, that God should be at once a One and a Trinity, or that the incarnated Christ be both wholly a God

and wholly a man, although they could, and indeed must, be believed, were at the same time specifically contrary to reason. If reason could thus be perverted, so must man's rational soul be perverted too.

Therefore, an individual can be either a complete One or else only a fraction or part of some other One. Since our senses and so our reason perceive him as a complete One, to suppose him nevertheless to be only part of a supreme One whose totality is unrevealed by our senses, is not an inference that our reason should be asked to make. Two different Ones can resemble each other, but the more closely they are scrutinized the less they seem to be merely so many parts of a greater One.

Ockham's contemporary and friend, Jean Buridan, seems rather to have punctured than refined Ockham's denial of the reality of universals by distinguishing realities from words. For neither Ockham nor most others seemed to have worried about the meaning of the word *real*. Buridan now sensibly suggested that an individual can be real as an individual, and that a group of individuals can equally well be real as a group of individuals.

The problem of individuation was still being argued. Aquinas, enticed by Averroes, had said that the origin and cause of it was matter. Thus the individual arose out of the last and lowliest creation. But only the Averroists and later Thomists followed him. The others insisted either that it was the form or soul which, by contact with the body, actualized its potential individuality, or else that it was the junction of the two which produced both the existence and the individuality simultaneously.

Finally, stirred by the Scotist hypothesis of God's free-will omnipotence, Jean de Bassoles and others began to say that if God had the power to conceive of and to actualize an unlimited number of Ideas, He could not only, as was already conceded, actualize a multiplicity of genera such as the animal and the further multiplicity of these as species such as dogs, but He could equally well actualize—as Hervé de Nédellec and Durand de Saint-Pourçain had perhaps already envisaged—further multiplications within the species which would be individual dogs or men. And, should this be so, was

it not these individuals which formed the underpinning of reality?

Those who championed the priority of universals were at that time called Realists and their opponents Nominalists, because of their divergent views as to whether universals were realities or mere names. But the modern terms of Universalists or even of Monists, and of Particularists or Pluralists, are at least less liable to misunderstanding.

It was natural enough that both Greeks and Christians should have assumed that an eternal Being must possess more reality than ephemeral ones, not only because of its quantitative superiority in duration but also because it must be both the Cause and End of all the rest. Therefore, to them the real meant the significant, the key to the mysteries of the universe and life as man perceived them.

It was also natural to assume that the eternal Being was infinite and therefore a One, because any plurality opened the door to possibly heterogeneous and conflicting causes and ends. This was probably why the dualism of both Mithraist and Manichee was doomed to defeat, and also why the universal was identified with the intelligible, as contrasted with the virtually unintelligible nature of man's experience with sensuous particulars.

Therefore even the Averroists took it for granted that man's soul, at least, must be somehow a part of eternity, and Christians, of course, pictured man's eternity in a far more concrete form. In fact the only wholly human soul which might seem to them ephemeral was that of the incarnated Christ following his Resurrection. Was it not in order to vest even this human soul with an appearance of eternity that the doctrine of the Eucharist evolved? His Real Presence, the evocation of his persisting humanity, contrasted with his pure divinity.

In so far, then, as this analysis is sound, the Nominalists were now inaugurating a revolutionary change. For by attributing a reality to the concrete which challenged that of the abstract, they were endowing the material, the multiple, and the allegedly ephemeral with an independent, and therefore perhaps divisive, intelligibility and significance of its own.

v. God. Whereas the Averroists, following Aristotle, saw no valid reason why men should suppose that God acted as a Providence—for He might quite as well, as Thomas of Wilton said, know nothing except about Himself—Duns Scotus, by assuming His almost complete free will, had imagined Him in calculated and complete control of every mundane as well as celestial event.

Accepting this premise of Scotus, Pierre Auriol proceeded to deny that God was hampered by any of the supposed attributes traditionally inferred from the assumption of His perfection, especially His perfect omnipotence, omniscience, and goodness. For these were simply anthropomorphic conceptions based on man's idea of the perfect man.

And what can man know about God as cause? He may, said Jean de Bassoles, be able to create an infinite number of universes, but then again He may not even be the Supreme Being and therefore the sole cause. Thomas Bradwardine added that according to reason alone He may quite as well be only one of many efficient causes. Shortly after this, Robert Holcot went so far as to say that reason alone actually led to this probability, because if God were in fact the sole efficient cause He would necessarily be the sole cause of all the evil as well as all the good in the world, and at the same time render any human free will as further cause impossible.

The Averroist, Jean de Jandun, had averred that reason—that is, Aristotle according to Averroes—proved that individual immortality of the soul, and therefore a heaven and hell, were impossible. Robert Holcot, recognizing that this was at least true of many of the Christian mysteries such as that of the Trinity, concluded that God's upper world of pure spirit functioned according to a superreason to which human reason could not attain.

In all these cases a reversion to the pre-scholastic era is noticeable: the almighty God, everything a miracle, a limited if not an absent human free will—all of which indicated a growing tendency to distrust reason as a means of adding to man's knowledge of the supernatural. This, as we shall see in a moment, was to reach its culmination in the doctrine of Ockham.

vi. Logic vs. Experience. The thirteenth-century experimenters like Robert Grosseteste and the Baconians had in mind practical rather than theoretical advantages. They had no expectation that the results which they hoped for would embarrass the theologians. But the elaborations introduced under the wing of Aristotle by the Thomists and especially the Scotists now began to try men's patience. As has recently been said by an eminent mathematician, one of the difficulties of mathematics is that it seems capable of proving too much.

Pierre Auriol was among the first to challenge the earlier but still prevalent manipulation of logic. But, in condemning its use in order to multiply the various intermediaries such as the species, he appealed to experience only negatively, as by saying that logic, unless supported by the evidence of experience, was likely to degenerate into mere imagination. In other words he did not suggest how or what experiences might be positively employed in order to test the truth of purely logical conclusions.

At the same moment, however, Jean de Jandun declared that if theology was to hold its own it must henceforth rely rather on physics than on logic. It was Ockham, shortly after, who took the next step.

Ockham was one of the first openly to offer experience not simply as a check on logic but as the only raw material it could rely on. He said that our senses reveal only particular effects, and we cannot safely infer universal, or any other causes from them—if only because their cause, if any, may as well be particular and multiple as universal and unique. From known causes men may safely infer their effects because they can experience them both and thereby put two and two together. But then, and only then, can they begin to generalize. At present the generalizations are usually based on certain Greek or other premises, as that God is perfect Being. But these premises, unless supported by experience, are mere speculations; so are the inferences made by abstraction, which are supposed to tally with them.

The Averroists claimed that the logical proofs offered by Aristotle had revealed truths incompatible with faith. Ockham merely said that these alleged proofs, whether of Aris-

totele, Aquinas, or Scotus, revealed no truths at all, and that the dogmas of faith therefore remained, for better or worse, untouched by them.

As regards the Faith, then, of what more use is experience than logic? We can only tell to the extent that our experience may throw light on the relations between God and man. In what sense, for instance, can it be shown that God was, in creating, the first Cause, or that He was still, as the First Mover, the efficient Cause? It could be argued from the hypothesis that His free will had no limits, that science as the study of recurrences was a waste of time because He was free to cause, or, as by miracles, to interrupt them. But, Ockham would seem to have said, only by experience can men learn how likely it is, in any given case, that God will cause or permit a recurrence.

We are back again to Augustine's contention that every event is a miracle but that only the unusual or rarely recurrent event is ordinarily so interpreted. As Aristotle fell from grace, Augustine—as one might now almost say was his custom—reappeared to replace him.

d. William of Ockham

Although Ockham's doctrine was only the culmination of the trend of doctrine which followed Scotus, it was so influential and in so many ways original that it needs to be separately and more systematically summarized.

i. Premises. According to Ockham, the Franciscan, man learned many truths from divine Revelation and these were certainties. But *what* these certainties were must be sought rather by personal exegesis than by tradition or authority. Regarding many other truths, moreover, the divine Revelation was silent. Man, however, being equipped with senses and reason, was potentially able to find out these truths too, for the created world itself also constituted a Revelation.

ii. Mechanics of Knowledge. The sequence to be followed in this search is, first, by using one's senses or experiences in order to receive direct intuition; second, by using one's reason in order to form sound generalizations from

them, as of genera and species, or of the evidence of recurrences and so of probabilities. Only after these processes should man's free will be exercised, because a man cannot choose wisely until he has found out what the true alternatives are.

iii. Purpose and End. By this method man can come to general conclusions, but in doing so, he cannot find any evidence, as most of his predecessors had supposed, of any eternal reasons, first principles, or supreme ends like, for example, perfection. There was no evidence that man participated in God as Aquinas asserted or, as Scotus said, that he was universal with God. Faith required a belief in the existence of God, but it did not follow that, in creating, He made His creatures dependent on Him. Each individual man, therefore, could be assumed, according to natural intuition and reason, to be his own master.

iv. God. Obviously, then, according to Ockham, natural Revelation can tell us nothing about the existence or non-existence of God. We have to take Him wholly on faith. This faith in regard to the supernatural was the equivalent of intuition in regard to the natural; only with it may man apply his reason to the problem of His nature.

The divine Revelation tells us further that this God is omnipotent and as such is the Creator of the world. It tells us also that He is eternal, and therefore that His omnipotence will subsist without end. Moreover, He cannot remain omnipotent unless His free will eternally subsists. Scotus had said that God had once possessed free will but now no longer possessed it because He was unable, once He had made up His mind, thereafter to change it. Whether or not Scotus said this chiefly as a sop to the Thomists we cannot tell. Logic in any case seemed to be on the side of Ockham, and Jehovah could be cited in corroboration.

Many of God's powers, however, have not been or at least are not now being exercised. For instance, He can annihilate the world and its men. So He can, but does not now, deceive men. He can deprive men of their free will and thereby assume, as an omnificent Providence, control over men's

thoughts and acts. He can even change the moral law, as by repealing His own Commandments. He can do these things although, so far, He has refrained.

Among the powers which He does exercise is to act contrary to reason and logic, as by becoming a complete man while still remaining a complete God. He can also choose to act contrary to the laws of nature, as by miracles, yet without revoking the routine operation of these laws.

For all God's omnipotence, however, Ockham inconsistently imposed certain limitations. One was that God cannot choose not to love Himself, by which he is surely intimating that God *can* choose not to love men. Another was that He cannot change the *created* laws of logic. Presumably He can deprive man of the capacity to follow them, and can so change things that even if followed they will only lead him astray. But he cannot change the laws themselves, presumably for the same reason that He cannot change the laws of mathematics. God can render the laws of logic inoperative in His own supernatural world but not in the natural world of Ockham.

v. Man. Perhaps man's most direct intuition is of his individuality; and why should God not have created it directly rather than, as the Platonists had supposed, only indirectly as an enfeebled product of universality? Why, again, the need of imagining needless intermediaries? Ockham had evidently had enough of the scholastic theories about universals; but, in seeking the alternative of individuality he was groping, for he was discovering that the proper definition of the Many was as elusive as was that of the One. For surely the many were also divisible, so that even a man was a divisible individual. His conclusion, therefore, was that his divisible parts were rather compounded of particulars such as his heart or brain. These were not individual things because they could not exist as such if detached. Therefore, man, unlike water or earth, was, as an individual, indivisible.

So far, so good; but he concluded further that a man was permanent, and therefore that any change in him, not only by generation or corruption but also by changing his location, so changed his identity or personality that he became a

wholly new individual. Only a logician could call each such individual permanent rather than ephemeral.

Finally, lest there be any excuse for retaining the idea of a universal, Ockham repudiated the claim that there was any mutual interpenetration between one individuality and another. The relation of these was merely that of inner and spiritual or of outer and material proximity—a juxtaposition, but no fusion such as there was in the ordered compound of particular parts.

Man, Ockham said, has free will. Faith tells us as much, and, since God has no present will to deceive, man's observation and experience amply confirm this fact.

It follows from this that God can logically have no foreknowledge of a future which is contingent. He can, as Providence, counteract the effects resulting from man's free will, but He cannot cause them.

It had previously been said by the scholastics that all men were born, or at least infused, with an irresistible inclination to seek the supreme end not only of their own but of universal perfection. But Ockham denied this because man did not have complete free will unless he could choose any end or even none at all. Therefore, he could choose rather to seek only his own selfish perfection or retrogression as well as any other. Furthermore, it could only be concluded that, according to reason, the whole could be nothing more than the sum of its individual parts.

Ockham recognized that man's free will could not operate in a vacuum. It had to be influenced by his inherited traits, by his environment, and by grace. But these influences were resistible. It had also to be influenced by his reason, and this, however faulty, was irresistible. God alone could resist it, but even He, by doing so, could not, by changing His mind, change reason itself or induce men not to try to follow it.

Furthermore, all Christians wished to be saved and believed that the acquisition of merit was therefore indispensable. But what constituted merit? Ockham said that it consisted in the ability successfully to resist temptation. Therefore mother-love was not meritorious, nor could the naturally virtuous man acquire much because he had only

a few and innocuous temptations to resist. If, on the other hand, a man acquired his virtue by the full exercise of his will power, he accumulated real merit, and this merit he was able to retain.

Now such a man, in so far as he became virtuous, lost most of his free will. Contrariwise, a felon, by his evil deeds, would also lose most of his. Thus one might say that although all men are born with free will, they may freely will to diminish it.

But we must not forget that God's free will endured. Therefore He could always freely choose to save or damn a man irrespective of what merits or demerits he had acquired. It was still being generally assumed that at the Last Judgment God, as Christ, was bound to conform His judgments to the law of justice. But according to Ockham, His free will, although limited here below by the laws of logic, was not limited by that of justice. He could take it into consideration but He was not bound by it. We know how hard Augustine had tried to reconcile predestination and justice. Ockham, however, was at such pains to magnify God's free will that he was apparently careful not even to try.

But what, then, became of the sacramental powers of the priests? Even if they could give assurance of merit, they could not give the further and vital assurance that this merit would necessarily save.

Faith was a certainty; reason revealed only probability. But reasoned probabilities when applied to Scripture became automatically transformed into certainties!

e. The Purpose of Natural Reason

The conflict between the Church and the lay world, which had at this time reached a degree of intensity comparable to the earlier conflicts with first Roman and later Germanic paganism, differed from either of these because it arose not from without but from within. Triumphant in those first two tests of strength, the Church had confidence that in this third one, too, she was so secure that she had now only to consolidate her victory.

But those first two triumphs had been obtained by con-

trasting the spiritual with the temporal life, and the Church was now aiming to complete her triumph by reconciling the two, or, we may better say, by absorbing rather than obliterating the temporal. For she was now claiming to rule the State, was claiming to be the champion and embodiment of reason and even of science. The *credo ut intelligam* was being extended to demonstrate that knowledge, culture, and enlightenment all derived from, and were explicable only in terms of, the established dogma. Following Scotus, Auriol put his finger on the point at issue when he warned the Council of Vienne of 1311 not to try to transform purely philosophic speculations into dogmas. Pagan philosophy which had originally been discredited because it deified reason, was now being incorporated into dogma in order to show that, barring certain mysteries, dogma was equally, and indeed even more, reasonable. Being so, it had now become peculiarly fit to rule the material as well as the spiritual world, to dictate how men may best pursue happiness and promote the temporal welfare in the present life as well as to prepare themselves, at small temporal cost, for their own and others' eternal happiness.

Thus dogma was to be so extended that, with the help of such demonstrations as those of Aristotle, it would be best equipped to solve every temporal problem as well, whether of government, war, medicine, economics, or science. And the old pagan reason or logic, when discreetly manipulated, was to be the instrument whereby all this could be brought about.

But this logic was not only supercilious towards experience, towards appearances as against desires; it was also based wholly on the criteria of virtue and sin. What was morally desirable must be empirically true. We have seen how these two worked at cross purposes in King Louis IX; how they turned into aggression of the worst kind with the Crusades; how they hampered autopsies in medicine, hampered trade by forbidding usury, and were now also hampering physics. This was why such men as Jean Buridan came to allege that the Church's code of morality was unfit to further men's temporal aspirations.

When Jean de Jandun hinted and Robert Holcot later

categorically declared that the world of God and His hereafter functioned according to a superlogic the nature of which men were incapable of grasping, they were implying, probably, that the Church should confine her speculations to what this superreason had supernaturally revealed, and should leave to laymen the responsibility of harnessing purely natural reason to serve the temporal purposes for which God had specifically endowed it.

5. TEMPORAL AUTHORITY

a. Before 1335

Until the radical innovations introduced by Duns Scotus, the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas was generally followed. As we have seen, Dubois, although a lay jurist, wanted to restrict the powers of the Church chiefly because she had failed to support a further Crusade. Quidort supported the idea of popular sovereignty chiefly in order to furnish a unified foundation from which the two equal powers of Church and State could be subordinately derived.

But the rigid descending hierarchy from God via logic to man, where contingency was for temporal purposes all but denied, was now broken by Scotus' arguments that, since God and perhaps men had free will, contingency had no limits, and that, unless based on Revelation, logic could serve only to reveal its own fragility.

Somewhat later Pierre Auriol, also a Franciscan, turned his attention to the individual, claiming as against Scotus that men possessed certain inalienable rights. They could not deprive themselves of the right to marry or to be freemen. Nor could even an infant Jew be baptized without the consent of either its parents or an authorized guardian. For these or other reasons affecting the general good any man could, through either the Estates-General or General Council, resist both prince and pope. God's Providence, he said, dealt only with the general direction, but not with the details, of human events.

At this same time Jean de Jandun, who was inclined to Averroism and who collaborated with Marsiglio of Padua in writing the famous *Defensor Pacis*, was asserting that the

logic of Aristotle as still being relied on regardless of experience had proved itself a failure. For inasmuch as man cannot reason unless he has something tangible to reason about, logic must depend on the evidence offered by his senses—and this must therefore be on physics rather than on ratiocination. Nor will this affect our faith because God is not bound by the laws of either nature or logic.

b. Marsiglio of Padua

i. John XXII. During the years from 1316 to 1334 the pope was John XXII, a Frenchman from Cahors who was born in 1245 and therefore still in the Thomist tradition. To him the pope was the sole vicar of God, as supreme over men as men's souls were over their bodies. He must therefore interfere in temporal affairs as often as he thought this expedient in order to promote men's chances of salvation. On this premise he regarded it as his duty to excommunicate even a prince who disobeyed him, and therefore any of that prince's subjects who remained loyal, holding out as a threat arrest by the Inquisition with its power to confiscate, imprison, torture, and kill.

To these means of enforcement already devised by his predecessors, this pope now added the device of claiming the clerical privileges and exemptions for many who were not ordained. Many were now gladly embracing this opportunity because they could still marry and need not assume any duties unless they chose to, yet could not be tried by the civil courts, and could not be taxed or recruited for military service under their prince.

In an age when the laity was becoming more and more impatient with the Church's overbearing attitude, this now very old man was, as it appears in retrospect, only courting serious trouble.

ii. Theology of the Attack. Marsiglio's theology so closely resembled that of the still lively Waldensian heretics that he was almost surely influenced by them before leaving Padua for Paris. First of all, he confined the Revelation to the New Testament and discarded any other than the literal interpretation of it.

Accordingly he understood the assertion that Christ died for all men to include the laity as well as the clergy, and the assertion that "my kingdom is not of this world" to mean that his Revelation applied only to that which concerned the afterlife. This being the case, the laity was not only left exclusively free to direct the present, temporal life, but was not excluded from sharing in the direction of the other.

The clergy, to be sure, were specially equipped to interpret Revelation, but there was no ground for supposing them infallible. They should be heard as expert teachers should be, but the hearer was not obliged to believe them on faith; rather, he was bound in conscience to disagree with them if they could not convince him.

No one, therefore, needed to believe on faith that Peter was ever bishop of Rome or even that he ever was in Rome, or that the episcopate enjoyed divine powers. The Fathers and Doctors too could err, also the councils, and even the whole body of the faithful.

As to the sacramental powers of the priests, there is no warrant, he said, for alleging that even these should be accepted on faith as anything more than liturgical accessories serving to please God and to furnish a moral support which facilitates the achievement of contrition; and a virtuous layman can do this better than a less virtuous priest. To be sure, a sinner who does not confess and seek the priest's absolution is running the grave risk of merely supposing he has achieved contrition. Nevertheless, if he in fact has achieved it, he will be absolved because this is given not by any priest but only by God. Far from proclaiming that God has absolved, the priest can do no more than say, as a lawyer does to his client, that he believes, on the evidence at his disposal, that the Judge regards him as absolved.

Since, moreover, salvation was given only to those who sincerely believed and acted because they so believed, to obtain confessions of belief by coercion, and so invite hypocrisy, could only render men's salvation the more unlikely.

If the divine authority was revealed chiefly through certain symbolic passages in both Testaments, only a highly specialized priesthood could extract its real meaning. But if, on the contrary, this authority was confined to the literal meaning

of the New Testament—as the Manichees and many of the Waldensians had alleged—laymen, too, could form an opinion. Since Christ died for them as well and promised to save them if they heeded his Word, it seemed only fair that their interpretations of its meaning should also be heard and respected. Yet quite the contrary was still the case.

iii. State Authority. The Waldensians rejected the alternative that the State should be authorized to assume the human authority which the Church had wrongly usurped; but Marsiglio recognized that unless this were done only anarchy would result. For the State was at least a going concern already exercising, however defectively, the temporal human authority. The State, moreover, was the only power capable, as Philip IV had recently demonstrated, of putting the Church in her place.

Patently, the organization of the Church was now crystallized to form a self-perpetuating body of rulers responsible to none but themselves. For the pope chose the cardinals and the cardinals in turn chose the next pope. Not even a bishop, although often also chosen by the pope, could now have a word to say.

The State, to be sure, could not boast of a much more popular form of government, but at least the people were armed and, if their grievances were sufficient, could demand and obtain redress. Therefore even where, as in France, the kingship was hereditary, their king was still regarded as the servant of his people as well as of his God. The idea of his exclusively divine right was only to come later.

Furthermore, it was through the State that the laity had the best chance of obtaining a voice in determining what spiritual as well as temporal human authority should be. Indeed the recent convocation of an 'Estates-General' by the king of France in 1302 seemed to be a harbinger of a wider popular representation to come. But Marsiglio the Paduan wanted to go much further, by setting up forms of government modeled on those of the far more popular ones now established by the Italian communes.

Just as we can only guess that Waldensians had a considerable influence on Marsiglio's theories of Revelation, so it is

with influences on his theories of government. One of these was surely Aristotle, and Jean Quidort too, perhaps, resulting from Marsiglio's stay in Paris. A third, and possibly most decisive one, was that of the Italian communes among which he grew up, whose forms of government as described by the jurist Oldrado some eighty years earlier were still in operation.

Marsiglio of course had no more hesitation about limiting the franchise than had Plato or the eighteenth century. Not only the unbaptized but also all children, women, slaves, and even manual laborers were to be incompetent to vote.

As to the mechanics whereby the voters could really make their opinions count, Marsiglio was understandably vague, for he was something of a pioneer in tackling a problem which remains largely unsolved to this day. First, the voters must delegate their powers to elected or, at least, approved representatives who would presumably correspond to the Third Estate. This was simple enough. But the fact was that this body had rarely been authorized to elect its ruler even when the office was not hereditary. Marsiglio did not stress the idea, already current, of a mythical social contract, doubtless because it belied popular sovereignty; yet he denied all rights to the Estates-General except to approve or disapprove of what the existing ruler was proposing. His belief, then, may well have been in a mythical election of the ruler by this body, to correspond to its only less mythical power to depose him for cause.

Having somehow eluded this difficulty, Marsiglio was confronted by another: how was a ruler, who might be still a child, obtain the capacity to rule wisely? Marsiglio fell back on the natural solution that the drafting of new legislative bills be left to certain sages. But he does not say how they were to be chosen, to say nothing of how the ruler was to be persuaded to approve them before submitting them to the Estates-General for ratification.

Marsiglio was seriously concerned to eliminate the danger of rule by minorities because these were too liable to promote their own selfish well-being at the expense of the general welfare. The only majority was the laity and only the State included them. Even here, however, there was danger that a

minority should rule. The sages, too, as presumably appointees of the ruler, were liable to corruption, and, even if not corrupted, they could still err. The veto power was therefore an indispensable safeguard.

To seek the popular will was necessary, not only because the customary law represented the recorded wisdom laboriously acquired by past experience, but also because new legislation, even if theoretically desirable, ran the risk of being unenforceable unless it had had at least the approval of a majority. Both the past and the present popular will must be respected.

There must be further safeguards, however, which contradicted this majority principle. The clergy could vote because the laity far outnumbered them. But the poor must be disfranchised because, although a majority, they would be tempted to vote to expropriate the property of the rich. Analogously the army, which now consisted chiefly of mercenaries, should be strong enough to enforce the law, yet too weak to flout it.

How these sovereign powers of the State should be exercised in order to keep the clergy within their proper sphere was another question, and one which Marsiglio was at pleasant pains to elucidate. He had the advantage that the Church had to admit, at least theoretically, that only the State could use force. The Church could legislate and judge, but the enforcement of her decrees had to be left to the State. Actually she did imprison, virtually she tortured, but, unavoidably, she left it to the State to confiscate and kill. This was one reason, at least, why of late the Church had made disobedience a sin meriting excommunication and the ultimate charge of heresy. Therefore Marsiglio had only to declare the right of the State to disobey in order to render the Inquisition almost helpless. Here his justification was that opinion was no crime except in so far as it amounted to conspiracy against the safety of the State. This, although Marsiglio was probably unaware of it, was an opening wedge to the modern principle of toleration.

Other recommendations of Marsiglio were that the State alone should convoke the General Councils, appoint the pope—as she was indeed already doing—and at least supervise excommunications. As to the clergy, the State, as the legal

owner, should have the power to dispossess the clergy of the land of which they had been given merely the beneficial use. Furthermore, the State should exercise the veto power over all proposed ordinations, thereby setting a limit to, and in the long run reducing, the number of priests.

The final and most radical recommendation was that education be transferred from the jurisdiction of the Church to that of the State. For it was the young who would in due course constitute the sovereign power in both the spiritual and temporal spheres.

iv. Natural Law. John XXII had adopted Aquinas' concept of natural law. This was based on the premise that God had created men endowed with good inclinations as well as right reason, because God, as the Redemption indicated, was eternally concerned to see that they made the best possible use of both. Revelation had further indicated how these inclinations could be utilized, and that man's reason gave him the ability to do so. Thus natural law differed from the divine law only to the extent that it was to be learned solely by means of the right use of this reason.

But as was now to be more and more recognized, first by Scotus and later by so many others, infallible as natural law might be, man's reason had produced no infallible way of finding out what it was. If it was divine, it was *not* natural; and if natural, it was to be the concern of laymen as well as priests. Aquinas himself had assigned considerable authority to man as a social as well as rational animal. Furthermore, as it was now being frequently said, God, as Providence, left men a good deal of discretion as to the means by which His and their common end was to be realized.

Marsiglio, however, emboldened by his theory that the laity too, or at least all the faithful, were capable of understanding Revelation, and being convinced that God had endowed men with reason in order to direct their temporal as well as eternal well-being, concluded that the natural law was, as the name implies, not supernatural. It was, therefore, that which men were left to discover for themselves as best suited to perfect their temporal but nonetheless Christian life.

Since Revelation itself differentiated the two orders, it was only consistent to infer that men had also the inclination to promote their felicity on earth by improving their physical, economic, social, and intellectual status. This only the State was equipped to undertake. Yet, paradoxically, the Church, which was most insistent that men had a natural inclination to virtue, now countered by declaring that, if given free rein to their inclinations as well as to their reason, men would be playing with fire and likely to merit perdition rather than salvation. For this, she said, was substituting the rule of might for that of right, the rule of expediency for that of principle, the rule of Satan for that of Christ.

Marsiglio, on the other hand, could counter that although man and his State were fallible enough, they might together, if given a free hand, discover what the so-called natural law might really be. Customary law had already laid the foundations. New legislation would permit further experiments based on trial and error. It might even turn out that there was no such thing as a natural law which was equally appropriate to all times, places, and people. But the only way was to try; and in any case men could in this way throw light on what laws were suited to a particular time, place, and people.

No wonder that Marsiglio excited almost as many people as he shocked. Among those whom he excited was William of Ockham.

c. William of Ockham

i. Divergences from Marsiglio. On the heels of Marsiglio came William of Ockham, not an Italian, but an Englishman, not a free-lance layman but a sincere Franciscan monk. Ockham, therefore, although he was influenced by Marsiglio, thought himself to be still within the bounds of orthodoxy, and, in some ways at least, he doubtless was. Marsiglio, for instance, was hostile to the Church as an institution. Ockham was hostile chiefly to the scholastic philosophies which the Church had tried to superimpose on the divine Revelation. Ockham also accepted the Old Testament (probably as recently translated from the Hebrew by Nicolas de Lyra) and, subject to a few exceptions, the validity and independence of

the sacramental power. Although he challenged the authority of the papacy, it was in order to attribute it, not to the State but rather to God, and thereby to the individual for whose sake God had spoken and died.

ii. Free Will and Reason. God, he said, had endowed men with free will and reason, and surely this was not without purpose. By the Fall their free will had not been forfeited, for, if it had been, the whole purpose of their creation would have failed. It had, rather, activated their reason. Before, men had had the intuitive knowledge possessed by the angels, but thereafter they had to use their reason not only in order to regain the knowledge of the natural world, but also, by means of the divine Revelation, in order to find out what, before the Fall, they had intuitively known of the supernatural world. Here, however, Ockham agreed with Marsiglio that the text was to be understood not symbolically or mystically but literally.

Thus still liberally endowed, God left man, for the time being at least, to his own devices; His Providence consisted in scrutinizing but not in interfering with men. Perhaps God felt that men's true moral nature could be best assessed if they were put wholly on their own responsibility. If this tended to minimize the role of God's free grace, it no less minimized the role of the Devil's malice.

iii. Divine Law. As to the divine law, Ockham said it was of three kinds. The first was merely corroborative of natural law, as to remind men that according to both laws "Thou shall not kill." The second was to confer a central leadership, as by the words "Thou art Peter." The third was the new kind of behavior which was required of men if they were to have a chance of salvation. Much which was permissible by natural law would henceforth be forgiven only as a result of confession, contrition, and penance.

iv. Natural Law. After the Fall but before the divine Revelation, the natural revelation of sense experience was employed in painfully retrieving some of the knowledge of natural law which had been lost. Since the divine law had supplemented rather than superseded the natural, the quest

for it too must not be relaxed. This natural law had formerly been moral; now, said Ockham, it was no longer such. But merely because it did not concern the revelation of immortality, it did not become immoral but simply amoral—that is, it was still the law which was designed by God as the most appropriate to direct the morality of the temporal life.

In this way Ockham reached his main thesis: that every man had certain natural rights which were inalienable. Some he could alienate, but only voluntarily and conditionally; others, such as the right to live and to be free, under no circumstances. The right to life forbade his being killed or killing himself, just as it demanded that he be fed and be saved if in danger of death. Thus a doctor must attend him regardless of a prospective fee, and he must not be left to drown or suffocate. The right to freedom also existed at birth and during immaturity, but it did not, like the right to live, persist evenly throughout life.

A larger number of the natural rights with which he was born, however, a man could alienate only conditionally—that is, for a consideration: to his ruler or priest, for instance, on condition that the authority which he had voluntarily conferred was not abused, as by an intentional flouting of either the natural or the divine law, as the case might be. Reciprocally, this ruler or priest, having chosen to alienate some of his authority by granting franchises, immunities, or other prerogatives, could not revoke them unless they had been abused.

As it was of personal, so to Ockham was it of property rights. Since the Fall, at any rate, a first possessor acquired legal title against all comers. He could sell on condition of payment; and he could also, as in loaning, later waive his right to repossession. Neither State nor Church, however, could confiscate his property, or even force him to sell at any price; whereas Aquinas had said that the latter could be done as often as it could be shown that this was for the common good or was in order to further the divine end.

Ockham apparently ignored the natural right of an accused to a fair trial. At this time, however, even the lay jurists were rarely concerned about it.

v. All Authority Challenged. Since the Church's authority was limited to the enforcement of the divine law, it concerned only the moral or immoral behavior over which she had not alienated her control. The State on its part retained all its pre-Christian authority over all that amoral behavior which concerned the temporal life and which it had not so far alienated. This latter life was every day becoming of greater public concern. Ockham respected established law, whether civil or canon, in so far as it conferred rights, but he felt that neither branch adequately protected the individual. He advocated rather a Bill of Rights than a full-blown Constitution. God was quite able, if He chose, to take care of the general welfare and to direct man to the fulfilment of his foreseen end; but since men were otherwise being left free to sink or swim, they had the right and even the duty to discover the natural law of justice between individuals and to try, in so far as practicable, to put it into effect.

Marsiglio's effort had been to try to emancipate the individual from the thralldom of the Church, even if this meant incurring the thralldom, if not of the State, at least of the popular majority. Ockham, proceeding from there, sought, by his Bill of Rights, to emancipate the individual also from the thralldom of this majority. For, in other words, Ockham believed that God intended to give every individual a fair, and even more than his earned, chance of obtaining his temporal as well as his eternal welfare.

6. ASTROPHYSICS

a. Activity

During the second quarter of the fourteenth century the interest in astronomy and physics became equal to that obtaining in astrology and alchemy. It derived on the one hand from metaphysics, and on the other from the greater realization of the use of mathematics as a supplement to the dialectical logic of language in the understanding of the physical world. It was a quantitative rather than a qualitative approach.

b. Infinity

The nature of infinity was more closely scrutinized. Pierre Auriol and Jean de Bassoles defined it as "That than which there can be nothing greater"; Francesco di Marchia defined it as "That which exceeds all determinable proportions." Richard Killington described it as anything short only of infinity itself, meaning, apparently, what Ockham was about to define as that which is beyond infinity and yet still short of that maximum infinity which is possessed only by God.

Regarding its degrees, Henry of Harclay was now saying that there could be infinity in numbers and lines but not in planes or cubes. Nicolo Boneti denied this possibility for lines as well, presumably because he better envisaged the difficulty of fitting physical nature into mathematics.

Bonaventura and Aquinas had said that, apart from God, a past infinity, although revealed to be untrue, was not unreasonable because it was not beyond God's power to have made it so; but that even God could not create a future infinity. Pierre Auriol now alleged that God could not create any eternity permanently, but only successively and therefore a future one only potentially. To this, however, Francesco di Marchia, following Henry of Harclay, objected that unless both the past and the future infinity were such simultaneously, time had no infinity at all. Here it may be safely assumed that they all had the problems of God's foreknowledge of man's free-will judgments at least in the back, if not in the front, of their heads.

In regard to space, Aristotle had alleged that whereas the infinitely small could exist in act, the infinitely big could exist only in potency. Durand de Saint-Pourçain agreed. More specifically, Henry of Harclay had maintained that infinity of space was only possible, even mathematically, as to numbers, points, and lines, and not as to planes or cubes. It was therefore impossible even as to geometrical, to say nothing of physical, space.

Boneti, an atomist, now went to the opposite extreme, alleging that there could be an infinitely big but could not be an infinitely small. But apart from the atomists it was hereafter the general opinion, as of Marchia and Ockham,

that God at least could have, even if He had not, created an infinity of both.

Here again we may surmise that the earlier men could, or would, not conceive of space apart from matter, whereas the later ones had in mind at least the possibility, if not the actuality, of a vacuum.

Finally Richard Fitz-Ralph, an Irishman and therefore perhaps content to disagree, observed that the efforts to resolve these problems of what was infinite led only to an infinite chaos.

Although Marchia had already subscribed to the possibilities not only of all past infinities but of that of intensity as well, Ockham said that even God could not create any infinity of intensity of quality. He doubtless had in mind such phenomena as heat and cold and whiteness and blackness. And possibly, too, in contradiction to Jean de Bassoles, infinity of virtue and vice.

c. Astronomy

i. The Cosmos. Whether the earth was stationary in the centre of the universe of revolving stars and planets, or was merely another planet revolving around the sun as a stationary centre, was a matter of dispute among the ancient Greeks. Aristotle had supported the first, or geocentric, view; this, as modified by Ptolemy, an Alexandrian Greco-Roman who lived in the early second century A.D., was the prevailing Roman belief at the time that Christianity triumphed. The Christians, believing as they did that man was the sole purpose of Creation, unquestioningly accepted these views, which thereafter remained unchallenged throughout one thousand years.

Then in the fourteenth century, Aristotle's views came under suspicion, and many therefore preferred the purely Ptolemaic conceptions. This issue led further to a fresh consideration of the second or heliocentric alternative. This view had been frequently referred to in the old texts, and Aristotle (in his *De Caelo et Mundo*, Book II) had spoken of the ancient Pythagoreans' suggestion that the earth was merely another planet, revolving around a central fire.

Around 1330, Petrus Bonus of Ferrara in this connection referred to the fact that Aristotle's geocentric view had been contested in his own day, and we are startled to find François de Meyronnes of Provence saying a little later that:

A certain Doctor nevertheless says that if the earth were to move and the sky to be at rest this would be a better disposition of things,

adding, however, that:

This is contested because of the diversity of the motions in the sky which could not [on such a hypothesis] be saved. (Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, III, 530, n. 24.)

Perhaps this was Meyronnes' own objection; but if so, why did he withhold this doctor's identity? Why did he say "hoc impugnatur" (this is contested) instead of "hoc impugno" (this I contest)? Here it must be added that at this time a Jew, Levi ben Gerson, also from Southern France, was expressing his dissatisfaction with the Ptolemaic system. And, if we may anticipate, it was hardly more than a generation later that Nicolas Oresme of Bayeux was maintaining that the earth rotated on its axis and that the celestial bodies were therefore, in comparison, virtually at rest.

ii. Comets. In order the better to account for the motions of the stars and planets, Aristotle had supposed that in their superlunar space there was yet a fifth element, or quintessence, with laws of its own which could only be surmised. Later, for a time, the Christians had naturally supposed that God's will alone accounted for the phenomena of both the super- and sublunar worlds.

With the rise of astrological lore, however, there was a return to Aristotle's belief that God as the Unmoved First Mover merely supplied the first energy, counting, if at all, on Nature, to transmit this energy via the stars and planets to the sublunar world. This was to lead to the growing suspicion that these laws as observed by man must be no less operative in the celestial than in the terrestrial spheres.

The behavior of the stars and planets was still a puzzle. Their motions, however, were regularly recurrent. God, therefore, having once set them in motion, had then pre-

sumably left them alone to pursue their natural courses. But it must be otherwise with the supposedly nonrecurrent comets. These must be directly produced by God as specific warnings of events, presumably catastrophic, soon to come.

The astrologers, however, were dissatisfied that events to come must be ascribed rather to the direct will of God than to the laws which He had surely created in order to save Himself the trouble of having to will every inconsequential event. The regularity of the motions of the stars and planets further increased their objections. God doubtless approved of, but surely did not, as Augustine had supposed, also initiate them. The traditional role of Providence might suffer in consequence, and that of destiny be encouraged; but it seemed time that science be given its day in court. In 1337 a comet appeared, and this was doubtless taken by most men to be directly caused by God as a startling warning. Two astrologers, however, the *Perscrutator* (probably Robert of York) and Geoffroi de Meaux, understood this comet to complete, with Mars and Saturn, a conjunction which must cause disastrous effects soon to follow on earth.

iii. Precision. Throughout this period there was a steady increase in precision of observation, and this was largely due to the use of instruments designed to that end. One of the chief incentives was to correct the inaccuracies of the calendar, and a whole series of almanacs or ephemerides now appeared which were based on a more precise scrutiny of the positions of the celestial bodies. These were naturally in particular demand by the clerical hierarchy, and those produced by Jean de Linières, Johann Danko von Sachsen, Firmin de Beauval, and Jean de Murs between about 1327 and 1398 were probably only among the most trusted. The two latter were also among the first to divide the degree not only into minutes but into seconds.

d. Natural Motion

i. Circular Celestial. To both Plato and Aristotle God did not move, and this was because He was eternal and perfect. Everything else, being ephemeral and imperfect, did move; yet the fixed stars, although the nearest to heaven and

therefore presumably the least ephemeral and imperfect, were obviously the most actively in motion. How could this be? Aristotle's explanation was that they were on that very account the most alive and therefore the most eager to perfect themselves by rising into the circumambient heavens above, but that since they were bodies with weight they also tended to fall. Having, however, been originally set in motion by the First Mover, the desire of their souls to rise and the inclination of their bodies to fall—both in a straight line—were so nicely balanced that their motions became exactly and perpetually circular. This was presumably the most powerful and enduring device for transmitting God's energy to earth. For although their motions were the most violent, they were also the least imperfect because their circular courses were the most enduring.

ii. Terrestrial Bodies. Aristotle had supposed that even soulless bodies had natural desires to perfect themselves by rising; and that, because the element earth had the least and the element fire the most desire, fire tended to superimpose itself, with air, water, and earth held down underneath. It was not that earth most sought to fall but rather that it cared least to rise.

Undisturbed, these four elements would have remained inert in their respective layers; but the energy transmitted had become so imperfect and variable that the layers were constantly being mixed. Thus, when a boulder was pushed off a cliff it fell, not because of the degree of energy of the push, but rather because the air wanted to displace it. Were this air so nimble as to get out of the way, the boulder would fall instantaneously. There being no vacuum, however, the air could move only when it was able to occupy the space which the boulder had vacated. This seems to us a silly explanation, but Descartes was to approve it in principle and the law of gravity was made acceptable only by Newton.

In the course of the fourteenth century there were many efforts to find a more satisfactory explanation, but before 1350 even Jean Buridan, although obsessed by the significance of variations in mass and weight, could not see any satisfactory alternative to Aristotle's assumption that the

heaviest body was simply the one least endowed with a tendency to rise.

According to Aristotle again, the bodies of vegetables and beasts had souls, but their desires, although more acute, were as much preordained as those of the soulless. They were still at the mercy of what we should call instinct. When Descartes alleged that even the higher beasts were mere lifeless machines, he was only carrying Aristotle's theory to its logical extreme.

With the rational animal called man, however, it was different. Perhaps even he derived his energy or power of motion from his food and so from the stars, but he also possessed a free will to choose what motion he preferred. The amount of energy he could exercise was limited, but the varieties of use he might make of it were many. He was still bound, but supposedly by reason as well as by necessity. So far Aristotle, and with this principle the Christians had no reason to quarrel.

But to Christians man's rational free will to move was of small account in comparison with the power of necessity; to them the real problem of free will was in contrast to predestination. This theological free will did not involve what Ockham called amoral choices, where virtue and vice were not involved, but only those moral choices which pertained to salvation.

Aquinas, if he did not straddle this age-old issue, at least offered an equivocal compromise. But as the fourteenth century advanced, it was with Ockham that the belief in man's free will also to save his soul now culminated. That man's destiny should be preordained by God was distasteful enough, but that it was in fact preordained by the stars, and so by necessity, was repellent even to most of the astrologers. This theological free will, however, even if it had the support of sufficient or saving grace, must necessarily be at the expense of God's omnificence as Providence or Judge. We therefore need not be surprised to find so keen a scientist as Thomas Bradwardine resurrecting Augustine's doctrine of predestination, thereby returning the responsibility for the universal law of necessity from the stars back to God again. True, above necessity was Scotus' free will of God, but most of the scien-

tists and philosophers were now solicitous rather of believing in their own.

e. Violent Motion

i. The Evidence. Aristotle had insisted that motion could be communicated to a lifeless body only by contact, so that when the contact ceased the motion of the body also ceased.

The fact that two projectiles in passing each other in opposite directions did not lose their velocities, was in itself now suspicious enough, but the fact that in the meantime the projector had itself ceased to furnish any energy even to the air, seemed to render the whole Aristotelian concept quite unacceptable.

Yet what explanation was any better? Besides inertia, the opposite of energy, which rendered the initial motion of the lifeless body most sluggish, there was also the friction, not only of earth and water but also of the air, to resist the moving body. But these factors seemed rather to corroborate than further to discredit Aristotle, for such bodies certainly showed a reluctance to move even when in contact with the energy.

Aristotle had said that a constant degree of energy produced a constant velocity, so that should the energy be doubled, so would the resulting velocity. But Bradwardine and Buridan corrected this assumption by saying that in order to double the velocity the energy must be cubed. Here Aristotle seemed to have assumed that the motion engendered would meet with no greater resistance so long as contact with the energy subsisted, whereas Bradwardine and Buridan must have had an increasing resistance in mind. All three had a right to be puzzled.

The evidence of the sailboat must have been familiar to them. Here a constant air, disturbed by the irregular energy transmitted by the upper spheres, set a boat in motion, at first imperceptibly, then for a time at a constantly accelerated velocity; but as the water resistance increased, this acceleration gradually ceased. And when the air ceased, the velocity began, though only gradually, to decrease. This first acceleration of velocity in spite of an unchanged degree of energy

seemed to have disproved the equation in any form. Bradwardine's correction was doubtless based on the presumption of an increasing resistance, but, on the assumption of no resistance, he concurred with his colleagues at Merton College, Oxford, that constant energies produced not constant, but rather constantly accelerated, velocities. This realization in itself, however, did not help to explain why, after the wind had died, the boat continued for some time to move.

Aristotle had intimated that the motions of the celestial bodies might be due to a nice balance between their desire to rise to God and their natural inclination to fall to earth. But he also claimed that they moved in a fifth element, of whose laws science could have no precise knowledge.

Already around 1270, however, Robert Kilwardby had intimated that the same laws were operative in this upper world as obtained in the lower, and this belief spread so that about 1347 it was taken for granted by Buridan. But, if this were so, why did these bodies continue to move at the same undiminished velocity when there was no evidence of any energy to maintain them in motion? Originally they may have been inert, and the Divine energy had set them in motion at the time of their creation. But why, if subject to a universal law and not alive, did they continue to move, and at an undiminished rate, when the violent motions of terrestrial bodies soon ceased?

To explain the circular motion, their tendency to move like the projectile in a straight line opposite to that from which the energy had come, could perhaps account for their energy to rise; and if they had a natural desire, like terrestrial bodies, to fall, the two tendencies might so perfectly cancel each other that they moved in a circle.

But this theory of Aristotle's did not explain how they were able indefinitely to maintain the violent effort to rise away from the earth which thereby continued to balance their natural motion to fall towards it. The difficulty was that, if a First Mover were assumed, it would be applying a constant energy, and it was now generally understood that, unless the resistance increased in proportion, the velocity would constantly accelerate. Yet there was clearly no acceleration, which meant either that the resistance was perpetually in-

creasing or that the energy was perpetually decreasing. And this seemed a doubly improbable solution.

ii. *Impetus*. It was around 1330 that the *impetus* theory, perhaps suggested by the Aristotelian commentator Philoponus, a fifth-century Alexandrian, was propounded. This supposed either that the energy of the Mover, by its physical contact with a body, infused it with some of its energy—rather as heat is transmitted—or else roused or actualized in it a certain dormant disposition to move. In the case of the projectile or boat this energy clearly did not last, but it at least served to account, as Aristotle's theory did not, for an undeniable fact.

The first break from Aristotle was apparently made almost simultaneously by the Italians Nicolo Boneti and Francesco di Marchia, and by Joannes Canonicus. The idea itself proved as ephemeral as the alleged *impetus*; but it did serve to convince men that a body, having lost contact with its energizing force, could continue to move in spite of a subsisting resistance.

iii. *Vacuum*. That Nature abhors a vacuum had long been a triumphant axiom. Nevertheless the atomic theory of Democritus and Lucretius, which presupposed its existence, had never been forgotten, and about 1300 Pietro d'Abano showed his awareness of this by declaring that, since the air had weight, a vacuum might, though unidentifiable by man, exist above the four elements. Around 1330 Nicolo Boneti declared that the number of indivisible atoms was infinite, which could be true only if there were no other atoms and therefore none of the four elements in between. Nicolas d'Autrecourt, a follower of Ockham before 1350, was following suit.

iv. *Momentum*. Now only if this were so, could the unvarying and perpetual motions of the celestial bodies be satisfactorily explained. For if the energy was being constantly applied, their velocity must constantly accelerate unless the resistance also constantly increased, and this, however slight to begin with, could hardly go on perpetually. If the energy failed, then the *impetus* and the motions must gradually cease. But if the motions occurred in a vacuum where there

was no resistance at all, a constant energy would only accelerate the velocity even more; whereas the total absence of both energy and resistance would allow the initial velocity to remain both unaccelerated and undiminished.

To what extent this critical scrutiny of the celestial motions consciously led to the idea that Aristotle's violent motion was also merely natural, is uncertain, but the cumulative effect of applying the three hypotheses of acceleration, impetus, and a vacuum to those motions constituted, logically at least, the decisive steps.

To what extent the recorded views of the Archaic Greeks, which had been so effectively discredited by Plato and Aristotle, were also an influence is, however, less clear. In order to gauge how far these early views helped to raise doubts about the validity of the still triumphant premises, we may be allowed to refer again to the traditional assumptions which had supplanted them.

Many of the Archaic Greek cosmologists had supposed not only that matter was eternal, but also that it had always been and would always remain in motion. In our time, since about 1925, the astrophysicists have come substantially to agree. In his *Timaeus* (Loeb, 30A)—his *Laws* were not yet known—Plato had reacted against such an idea, declaring that this “disorderly motion” was true only before God's creation of soul, matter, space, and time. For this was what he meant by chaos. God, having formulated His Ideas or Model, then created His exemplars, and His first creation even before Time and Space was Soul (which was Reason and therefore Goodness), in order to bring a semblance of order out of the chaos. The motion which up to this time had been universal was, except for natural motion, now confined to the initiative of living beings, and all others were presumably residual effects of the precreation, necessary motions over which Reason was only gradually taking control. This age-long process was that of Becoming. On this matter the Neoplatonists do not appear to have diverged.

Aristotle differed from Plato in regarding the world as uncreated and eternal. There always had been motion, but only because there always had been a First Mover who provided all the energy for both man and matter.

Living souls, therefore, did not, as Plato supposed, serve to reduce chaotic motion to Reason, but rather to help the First Mover in keeping motion from coming to rest. Plato's God wished to reduce motion to ordered and perfected rest; Aristotle's wished rather to prevent it from coming to rest. In both cases man was being employed to help Him.

To the extent that this distinction is not too defective an oversimplification, we can understand the bewilderment of the good Christians in using these master texts in order to perfect a sound Christian philosophy. It was therefore no wonder that the Averroists and other heretics balked at following the scholastic lead.

It was apparently Averroes and after him the Latin Averroists such as Jean de Jandun (and perhaps after him also John Baconthorpe, Marsiglio, and Robert Holcot) who now first declared that since the universe was eternal and was now in motion, it must always have been, and always continue to be. Since the First Mover was eternal, Aristotle's violent as well as natural motion were as natural to bodies as rest. These ideas were now very much in the intellectual air.

Ockham was by nature an intellectual rebel and is known to have been often in sympathetic association with the many who had been more or less attracted by Averroism. As a conscientious follower of Francis of Assisi, he was unsympathetic not only to the temporally minded Church, but also to her scholastically minded theologians.

Aware as he now was of the impetus theory and of the Averroist extension, it is not surprising that he came to the radical conclusion that, although matter was not eternal but rather created by God out of nothing, there was no objection to supposing that He created it rather in motion than at rest; and that even if He had been the First Mover He had no need to continue to move it nor, as Plato had supposed, any reason to try, by encouraging its Becoming, to reduce its motion and thereby its susceptibility to change. Thus, speaking of the inadequacy of the impetus theory, he said that when the projectile "moves in such a motion after its separation from the projector, it is merely moving of its own accord and not because of some absolute or relative energy which is inside it" (*Questiones et decisiones in IV Libris, Sententiarum*, II,

XXVI). He gave concrete disproof by observing that if the motion was due to an energy infused by contact, a gentle but prolonged touch would be just as effective as a violent instantaneous blow.

By presenting this hypothesis, Ockham was declaring a physical law which was not to be generally recognized even by the leading physicists until the seventeenth century. And it may be mentioned, if incidentally, that his belief that motion consisted of a series of jerks or changes of individuality has reappeared only in our day.

Almost if not actually contemporaneous with Ockham was a follower of his, Jean Buridan. Like his other followers, Buridan was unable to rid himself of the notion of impetus, but in spite of this he also came to the conclusion that the motion, once initiated, was permanent in the sense that once imparted it could be arrested only by coming into contact with a resistant body of a force equal to that which had originally imparted the momentum. For only by accepting the hypothesis of a vacuum and an enduring momentum could the perpetual motion of the celestial bodies be physically rather than metaphysically explained.

Buridan, being more directly under the spell of the University of Paris, could not, as easily as Ockham, ignore causes. Therefore he clung to the theory of impetus, but made its effect a permanent one. On the other hand, he went further than Ockham in analyzing the effects of weight, velocity, duration, and rest as the counterweight of motion.

v. Effect on Theology. The effect of the theory of momentum on the then dominant conception, was radical because it undermined one generally accepted proof of the existence of God. Aquinas had offered as a premise that all motion had a cause, and that the cause had to be something exterior to that which was in motion. This was certainly what Aristotle had supposed, but before him many of the Archaic Greeks had thought otherwise. Plato had supposed that God had created the present universe as the exemplar of His model, precisely in order to reduce a chaos in motion to some semblance of a more enduring order. God wanted to diminish rather than to activate motion. According to Plato,

therefore, there was as much need of a cause to produce rest as to produce motion, and, if this were so, there was no clear need in either case to assume, as Aristotle was then to do, that violent motion required a cause.

Duns Scotus believed that God's existence as Being could be proved, but he maintained that there was no evidence either way that this Being was a Creator or Providence, or that men had been endowed with either free will or immortality. For these beliefs men could only rely on the Word of Revelation, which although it could not be proved reasonable, could be proved not unreasonable.

But Ockham, while apparently agreeing with Scotus in regard to immortality, believed that, because of the evidence that violent motion, too, was as natural as rest, there was a rational probability that there had been no Creation, that there was no Providence directing men's free-will life on earth, or even any over-all Final Cause. That individual men by their free wills would obtain rewards or suffer punishments in the afterlife was the only likely purpose or teleological end.

Only, said Ockham, if God were in the future to choose to reveal Himself to men's senses, as by setting everything in motion or bringing everything to rest, could He prove to men the rational probability rather than the improbability of what must otherwise be accepted only as faith.

Thus, in the course of the early fourteenth century, Anselm's *credo ut intelligam* and even Abelard's apparently modified *intelligo ut credam* were becoming reduced to a simple *credo*. Pope John XXII had tried, although unsuccessfully, to maintain that the saints obtained the Beatific Vision only at the end of the world. This was not a matter with which intelligence could cope. So was it, too, with the new doctrine of the Immaculate Conception which, following Bonaventura and Raimon Lull, Duns Scotus did so much to make ultimately acceptable. Pope Clement VI in his bull *Unigenitus* of 1343 declared that Christ and the saints by their supererogatory merits had enabled the pope, as authorized by God, to dispense this infinite accumulation in the form of grace, which, upon the death of the recipients, served to replenish the depleted store. It was a sort of perpetually re-

volving fund which was called the *Thesaurus*. But neither was this within the province of rational scholastic debate.

Thus the *credo* was becoming more and more segregated and self-sufficient, which is just what Ockham, literally interpreting "My kingdom is not of this world," believed that it should be.

7. AFTER 1350

History itself does not end, but the historian has to, and must choose the least awkward moment. In this case it will be the year 1350, when the Hundred Years' War had just begun and the great Black Plague which carried off nearly half the population had just come and gone. Like everywhere else in Latin Europe, distraction and dispersion followed in France and especially in Paris, and it was many, many years before the budding beliefs of 1350 could pretend to resume their former momentum.

NOTES ON PERSONS MENTIONED
WHO FLOURISHED 1301-1350
(Scotus and Ockham)

*Approximate
birth & death
dates*

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| 1243-1314 | JACQUES DE MOLAY. Grand Master of the Templar Order when it was dissolved. |
| 1250-1316 | PIETRO D'ABANO (near Padua). In Constantinople before 1293. In Paris 1293, perhaps until after 1303. Then returned to Padua to teach till his death there about 1316. Had an encyclopedic curiosity but primarily concerned himself with astrology and medicine. Translator (especially of Galen) from the Greek. |
| 1252-1321 | PIERRE DUBOIS of Coutances. Jurist. Pupil of Siger de Brabant (1235-) but not an avowed Averroist. Backed Philip IV against the Templars. Probably studied canon law at Orléans. Urged world hegemony by the French to obtain world peace. |
| 1255- | ARRIGO DA CREMONA. Jurist. Perhaps drafted the bull <i>Unam Sanctam</i> of Boniface VIII in 1302: pope supreme over emperors or kings. |
| 1258-1330 | WALTER ODINGTON of Evesham. Benedictine. Wrote on music (consonances and dissonances), the calendar, mathematics, and alchemy. |
| 1259-1331 | ENGELBERT VON ADMONT (in Styria). Benedictine. Studied in Prague and Padua. An encyclopedist who wrote especially on the education of princes. Urged coequal rule of Church and State to defend and extend Christianity as means to world peace. |
| 1259- | GIACOMO CAPOCCIO DA VITERBO. General of the Augustinian Hermits. Obtained Doctor's degree at University of Paris in 1293. As much a Scotist as a Thomist. Pope supreme, but State has a good deal of delegated authority. His approach was rather scholastic than legal. |

- 1259- PONSARD DE GIZY. A Templar.
- 1260-1310 PIERRE AUTIER of Pamier (Pyrenees). Burnt at the stake in 1310 as a Cathar.
- 1260-1320 BERNARD DELICIEUX DE LIGGOSSI (near Montpellier). Spiritual Franciscan; bishop. Lost fight against Dominicans and Inquisition when John XXII succeeded Clement V, and he died in prison. Was sorcery his alleged crime?
- 1260-1325 HENRI DE MONDEVILLE of Normandy. Surgeon. Studied medicine at Montpellier. Said a doctor should be both a physician and a surgeon. A pupil of Teodorico Borgognoni of Lucca (1205-1298). Wrote very spirited memoirs—perhaps at some risk to his safety.
- 1260-1327 JOHANN ECKHART of Hochheim (near Gotha). Dominican. Master of Theology at the University of Paris. Neoplatonic, mystical school. God above Being because He created it. Christ inaugurated motion. Holy Ghost the first Being. Man partly divine and can virtually become perfect.
- 1261-1302 JACQUES DE METZ. Dominican.
- 1264-1314 CLEMENT V (Bertrand de Got) of Gascony. Studied arts at Toulouse, law at Orléans and Bologna. Archbishop of Bordeaux 1299-1305, pope 1305-1314. Moved papal curia to Avignon. Appointed nine French cardinals out of ten. Annulled all the decrees of Boniface VIII.
- 1265-1313 GUILLAUME DE NOGARET of Toulouse. Son of a persecuted Cathar. Professor of jurisprudence at University of Montpellier in 1291. Member of Curia Regis in Paris 1296 on, and later Keeper of the Seals. Professed to believe he could prove anything by legal or at least by logical arguments.
- 1265-1321 DANTE. ALIGHIERI of Florence. Layman, poet, philosopher. Favored emperor as the temporal sovereign and as such the equal of the pope.
- 1266-1308 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS of Maxton on the Scottish border. Franciscan in 1281. Student at Oxford before 1290. Studied at University of Paris under Gonsalve de Balboa, 1293-1296; then at Oxford again and there began to teach theology in 1300. In 1302 he returned to University of Paris to study for his doctorate but was banished in 1303 for defending the cause of the papacy. Returned to Paris in 1304 and obtained his doctorate in 1305. Then sent to Cologne in 1307, where he died in the following year.

*Approximate
birth & death
dates*

- 1267-1327 VITAL DU FOUR. Probably a Frenchman. Franciscan, Cardinal.
- 1268-1306 JEAN QUIDORT DE PARIS. Dominican. Studied at the University of Paris 1284-1290. Master of Arts after 1292 and of Theology in 1304. Eucharist theory of impanation. Possible Averroist taint. Close to Aquinas. Wrote on astrology.
- 1268-1323 HERVÉ DE NÉDELLEC of Brittany. Dominican in 1303. General of that Order 1318-. Bachelor of Theology at University of Paris in 1303. Charged to inquire into guilt of Templars and into errors of Durand de Saint-Pourçain (1273-). Sought to reconcile doctrines of Aquinas and Scotus.
- 1269-1314 PHILIP IV. King of France 1285-1314. Tried in vain to abolish the Ordeal of the duel. Set his will above the law and so above justice because of wish to legislate. Made frantic efforts to raise revenue, and employed unscrupulous jurists such as Guillaume de Nogaret (1265-) to that end.
- 1270- JOHN DASTIN of England. Alchemist. Had correspondence with Cardinal Orsini and Pope John XXII.
- 1270-1340 NICOLAS DE LYRA of Normandy. A converted Jew. He corrected the Vulgate Latin version of the Old Testament by following the original Hebrew, which was to be relied on by Luther, and he emphasized its literal meaning. H. Brémond (*Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France*, III, 27) says he believed that man was created by God, not for man's own good but for God's glory.
- 1270-1340 TADDÈO DA PARMA. Physician who taught at Bologna that astrology was an indispensable part of medical practice, and also the lore of magic and sorcery. His philosophy Averroistic.
- 1271- HENRY OF HARCLAY of England. Was writing in Oxford by 1315. His conception of God's Ideas nearer to Augustine than to Scotus.
- 1272-1342 BENEDICT XII (Jacques Fournier) of Saverdun (near Toulouse). Cistercian. Doctor of Theology at University of Paris. Made cardinal by his uncle, John XXII (1245-) in 1327, and succeeded him as Pope in 1334. Began the papal palace in Avignon in 1335, and in 1336 he revoked his uncle's view that

no souls enjoyed the Beatific Vision until after the final Day of Judgment. Claimed personal jurisdiction in all accusations of magic or sorcery. Forbade monks to engage in alchemy.

- 1273-1334 DURAND DE SAINT-POURÇAIN, in the Bourbonnais. Dominican. In Paris before 1303. Doctor of Theology in 1312. In Avignon 1313-1317. Bishop of Limoux, Le Puy-en-Velay, and Meaux 1317-1326. He broke with the Realism of Aquinas.
- 1273-c1334 NICHOLAS TREVET (or Trivet or Triveth) of England. Dominican. Studied in Paris and at Oxford, where he became a Doctor of Theology. Familiar with the Latin Classics. Followed Aquinas but not slavishly.
- 1273-1342 PIERRE DE LA PALUD of Bresse (near Macon). Studied civil law at Toulouse or Montpellier, where he became a Dominican and defended Aquinas against the deviations, especially those of Durand de Saint-Pourçain (in 1318). Doctor of Theology in 1314. Says ingredients of magical concoctions have no occult virtue in themselves, nor have magicians any powers, for their effects are wholly due to the Devil himself.
- 1275- ANGELO D'AREZZO. Reluctant to disbelieve Aristotle as interpreted by Averroes, but says one must, because much of it is contrary to faith.
- 1275-1335 THOMAS OF WILTON. Not an Averroist, but he speaks of various of their conclusions as at least not refuted by natural reason. Chancellor of London, but received a papal permission in 1320 to reside at the University of Paris.
- 1275-c1343 WALTER BURLEY of Herefordshire (?). Probably a secular priest. A Fellow of Merton College, Oxford; in 1305. Also studied at the University of Paris. Commentator on Aristotle. Was an independent Scotist. Was tutor to Edward, the Black Prince (1330-1376).
- 1275-1356 GUGLIELMO DA CREMONA. Augustinian monk after 1282. Combated ideas of Marsiglio of Padua. Received Doctorate of Theology in Padua in 1350.
- 1277-1328 JEAN DE JANDUN of Champagne. Lay teacher at Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris. Met Marsiglio of Padua (1277-) there in 1311 and helped him write the *Defensor Pacis* in 1323-1324. They escaped to the protection of Lewis of Bavaria (1286-). Excommunicated in 1326. In Rome with

*Approximate
birth & death
dates*

- Lewis in 1328 and appointed by him as Bishop of Ferrara. Admired Averroes. Though he professed his Catholic orthodoxy, he was antischolastic and anticlerical.
- 1277-1343 MARSIGLIO OF PADUA. Was slow in choosing a career, and so dabbled in several. Met Jean de Jandun (1277-) in Paris by 1313 and became Rector of the University of Paris in that year. Influences on his *Defensor Pacis* of 1324 probably the Italian Communes and Aristotle's *Politics*, which was so admired by Jean de Jandun. Both went to Bavaria to escape persecution, and both excommunicated soon after. Followed Lewis of Bavaria (1286-) to Rome and back in 1328, but in 1336 Pope Benedict XII (1272-) obliged Lewis to get rid of him as a heretic.
- 1277-c1353 JEAN DE LINIÈRES of Picardy. The most celebrated astronomer of his day, said Trithemius (1462-1516.) His works written in 1320, 1322, and 1335. Relied chiefly on mathematics and observation, but preferred Ptolemy's eccentrics and epicycles to Aristotle's homocentric spheres. Wrote nothing on astrology.
- 1280- FRANCESCO (Rossi da Pignano) DI MARCHIA of Ancona. Franciscan. It is further known only that his work, written while lecturing at the University of Paris in 1320, was the earliest to defend the idea of the impetus against Aristotle.
- 1280- NICOLO BONETI of Venice (?). Franciscan. A scholastic writer on many subjects around 1325.
- 1280- PETRUS BONUS of Ferrara. Physician who wrote on the philosophy of alchemy in 1330. Among the first to cite the Pseudo-Geber text freely. He cited no thirteenth- or fourteenth-century Latin alchemical works.
- 1280- GAUFRÉ ISNARD.
- 1282-1322 PIERRE AURIOL. His family came from Quercy in Aquitaine. Franciscan. Student at University of Paris in 1304. In Bologna and Toulouse 1313-1314. Doctor of Theology at University of Paris in 1318. Archbishop of Aix-en-Provence in 1321 but died soon after. He tried to reconcile the Realism of Scotus with Nominalism.

- 1285-c1350 GEOFFROI DE MEAUX. Physician at French court. Had University of Paris arts degree by 1310, and (later) a medical degree. Chiefly concerned with judicial astrology. Claimed to have predicted the Black Plague.
- 1285-1345 PIERRE DE CUIGNIÈRES. Served as representative of Philip VI at royal council of 1329.
- 1286-1346 JOHN BACONTHORPE of Norfolk. At Oxford and Paris. A Carmelite. Much influenced by Averroes.
- 1286-1348 ROBERT OF YORK. Known also as the *Perscrutator*. Dominican. Perhaps died of the plague of 1348. Wrote a work on alchemy. Said in it that he had never learned anything from the ancient books. Was groping towards a significant new theory of astrological chemistry. Based weather forecasts on an astrological conjunction of 1325.
- 1287-c1328 FRANÇOIS DE MEYRONNES of (Digne? in) Provence. Franciscan. A pupil of Scotus at University of Paris 1304-1307. Refined Scotus' doctrine. Obtained his License in 1323. Preferred Plato and Neoplatonists to Aristotle. Did he carry Scotism to perfection or to abstract absurdity? He thought *some* usury legitimate.
- 1287-1347 JEAN DE BASsoles. Franciscan. Like Meyronnes (1287-), a pupil and follower of Scotus. Concerned especially to refute Aquinas (1225-) and Henri de Gand (1233-).
- 1288-1344 LEVI BEN GERSON of Bagnols in Languedoc. "The greatest representative of medieval Judaism after Maimonides, and their boldest philosopher" (Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, III, 595). He criticized Ptolemy but held to the geocentric principle.
- 1289- JOANNES CANONICUS (Marbres) of Venice (?). Franciscan. Followed ideas of Francesco di Marchia (1280-) very closely. Wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* about 1321-1325.
- 1290-1349 THOMAS BRADWARDINE of Chichester. Proctor of Merton College, Oxford, in 1325. Innovated calculations of variations in velocity. His predestinarian treatise of 1344 continued to be an authority even to Calvin. Was with English army as chaplain at battle of Crécy in 1346. Archbishop of Canterbury in 1348.
- 1291-1352 CLEMENT VI (Pierre Roger) of Rozières. Benedictine. Taught canon law in Paris. Bishop of Arras,

*Approximate
birth & death
dates*

- Sens, and Rennes 1328-1338. A Cardinal. Pope 1342-. Favored luxury and display. Inclined to accept natural magic as against sorcery and demonology, and so science as against the supernatural.
- 1291-c1355 JOHANN DANKO VON SACHSEN. Pupil of Jean de Linières (1277-), and probably still in Paris in 1331 and 1355. Spoke of the doubters of the science of astrology, partly because some astrologers claimed that even religious beliefs were governed by the conjunctions.
- 1294-1322 PHILIP V. Son of Philip IV (1269-). King of France 1316-1322.
- 1294-1354 RICHARD KILLINGTON or Kilmenton. A pupil and friend of Thomas Bradwardine (1290-). Wrote his *Sophismata* before 1330.
- 1295-1347 WILLIAM MERLE(E) or Morley (?). Reputedly connected with Merton College, Oxford. Rector in 1331. Kept a journal of the weather. Suggested as prognostics (1) melting of salt, (2) sound of distant bells, (3) biting of insects, (4) astrological conjunctions.
- 1295-1349 WILLIAM OF OCKHAM (Occam) in Surrey (?). Franciscan. Studied probably in the Franciscan College, Oxford, 1312-1318. Taught at Oxford as a Bachelor until 1324. Then summoned to Avignon to justify some of his views but was not condemned. Being detained there in 1328, he escaped (with the Spiritual General of the Franciscan Order) to court of Lewis of Bavaria (1286-) then in Pisa. He was excommunicated in that year. Returned with Lewis to Bavaria in 1330, where he continued to defend the Spirituals till his death.
- 1297-1361 JEAN BURIDAN of Bethune. Rector of the University of Paris in 1328 and again in 1340, and taught there almost continuously. Was at Avignon for a time before 1334. A Master of Arts but not a Doctor. Problem of usury, one not of principle but only of expediency. Prices should be based not on justice but rather on demand and supply.
- 1298-c1345 FIRMIN DE BEAUVAL or Belleval (near Amiens). Astronomer. Asked by Clement VI in 1345 to reform the lunar calendar. His work was soon to become

a classic. Also an astrologer predicting lucky and unlucky days. His meteorology was also based on the behavior of animals.

- 1298-1350 NICOLAS D'AUTRECOURT of Bar-le-Duc. Studied at University of Paris 1320-1327 and taught there. Discarded Aristotle in favor of vacuum and atoms of Epicurus. Carried Ockham's skepticism to an extreme. Went beyond Averroes to doubt of the reliability of recurrences as well as of rational religion. Forced to recant in 1347. But he still held faith superior to science.
- 1298-1350 JEAN DE MURS (Meurs) of Lisieux (?). A canon of Notre Dame. Connected with the University of Paris in 1321-1339. Mathematician. Worked on calendar reform. Did important work on quadrant, and on latitude and longitude. Wrote on astrological conjunctions, mechanics, and musical theory.
- 1299-1349 ROBERT HOLCOT or Holkot in Northamptonshire (?). Dominican. Active at University of Cambridge. A skeptic of reason and philosophy. Any knowledge of God or heaven probably requires the use of a superreason; so only Revelation can reveal it to man.
- 1300-1360 RICHARD FITZ-RALPH of Ireland. Bishop of Armagh and Primate of Ireland. He argued that Averroes was nearer to Augustine than to Aristotle!
- 1305-1350 SIMON DE CORVINO of Liège. An astrologer who claimed that he had predicted the Black Plague from a conjunction of 1345.
- 1310-1374 JOHN OF ESCHENDEN of England. An astrologer associated with Merton College, Oxford. Claimed to have predicted the Black Plague from a conjunction of 1345. He recognized that this plague was contagious. He was also a meteorologist.
- 1323-1382 NICOLAS ORESME of Bayeux. "One of the greatest men of science of the 14th century" (Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, III, 1486).

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
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